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David Syrett Books And Articles |
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Professor David Syrett -- (8 January 1939 in White Plains, New York – 18 October 2004 in Leonia, New Jersey) was Distinguished Professor of History at Queens College, City University of New York in Flushing, New York and a widely respected researcher and documentary editor on 18th century British naval history and the Battle of the Atlantic during World War Two. Pertaining to the Battle Of The Atlantic during World War II, he published, in addition to three major works, many articles, all of which are listed below. |
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The Defeat Of The German U-boats: The Battle Of The Atlantic (1994) |
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The Battle Of The Atlantic And Signals Intelligence: U-boat Situations And Trends, 1941-1945 (1998) |
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The Battle Of The Atlantic And Signals Intelligence: U-boat Tracking Papers, 1941-1947 (2002) |
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1 |
Failure at Sea: Wolf Pack Operations in the North Atlantic, 10 February-22 March 1944 |
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2 |
The Battle for Convoy ONS-154, 26-31 December 1942 |
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The Battle for Convoy UC-1, 23-27 February 1943 |
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The Last Murmansk Convoys, 11 March-30 May 1945 |
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5 |
The Battle for Convoy HG-75, 22-29 October 1941 |
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The Battle for Convoy HX 133, 23-29 June 1941 |
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On the Threshold of Victory: Communications Intelligence and the Battle for Convoy HX-228, 7-12 March 1943 |
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8 |
Communications Intelligence and Murmansk Convoys JW 56A, JW 56B, and RA 56: 12 January - 09 February 1944 |
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9 |
The Mariner's Mirror - Society for Nautical Research Volume 89, No. 1 (Feb. 2003) |
Convoy OG 69, 20-29 July 1941 |
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10 |
Volume 52, #1 Winter 1992 |
Weather Reporting U-Boats In The Atlantic, 1944-1945; The Hunt For U-248 |
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11 |
Journal Of Military History - Virginia Military Institute Volume 58 No.4 (October 1994) |
Communications Intelligence and the Sinking of the U-1062: 30 [Explores the role of Communications Intelligence by the US Navy to hunt and sink one U-boat, U-1062, a vessel assigned to the Allied blockade between the Far East and Europe.] |
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12 |
Intelligence and National Security Volume 17, Issue 3, 2002 |
The Infrastructure Of CommunicAtions Intelligence: The Allied D/F Network And The Battle Of The Atlantic [The best Allied source of intelligence on German activities during World War II in the Atlantic was the radio transmissions made by German U-boats. To exploit this intelligence the Allies established a network of directing finding stations around the rim of the Atlantic. When fully established the Allied direction finding network played an important role in providing the intelligence required to defeat the U-boats.] |
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Volume 57, #1 Winter 1997 |
The Battle For Convoy SC-121, 06-10 March 1943 |
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14 |
Journal of Strategic Studies Volume 24, Issue 3, 2001 |
Communications intelligence and the battle for convoy OG 71, 15-23 August 1941 [In 1941, the British instituted a comprehensive system of convoys in the Atlantic. One of the first convoys, OG 71, while sailing between Britain and Gibraltar, was shadowed by German aircraft and attacked by U-boats. In the ensuing August battle, while no U-boats were sunk, the British lost, out of a convoy consisting of 22 vessels, two escorts and eight merchant ships. The German victory was not complete owing to the inability of the German aircraft and U-boats to cooperate successfully as well as the failure of the U-boats to fight the battle effectively and aggressively. The British also made many mistakes during the defence of Convoy OG 71. The surface escorts made many errors of tactics; as for the British aircraft, owing to an inability to cooperate with the surface forces, they became almost totally ineffective. One bright spot for the British during the battle, however, was communications intelligence. The battle saw the first use of high frequency direction finders and on several occasions skillful use was made of information obtained from enemy radio transmissions. In fact important lessons were learned by the British from such use of communications intelligence which would pave the way for a more effective implementation of such information in future convoy battles.] |
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The Mariner's Mirror - Society for Nautical Research Volume 85, No. 1 (Feb. 1999) |
Communications Intelligence And The Sinking Of The U-860, April-June 1944 [In the latter part of the Battle of the Atlantic (1944-5), when wolf-pack tactics had been defeated and U-boat numbers were dwindling, U-boats increasingly traveled individually and struck less frequently, thus becoming harder to find. In response the Allies developed different search tactics, emphasizing the use of communications intelligence, the science of locating an object or position by analyzing the contents, as well as electronic characteristics (called ‘traffic analysis’) of the radio signal itself. Since by 1944 the British had long since broken (without detection) the German encryption code (‘Ultra’), this article focuses on the increased used of radio-direction finding (D/F) and the then-recently developed ‘traffic analysis’ tactics, such as TINA* and radio fingerprinting. The author uses the discovery, tracking, location, and destruction of the U-860 as his example.] *Op-20-G maintained oscillograph readings of German transmissions known as TINA. Individual radio operators touched the Morse key differently when transmitting. Op-20-G analysts could usually identify an enemy vessel by using TINA to fingerprint and track individual radio operators |
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