Communications Intelligence and the Sinking of the U-1062: 30 September 1944

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AFTER the defeat of the wolf packs in the great convoy battles of 1943, the battle of the Atlantic became in many respects a maritime guerrilla war in which individual U-boats were hunted down by the Allies on the high seas. Communications intelligence played a vital role in the Allied effort to track down and sink such vessels, resulting in the sinking of ninety-three U-boats during the years 1943–45.¹ This paper explores the use of communications intelligence by the U.S. Navy to hunt for and sink one of these U-boats, the U-1062, which was running the Allied blockade between the Far East and Europe.²

On 5 January 1944 in the South Atlantic the German merchant ship Burgenland sank under a hail of shell fire from the American

1. Battle of the Atlantic, vol. II, U-boat Operations, Appendix I, 1–5, Record Group 457, SRH-08, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. The documents used in this essay are from Record Group 457. They are communications intelligence records amassed by the U.S. Navy during World War Two and then turned over to the National Security Agency after the war. These documents were declassified in 1987. Hereafter the National Archives and Record Group 457 will be cited as NA.

2. The literature in the field falls in the following categories: works which were written before the knowledge of Ultra; general surveys which only deal with communications intelligence in very general terms; and those which were done before the declassification of the Record Group 457, which is being used here as one of the principal primary sources. S. E. Morison and S. W. Roskill fall into the first category. When they wrote the official histories of American and British naval operations in World War II they did not know of Ultra. This was also the ease with Günter Hessler, the author of U-boat War in the Atlantic, 1939–1945 (London, 1989), which is the most authoritative German account of the Battle of the Atlantic in English. Dan van
cruiser USS Omaha. This was the end of the German effort to run the Allied blockade between Europe and the Far East with surface ships. Over a three-year period, fifteen merchant ships had successfully sailed through the Allied blockade from Europe to the Far East carrying 57,000 tons of cargo, while sixteen blockade runners from the Orient had arrived safely in Europe with 111,490 tons of cargo. But at the beginning of 1944, with the sinking of the Burgenland, the Germans saw that it would be impossible, faced by overwhelming Allied naval power, to continue running the blockade between Europe and the Far East with surface vessels. However, due to their war industries’ need for strategic materials such as wolfram and molybdenum, as well as the political necessity of strengthening their Japanese allies with advanced weapons and technology, the Germans decided to continue attempting to break the Allied blockade by sending cargo-carrying U-boats back and forth between Europe and the Orient.

Thus, at the beginning of 1944, the Germans were preparing to institute a U-boat blockade running service to the Far East. They were already familiar with some of the problems of operating U-boats in the Indian Ocean, as a number of German U-boats had, during 1942 and 1943, operated east of Cape Town, the first having been the U-181 which sailed from France in September of 1942. In addition, in 1943 the


7. Ibid., Ch. XIV, Appendix A, H1.
Germans established a small operating base to support U-boat operations in the Indian Ocean at Penang, an island off the Malay Peninsula.  

At first, it was intended to employ a number of large Italian-built U-boats to carry cargo between Europe and the Orient. This scheme, however, collapsed in the confusion following the surrender of Italy. Also in 1943, the Germans began to build several type XX ocean going freighter U-boats for the purpose of carrying cargo. However, none of these vessels were completed and in early 1944 the resources were directed to the construction of other types of U-boats. The Germans would, finally, use for blockade running to the Far East existing types of U-boats which had been specially modified for that purpose. The first mission by such a vessel began on 26 February 1944 when the U-851, a modified type IXD U-boat, sailed from Bordeaux with a cargo consisting mostly of mercury and lead.

The Allies first learned of the German plans to use U-boats to run the blockade to the Far East from a decoded dispatch from the Japanese ambassador to Germany. What appeared to the Allies at the time to be the greatest threat posed by U-boat blockade running, were not the relatively small amounts of strategic raw materials which Germany could transport from the Far East in U-boats, but rather the transfer by the Germans of advanced weapons and technology to the Japanese. The latter threat was real, for the Germans had already shipped to the Japanese such technologically advanced devices as radar equipment, acoustic torpedoes, and Enigma code machines. Indeed, from the beginning of 1944 as Allied intelligence was receiving reports that the Germans were engaging in nuclear research and were developing a host of revolutionary weapons, ranging from jet aircraft to long range rockets, the threat of transfer of advanced weapons and technology from Germany to Japan was very real and ominous. There was thus a distinct possibility, in the Allies' view, that technologically advanced German weapons, shipped to the Japanese by U-boats, could adversely affect the war in the Pacific.

The Allies set out to meet the threat posed by German U-boat blockade running by attempting to intercept and sink the U-boats while

11. E.g., ibid., 2: 78.
they were en route to and from the Far East. It thus became the mission of the U.S. Navy to prevent any German U-boats from passing through the Central and South Atlantic. This, however, was a formidable task for locating a single U-boat in this vast area was, in many respects, similar to finding a proverbial “needle in a haystack.” Therefore the success of the American effort against German U-boat blockade runners in 1944 had to depend absolutely on the ability of U.S. Navy intelligence to provide the information required to locate and sink these German vessels.

The only possible means it could use to locate a German U-boat during 1944 in the vastness of the Central and South Atlantic was to intercept and then analyze the radio communications to and from the vessel. The Americans could use radio transmissions to locate a U-boat in three ways: by taking cross bearings to locate the source of a radio transmission, which is known as direction finding, or D/F;\textsuperscript{15} by identifying the transmitter by means of the characteristics of the intercepted transmission; or by obtaining the contents of a radio transmission through decryption.\textsuperscript{16} German U-boat radio transmissions were picked up by a string of American intercept stations in North America, the Caribbean, and South America.\textsuperscript{17} Upon interception, the text of German U-boat radio transmissions was sent to Washington, D.C., for analysis.

In fact, the Allies had been decoding and reading German U-boat coded radio transmissions since December 1942.\textsuperscript{18} Such radio messages were decrypted by the U.S. Navy’s OP-20-GY(A)\textsuperscript{19} at 3801 Nebraska Avenue in Washington. After being translated into English, the decrypts were sent by the hand of an officer or by a special secure teleprinter to the F-21 Section of Combat Intelligence in the Office of Commander-in-Chief [COMINCH]. Adjoining F-21’s main Submarine Tracking Room was F-211, the “Secret Room.” Only five persons were permitted regularly into the Secret Room\textsuperscript{20} plus several high-ranking officers.\textsuperscript{21} Both the

\textsuperscript{15} U.S. Navy Communication Intelligence Organization, Liaison, and Coordinating, 1941–1945, 7–11, 13–14, NA, SRH-197.

\textsuperscript{16} A Preliminary Analysis of the Role of Decryption Intelligence in the Operational Phase of the Battle of the Atlantic, U.S. Navy OEG Report # 66, 8/20/51, 011–012, NA, SRH-367.

\textsuperscript{17} U.S. Navy Communication Intelligence Organization, Liaison, and Coordination, 1941–1945, 7–11, 13, 18–19, NA, SRH-197.

\textsuperscript{18} Hinsley, British Intelligence, 2: 549–52.

\textsuperscript{19} OP Office of Chief of Naval Operations G Communications Division Y Cryptanalysts A Atlantic.

\textsuperscript{20} Commander Kenneth Knowles, USN, Commander F-21; Lieutenant John E. Parsons, USNR, Commander Secret Room; Lieutenant(jg) John V. Boland, USNR; Ensign R. B. Chevalier, USNR; Yeoman Samuel P. Livecchi, USN.

\textsuperscript{21} Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, Chief of Naval Operations and COMINCH; Vice Admiral Richard S. Edwards, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations and
Secret Room and OP-20-GY(A) were in close contact by radio and teleprinter with the Naval Section of the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park in England and the Operational Intelligence Centre's Submarine Tracking Room in the Admiralty in London.

In the Secret Room, the contents of the decrypts were married to other intelligence such as D/F fixes, ship and aircraft sightings of U-boats, reports of U-boat attacks, and prisoner of war interrogations, to produce a total intelligence picture. Intelligence, with its sources of information hidden, then moved out of the Secret Room to F-21's Submarine Tracking Room as well as to the 10th Fleet's Convoy and Routing Section, and to various combat commands. The decryption of German radio transmissions and the operations of the Secret Room were the most closely guarded secrets in wartime Washington with the single exception of work on the atom bomb.\textsuperscript{22}

The intelligence obtained by U.S. Navy intelligence from decryption of German radio messages could be very good, but there was never enough of it at the right time, and it was difficult to employ for the purpose of hunting down a lone U-boat in the vast area of the Atlantic. Interception of a German radio message was an especially awesome task because 90 percent of all radio transmissions made by U-boats were less than ninety seconds in length. Furthermore, the employment of "Off-Frequencies" by German radio operators made it particularly difficult for the Allies to obtain the texts of U-boat radio transmissions as well as D/F fixes on the locations of the transmitters. In addition, increased security measures taken by the Germans to protect their codes and ciphers resulted, at times, in delays and lags in decoding radio messages by the Allies.

Above all, however, U-boats proceeding to and from the Far East denied the Allies intelligence from radio transmissions by the simplest of all expedients, that of maintaining radio silence for long periods. Gone were the days of 1943 when, during wolf pack operations, U-boats made numerous radio transmissions. In 1944, some U-boats went for "periods as long as 30 or 40 days without making a single radio transmission." Thus the only way that U.S. Navy intelligence, and for that matter the \textit{Befehlshaber der Unterseebooten} [BdU], could determine the position of a U-boat maintaining radio silence for long periods of time was by means of dead reckoning.\textsuperscript{23} Indeed, the difficulties created

\textsuperscript{22} David Kahn, \textit{Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Break the German U-boat Codes, 1939-1943} (Boston, 1991), 237-44; Functions of the "Secret Room" (F-211) of COMINCH Combat Intelligence, Atlantic Section, Anti-Submarine Warfare, WW II, (undated), NA, SRMN-038.

\textsuperscript{23} OP-20-GI Memoranda to COMINCH F 11 on German U-boat Activities, October 1943-May 1945, 146-48, NA, SRMN-051A.
by U-boats maintaining radio silence is nowhere better shown than in
the operations mounted by the U.S. Navy in September of 1944 to
intercept and sink the U-219 proceeding to the Far East and the U-1062
returning to Europe from the Far East.

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The U-1062, a type VII F U-boat, arrived in Penang on 18/19 April
194324 carrying torpedoes for the German U-boats based there.25 The
U-1062 remained in the Far East for over a year before sailing from
Penang for Europe on 16 July 1944. The Americans probably learned
of the U-boat's putting to sea by intercepting and decrypting a radio
message from Tokyo to Berlin. On 15 August, U.S. Navy intelligence,
by means of dead reckoning, "plotted" the U-1062's position in the Indian
Ocean as 43°S 46°E. On 30 August, the U-1062 was "Reported from 30°
27'S 04° 42'E en route to Germany from Penang."26 As the U-1062
made its way westward across the Indian Ocean and then proceeded in
a northerly direction through the South Atlantic, both the BdU27 and
U.S. Navy intelligence28 continued to plot by dead reckoning the position
of the U-boat.

U.S. Navy intelligence, aware that the U-1062 was a type VII F
U-boat, knew that the vessel would have to be refuelled at sea, somewhere
in the Central Atlantic, before she could complete her voyage to Europe.
There was thus a good possibility that the exchange of radio messages
between the BdU and the U-1062, setting the time and position for the
refuelling operation, would give the U.S. Navy the information required
to intercept and sink not only the U-1062, but also the U-boat refuelling
the U-1062.

At 1638 on 28 August 1944, the BdU radioed the U-1062 requesting
that she "report position tonight, also how much fuel you will need to
take on for return to Norway at most economical cruising speed."29
Several hours later the U-1062 reported by radio to the BdU that "my
position is ((30.27S—04.42E)). 48 cbm. I need 50 cbm, Junkers com-

24. Blockade Running Between Europe and the Far East by Submarines, 1942–
1945, B-2, NA, RSH-019.
25. Memoranda Concerning U-boat Tracking Room Operations, 2 January
1943–6 June 1945, 206, NA, SRMN-032.
26. OP-20-GI Reports of German U-boats East of Cape Town, July 1944–May
1945, 11, 14, NA, RSMN-053.
27. E.g., BdU War Diary, 14 August 1944.
28. E.g., "COMINCH Rough Notes on Daily U-boat Positions and Activities,
29. German Navy/U-boat Message Translations & Summaries, f. 38778, NA,
SRGN-001/49668.
pressor cylinder liner stage 2, reserve FUMB [a radar detector] instrument and gyro sphere." The Americans not only decoded and read both of these messages, but also determined by D/F the position of the U-1062's radio transmission as 30° 30'S 04° 45'E. Both the BdU and U.S. Navy intelligence now knew the position of the U-1062 and had confirmation that she was soon be refuelled from another U-boat at sea. Moreover, by dead reckoning, the Americans could calculate when she would come within range of Allied antisubmarine aircraft based at Ascension Island in the South Atlantic. Indeed, at 1500 on 10 September, an American antisubmarine aircraft from Ascension Island conducting a search ahead of the estimated position of the U-1062 "sighted a large U-boat" in 02° 04'S 07° 50'W, which submerged before an attack could be made. This vessel was thought to be the U-1062.

U.S. Navy intelligence also thought that the U-1062 would most likely be refuelled by either the U-180, U-195, or the U-219. These three U-boats had sailed from Bordeaux in the last week of August, just before that city fell to the Allies, and were thought to be by then passing between the Azores and Madeira heading towards the South Atlantic. However, the U-180 was ruled out as a refueler when it was concluded that she had been sunk in the Bay of Biscay by Allied aircraft. On 6 September, the BdU requested that the U-195 and the U-219 radio their positions and passage reports. Four days later, on 10 September, the U-219 reported her position as 36° 21'N 17° 18'W and that she had 379 tons of fuel on board. This radio transmission was decoded by the Americans within hours and was D/Fed as coming from 36° 00'N 19° 00'W.

The U-195 failed to report to the BdU at this time and this omission tended to rule her out in the eyes of U.S. Navy intelligence as a possible refueler for the U-1062. Thus, it was concluded that the BdU would order the U-219 to refuel the U-1062 at some future date in the Central Atlantic. This conclusion was confirmed on 15 September when the BdU ordered the U-219 and the U-1062 to "proceed approx via # 55 in large sq: east of ((EC 50 14.33N-32.03W)). In approx this area Albrecht [U-1062] is to be refuelled with approx 50 cbm for return to Norway." The BdU also estimated, by dead reckoning, the positions of both the

30. Ibid., f. 38797.
32. Ibid., 470, 476.
34. Ibid., f. 39326.
U-219 and the U-1062 and included them in its message to assist the commanders of those vessels in their navigation to the meeting point. This radio message, decoded by the Americans the next day, gave U.S. Navy intelligence the approximate location where, but not the time when, the U-219 would refuel the U-1062.36

Several days later, on 19 September, the BdU radioed the U-219 and U-1062 for the last time giving further information about the intended refueling operation. This message ordered that the two U-boats should meet “at sundown on 28/9 in # 7586 (( # EH 7586: 11.33N–34.39W))).”37 The BdU obviously intended that the two U-boats should rendezvous just before, or at, sunset in order to carry out the refueling operation under cover of darkness and minimize the possibility of being intercepted. When this message was decoded, on 21 September, U.S. Navy intelligence knew when and where the U-219 would meet and refuel the U-1062.

In the absence of further radio transmissions to and from the U-219 and U-1062 U.S. Navy intelligence had to rely on dead reckoning to calculate the positions of the two U-boats. Even though dead reckoning, according to U.S. Navy intelligence, was not “as unsatisfactory”38 as it might appear, it was still a rough and ready method to determine the position of the two U-boats. There were a large number of uncertainties in these calculations, such as the weather, the condition of the U-boat’s machinery, and the predisposition of the commander, which might throw a U-boat off the schedule ordered by the BdU or the dead reckoning position obtained by U.S. Navy intelligence. One historian has calculated that a U-boat, whose position was estimated by dead reckoning, could be anywhere within an area of between “10,000 to 15,000 square miles.”39 Nevertheless, by means of dead reckoning, U.S. Navy intelligence placed the U-219 at 12° 00′N 34° 30′W and the U-1062 at 11° 30′N 34° 30′W40, which was very close to the position of the rendezvous ordered by the BdU.

The Americans had begun operations to hunt down and sink the U-219 and the U-1062 on 13 September when Task Group [TG] 41.7, consisting of escort carrier USS Tripoli and four destroyer escorts,41 sailed from Recife, Brazil and headed northeast “to conduct offensive

37. Ibid., ff. 39760, 39789.
41. USS Straub, USS Gustafson, USS Alger, USS Marts.
operations against a homeward bound submarine estimated to be in the general area of latitude 05° 00'N longitude 19° 00'W." The day before, U.S. Navy intelligence, by means of dead reckoning, further estimated the position of the U-1062 at 01° 11'N 11° 30'W and advancing at a rate of approximately 150 miles per day. It thus appeared to the Americans that the U-1062 was proceeding northwest in such a way as to carry the vessel to the "west of Cape Verde Islands."

On 18 September, TG 41.7 began searching along the suspected track of the U-1062. For the following several days the ships and aircraft of the task group searched for the enemy vessel without result. On 21 September, the day of the final radio message from the BdU setting up the rendezvous between the U-219 and the U-1062, it was decided in Washington that TG 22.1, consisting of the escort carrier USS Mission Bay escorted by five destroyer escorts, should sail from Dakar "to conduct operations southwest of Cape Verde Islands against north and south bound submarines." TG 22.1 had orders to relieve TG 41.7 and to search for the U-1062. On 23 September, as the American task group steered a course of 160 degrees, the aircraft of TG 22.1, at 13° N 27° W, began search operations for the U-1062. But at 2300 on 23 September, TG 22.1 received orders to search to the northward of 15° N for a southbound U-boat—the U-219.

The orders calling for TG 22.1 to hunt to the northward for the U-219 were obviously brought about by the decoding of the orders from the BdU to the U-219 to refuel the U-1062 at sea. U.S. Navy intelligence on 23 September placed the U-219 at 18° 15'N 30° 30'W moving south at a rate of about 90 miles per day. From 24 to 26 September, TG 22.1 searched for the U-219 in an area bounded by 15° N and 16° N and 30° 30'W and 34° 30'W. The USS Mission Bay and her escorts steamed back and forth through this area flying off aircraft to search for the U-219 covering an area of up to 120 miles on each side of the escort carrier. At 0927 on 26 September at 15° 00'N 33° 18'W, an aircraft from the USS Mission Bay obtained "a disappearing radar contact." Additional

42. Report of Operations, Task Group 41.7 during the period 13 September to 18 October 1944, 1, Naval Historical Center. Hereafter this archive will be cited as NHC.
44. Report of Operations of Task Group 41.7 during the period 13 September to 18 October 1944, 1, NHC.
45. USS Howard, USS Farquhar, USS J. R. Y. Blackey, USS Hill, USS Fessenden.
aircraft were sent to the area of the contact and a search was mounted with sonobuoys which lasted for about twenty hours without result.\textsuperscript{48} This contact could have been the \textit{U-219} whose estimated position on 26 September was 14° N 34° W.\textsuperscript{49}

On 27 September the USS \textit{Mission Bay} and her escorts broke off search operations and steamed south to join TG 41.7 at 11° 50'N 34° 30'W. COMINCH had “Predicted” that the \textit{U-219} would refuel the \textit{U-1062} on 28 September at 11° 50' N 34° 30' W. The BDU's orders to the \textit{U-219} and the \textit{U-1062} called for the rendezvous between the two U-boats to be at 11° 33'N 34° 39' W.\textsuperscript{50} The objective of the two American task groups was, by searching the area of the rendezvous and locating the \textit{U-219} and the \textit{U-1062}, to sink the two enemy vessels.\textsuperscript{51}

At 0059 on 28 September, the USS \textit{Mission Bay}, while en route to meet with TG 41.7, obtained a MF/DF\textsuperscript{52} bearing on a radio transmission in “German bar code.” This was a radio beacon signal used by one U-boat to home in another U-boat to it.\textsuperscript{53} At 0433, another MF/DF bearing at 158 degrees was obtained on another German radio beacon transmission. Twenty minutes later the ships of TG 22.1 obtained a surface radar contact bearing 194 degrees at a range of 1800 yards. The destroyer escorts USS \textit{Farquhar} and USS \textit{D. E. Howard} were detached to investigate this contact which disappeared at 0506 in 11° 46' N 34° 38' W.\textsuperscript{54} It was concluded by the USS \textit{Mission Bay} that the radar contact was “the Southbound Submarine.”\textsuperscript{55} Then, at 0627, the USS \textit{Mission Bay} obtained a third MF/DF bearing at 132 degrees on another radio beacon transmission in bar code. Because of the direction of the bearing, it was thought that this radio transmission came from another U-boat rather than from the contact obtained previously by the ship’s radar.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{48} Report of Operations of Task Group 22.1, 8 September to 25 November 1944, 2–3, NHC.

\textsuperscript{49} COMINCH file: Rough Notes on Daily U-boat Positions and Activities, 1943–1945, 1039, NA, SRMN-034.

\textsuperscript{50} German Navy/U-boat Message Translations & Summaries, ff. 39760, 39789, NA, SRGN-001/49668.

\textsuperscript{51} Report of Operations of Task Group 22.1, 8 September to 25 November, 3, NHC.

\textsuperscript{52} Medium frequency direction finder.

\textsuperscript{53} Memorandum, Employment of High Frequency Direction Finding equipment on ships employed on Anti-Submarine Operations, 11 August 1942, 2, 10th Fleet files, NC1, Box 6, NHC. I wish to thank Ms. K. Williams for this information.

\textsuperscript{54} Report of Operations Task Group 22.1, 8 September to 25 November 1944, 3; Daily Operations Narrative: Task Group 22.1, 23–24, NHC.

\textsuperscript{55} Chronology and Analysis of Events of 28 September to 6 October 1944, NHC, [TG 22.1].

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
Because of "heavy squalls" in the area, there were no airborne aircraft from the USS Mission Bay when the first of the MF/DF bearings and the radar contact were obtained. The first aircraft was thus catapulted off the escort carrier at 0614 and dispatched to the area where the radar contact had disappeared, to hunt for the U-boat by locating it and then tracking it for hours through sonobuoys dropped from the aircraft. Finally, at 1908, an aircraft from the USS Mission Bay attacked the contact in 11° 49'N 34° 39'W with a Mark 24 Mine—an airborne acoustic homing torpedo. After the attack an "Explosion occurred and was recorded, overloading the buoy with deadening rushing sounds for one minute." At the time, it was thought by the USS Mission Bay that a U-boat had been destroyed. Later however, in Washington, D.C., the explosion was correctly judged to be the acoustic homing torpedo exploding at the end of its run.

The hunt for the U-boat was thus given up and all the aircraft were ordered to return to the USS Mission Bay in order to coordinate operations with TG 41.7. The plan, as laid out by the commander of TG 41.7, the senior officer of the combined task groups, was for each task group to steam on parallel courses five miles apart. Aircraft, equipped with radar from one escort carrier, would conduct searches for four hours. After three and half hours they would be relieved, by radar-equipped aircraft from the other escort carrier. Aircraft from the USS Tripoli were to conduct the first series of searches on the night of 28 September. However, this scheme broke down almost at once when an aircraft from the USS Tripoli sighted and attacked a U-boat.

At 1940, just after taking off from the USS Tripoli, an aircraft obtained a radar contact and then immediately afterwards sighted a surfaced U-boat—the U-219. A minute later gunfire was seen from the bridge of the USS Tripoli and the pilot of the aircraft was heard to say, on the VHF radio, "I've got him, I've got him, he's shooting at me. I am going to make a run," and then the aircraft disappeared without a trace. A pilot of another aircraft thought he saw the missing aircraft through the darkness making, while under antiaircraft fire, a low level attack on the U-boat. Next, in the face of antiaircraft fire from the U-219, another aircraft attacked with rockets. This attack was immediately followed by a strafing attack from a third aircraft, while a fourth aircraft attacked with depth charges, dropping one alongside the German vessel just before the U-219 submerged. Shortly after the U-219 had disappeared

57. Daily Operations Narrative: Task Group 22.1, 2, NHC.
60. BdU War Diary, 29 December 1944.
under the surface, propeller noises were heard from sonobuoys by the hunting aircraft. The search for the U-219 was continued by aircraft and two destroyer escorts, without result, until 1307 on 29 September.61

The commanders of the two American task groups knew that there was at least one, and possibly two, U-boats in the immediate region. But weather conditions prevented flying operations in the first part of 29 September and it was not until 1900 that the search for the enemy vessels was restarted. The plan was for TG 22.1 to search north from 10° 30'N 30° 40'W and for TG 41.7 to search south from this point. Aircraft from the two escort carriers would thus sweep out to a distance of sixty-five miles on each side of the ships searching for U-boats.62

At 0045 on 30 September, aircraft from the USS Mission Bay obtained a radar contact, distant sixty miles from the ship, at 11° 58'N 34° 38'W, which quickly disappeared. The aircraft dropped a sonobuoy pattern and obtained "good indications" of the presence of a U-boat. Additional aircraft were dispatched from the Mission Bay which continued to track and hunt the U-boat with sonobuoys. By 0955, it appeared to observers on the Mission Bay that the U-boat was on a course of between 150 and 170 degrees making a speed of about 4 knots. It was further believed that "He has to come up some time." At 1120, the destroyer escorts D. E. Howard, Fessenden, and J. R. Y. Blakely were detached from the screen of the Mission Bay and sent to the area of the contact. The hunt was continued until finally, at 1630, the Fessenden attacked the target in 11° 40'N 34° 41'N with a hedgehog.63 Fourteen seconds after the missiles of the hedgehog had disappeared under the surface of the water, there were four "separate" underwater explosions followed by "Gurgling and cracking sounds," which were picked up on the ship's sonar and heard by aircraft from sonobuoys. Later, an oil slick appeared on the surface of the sea.64 This was the end of the U-1062.

After the USS Fessenden's successful attack, the ships and aircraft of the two task groups continued searching for the U-219 in the general area of the sinking of the U-1062. TG 22.1 remained, in fact, in the region until 10 October hunting for her. A number of sonar contacts were initially obtained and on 3 October a MF/DF bearing was picked up, but even though a number of attacks were carried out, nothing

61. Report of Operations of Task Group 41.7 during the period 13 September to 18 October 1944, 2–3, NHC.
62. Ibid., 3; Report of Operations, Task Group 22.1, 8 September to 25 October 1944, 3, NHC.
63. A mortar-like weapon which throws bombs forward of the vessel which explode on contact with a U-boat.
64. Daily Operations Narrative: Task Group 22.1, 29–32; [TG 22.1], Chronology and Analysis of events of 28 September to 6 October 1944, NHC.
came of them. In the early hours of 4 October, it appeared that the U-219 was still in the region when the USS Mission Bay's HF/DF set picked up a coded radio transmission of "78 word groups." This radio transmission most likely came from the U-219 but was not, apparently, received by the BdU or picked up by the American shore-based intercept stations. TG 22.1 continued the search and there were several more contacts, which were believed to be with a U-boat and were thought, at the time, to have been successfully attacked. However, these attacks were later judged to have been without result. Finally, with the fuel of the ships running low and any remaining hints of the presence of a U-boat having vanished, TG 22.1 broke off the operation on 10 October and departed the area for Brazil. Ten days later, TG 41.7 also broke off the operation, leaving the U-219 to continue on her way to the Far East, arriving at Djakarta on 11 December.

It took both U.S. Navy intelligence and the BdU some time to figure out just what had happened on 30 September. The Americans knew that the USS Fessenden had sunk a U-boat on 30 September, but they did not know whether it was the U-219 or the U-1062 until sometime later. It was not until quite a while later that the USS Fessenden was officially credited with having sunk the U-1062. The BdU, not knowing the fate of the U-1062, did not post that U-boat as being lost until 4 December when the U-219, who maintained radio silence throughout the rest of her voyage to the Far East, reported that she had not, because of enemy action, refuelled the U-1062.

In the final analysis, and from hindsight, we can say that the course of the war in the Pacific was not altered by advanced German weapons

65. Daily Narrative: Task Group 22.1, 33-41, NHC.
66. High frequency direction finder.
67. Daily Narrative: Task Group 22.1, 42, NHC.
70. Daily Narrative: Task Group 22.1. 42-45, NA.
71. Report of Operations of Task Group 41.7 during the period 13 September to 18 October 1944, 4; Report of Operations, Task Group 22.1, 8 September to 25 November 1944, 4, NHC.
72. OP-20-GI Reports of German U-boats East of Cape Town, July 1944-May 1945, 11, NA, SRMN-053.
74. COMINCH file: U-boat Intelligence Summaries, January 1943-May 1945, 490, NA, SRMN-037.
75. COMINCH file: Liquidated U-boats, 1942-1945, 159, NA, SRMN-041.
76. E.g., German Navy/U-boat Message Translations & Summaries, ff. 40864, 41122, 41145, 41186, 41211, NA, SRGN-0001/49668.
77. BdU War Diary, 4 December 1944.
technology. This was not known at the time, however. Of the forty-four U-boats dispatched by the Germans to run the Allied blockade between Europe and the Far East only sixteen arrived at their destinations. Twenty-eight U-boats were sunk while en route to or from the Far East. One of these U-boats was the U-1062. The Americans, in sinking the U-1062, had a number of advantages. Cryptographical intelligence gave the U.S. Navy foreknowledge of the time and place of the refuelling rendezvous between the U-219 and the U-1062. This knowledge permitted the U.S. Navy to deploy an overpowering force of two escort carriers and nine destroyer escorts to search the area of the rendezvous in an attempt to intercept, attack, and destroy the U-219 and the U-1062.

Although only one of the two U-boats being hunted was sunk, in the overall picture, as more than half of the U-boats en route to or from the Far East were sunk, and moreover given the considerable odds that the Americans faced in tracking them down, the operation can be considered a success. Not only were the Americans able to deploy overwhelming numbers of vessels, but their ships and aircraft were of the latest design and equipped with the most advanced technology. Aircraft from escort carriers gave the U.S. Navy the ability to search large areas of the ocean. Furthermore, American carrier-borne aircraft were equipped with radar and sonobuoys which enabled them to conduct day and night searches over large sea areas not only for surfaced U-boats but for submerged ones as well. Finally, the Americans had communications intelligence and advanced electronic technology—a powerful advantage, which added to all the others, gave them this victory.

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