


WWNU(Gen)
2854

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

WAR DIARY

German Naval Staff Operations Division



PART A

VOLUME 34

DECLASSIFIED IN ACCORDANCE OF 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ:
DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

JUNE 1942

A-13450

Op-32-F-45
CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION FOR WAR DIARY

GERMAN NAVAL STAFF OPERATIONS DIVISION

PART A - VOL. 34 - JUNE 1943

Op-32-V (2)
Op-32-F-2
Op-32Y (2)
Op-32-F-11 (2)
Op-32-F-12
Op-32-F-17
Op-32-F-45 (2)
Op-32-FIR
Op-34 (2)
Op-30

Op-C5
Op-55
MID (10)
CIA (4)
State (4)
USMC (8)
COIS-BAD (5)
US Naval Academy
USN Intell. Schl.
Armed Forces
Staff College.

Industrial College of
the Armed Forces
US Naval War College
CinCPac
CinClant
CinCNavELantMed
ComNavMed
ComNavFE
JCS - Hist. Section.
EXOS - Op-History.


4A-73229

WAR DIARY OF THE GERMAN NAVAL STAFF
(Operations Division)

PART A

June 1942

Chief, Naval Staff:	Grand Admiral Raeder, Dr. h.c.
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:	Vice Admiral Fricke
Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff:	Captain Wagner



Volume 34

begun:	1 June 1942
closed:	30 June 1942

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington, D. C.

Foreword

1. The Office of Naval Intelligence has undertaken to translate important parts of the War Diary of the German Naval Staff. The present volume, entitled War Diary of the German Naval Staff, Operations Division, Part A, Volume 34 is the sixth one of the series to appear. Other volumes will follow shortly.
2. The War Diaries, Part A, are important because they contain a day by day summary of the information available to the German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the basis thereof. Together with the Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939-1945, which have been published by this office, the War Diaries should provide valuable material for the study of naval problems arising from total war. The War Diary, Part A, is also a useful index to the German Naval Archives of World War II; references may be found in the micro-film library of Naval Records and Library.
3. Due to the cost of publication, only a limited number of copies could be made; it is therefore desirable that the copies which have been distributed are made available to other offices which may be interested.

Washington, D. C.
1948

1 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

France:

The enemy press is attempting to support diplomatic efforts of the United States to prevent a break in the relations with France (negotiations on the question of the Antilles) by a propaganda campaign stressing allegedly strained relations between France and the Axis Powers.

Along the same line are charges about reopening Italian claims with regard to Tunis, Corsica, and Nice, as well as emphasis on the well-known efforts of Laval for closer cooperation with Germany. This propaganda is based on the fear of the enemy that Laval will succeed in bringing France entirely to the side of the Axis and that naval warfare of the Axis will be afforded unwelcome reinforcement because of important relief in the Mediterranean Sea and in North Africa provided by the French Navy and Merchant Marine.

Great Britain:

Coal is at the center of the debate on domestic issues. Differences coming to light in these discussions, though unimportant in themselves, tend to give an indication of the fight for power between the Right and the Left and to deepen the schism of the Labor Party into moderate and radical wings.

Bulgaria:

The Government has just published the proposals made by the Russian government in Sofia in Dec. 1940 for a pact of mutual assistance between Russia and Bulgaria. At that time Moscow was willing to allow adjustments in the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier. These would have decreased Turkish holdings considerably. Publication of these proposals has justifiably increased Turkish fears with regard to Russian policy and can therefore be regarded as an asset for Germany.

Liberia:

The United States plans to take over officially all air bases in Liberia at the end of May. The government has asked all German nationals in Monrovia to leave the country as soon as possible. These German nationals, about twenty in number, will probably be returned to Europe in a chartered French plane.

U.S.A.:

Lacking military successes and wanting to utilize the waiting period until they have completed rearmament and are able to seize the military initiative, statesmen of the United States are concerning themselves with propagandistic speeches on war aims and the post-war world. For a speech of this type by Sumner Welles see Political Review, No. 125, Par. 7a.

1 Jun. 1942

The refusal to recognize De Gaulle as political leader, as expressed in a statement by Secretary of State Hull, is meeting with definite criticism in the United States in view of the renewed fighting in Libya.

Japan:

The German Embassy reports that the ultra-nationalist group under the leadership of Nakano has been dissolved and has joined the Imperial Rule Assistance Organization. This was due to the pressure exercised by the government and by the Army who are determined not to permit the existence of a separate group even in the nationalist camp.

Special Items:

I. The study of the Naval Staff concerning naval operations against Brazilian harbors (see War Diary 30 May), which has already been made available to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, has been forwarded to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff for the information of the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters, Captain von Puttkammer and the Naval Liaison Officer at the Armed Forces High Command. Note was made of the fact that the only submarines that could be used for these operations are Type IXc. At the end of June, 7 of these boats can be made available for this operation, provided that they are ready for action by the dates planned. Copy as per 1/Skl I u 1035/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XVII.

II. On 28 May Group North reported its views concerning the fight against convoys in the Arctic Ocean. The Group thinks it almost impossible that our Air Force will be able, even in good weather, to make adequate reconnaissance flights in addition to carrying out combat missions. The sea area is too great. Such reconnaissance is necessary for accurately determining the position of the probable remote escort consisting of heavy forces, including aircraft carriers, and proper employment of pocket battleships is dependent on this knowledge. These can only be used if it can be assumed with some certainty that only the close escort will be contacted and that it will be possible to break off the attack at any time. The disadvantage is that, aside from consuming oil uselessly, the pocket battleships do not reach the principal target, which is the convoy. They are held in check by the cruisers and destroyers of the close escort, running the danger of hits which necessitate prolonged periods of repair.

Group North therefore suggests that after convoy PQ 17 has been located the Trondheim group be transferred north and make a joint attack with the pocket battleships, while submarines maintain contact with the convoy.

1 Jun. 1942

General directions for the action:

1. Make contact with convoy as rapidly as possible.
2. Avoid engagements except with the close escort.
3. Destroy close escort by means of the battleship and the HIPPER. Have pocket battleships and their destroyer escorts annihilate the convoy, inflicting severe damage on the steamers and putting them out of control rather than sinking them.
4. Retreat to bases as rapidly as possible. Have the submarines destroy the damaged ships.

The increased oil consumption is justified by a greatly increased expectation of success. Ship's planes can be used as auxiliary fighters. Danger from enemy submarines accompanying the convoy is not considered greater than that from torpedoes fired by destroyers. The Group requests at the same time that the first mine-laying submarine which is free be made available for mine-laying operations off Kola Bay and the entrance to the White Sea. The boat will be returned when the mission is completed until a third mine-laying submarine is free to be permanently attached to the Group.

The Naval Staff is in basic agreement with these views. The oil contingents assigned for June 1942 permit carrying out these operations as planned. Hence the Naval Staff is lifting the restrictions concerning the use of heavy vessels which burn fuel oil.

Since the Fuehrer desires to be informed of any plan concerning the use of the TIRPITZ, the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters will be notified of the above plan and will be asked to undertake to inform the Fuehrer.

Copy of telegrams as per 1/Skl Ia 1016/42 Gkdos. Chefs. and 1/Skl Ia 1044/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in the War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA.

III. In accordance with the Fuehrer Directive No. 42, all instructions relating to operations "Attila" and "Isabella" are cancelled. Instead, the following operations are to be so planned that they can be carried out with a minimum of preparation:

1. Occupation of unoccupied France in cooperation with Italian Forces [Code name "Anton" (secret)]. The purpose of the operation is to break the resistance of unoccupied France and to occupy the whole country. It will be the task of the Italians to occupy the French Mediterranean coast and to block the fleet bases from the sea so as to prevent the French home fleet and merchant marine from going over to the enemy. Support is to be given by German air and naval forces in the Mediterranean.

2. First countermeasures against enemy attack on the Iberian peninsula [Code name "Ilona" (secret)]. The first target is the occupation of the southern approaches to the Pyrenees and the protection of the harbors on the northern Spanish coast by prior German occupation.

1 Jun. 1942

All negotiations and preliminary discussions of these plans either with Spain or with other non-German officials are prohibited.

The Armed Forces High Command requests data by 10 Jun. 1942 concerning forces earmarked for this purpose, a general outline of how the plan is to be executed, and an estimate of the time required before operations can actually be started.

The Naval Staff charges Group West with carrying out operation "Ilona". It will cooperate with Army Group D as far as occupation of northern Spanish harbors is concerned. 1 torpedo boat flotilla (4 vessels), 1 PT boat flotilla, and in any case the available forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West can be counted on. Naval Artillery Group "Fritz", which up to now was intended for operation "Attila", is ready to assist in the occupation.

Copy of telegram as per I op a 1043/2 Gkdos. Chfs. in File "Ilona".

The German Admiral, Rome is also told of operation "Anton" with the additional information that the Italians are to turn against Tunisia as well, if the need arises. A task force for this purpose is now being formed.

The necessary conferences with Italy will be arranged by the Armed Forces High Command.

The Naval Staff requests data from the German Naval Command in Italy by 8 Jun. concerning our forces available for support of the Italians and the probable time required to make these forces ready, and concerning any requests and demands to be made of Italy as well as the possibilities for assisting them.

Additional forces (PT boats, mine sweepers, and submarines) cannot be counted on for the time being. Negotiations with Italian officials are out of the question for the present. Copy of telegram as per 1/Skl I op 1042/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in File "Anton".

IV. The Naval Attache at Washington has returned from America by diplomatic exchange and has submitted an exhaustive report on the American Navy and Merchant Marine.

A copy of his report of 26 May is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XVII.

His information is largely known to us already. The account of American tonnage in his report and his estimate concerning new construction capacity are in general agreement with the results of the investigations of the Naval Intelligence Division. The Naval Intelligence Division will evaluate the report of the Naval Attache in detail.

1 Jun. 1942

Situation 1 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

All vessels in foreign waters are informed that Mexico has entered the war against Germany and that all Mexican air and naval forces are to be considered hostile, as per Radiogram 1925.

All forces in home waters are also informed about the existence of a state of war between Germany and Mexico (see Radiogram 1942).

All vessels outside home waters are further instructed that they can expect attacks by Brazilian air and naval forces and that further instructions will follow (see Radiogram 1514).

Sailing orders are radioed to the DRESDEN for procedure after her rendezvous with the REGENSBURG, which the Naval Staff expects to take place about 10 Jun. (see Radiogram 1628).

Ship "10" is advised of the sailing orders of the DRESDEN by Radiogram 1602.

The Italian motor ships VULCANIA and SATURNIA which put into Port Elizabeth on 27 May left for Las Palmas on 29 May. The tankers TAIGETE and ARCOLA also are bound for Las Palmas from the Cape Verde Islands.

Special Items:

The Naval Staff considers it very important that the "Bachstelze" autogyro type planes not only be used on board submarines, but also serve as an extended lookout for the commanders of auxiliary cruisers, in addition to the usual plane equipment. The Naval Staff informs the Air Minister and Commander in Chief, Air that the Navy will provide ship "14" for tests aboard ship and, if they turn out favorably, for permanent use with this type plane. Ship "14" will be completed by the end of August or middle of September in Stettin and is already available for carrying out necessary constructional adaptations.

Copy of letter as per 1/Skl I L 12915/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. V.

1 Jun. 1942

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Evaluation of reconnaissance photos taken on 1 Jun. in the area off Portsmouth show 12 ocean-going tugs towing 2 vessels apiece, each about 24 meters long. Another photograph taken on 29 May of the Portsmouth roadstead shows 15 tugs with 2 vessels in tow in a loose group with no particular formation. It is not certain whether both pictures were of the same vessels. Group West suspects training or assembling of landing vessels, but in view of the weather considers it improbable that a landing is intended for either 29 or 30 May.

The Naval Staff agrees with Group West that increased vigilance is desirable in any event. Group West has already informed the Commanding General, West and the 3rd Air Force.

Air reconnaissance on 1 Jun. indicates considerable activity off the southern coast of England. A westbound convoy consisting of 15 vessels, preceded by motor mine sweepers, was sighted east of the Isle of Wight. Once again 12 westbound tugs, each with 2 barges in tow, were sighted to the east of the convoy. They were under fighter escort. Toward evening about 30 vessels were sighted in the area southeast of Eastborne. A group of 20 smaller vessels the size of mine sweepers and PT boats was also sighted in the same vicinity. Numerous barges the size of Rhine barges were also sighted at the shore between Eastborne and Dunge Ness.

In Southampton 85 barges 30 meters long were counted, in addition to several large ships and destroyers. Other convoys with a total of 40 to 50 ships were sighted off Plymouth, Bournemouth, and Start Point.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

Channel Coast:

It is planned to have the 4th and 2nd PT Boat Flotillas lay mines east of Great Yarmouth during the night of 1 Jun.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Normal reconnaissance activity in the North Sea during the day, very little at night.

After a long lapse of time, it was again possible to make a complete photo-reconnaissance of Scapa Flow on 31 May. The following vessels

1 Jun. 1942

were sighted: 1 U.S. battleship of the NORTH CAROLINA class, 1 battleship of the NELSON class with 1 plane, 1 battleship of the KING GEORGE V class, 1 U.S. heavy cruiser of the WICHITA class with 2 planes, 1 heavy cruiser of the LONDON class, 1 (probably heavy) "A" cruiser of the LONDON class (center funnel missing), 2 cruisers of the SOUTHAMPTON class, 1 cruiser of the LEANDER class, 1 cruiser of the FROBISHER class, 3 destroyers of the A class, 4 destroyers of the V and W classes, 13 destroyers of undetermined class, 1 repair ship, the destroyer escort WOOLWICH, 1 gunboat, 4 guardboats, 1 tanker, and 25 steamers.

The Air Force Listening Service reports one northbound and one southbound convoy in the Thames Estuary.

Own Situation:

Convoy and escort service in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North is proceeding according to plan. 3 enemy planes were belatedly reported shot down by the Rhine Flotilla and naval gunfire on 31 May. Enemy air activity in the Heligoland Bight and in the Wilhelmshaven area during the night of 1 Jun. The Navy was able to shoot down several planes. Details not yet received.

The Commanding General, Armed Forces, West has asked the Naval Staff and the Armed Forces High Command what action has been taken with regard to making available to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Netherlands the task forces of the Naval Station, North Sea.

Execution of the mine-laying operations "Antonius" and "Julius", which were ordered by Group North and which are designed to complete the West Wall (mine fields 13a and 15a), has been delayed by 5 days so that the necessary destroyer escort can be provided.

2. Norway:

Vice Admiral Kummetz reports his intentions to take over command of the task force in the Arctic Ocean on 4 Jun., making the LUETZOW his flagship (see Telegram 1925).

The transfer of the headquarters of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean to Narvik has resulted in poor communications and therefore has made close cooperation impossible between that command and the Air Commander, North-East (see War Diary 29 May). As a result the Naval Staff, making reference to the scruples expressed to the Commander in Chief, Air by the 5th Air Force on 3 May concerning this point, has requested Group North to clarify and report on the matter at once. Group North was informed that it is important to take immediate measures to secure this valuable cooperation between the two commands. Copy of this directive has been sent to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean (see Telegram 1017).

Group North reports that the matter is being investigated and clarified.

1 Jun. 1942

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

The Admiralty has announced loss of the cruiser TRINIDAD.

Apparently this is the ship sunk by the Air Force on 15 May, 120 miles northwest of the North Cape.

Air reconnaissance reports 7 medium-sized merchant ships and 5 patrol vessels in Iokanga harbor.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

1 destroyer of the GROZNY type was reported seen east of Seiskari proceeding east at full speed.

Air reconnaissance reports no change in the ships in Leningrad harbor. Work on the cruiser KIROV is continuing. About 20 vessels of varying size were observed in Novaya Ladoga.

2. Own Situation:

Baltic Sea Entrances:

The German steamer MALMOE (981 GRT) struck a mine and sank in the Sound. A mine exploded in the fishing net of a Danish trawler 2 miles east of Brandsoe. Convoy and escort services in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, East are proceeding according to plan. 4 patrol vessels have been sent to the Skagerrak for tests conducted by the Torpedo Experimental Station and the Mine-Laying Experimental Command.

Eastern Baltic Sea:

The 19th and 20th transport groups to Vasa will leave Stettin and Danzig on 2 Jun. In the afternoon of 31 May during an enemy air raid on the harbor of Ust' Luga 2 vessels of the 1st Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla were damaged by 2 bomb hits, machine gun fire, and shell fragments. Shell fragments also damaged a naval barge to the extent that she had to be grounded.

1 Jun. 1942

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence has picked up a report on submarine attacks near Nantucket Island, off the Mississippi, and at the northern entrances to the Yucatan Channel. The United States steamer KNOXVILLE CITY (5,686 GRT) was torpedoed at the last-mentioned place.

2. Own Situation:

Contact has been made with a westbound enemy convoy by Group "Hecht" at quadrant BC 8257. The shadower was driven off repeatedly. It was impossible to take action because of the weather. Group "Hecht" was ordered to discontinue the operation.

U "566" reports sinking the tanker WESTMORELAND (8,967 GRT), and U "432" the sinking of the steamer LIVERPOOL ROVER (1,426 GRT).

No sinkings have been reported by the submarines in the south; it is therefore probable that the enemy has changed his shipping route.

U "652" in the Mediterranean (quadrant CO 9134) reports that she is unable to submerge and urgently requests aid. 3 boats in her vicinity have been ordered to her aid.

Further details on the submarine situation are contained in the War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

With regard to the supposed attack of Brazilian planes on Italian submarines, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports that the Italians were unable to recognize either the markings or the type of the attacking planes.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

For details of the enemy attack on Cologne during the nights of 30 May see daily situation report.

On 1 Jun. 15 enemy planes engaged in a daylight raid were shot down, and 3 planes were probably shot down. This number includes planes downed by the Navy. For results of reconnaissance flights over the English Channel, see Enemy Situation, West Area.

On the night of 1 Jun., 65 planes attacked Ipswich, while the enemy attacked the Reich in great numbers. The focal point of attack was the Ruhr area. Duisburg, Essen, and Oberhausen were damaged, including industrial installations. For details see daily situation report. 37 planes were shot down, 20 of them by fighter planes.

1 Jun.1942

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Harassing raids on air bases in Malta were continued. Heavy attacks were launched in order to support the Africa Corps.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing new to report from the Army fronts and the Black Sea. Vessels on Lake Ladoga were attacked by gunfire, but the effect was not observed. A bomb hit was scored on the loading pier in Iokanga harbor. 10 planes were shot down in the area around Kirkenes.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

During the night of 31 May, 3 tankers and 2 escort vessels left Gibraltar for the west. At 0700 the EAGLE, the CHARYBDIS, and 3 destroyers left for the east. The formation reentered Gibraltar at 1600. Convoy activity in the Port Said-Tobruk area is more pronounced. See daily situation report for details.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

The night of 31 May witnessed enemy air raids on Benghazi, Messina, and Reggio. Mine-laying activities were observed off Benghazi. 1 torpedo boat was damaged by incendiary bombs in Messina.

For a report of the THESEUS concerning the land and air situation see Telegram 0030.

Naval Situation: 2 motor mine sweepers have been transferred to the Italian Naval Command, Benghazi for purposes of escorting incoming and outgoing traffic through coastal waters. This has made it more difficult to maintain the line of communication between Benghazi and Derna, but was necessary in view of the increased danger of submarines lying off Benghazi. Discharge in Derna on 30 May was 620 tons, on 31 May 435 tons. No convoys to Tobruk have been observed since the beginning of the advance of the Panzer Army on 26 May. For this reason, no further results were attained by submarines in the Tobruk area, with the exception of successful action on 27 May against transports which had left Alexandria prior to the beginning of the offensive.

In connection with the request of the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff that the territorial waters off Cape Bon be mined by the French, the Naval Staff again wants to point to the importance of strengthening the blockade of the Strait of Sicily. The Naval Staff requests the German Naval Command, Italy to comment on the possibilities of finally blocking the whole Strait of Sicily effectively.

1 Jun. 1942

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa

Transports are proceeding as planned with nothing new to report.

Counting the steamer BRAVO, a total of 1,025 tons of German and Italian cargo has been lost.

The supply program for June includes 35,200 tons to Benghazi and 62,000 tons for Tripoli, making 25 motorship and 4 steamer trips. The tanker program has not yet been worked out.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

On 31 May, the net tender SOFIA chased a submarine near Kythnos. The enemy submarine probably was damaged.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence reports continued submarine activity. 12 submarines were sighted at sea, 6 of which were in the western part of the Black Sea as far as the Crimea.

Own Situation:

On 31 May enemy planes attacked Simferopol, Kerch, Feodosiya, Yalta, and Eupatoria.

A request of the Army General Staff to the Naval Staff has been answered by the Naval Group South to the effect that it is intended to use all available PT boats, Italian PT boats, and submarines in the fight against the supply lines to Sevastopol. Bases for PT boats are Ochakov and Skadovsk, jumping-off harbor is Ak Mechet; base and jumping-off harbor for the Italian PT boats is Yalta, and for the submarines either Yalta or Ak Mechet, depending on the situation. The following vessels are ready now: 2 Italian PT boats in Yalta, 3 Italian PT boats in Sulina, 3 Italian submarines in Constanta. 2 of our PT boats will be ready in Constanta about 3 Jun., and 3 more Italian submarines will be ready in Constanta about 4 Jun. The same report has gone to the Southern Army Group (see Telegram 1300).

VIII. Situation East Asia:

Nothing new to report.

1 Jun. 1942

IX. Army Situation:

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Situation unchanged.

Central Army Group:

One of our supply trains in the area of Bryansk was derailed due to action by partisans. Our forces made a successful advance southwest of Vyazma. The attack by the army corps south of Vyazma in a westward direction will start on 2 Jun.

Northern Army Group:

Unsuccessful enemy attack took place in the Pola sector. Counterattacks in the Volkhov pocket were beaten off. Our own wedges have begun a concentric attack. An enemy tank attack against the new formation west of Yamno was beaten off. Enemy offensive action near Soltsy.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

No special fighting.

3. North Africa:

The enemy confined himself to reconnaissance advances on the eastern and northern fronts. A concentric attack against fortified enemy positions was completely successful, leading to capture of 3,000 prisoners, including a general. From 31 May to 1 Jun., the following equipment was either destroyed or captured:

101 tanks and armored cars
121 guns
187 motor vehicles

A sudden burst of artillery fire directed at the field headquarters of General Rommel wounded his Chief of Staff and his Chief of Operations. General Cruewell is a British prisoner of war.

2 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Spain:

The British Government has informed Spanish authorities that all rumors about Great Britain's intentions with regard to Spain are false. Great Britain harbors no intentions whatsoever against Spanish sovereignty, but is only desirous of continuing her good relations with Spain.

In view of the uncertain domestic situation prevailing in Spain, the significance of this kind of statement should not be underestimated.

Finland:

The German Legation reports that the Finnish President has stated among other things that there are no indications of a British landing in the North. Enemy peace propaganda no longer meets with sympathetic reception on the part of the people, who are becoming increasingly convinced of the necessity of holding out in the war against Russia.

Japan:

Newly conquered areas are rapidly being Japanized. Beginning on 1 Jun., privately owned land is being seized in the Dutch East Indies under the pretext that titles to this property date from the time of the Dutch East Indies Company and should now by rights, therefore, be assigned to the Japanese Government.

U.S.A.:

With increasing apprehension, the American press is discussing the critical situation created on the Atlantic Coast by submarine warfare. Their opinion is that this coast has become the most important theater of war. They feel that the American naval coast guard and patrol forces are in urgent need of reinforcements. They also feel that the decision of the U.S. Senate to increase the number of coast patrol blimps to 70 is inadequate, and that the time is not far off when persons responsible for this situation will have to account for it. A change in tactics on the part of the Air Force and the Navy is inevitable.

This reaction to German successes invalidates the argument that it is a mistake to operate submarines on the coast of America, because that would result in increasing the war fervor of the American people.

Turkey:

The neutral press generally interprets the signing of the German-Turkish commercial agreement (providing arms for Turkey) as a substantial diplomatic victory on the part of Germany.

2 Jun. 1942

Italy:

Supplementing press reports, the Foreign Office reports in connection with the Foreign Minister's speech that Count Ciano strongly emphasized that the territorial demands made by Italy on France still stand. This statement was strongly appaluded by the senators. In his report on the Armistice Commission, Senator Salata declared that the well-known demands by Italy have not been modified. He said we are dealing here with two problems which together represent one basic problem, namely Italian domination of the Mediterranean and of North and East Africa. In accordance with the German-Italian agreement, the Mediterranean has been assigned to Italy as her "Lebensraum".

Special Items:

I. On 10 May the Admiral, Arctic Ocean submitted a study on the possibility of conducting active operations for the period of the polar day (see War Diary 18 May).

The Naval Staff is in agreement with the basic points of that study. The possibility of employing the TIRPITZ and the HIPPER is discussed separately on the basis of the suggestion of Group North. (See War Diary 1 Jun..)

The suggestion of using mine-laying submarines in coastal waters during the polar daylight period is still under consideration.

The Naval Staff is of the opinion that the operational possibilities for cruisers in the eastern Barents Sea and in the waters around Novaya Zemlya Island are better than they are thought to be by the Admiral, Arctic Ocean. The Naval Staff has not yet received the results of preparatory work now being done on this by Group North.

This then confirms the fact that there is no question at this time of recalling submarines from the northern theater. Instead it may be expected that the planned consolidation of submarines in northern Norway still carries some promise of success. The necessary orders have already been issued.

The following should be kept in mind for the use of PT boats:

- a. Their use is greatly restricted during the period of the polar day.
- b. There is an urgent need for PT boats in other theaters of war.
- c. The training of PT boats in home waters depends on PT boat tenders.

2 Jun. 1942

The defensive value of PT boats cannot weaken the importance of these factors.

Group North therefore has been ordered to transfer the 8th PT Boat Flotilla and the LUEDERITZ to home waters immediately (utilizing all towing facilities!). The Admiral, Arctic Ocean is also informed. There will be no objection to a short delay in carrying out these orders, if projected mine-laying operations have to be completed first. The 6th PT Boat Flotilla continues under the command of Group North (Admiral, Arctic Ocean). Group North is free to transfer this flotilla or some of its vessels from Svolvær to some other base.

Copy of telegram as per 1/SK1 Ia 1033/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

II. The Naval Staff (The Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff and the Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff) does not completely approve the position taken by the staff of the Naval Construction Division with respect to the continuation of previously suspended construction of naval vessels (see War Diary 21 May).

The Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff is of the opinion that the security of coastal waters is of prime importance. He therefore feels that top priority should be given to the completion of torpedo boats, mine sweepers, and mine-exploding vessels. Accordingly he has proposed to the Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff a priority plan with four degrees of priority. Copy of the letter as per 1/SK1 I opa 13280/42 Gkdos. is in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

III. In view of its importance, the Naval Staff considered it necessary to re-examine the situation with regard to light naval forces (destroyers, torpedo boats, mine sweepers, motor mine sweepers, and PT boats). This analysis resulted in the "Memorandum on the Plans for Constructing Light Naval Forces" ("Denkschrift zum Bauplan leichter Streitkräfte") the contents of which have been approved in principle by the Commander in Chief, Navy. The memorandum was forwarded to the Naval Staff Service Division on 29 May, with copies to Naval Ordnance and Naval Construction Divisions. This will serve as a basis for future discussions.

Copy as per 1/SK1 Ia 11684/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V and in the Memoranda File ("Denkschriftensammlung").

IV. According to a communication from the PT Boat Section, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff replacements and reinforcements for the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla in the Mediterranean could be effected, if need be, by using PT boats "151" to "158". The PT Boat Section, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff has stated, in answer to questions by the Operations Division, Naval Staff, that if there is sufficient rainfall in July it will be possible to transfer the PT boats on the Rhone up until 15 Jul. In order to get the 3 (or at most 4) vessels from the 7th PT Boat Flotilla ready by this date, orders would have to be issued by 1 Jun. at the latest. If the decision were made by 1 Jun., it would be possible to have the boats ready for action in Sicily by the middle of August. Consent by the French Government will by all

2 Jun. 1942

means have to be assured and will have to be in our hands in time for the operation to take place as scheduled. Starting with 1 Sep., ship movements on the Rhone will again be possible. Since the proper training of the 7th PT Boat Flotilla would be greatly hampered by immediate transfer of these boats, the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff is of the opinion that it would be best if these 8 boats were not transferred until September.

The Operations Division, Naval Staff is also of the opinion that if PT boats "151" to "158" are to be transferred at all, their transfer should not take place until September. This information has been sent to the PT Boat Section, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff with the remark that the decision will be made by 15 Jul. as to whether or not the boats should be ready for transfer at Chalons sur Saone beginning 1 Sep. The Operations Division, Naval Staff will see to it that consent is obtained from the French Government in time.

V. On 6 and 15 May, two conferences were held between the representatives of the Air Force and the Commander in Chief, Navy (Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff and Recruitment Division, General Administration Bureau, Naval High Command). These conferences dealt with basic questions relating to personnel policy and to naval vessels assigned to the Air Force. At the conference of 6 May on the basic position of both branches of the Armed Forces, it was agreed that the Navy is responsible for personnel planning and that the Navy alone is responsible for combat tasks at sea. It was further recognized that both branches should cooperate in sea rescue activities under the leadership of the Navy. The responsibility and authority of the Navy for transport tasks by sea was recognized.

VI. The Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at the Fuehrer Headquarters has made a report to the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff concerning his conversation with the Fuehrer on plans for later construction of battleships and carriers. The Fuehrer rejects the plans of the Construction Division, Naval Staff, considering them merely a further development of old designs. The Fuehrer considers it necessary to approach this problem from an entirely new viewpoint and he developed his ideas on the subject at great length. He emphasized increasing the number of planes carried by the battleships, expanding their aft and midship decks to landing decks, increasing their firing power, speed and range as much as possible, while placing less emphasis on their armor. At the same time the Fuehrer continues stressing the construction and development of aircraft carriers and is in full agreement with the plans to construct a 40,000 ton carrier with 15 cm. guns and carrying a very large number of planes. He is also in basic agreement with the idea of constructing a cruiser-carrier with two 15 cm twin turrets, carrying 10 fighter planes and approximately 8 torpedo bombers.

The written report as per 1/Skl 13337/42 Gkdos. is in Files "Fleet Expansion" ("Flottenaufbau").

VII. A photographic survey of the status and development of the French Fleet from the beginning of the war until the middle of May 1942, as well as a report on the interned French naval forces in Alexandria, is

2 Jun. 1942

contained in News Analysis No. 25 of the "Foreign Navies" series of the Foreign Navies Branch, Naval Intelligence Division.

Situation 2 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 1629 instructs the REGENSBURG and the DRESDEN to proceed east of the Banka and Billiton Islands, since a mine field is located between the two.

Radiogram 2307 gives sailing instructions to the REGENSBURG, for her rendezvous with ship "10" and her subsequent trip to Japan by way of route "Gelb".

Radiogram 2248 informs all vessels in foreign waters of pertinent new information obtained from the latest edition of "Amsi" and "Camsi" (Confidential Admiralty Shipping Instructions).

Radiogram 0631 gives further information regarding the enemy situation as well as instructions about changes in the return route from Italian East Africa to Germany.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring reports 1 motor gunboat, 12 crashboats, 2 mine layers, 1 mine sweeper, and 2 unknown vessels at sea. It also reports increased convoy activity between the Thames and Portsmouth, with 2 or 3 convoys as against an average weekly traffic of only 1 convoy until now. One destroyer, 3 unidentified vessels and 1 convoy vessel were located off Portsmouth.

Air reconnaissance reports 30 steamships south of Portsmouth on a northeasterly course, 4 large steamships 240 miles west of Brest on a northerly course, and 2 medium-sized steamships 200 miles west of Brest on a southerly course.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ground mine in the Gironde estuary and one off Lorient were cleared away.

2 Jun. 1942

Channel Coast:

Motor mine sweeper flotillas cleared 3 ground mines at Calais and 3 at Dunkirk. The 36th Mine Sweeper Flotilla cleared 5 ground mines on route "Rosa" between Ostend and Gravelines.

On the afternoon of 1 Jun., 2 Spitfires attacked near De Hann with slight damage to the 18th Patrol Flotilla. In the same area, 2 Spitfires were downed.

During the night of 1 Jun., the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla carried out its mine-laying mission according to plan. An enemy destroyer was sighted after completion of mine-laying operations. Unfortunately it was impossible to proceed to attack the destroyer because S "70" collided with the vessel ahead of her during the operation. (See Telegram 1520 for a brief report.)

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla had to give up its mine-laying operations since it had been spotted and was being pursued. It was impossible to enter into an engagement. (See Telegram 1040 for a brief report.)

During the same night, the enemy made air raids on the 2nd Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla and on the 36th and 38th Mine Sweeper Flotillas. Our side suffered no losses. Patrol boat "1510" ran afoul of a wreck off Dieppe on 2 Jun. It is questionable whether salvage operations will be undertaken.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

There was little reconnaissance activity during the day, and moderate activity at night.

Own Situation:

In the forenoon, the Scheveningen radio station was attacked by 2 Spitfires, with gunfire. No damage is reported. In the course of the day and during the night of 1 Jun., naval coastal artillery and naval anti-aircraft gunfire shot down 2 Spitfires, 1 Bristol-Blenheim and 1 4-motor bomber over the Netherlands coast. Enemy fighters in considerable numbers attacked Flushing, dropping about 40 bombs and causing damage to both civilian and military installations. For details see Telegram 1810.

In connection with mine-laying operations in the North Sea (renewal of the West Wall), Group North requests, for reasons relating to command and communications, that the Air Force Operations Staff be requested to order only 1 air force to carry out both reconnaissance and fighter or heavy fighter protection. However, if it should prove impossible for any except the Commanding General, Air Force Group Command, Central Area to provide the necessary fighter and heavy fighter protection, this command should be ordered to carry out this task north of 58° 30' N, also. Care also should be taken to assure the mutual exchange of information between the air force

2 Jun. 1942

and the Commanding General, Air Force Group Command, Central Area.
(See Telegram 1232.)

The Naval Staff has taken the necessary steps to request this from the Commander in Chief, Air Force.

The Naval Liaison Officer, Army High Command requests information whether a task force of Naval Station, North can be set up for emergency use by the Commander in Chief, West. He suggests directing Station North to settle this matter directly with the Commander in Chief, West. (See Telegram 1225.)

The Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff will take care of this matter.

2. Norway:

The enemy air force was very active on 1 and 2 Jun. Tromsø and Fulgenes, near Hammerfest, report air raids and small damage, while Kirkenes reports an air raid without damage.

Convoy work is proceeding according to plan.

Group North submits the information obtained from the weather station "Knospe", Spitsbergen, about the possibility of picking up the expedition by sea or land planes. This information indicates that it will be impossible to utilize either type plane in June because of the danger they will incur when landing. For this reason the Naval Staff plans to have the expedition picked up by sea plane in July. The plane will take along a weather land buoy. Suitable instructions have been sent to Group North, with copy to Air Force Operations Staff and Naval Liaison Officer, Air Force High Command (see Telegram 2103.)

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reports 17 vessels in Murmansk, 7 in Iokanga and 14 in Archangel.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Convoy and escort operations in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea are proceeding according to plan.

2 Jun. 1942

Since it is unlikely that the Russian fleet forces will break through into the central Baltic Sea, Group North requests permission to transfer the Danish 12 cm battery at Gjedser to the Jammer Bay in accordance with the wish of the Commander in Chief, Navy to reinforce the northern coast of Jutland (see Telegram 2104). The matter will be handled by the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff.

Mine fields Tiger I and Tiger II were laid off the entrance to Kronstadt Bay as planned.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report except for the usual submarine sighting reports off the American coast and in the West Indies.

2. Own Situation:

Reports of successful operations off the American coast and in the West Indies:

Submarine U "553"	sank the S.S. MATTAWIN	(6,919 GRT)
Submarine U "558"	sank the Dutch steamer TRITON	(2,078 GRT)
Submarine U "578"	sank the S.S. BERGANGER	(6,826 GRT)
Submarine U "159"	sank a U.S. steamer	(6,200 GRT)
Submarine U "502"	sank the tanker ALCOA PILGRIM	(6,750 GRT)

Total tonnage sunk: 28,773 GRT

The southern submarines have been transferred to the Trinidad area (1 submarine) as well as to the area where, according to all indications, enemy shipping plies between Capetown or South America and North America (2 submarines).

Submarine U "652" had to be sunk in quadrant CO 6758 in the Mediterranean, since she could no longer be kept afloat. All of the crew have been transferred to submarine U "81". While on her return to Salamis, submarine U "81" was able to out-maneuver the four-fan of an enemy submarine.

Commanding Admiral, Submarines has pointed out that there are too many misses being made. Where shipping is heavy, he instructed the boats rather to fire single torpedoes at sure marks. On the other hand, when there is little shipping, torpedoes can be used freely so as to exploit every possibility. Further details and additional news will be found in the Supplement, Submarine Situation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

2 Jun. 1942

Special Items:

Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports that sinkings for the month of May amount to 755,093 GRT. The published figure of 767,400 GRT was arrived at by adding late reports of the preceding month.

This record success of submarine warfare is almost exclusively due to operations in the Western Atlantic, off the North American coast and in the Caribbean Sea. These sinkings were undoubtedly favored by an incompletely developed defense on the part of the enemy. This, however, does not detract from the excellent work done by the successful submarines, either from a military standpoint, or above all, from the point of view of seamanship. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines has calculated the effectiveness of the submarines as 9,206 GRT per boat in the month just past, or as 426 GRT per boat, per day at sea. This result also leads us to expect good results in the months to come, particularly since the number of operational submarines available to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines will increase appreciably. This is true, since the lag in construction due to the winter months has now been overcome.

VI. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day 19 enemy planes were shot down in the western area. At night, 58 of our planes attacked Canterbury. Enemy air raids on the Reich concentrated on the Ruhr area and caused bomb damage in Duesseldorf, Muenchen-Gladbach, Essen, Oberhausen and Muelheim. Fourteen of the attacking planes were destroyed.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Continuous waves of dive bombers and heavy fighters attacked the encircled enemy at Bir Hakheim with outstanding success.

3. Eastern Front:

Fighter and dive bomber formations began a continuous series of attacks on Sevastopol at 0600. In the Arctic Ocean, 2 large ships were probably damaged at the pier in Murmansk, while 4 larger ships were probably damaged in Iokanga.

2 Jun. 1942

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

The EAGLE, 1 DIDO class cruiser and 4 destroyers left Gibraltar in an easterly direction at 0500. No further contact has been made with this formation so far. Convoy activity between Port Said and Tobruk continues at a normal rate. According to photo reconnaissance, there was no essential change in the number of ships in the harbor of Tobruk during the forenoon. For details, see daily situation report.

2. Own Situation Mediterranean:

On the forenoon of 2 Jun., 10 Italian submarines were in a waiting position in the Mediterranean.

Naval situation of operation "Theseus": Nothing to report.

The increased alert of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla has been relaxed. Reason given: "No target".

The total supply tonnage brought into Derna by the German Naval Command for the preparation and execution of the attack by the Panzer Army amounted to 7,500 tons of German Army supplies, plus 2,000 tons of Italian supplies. With a maximum discharge of 750 tons per day, the daily average for the whole month in Derna was 315 tons. Therefore it would be possible to increase the discharge rate to 500 tons; this depends only on the number of stevedores and trucks available for unloading and transport.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Transports are proceeding according to plan with nothing to report.

Available reports indicate that a total of 29 ships with 989 men, 2,262 vehicles, and 33,901 tons of German army materiel were shipped to North Africa from Italy in May. The Italians transported more than 11,000 tons.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The steamer BENGASI has been held in Piraeus on orders of the Operations Staff, North Africa, German Naval Command. The tanker RONDINE which is important for transporting gasoline to the Air Force suffered rudder damage in the Corinth Canal on her way to Italy and is in need of repairs which will last 12 days.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2 Jun. 1942

Own Situation:

On 31 May, submarine DELFINUL returned from her extended trip to Constanta, reporting no sinkings.

During the night of 1 Jun., 2 Italian submarine chasers operated in the area of Cape Sarich without sighting any enemy vessels. Naval barges have begun transporting fuel to Ochakov for the 1st PT Boat Flotilla. Persistent enemy air activity has caused suspension of shipping to Taganrog. Mine-exploding vessel "191" was successful in clearing mines 5 miles southwest of Ochakov. These presumably were German air mines. A group of partisans which had been landed near the lighthouse of Sofiyevka on 30 May was annihilated by fire from the Army Coast Artillery.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

IX. Army Situation:

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

At 0600 our artillery unleashed sudden harassing fire at the Sevastopol front. The fire was directed against field fortifications and troop bivouacs. Simultaneously all forces of the Air Corps began to attack the harbor and the city of Sevastopol in waves, 700 sorties in all. These lasted all day. Nothing to report from the Von Kleist Army Group or from the 6th Army. The 2nd Army beat off 2 attacking enemy regiments northwest of Livny in stubborn close-range fighting, with bloody losses to the enemy. Hungarian defense forces were successful in fighting partisan groups in the rear of the Army.

Central Army Group:

Nothing to report.

Northern Army Group:

Situation of the 16th Army remains unchanged. In the area of the 18th Army an attack on the eastern front of the encircled area west of Yanno was beaten off with the help of tank and artillery support. Little activity is reported from the Volkhov pocket.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Nothing to report.

2 Jun. 1942

3. North Africa:

The 90th Light Division and the Italian Motorized Division "Trieste" attacked the Free French Brigade which was protecting the southern enemy flank in the Bir Hakheim area. The fighting is continuing. Enemy attacks by the 4th Armored Brigade against the northern wing of the Italian XX Army Corps and the east wing of the German Afrika Korps were beaten off with great losses to the enemy.

3 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

On 2 Jun. 1942, in the House of Commons, Churchill gave a detailed description of the tank battle in Libya. He said that the battle as yet is not over by any means and stressed the "immense British air raids" on Cologne and Essen. These, he said, represent a new chapter in the air war against Germany, the extent of which will increase even more, once the Air Force of the United States enters the fighting in the near future. As the year goes on, he added, all cities, harbors, and industrial centers of Germany will be subjected to an ordeal of such duration, severity and extent as no country has yet had to suffer.

The suggestion was made in the House of Lords that an agreement be made now concerning the post-war world and that action designed to aid the hungry peoples of Europe be planned. Conditions for a long-lasting peace in the future are: prolonged military control of Germany, destruction of the German military system and supervision of German education. A spokesman for the government declared that a confidential exchange of opinion on post-war problems already is in progress between the big Allied Powers.

India:

It can be expected that the growing influence of Gandhi on the leadership of the Congress Party will lead to increasing British difficulties. In contrast to Nehru, Gandhi apparently is willing to cooperate with the Japanese to achieve his goal of British military evacuation from India.

Australia:

In advocating the new war loan, the Prime Minister made the statement that Japan's adventure in the Pacific is beyond her capacity. He said that he is not of the opinion that Japan would succeed in landing any forces to speak of in Australia. He felt that the Axis Powers have been driven into a corner and that none of the predictions of a rapid conquest of Libya, of a defeat of Russia and of a quick end of the war in the Pacific have come true.

This parade of confidence corresponds to an actually revived optimism on the part of the Anglo-Americans. In view of the real circumstances, this can only be interpreted as the sole result of consistent and clever propaganda which directs the attention of the masses away from present failures and toward the hoped-for change in the situation, once the United States has completed her rearmament. In this sense, too, each week in which disastrous reversals can be avoided or more or less glossed over is felt to be a valuable gain of time. The speeches of almost all Anglo-American statesmen hew to this line and have had the desired effect not only on their own countrymen but also on the

3 Jun. 1942

neutrals. A neutral diplomat declared in this connection that the impression Allied propaganda creates is a thoroughly aggressive one, while German propaganda seems to have a definitely defensive character.

U.S.A.:

Pointing to the declarations of war by Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, President Roosevelt, apparently under Russian pressure, has sent a message to Congress proposing that the United States consider herself at war with those powers.

Brazil:

Reserve officers have been called to active service.

Special Items:

I. Defense of the Netherlands:

a. Supplementary to its memorandum of 19 Apr. 1942 (see War Diary of 1 May) on the question of the defense of the Netherlands, Station North reports that the Army has already started the removal of supplies from endangered areas. It requests information as to whether the Armed Forces High Command has been prevailed upon to reinforce the Army contingents stationed in the Netherlands, or whether the Navy High Command can be expected to issue orders, in accordance with the suggestion made by Naval Station, North, to remove supplies not currently needed from the exposed coastal area, including the harbors of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, as a precautionary measure.

The Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff has replied by saying that the Commander in Chief, Navy is of the same opinion as Station North, as far as the danger to the area is concerned, particularly since no reinforcements of the Army contingents can be counted on in the near future. It is not possible, however, to give up the repair facilities for naval vessels offered by the productive shipyards of Rotterdam and Amsterdam.

Except for that, however, all supplies which are not absolutely necessary for naval units stationed at the coast or for the operation of the shipyards will be transported to rear areas where they will be stored with due regard for future air transport.

b. The request for information by Commanding General, Armed Forces, West concerning the supply of troops from Station North to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Netherlands (see War Diary 1 Jun.) is answered by the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff, to the effect that necessary preparations by Station North have been under way for

3 Jun. 1942

quite some time. Right now, 8 battalions are available; 6 more battalions will be ready in July. The number of battalions depends on the rate of recruit training.

These battalions are not new but are mobilized and trained staff companies, naval anti-aircraft detachments, etc., which are being trained as anti-invasion troops.

II. In his War Diary of 15 Apr. 1942 the Commander, Destroyers commented on the suspension of destroyer construction which had been ordered at that time. He points to the possibilities that lie in seizing newly built Dutch warships and in the productivity of Dutch shipyards. He also mentions the criticism expressed by a Dutch naval architect concerning the plans for a destroyer of the torpedo boat "40" type.

A copy for further consideration of this question by the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff as per 1 Skl Ia 13268/42 Gkdos. is in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

III. The Operations Division, Naval Staff has expressed its final opinion concerning the North Sea routes to be taken by the Brest Group which will return by way of the English Channel. Referring to the points made by the Group on 15 May 1942, the Operations Division has come to the conclusion that, contrary to its original intention, it will unfortunately be impossible to proceed north on any other route than "Braun". "To proceed on another course would not have assured absolute safety, but nevertheless would have considerably reduced the probability of hitting a mine".

Copy of these remarks (1/Skl IE 11746/42 Gkdos.) is contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

IV. The following are instructions from the Naval Staff to Group West; Group North; the Fleet Command; Commanding Admiral, Battleships; and Commander, Destroyers.

1. There will be no changes by the Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff in the order of 12 May, as amended, which designated the torpedo boats assigned to the Torpedo Training School.

2. Training in open sea firing makes it necessary to leave a small torpedo boat group in Trondheim for the present.

3. All other vessels that are ready for action will be transferred to Group West. In the event that more than 4 vessels are ready for action, beyond those assigned to the Trondheim group, a fifth and sixth vessel will be assigned to Group North.

4. Right now it is impossible to assign 2 vessels to Kirkenes for patrol work.

5. All excess vessels assigned to Trondheim will be reassigned as soon as destroyers have arrived from home waters. The other vessels will be made available for immediate transfer in accordance with

3 Jun. 1942

paragraph 3, or after having been repaired (see Telegram 1701).

V. Concerning Operations of Cruisers in the Arctic Ocean:

On the basis of the request of the Commanding Admiral, Fleet and Battleships (see War Diary 29 May), the Plans and Schedules Branch, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff decided on 3 Jun. as follows:

a. Effective immediately the post of the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers is reactivated.

Vice Admiral Kummetz is appointed Commanding Admiral, Cruisers. The executive measure whereby the Commanding Admiral, Fleet has temporarily taken over the post of Commanding Admiral, Battleships is confirmed.

b. Task: Tactical and administrative direction of all pocket battleships and cruisers with the exception of cruisers assigned to the School Command.

The Commanding Admiral, Cruisers will be under the overall command of the Commanding Admiral, Fleet and under the tactical command of whoever is in charge of the operations in which he participates.

c. to f. Orders concerning organizational details.

g. The Naval Staff or Group North will assign additional forces if the scope of specific tasks exceeds that outlined in point b. above (see Telegram 1300).

VI. An extensive situation analysis was made by Naval Group South on the basis of personal conference tours of the Commanding Admiral of the Group, of the Chiefs of Staff of Group South and of the Admiral, Black Sea.

a. The Army feels that for the time being the Navy can play its greatest role in the support of the Army by continuing supply shipments from Rumanian harbors to Nikolayev-Kherson. At the same time it fully acknowledges the achievement of the Navy till now. In order to extend the Dnieper supply line up to Zaporozhe so as to relieve congested rail lines, it is mandatory to utilize all available naval barges, including all future reinforcements, if there is no overriding tactical naval need for them elsewhere.

b. Once current operations are completed, it is desired that as soon as possible the Navy also begin shipping supplies to the Crimea. Considering its railroad connections, Eupatoria would be the best terminal, but its harbor is poor. Since neither Sevastopol nor other ports in the Crimea can be considered as harbors because of the destruction they have suffered, our main terminal will have to be Ak Mechet. The supply lines to Ak Mechet and occasionally to Eupatoria will have to be maintained by naval barges. The Army Group will have to decide in time whether Zaporozhe or the Crimea is more important.

c. Later on, the main supply line will be in the direction of Yeisk by way of Mariupol, Osipenko (Berdyansk) and the Sea of Azov. Both the Army and Navy are now investigating whether it is possible to extend the sea supply line to Genichesk and to bridge over the

3 Jun. 1942

isthmus Genichesk-Perekop in connection with Port Khorli or Skadovsk. This would require construction of a connecting railroad.

d. Once the entire coast of the Sea of Azov is in German hands all tactical tasks there can be considered as completed. At the same time, however, the significance of the Sea is rising as far as supply tasks are concerned. Hence it is very important to safeguard and enlarge the only shipyard, Mariupol. The transfer of a heavy anti-aircraft battery to Mariupol is now in preparation.

e. The significance of the coast of the Crimea remains unchanged till all Black Sea tasks are completed. From the Navy's point of view, the bases, particularly those on the southern coast and the Kerch Strait, are of primary importance. Light naval forces will be based on Balaklava with Naval Shore Command "Willi" and 2 harbor defense companies which will form part of the assault troops. The harbor defense company which till now was assigned to Eupatoria will be assigned to Sevastopol. Its duty is to make a survey of the situation in Sevastopol as rapidly as possible while Army operations are still going on, to determine any installations or materiel which may be of importance to the Navy, and to prepare the ground for subsequent cleaning up operations of the harbor. The harbor defense flotilla assigned to Sevastopol will meanwhile be assigned to Balaklava. The 4th Air Force has promised anti-aircraft artillery for the important harbors, to be concentrated in Balaklava, Yalta and Feodosia.

f. It was decided that both Italian and German naval forces will work in close cooperation with the 4th Air Force of the Air Commander, South, stationed in the Crimea. A joint command is advisable. An attempt will be made to use both German and Italian PT boats and possibly Italian submarines for the attack on Sevastopol.

g. The necessity for clearing the route Ochakov North to the Crimea justifies the utilization of all available mine sweeping facilities with the exception, of course, of those forces needed for the protection of the main supply route. It does not seem reasonable to suppose that the Russians have laid mines off Odessa and Ochakov North since Russian ship movements have been observed in that area (the steamer SULINA has been sunk by a submarine). The laying of German protective mine fields is still under consideration.

h. Group South considers that enemy submarines will be the principal cause of interference with our supply line. Increased employment of PT boats will limit the mobility of enemy surface forces even more, thus reducing the danger of landing in the rear of our fronts. The 4th Air Force estimates that these air forces that will remain on the Crimea in the future will be able to meet all escort requirements in concert with the Navy. Support has also been promised for action against enemy naval forces in the Sea of Azov, starting with the middle of June.

i. Once the Army has reduced its forces stationed on the Crimea, protection of naval bases will principally fall to naval shore commands and harbor defense companies. Orders for the preparation of this task have been issued.

3 Jun. 1942

j. Minelaying as well must be confined to certain important localities. In addition to mine fields laid to protect our own supply routes in the western Black Sea, defensive mine fields will only be laid if the situation warrants it. No protective mine fields will be laid in the Sea of Azov and the western Black Sea, with the exception of minefields laid for alarm purposes for the protection of harbors. It is important to mine the Kerch Strait in such a way as not to block our own traffic. As far as protecting our flank is concerned, the northern tip of the Sea of Azov should be mined only by special order.

The Navy Liaison Officer at the Army High Command will receive a copy of this situation analysis. His copy will contain an exhaustive reply to the questions asked by the Army General Staff.

Further work on details is in progress in the Operations Division, Naval Staff.

VII. The Naval Staff has requested the Commander in Chief, Air Force and Minister for Air to assure the supply of Flettner helicopters, type Fl 282, to the Navy. These are urgently required for the arming of submarine chasers, as well as for the outfitting of battleships, cruisers, training cruisers, auxiliary cruisers, store ships, fleet tankers, blockade runners and ice breakers. The Air Force High Command was also asked to make sure that a sufficient number of Fl 282 U's be made available and, depending on the test results, to have some of this equipment made available for training purposes on board warships as soon as possible. Copy of above request as per l/Skl I L 12022/42 Gkdos., in War Diary Part C, Vol. V. The Naval Staff has also taken advantage of the opportunity to ask that the "FA Bachstelze" project be expedited so that these autogyros may be used temporarily aboard submarines and auxiliary cruisers.

Situation 3 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

Cruiser COLOMBO, which is homeward bound from the Indian Ocean, reached Ponta Delgada on 1 Jun. and Gibraltar presumably on 3 Jun.

South Atlantic:

The DIOMEDE sailed from Montevideo on 1 Jun.

Pacific Ocean:

Press Reports indicate that the Russian icebreaker MIKOYAN has left Callao for the United States.

3 Jun. 1942

2. Own Situation:

The German Armistice Commission (Economic Mission, Paris) reports via the Foreign Office that during the occupation of Diego Suarez the steamer WARTENFELS was put out of commission by her own crew by exploding her engine while in dry dock. The explosives were supplied by the French Navy. The explosion also damaged the entrance to the drydock which is 220 meters long, thus making the drydock unusable at the same time. French authorities believe that the crew was able to leave Diego Suarez in time.

A short signal was received from ship "10", which requested her supply ship to proceed immediately to rendezvous point "Messing" (see Radiogram 2238).

Previous to that, Radiogram 0558 had instructed ship "10" that, starting with 8 Jun., the REGENSBURG had been ordered to head daily for a point on the same longitude but 2° further south than the northern corner of the waiting area. The same radiogram also ordered the ship to arrange the supply and dismissal of the REGENSBURG in such a way as to permit the REGENSBURG to arrive at point Saale on 19 Jun. If the rendezvous cannot be kept, this information has to be radioed to the Naval Staff so that it can forward this information to Japan. Radiogram 1238 instructs the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN to be at point "Ernst" daily, starting 9 Jun., where a rendezvous is planned for ship "23". Ship "23" has received the necessary instructions by Radiogram 1620.

Auxiliary cruiser DOGGERBANK will probably reach Japan the beginning of August. Our Naval Attache in Tokyo is instructed to have the ship converted into a merchantman, since it is planned to use her subsequently as a blockade runner. He also is instructed to prepare docking facilities in Japan and to make preparations for overhauling the engine (see Letter 1701).

Radiogram 2021 has informed all vessels in foreign waters that our submarines stationed at the northeast corner of Brazil have been unsuccessful. The Naval Staff believes that all shipping has suddenly been re-routed from the coast to the center of the area Natal-Freetown, with the routes probably crossing in the vicinity of St. Paul. All vessels were further informed by this radiogram that the area of operation of our own three submarines has been moved up in a north westerly direction to the latitude of Guiana and that Italian submarines will operate off the Brazilian coast.

Radiograms 1800 and 1548 give instructions as to the position of Italian East Africa vessels and enemy reports respectively.

3 Jun. 1942

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

A list of the ships in harbors of the English coast according to photo reconnaissance during the month of May is contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIb.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Patrol boat "1510" has run free of the wreck and has sunk. It may be possible to raise her. The KONDOR and FALKE left Gironde in order to go into dry dock at Wilhelmshaven. They have arrived in Brest.

Channel Coast:

Enemy air raids on Cherbourg in the afternoon resulted in damage to transportation and to industrial and harbor installations. A naval battery shot down 1 attacking plane.

The 2nd and 4th PT Boat Flotillas laid mines in the area of Haisborough Sand and Orfordness during the night of 3 Jun..

Modified anti-submarine mines type A are to be used as a flanking minefield in the channel area in order to protect convoy shipping lanes against PT boats. The Naval Staff, therefore, has ordered that a group of 500 mines each be allocated for the areas off Calais, Boulogne and Le Havre to be used as flexibly moored surface mines. Because of the importance of this task, the Naval Staff attributes great significance to having the mines made available on time and without difficulty.

Copy of corresponding instructions to Underwater Obstacles Branch, with copy to Group West, as per 1/Skl IE 13159/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIb.

Special Item:

During the month of May, a total of 8 air raids were carried out against forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West. These resulted in a total loss of 3 vessels, and damage to 2. There were 42 dead and 78 wounded. Our forces definitely downed 4 planes.

3 Jun. 1942

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reports normal convoy activity off the British east coast. Radio monitoring reports increased air activity in the North Sea area.

Own Situation:

1 ground mine was cleared off Terschelling, 2 ground mines were cleared off Pellworm.

Convoy and escort operations are proceeding with nothing to report.

Special Items:

During the month of May, 42 ground mines were cleared in the area of Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North; 23 enemy air raids and 9 PT boat engagements took place. 23 enemy planes were shot down; 2 patrol vessels, 1 mine-exploding vessel and 5 steamers sank as the result of bomb hits, while 1 mine sweeper, 1 Danish trawler and 1 steamer sank due to mines. The Navy suffered 14 dead and 12 missing. Final figures on escort service are as follows:

591 vessels with a total of 1,110,689 GRT were convoyed; 290 of these vessels, with 617, 116 GRT were convoyed to Holland. 53 supply ships and 76 warships (43 of which were submarines) were convoyed.

These increased losses indicate greatly heightened enemy mine-laying and air activities. This will have to be stopped by all means if very serious interference with our supply lines is to be avoided.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Once again a submarine was spotted and chased off Sognesjoen.

Own Situation:

The enemy staged air raids on Vardoe on 1 and 2 Jun., but caused only slight damage. At noon of 2 Jun., a convoy was attacked by enemy planes near Egeroe, 2 bombs damaging the steamer DIETRICH OLDENDORFF. Further enemy air activity took place in Stavanger and Lister on 2 and 3 Jun. The net barrages I, II, and III at Utstikken near Oslo with double curtains and the north and south net barrages at Horten with only a single curtain are now serviceable for the time being.

Vice Admiral Kummetz has taken over command of the Task Force in his

3 Jun. 1942

capacity as Commanding Admiral, Cruisers with the LUETZOW as his flagship.

3. Arctic Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The British Admiralty reports that a large convoy (PQ 16) has fought its way to a North Russian port. The claim of the Armed Forces High Command that a total of 18 vessels has been sunk and that numerous others have been damaged represents an exaggeration of 175%, according to the Admiralty. The British report, based on eyewitness accounts by officers, states that the convoy completed this very dangerous trip with the loss of 6 to 7 ships.

Photo reconnaissance of 1 and 2 Jun. has shown the following:

Kola Bay:

40 steamships with approximately 230,000 GRT
6 destroyers
12 escort vessels
32 smaller ships

Iokanga:

7 steamships
8 coastal vessels

Archangel:

4 steamships, 50 km northwest of the harbor;
1 icebreaker and
15 steamships totalling 30,000 GRT in the northern harbor;
17 steamships with 35,000 GRT and apparently
2 naval vessels in the inner harbor;
12 smaller ships were distributed throughout the remainder of the harbor

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Sweeping of channels and convoy activities were proceeding according to plan in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea. The Dutch motor ship ANTARES was grounded on 2 Jun. as a result of hitting a ground mine in Langelands Belt.

5 enemy mines were cleared in the declared area east of Tytersaari.

3 Jun. 1942

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report from the Northeast Atlantic.

Submarines are reported sighted on the American coast off Nantucket Island and 240 miles east of Cape Lookout, while a report from the West Indies speaks of a submarine attack about 200 miles south-west of Santa Lucia.

2. Own Situation:

The Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters reports that the Fuehrer approves reassigning the 6 submarines to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines; these are the 6 submarines which had been earmarked to be added to those already assigned to Norway.

Success Reports: Submarine U "404" reports that the armed steamer WEST NOTUS (5,294 GRT) was sunk in quadrant DC 3212 and that the Swedish steamer ANNA was set afire in the same area. The Swedish steamer was sighted in quadrant DC 3267 on a zig-zag course. At night she travelled with her lights completely blacked-out. Her flag and the neutral markings on her hull were not seen until she had been set afire.

Submarine U "432" sank 2 trawlers by gunfire in quadrant BA 9896, and submarine U "172", while en route to the Caribbean Sea, sank a steamer of 5,000 GRT in quadrant DO 6724.

The Commander, Submarines, Italy has ordered the loss of submarine U "652" to be kept secret by all agencies. Submarine U "81" has entered Salamis with the crew of submarine U "652" on board. Details will be found in the supplement to the Submarine Situation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

In connection with the mine-laying task of submarine U "701" in the Chesapeake Bay (see War Diary 21 May), the Commanding Admiral, Submarines has been instructed that no mines should be laid north of the line from Cape Henry to Lightship CHESAPEAKE to 37° north in order to spare neutral traffic into Norfolk. This traffic is of benefit to us as well.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

For details of the effect of our own attacks on Ipswich during the night of 1 Jun. and on Canterbury during the night of 2 Jun. see daily situation report. One SC 1000 hit was observed directly next to the cathedral and 2 SC 500 direct hits on the cathedral were observed as well.

24 enemy planes were downed by our fighter planes during the day over the Channel; a 25th plane was downed by anti-aircraft fire.

3 Jun. 1942

91 German planes attacked Poole during the night of 3 Jun. 1942.

During the same night 40 to 50 enemy planes attacked northwestern Germany, concentrating on Bremen.

For details of the damage done see daily situation report.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Harassing raids on Malta were continued. The formation which had left Gibraltar, and is engaged in ferrying planes, was spotted at 1448, 50 miles northwest of Oran, already returning west at that time. It also was possible to intercept part of the Malta-bound planes in the Strait of Sicily and to down 9 Spitfires without damage to our forces.

3. Eastern Front:

During the night of 3 Jun., our Air Force continued air raids on the harbor and city of Sevastopol. A hit scored by an aerial torpedo sank a tanker of 3,000 GRT south of the Crimea.

Nothing to report from the Army fronts.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Mediterranean:

On 2 Jun., 3 submarines coming from the east put into Gibraltar. On 3 Jun., a cruiser of the CALEDON class, a destroyer and one of the smaller convoys put into Gibraltar from the west. The formation which left Gibraltar on 2 Jun. was first sighted by our planes 67 miles north-northwest of Algiers at 0635. During the day, it was repeatedly sighted by both our and Italian reconnaissance planes in the area between Algiers and Oran. It was on a westerly course and steaming at high speed. According to the Air Force, some planes took off from the formation and headed for Malta. (See air situation report.) According to radio intelligence, Italian planes attacked the formation at 0923. Italian reports indicate that submarines will be used for the supply of Malta; other sources speak of sail boats.

Radio monitoring indicates that several submarines in the Mediterranean have been relieved by submarines from home waters. This would tend to explain the arrival of 3 submarines in Gibraltar. Little convoy activity was observed between Tobruk and Alexandria. (For details, see daily situation report.)

A British Admiralty report of 3 Apr., which has only now been decoded, indicates that submarines PANDORA and "P 36" were sunk in the course of the air raid on Malta on 1 Apr. and that 2 mine sweepers were damaged at the same time.

3 Jun. 1942

2. Own Situation:

Mediterranean:

During the night of 2 Jun., enemy air activity was observed off Benghazi; apparently mines were being laid. No Italian reports are available concerning the results of the attack on the EAGLE formation. No situation report has as yet been received from operation "Theseus".

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Motor ship GIULIANI started her trip from Taranto to Benghazi on 2 Jun..

Otherwise, all shipping is proceeding according to plan with nothing to report.

During the month of May 1942, 6 ships transported a total of 19,433 tons of freight in the coastal waters of Libya. If the freight brought in from Italy is included, the total turnover of German Army supplies amounted to 32,459 tons in Tripoli and to 32,139 tons in Benghazi.

4. Area Naval Group North:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Photographic reconnaissance reveals only PT boats and motor mine sweepers in the harbor of Sevastopol, as well as a laid-up destroyer. Fifteen centers of conflagration can be seen in the city. Radio monitoring indicates 10 submarines and 1 destroyer in the western portion of the Black Sea up to the Crimea, and 1 destroyer in the northeast portion; during the day cruiser "E" was reported off the central east coast, as were 2 destroyers and 1 submarine. Cruiser "D" and 1 destroyer were reported in the area of Tuapse. 8 submarines were reported in the southeastern portion, while cruiser "A" was reported at sea in the central Black Sea.

Own Situation:

PT boats S "26" and S "28" left Constanta on 2 Jun., but returned because of motor trouble on S "26".

An Italian submarine chaser was unsuccessful in attacking a large transport vessel and 2 destroyer escorts with 2 torpedoes. This took place during the night of 2 Jun., 12 miles south-southwest of Cape Sarich.

3 Jun. 1942

One of two naval barges transporting fuel and material to the 1st PT Boat Flotilla hit a mine 7 miles south of Karavach and sank. She was on her way from Ochakov to Ak Mechet.

VIII. Situation East Asia

No Japanese reports have been received so far on the Japanese submarine attack on Sidney. Reuter reports that the wreckage of 2 Japanese submarines has been salvaged. The Australian Navy suffered losses in personnel as a result of this attack. The Domei Agency reports that all of the Solomon Islands now are occupied by the Japanese. Only air raids from both sides are reported from Burma. No official reports are available on the fighting in East China.

According to an exposition by the Japanese Military Attache to the German Ambassador in Ankara, the Japanese Naval Staff is of the opinion that the Allies might put naval forces into action in north-east Australia. No Japanese action with regard to India can be envisaged so long as the rear of the Japanese Fleet is endangered by Australia and so long as Singapore has not been restored as a base. Allied naval forces probably are based at Numba, Sidney and Auckland. For this reason the primary goal will have to be to secure all bases in New Guinea and in the Solomon Islands. An attack on Calcutta from Burma and on Ceylon will probably be possible only after the monsoon season. It is expected that the reconstruction of Singapore will take several months; American attacks on the Aleutian Islands at the same time represent a constant danger to the homeland; it will, therefore, be necessary to keep the bulk of the Japanese Fleet in the vicinity of the Japanese Islands during the summer months. It is hoped that Indian bases can be conquered in the Fall and that it will be possible to advance to the Persian Gulf from there.

This information is in agreement with information which the Naval Staff has received directly from Japanese authorities.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

On the Sevastopol front our artillery continued harassing fire on enemy positions and fortifications in cooperation with the Air Force with good results. No appreciable activity at the remaining fronts of this Army Group.

3 Jun. 1942

Central Army Group:

Forces engaged in reducing the pocket south of Vyazma were able to make some headway against stubborn enemy defenses. Otherwise little fighting.

Northern Army Group:

One of our divisions proceeded to attack the Lovat River sector in the area southeast of Staraya Russa in order to widen the supply line of the II Army Corps. It was possible to extend our territory by 4 km against strong enemy resistance. Our forces west of Yamno in the area of the 18th Army started to attack toward the west in order to enlarge the strip cutting off the enemy. The attack is gaining ground in heavy close-range fighting.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Nothing to report.

3. North Africa:

Nothing to report except for lively reconnaissance and artillery activity in front of the Panzer Army. Heavy attacks on the part of the Air Force effectively supported ground action against the Free French Brigade, cut off in Bir Hakheim. Continuous replacements of enemy tanks from Egypt have to be expected.

4 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

France:

The German government has requested Vichy to have the personnel of the American Consulate in Africa reduced to the number employed on 1 Jan. 1939. It has further requested that the future visits of American diplomats to Morocco be limited. Laval has declared his willingness to raise the issue in Washington in accordance with German wishes.

This measure will also have military advantages, as it will make conditions more difficult for the enemy intelligence service.

Great Britain:

Eden declared in the House of Commons that the limited aid extended to China is due to transport difficulties. A resolution was passed creating a new Ministry of Fuel and Coal, to be headed by Major Lloyd George.

Home Secretary Morrison's message to German workers and a similar declaration by Eden are contained in Political Review No. 128, Par. 3c.

Australia:

Foreign Minister Evatt fixed the main responsibility for the Pacific Front on the U.S.; the requirements for the maintenance of this front are very different from those needed for the war against Germany. He said that the victory of the Allies over the Japanese in the Coral Sea (i.e. the prevention of the attempted Japanese landing on New Guinea) has only reduced the threat to Australia, but has not eliminated it; he added that it is not enough to prevent a Japanese invasion of Australia, but that it is necessary to take the offensive.

Spain:

Symptoms of internal difficulties are discussed in Political Review No. 128, Paragraph 4.

U.S.A.:

The resolution confirming a state of war between the United States of America on the one hand, and Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria on the other, has unanimously been passed by the House of Representatives.

Special Items:

I. Concerning the Appointment of a Reich Commissioner for Maritime Shipping

On 20 May 1942, the Chief of the Reich Chancellory forwarded to the highest Reich authorities a copy of the decree by the Fuehrer concerning the appointment of a Reich Commissioner for Maritime Shipping.

4 Jun. 1942

The decree, bearing the same date, is not being made public and was therefore transmitted as classified material. The Naval Liaison Officer in the Armed Forces High Command reports that Vice Admiral Krancke participated in the final drafting of the decree as representative of the Armed Forces High Command.

The Operations Division, Naval Staff has made note of the changes in the final decree, as compared to earlier drafts, and has so informed the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff. These changes are as follows:

Instead of "Representative of Reich Shipping Firms", the official title is as indicated above.

Procurement, repair and replacement of available shipping space are emphasized.

There is no mention whatsoever of the necessary cooperation with the Navy. The Naval Staff is mentioned once, but not in this connection.

Final instructions will not be issued by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command as originally provided, but by the Commissioner himself, in conjunction with the Deputy for the Four-Year Plan; the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command; the Minister of Transportation; and the Minister of Armaments and Munitions. In this connection, too, no mention is made of informing the Navy of directives issued.

The future will show how far these instructions will affect the interests of the Navy.

A copy of the decree of 30 May 1942 which in Paragraph III appoints Governor and Gauleiter Kaufmann to the post, with headquarters in Berlin, together with the preliminary comments of the Operations Division, Naval Staff, is filed under 1 Skl I a 20147/42 in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

As a result of this decree, the relations between the Navy and the Merchant Marine enter a new phase. The fact that Vice Admiral Wuelfing von Ditter took over the post of Undersecretary for Maritime Shipping in the Ministry of Transportation about a year ago was not satisfactory, but proved to be only a half-way measure. The reason for this was that the Navy found it understandably difficult, even impossible, to obtain the desired influence in view of Von Ditten's dual capacity as Admiral-Undersecretary. This led to the realization that it is essential to place the Bureau for Maritime Shipping as well as all maritime shipping under the jurisdiction of only one office which would have complete authority. The Naval Staff felt that this authority should preferably be the Commander in Chief, Navy. The Fuehrer recognized the need for a

4 Jun. 1942

clear solution of this problem, without, however, agreeing to the suggestion of the Commander in Chief, Navy (See Report to Fuehrer, dated 13 May 1942) to place the Bureau for Maritime Shipping under the authority of the Navy. This then increases the importance of the request by the Commander in Chief, Navy for complete cooperation between the Commissioner and his agencies on the one hand, and the various branches of the Navy on the other. The Navy actually recognized its dependence on maritime shipping in wartime to such an extent that it was ready to take over the sole responsibility for maritime shipping. If, therefore, the new organization is to fulfill its task of "making coordinated plans for all maritime transports in accordance with the actual war needs, both strategic and economic, as well as procuring and properly utilizing all shipping space" with "all the effect this may have on the conduct of the war", then there can be no question but that the organization will have to cooperate closely and loyally with the Navy, as requested by the Commander in Chief, Navy. Only if this condition is met can the German Navy tolerate that it is not the sole agency responsible for both naval and maritime shipping, as is the case in other great sea-faring nations (e.g. Great Britain, Japan, United States, etc.).

II. The Underwater Obstacles Branch, Naval Ordnance Division does not feel that the sinking of PT boat "31" off La Valetta on 31 May was due to the surfacing of one of our own torpedo mines, Type A. This view has been transmitted to the Commander, PT Boats, German Naval Command, Italy by the Naval Staff, with a copy to the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla. Copy as per 1/Skl IE 13419/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

III. Losses of Enemy Cargo Space in May 1942

The sinkings in this record month include reports on:

Sinkings of 227 ships of 1,152,599 GRT,
Damage to 103 ships of 444,422 GRT.

A check by the Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, Naval Staff reduces these figures to:

227 ships sunk with a total of 967,420 GRT

136 of these, with a total of 645,270 GRT were sunk by German submarines. These figures then raise the total verified losses from the beginning of the war till 31 May 1942 to 17,612,358 GRT.

Copy of detailed tabulation as per appendices 1 and 2 of 3 Skl. F.H. (c) 9993 g. in file.

4 Jun. 1942

Situation 4 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

The Naval Attache at Buenos Aires, reports that the DIOMEDE still is in Montevideo. The French aviso D'YBBERVILLE and the French submarine GLORIEUX, which were en route to Dakar from Madagascar, were provisioned by the auxiliary cruiser QUEROY in the latitude of Angola. The QUEROY came from Dakar.

Indian Ocean:

British planes attacked Majunga and Tananarive without result. All anti-aircraft forces put up a stiff defense.

2. Own Situation:

In accordance with the wish expressed by Ship "10", Radiogram 2056 has instructed the REGENSBURG to proceed to point "Richard" immediately when she has completed her rendezvous with the DRESDEN, and to wait there for Ship "10" in accordance with sailing instructions. Ship "10" has received the necessary instructions by Telegram 1105. Because of the present scarcity of raw materials, it is desirable to safeguard all types of cargoes. For this reason all vessels in foreign waters have been advised to salvage as much of the cargo as possible from ships which cannot be taken as prizes and to employ supply or depot ships to transport the cargo to either German- or Japanese-dominated areas. Ship "10" was further instructed to take the NANKING to Japanese-dominated territory if possible, when she has completed her mission as supply ship. These instructions were sent out by Radiogram 2030.

Instructions sent to the Naval Attache in Tokyo deal with route "5" to be taken for the time being by the blockade-runners which are bound for Europe (see message 1802). Blockade-runners going to Japan will take a different route till they reach route "Gelb".

Information about the enemy situation was sent out by Radiograms 1528 and 2256.

The German Naval Command, Italy has transmitted the course of the Italian East Africa ships VULCANIA, SATURNIA, GUILIO CESARE, and DUILIO returning from Las Palmas to Gibraltar, and of the tankers ARCOLA and TAIGETE bound for Curacao from Las Palmas.

4 Jun. 1942

II. Situation West Area

Atlantic Coast:

The Gironde estuary has been closed temporarily because of suspected mine fields. Two ground mines were swept.

English Channel:

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance indicates no concentration of large or small vessels in the harbors of the southern coast of England. It spotted several PT boats with fighter escort 25 miles west of Boulogne at 0545. At 0630, 10 to 12 vessels, including 2 destroyers, several PT boats and motor yachts were sighted 10 miles west of Boulogne on a northwesterly course.

2. Own Situation:

A British landing attempt with rubber dingies took place between 0300 and 0310, 1 km north of St. Cecil, between Dannes and Le Touquet under cover of low flying planes. This attempt was beaten off by infantry, 2 prisoners were taken. An aircraft detector which remained undamaged is located 2 km from the landing point. Communications with the Army base at Dannes were interrupted temporarily. The Army fired on and drove off 4 to 5 enemy PT boats; during the engagement 1 of our own harbor defense vessels which sent out no identification signal because of an injury sustained by its radioman was hit and set aflame. The crew was saved. According to prisoner reports, it was planned to land 300 Britishers. Our own side suffered no damage or losses. Apparently, the vessels sighted by air reconnaissance were supposed to pick up these special commandos. At daybreak the 12th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla briefly sighted a small, rapid and very flat vessel off Boulogne, on a west-northwesterly course. For report by Group West and Commander, West see Telegram 1415.

11 vessels of the 2nd Patrol Division (12th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla was off Etaples, the 38th Mine Sweeper Flotilla was off Fecamp) were at sea between Boulogne and Le Havre during that action, but were unable to intervene because of firing from the coast (see Telegrams 1445 and 1625).

Because of a regrettable inefficiency somewhere in the Staff of Group West, the Naval Staff was not informed of these events at once. First reports of these events were received through the Air Force General Staff and from a communique of the British Headquarters. The latter indicates that the troops involved in this action were Commandos and supposedly obtained valuable information.

The mine-laying activities of the 2nd and 4th PT Boat Flotilla had to be interrupted during the night of 3 Jun. The 2nd PT Boat

4 Jun. 1942

Flotilla had to return because of engine trouble, while the 4th PT Boat Flotilla was unable to shake off its shadower. It thus would have been impossible to lay mines before daybreak. This task will be continued during the night of 4 Jun. For a brief report, see Telegram 0920.

The KONDOR and FALKE sailed for Le Havre from Brest.

In the afternoon, the enemy staged air raids on Boulogne and Dunkirk, causing slight damage and losses of personnel.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reports 4 large convoys off the east coast and 2 others in the Thames estuary. At 1040 contact was made with a formation consisting of 9 PT Boats and 2 naval vessels of undetermined type west of Egmond-aan-Zee, between Yarmouth and IJmuiden. They were repeatedly reported in the area northeast of Cromer until 0720; apparently they were engaged in a mine-laying mission. 1 submarine was located near Lister and Lindesnaes.

Own Situation:

Shortly after midnight 4 of our PT boats engaged 7 enemy boats in quadrant AN 8480.

A Danish trawler hit a mine north of Blaavands Huk, 1 freighter hit a mine east of Bursum and the steamer KATHARINA DOROTHEA FRITZEN hit a mine north of Langeoog. The vessels were either sunk or beached heavily damaged.

Convoy and patrol service in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North proceeded according to plan.

During the night of 3 Jun., enemy air activity was very lively in the area of East Frisia. The air raids centered on Bremen. Aerial mines were laid in the area of the East Frisian Islands.

Special Items:

I. In accordance with the request by the Naval Staff, orders have been issued by the Commander in Chief, Air for air protection of the mine-laying operations "Antonius" and "Julius" which will be carried out between 10 and 14 Jun. These orders were issued to the 3rd and 5th Air Forces and to the Commanding General, Air Force Group Command, Central Area with the 5th Air Force being responsible for over-all reconnaissance, the Commanding General, Air Force, Group Command, Central Area bearing responsibility for fighter and long-range fighter escort. For details, see Telegram 2125.

4 Jun. 1942

II. Group North reports that the critical convoy situation no longer permits anti-aircraft protection of submarines on trial runs in the estuaries of the Elbe, Weser, and Ems (see Telegram 0938).

2. Norway:

A Russian battery on the Rybachi Peninsula unsuccessfully shelled a convoy on 3 Jun. Current convoys have been slowed because of mines laid in the shipping channel Kirkenes-Tromsø. Nothing to report on the convoy situation along the north and west coast. 2 Russian aerial mines between points "Rot" 68A and 69 were swept on 3 Jun. 4 naval barges of the 21st PT Boat Flotilla are at present in Ramsund, 7 in Bodø and 7 in Harstad. The submarine chase in Sogne Sound has been unsuccessful so far. Enemy air activity was directed against Stavanger on 3 and 4 Jun. and against Bergen on 4 Jun.

Group North has issued orders to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean concerning transfer of the 8th PT Boat Flotilla to home waters together with the LUEDERITZ (see War Diary of 2 Jun., and Telegram 1629).

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Prisoner interrogation has yielded the information that 25 submarines were transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Arctic Ocean in 1941. This confirms our assumption that about 35 submarines are stationed in the Arctic Ocean. Supplies which are being shipped from Great Britain on the first convoy which can take arctic route to Siberia are supposed to be sent on to Western Siberia via the Ob and Irtysh Rivers.

Prisoner interrogation has confirmed the fact that a large naval yard is being built in Molotovsk and that the harbors of Amderma and Naryan Mar are being enlarged; waterways and rail facilities in the area are being extended.

Own Situation:

Group North has requested the Air Force Operations Staff to have aerial mines layed in the inner Archangel Bay, Onega Bay, Kandalaksha Bay and Mezen Bay. (See Telegram 1229).

The Naval Staff has requested the Air Force Operations Staff to ascertain whether it is possible to make available 1 BV 222 plane for a brief period in July, for picking up the personnel of the Navy weather station "Knospe" at Spitsbergen. This plane should be able to take along a land weather buoy weighing 500 kg. (See Telegram 1801.)

4 Jun. 1942

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

During the night of 3 Jun., submarine movements were observed between Kronstadt and Leningrad. A convoy of 4 mine layers left Kronstadt on 4 Jun. in a westerly direction.

2. Own Situation:

Convoy and transport service proceeded according to plan.

In the Skagerrak, the tests of the Mine Laying Experimental Command and the Torpedo Experimental Station continued. In the evening of 3 Apr. (June ? - Tr. N.) the Norwegian steamer GERSEKS, 4,969 GRT, hit a mine east of Cape Arkona and was heavily damaged.

A mine of unknown type was swept in the same area. The crew of the steamer GERSEKS was arrested in Sassnitz under suspicion of sabotage. No details are known as yet. The vessel is grounded in the Sassnitz roadstead.

3. Eastern Baltic Sea:

One enemy submarine was fired upon by an Army coast artillery station in the sea channel between Kronstadt and Leningrad and was forced to return to Leningrad.

Group North has requested the 1st Air Force to lay aerial mines in target areas A and B because it is evident that the Russians can leave Leningrad by way of Lissy Noss without using the channel. The mines laid in target area F up until now are believed adequate for the time being (see Telegram 1225).

The requirements of specific Navy tasks make it impossible to continue leaving naval forces on the land front, in spite of fullest understanding of Army needs. For this reason, the Admiral, Baltic States has requested return of Naval Artillery Battalion 531 as soon as the Volkhov pocket has been cleaned up. This battalion was temporarily made available to the Commanding General of the 18th Army and 50th Army Corps. The battalion is needed for the occupation of Tytersaari, for coastal defense and for artillery protection of Luga Bay (see Telegram 1855).

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

The intelligence service reports from Spain that a convoy will probably leave Gibraltar for the west on 5 or 6 Jun. Radio monitoring has intercepted submarine sighting reports which speak of submarines in the Gulf of Maine, in the areas of Chesapeake Bay and northeast of Boston. It also intercepted a report that the British steamer GEMSTONE (4,986 GRT) has been fired upon 180 miles northeast of St. Paul's Rocks.

4 Jun. 1942

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "404" reports that the Swedish steamer ANNA sank after 5 hours (see War Diary 3 Jun.). The steamer NOTUS will probably sink. Submarine U "106" has sunk the steamer HAMPTON ROADS (2,689 GRT) in the West Indies on 1 Jun. The 5,000 GRT steamer which was sunk in quadrant DL 3746 on 29 May has been identified as the SS BUNGLOE (5,318 GRT) (tonnage was estimated correctly).

The submarines in the South Atlantic report as their first success the sinking of the tanker HOEGH GIANT (11,000 GRT) in quadrant EQ 4671.

Submarine U "331" which is in the Mediterranean, made contact in quadrant CO 9917 (northeast of Sollum Bay) with a convoy of 3 vessels escorted by several ships and under fighter protection. 3 other submarines are operating against the convoy. Submarine U "331" reports she heard 2 hits from the three-fan fired at one of the escort vessels.

More details will be found in Supplement, Submarine Situation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

For details concerning the night attack against Poole consult the daily situation report.

11 enemy planes were downed by fighters in the West Area on 4 Jun. Armed reconnaissance damaged 2 Norwegian trawlers in the declared area in the Skagerrak. 59 of our planes attacked Sunderland in the night of 4 Jun.

40 enemy flights are reported over occupied western areas in the night of 4 Jun. Only minor damage is reported.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Air Force activity was concentrated on supporting the Libya operations.

3. Eastorn Front:

Large-scale attacks against Sevastopol are continuing. The Central Army Group has been used effectively in the Volkhov sector, as well as in rear areas. From the increased number of planes on air fields in the Murmansk area, the Naval Staff concludes the following:

a. The harbor and air field defenses in Murmansk are being reinforced against German attacks.

b. Plane parts brought in on the PQ convoys are being assembled for transfer by air to the remaining enemy fronts.

4 Jun. 1942

c. Heavy fighter forces are held in readiness to protect a possible enemy landing in the Petsamo-Kirkenes area.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Mediterranean:

The EAGLE formation has returned from the Western Mediterranean to Gibraltar, having completed the transfer of planes. The number of planes in Gibraltar is unusually high (106). A mine-laying cruiser which was sighted in the dock for the first time presumably reached Gibraltar on 2 Jun. Intelligence reports damage to the cruiser at the bow above the water line and a broken propeller blade. The cruiser presumably landed 150 members of the Air Force. The British radio reports that a British cruiser has collided with a British submarine in the vicinity of Gibraltar. It is possible that the damage to the mine-laying cruiser is due to this accident.

Rather heavy convoy activity was observed in the Central Mediterranean in the area between Tobruk and Ras Azzaz during the day. Details and the daily situation report will be found in Telegrams 0630 and 1840.

Nothing to report from the Eastern Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation:

Mediterranean:

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla went into action with 4 boats between Tobruk and Ras Azzaz during the night of 3 Jun. After numerous misses, 1 enemy destroyer was sunk by PT boat "57".

This first important torpedo success of the PT Boat Flotilla in the Mediterranean is especially gratifying.

The German Naval Command, Italy requests that the report of this sinking not be published for the time being. For a brief report see Telegram 1720.

Cargo unloaded in Derna on 3 Jun. amounted to 710 tons.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Nothing to report concerning supply shipments to Tripoli. While transporting supplies to Benghazi the motor ship GUILIANI was sunk by an aerial torpedo. Coastal supply transports were pro-

4 Jun. 1942

ceeding according to plan with nothing to report.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No reports are available.

Own Situation:

The Navy suffered no damage during an enemy air raid on Nikolayev on 3 Jun. On 3 Jun., 2 fighter planes with German markings fired on an Italian submarine chaser near the coast, which was carrying the Commanding General, 11th Army on an inspection tour. Reports indicate that not one of the planes of any of the German fighter wings which could be involved was in the immediate area at that time; it is, therefore, possible that the enemy may have used German markings. The investigation is still in progress. 2 men were killed in the attack, one of them Commander von Wedel (see Telegram 0945).

5. Organization:

The Italian Navy has made some suggestions concerning the command organization of Italian naval units in the Black Sea and Lake Ladoga. Accordingly, Rear Admiral Catalano Gonzaga is to take charge of the unit in the Black Sea, while Admiral Bertoldi will be in administrative command of the unit in Lake Ladoga. The Naval Staff does not object to this arrangement and has so informed the Chief of the Italian Liaison Staff, attached to the Commander in Chief, Navy (a copy was sent to the German Naval Command, Italy). Naval Staff adds that this does not affect the operational command of the [German] Admiral, Black Sea over the Italian forces in the Black Sea; Italian forces in Lake Ladoga are to be placed under the Finnish fleet command corresponding to the arrangement for German units.

Copy as per 1 Skl Im 13286/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

Domei reports the occupation of the railroad junction Yung-K'ang-hsue on the Canton-Hankow line on 3 Jun.

Reuter reports that Japanese plane formations were sighted over the east coast of Ceylon and 4 Japanese bombers and 15 fighters attacked Dutch Harbor on 3 Jun.

4 Jun. 1942

The German News Agency (DNB) reports that 2 of the Japanese midget submarines which were lost in the Japanese attack on Sydney have been raised.

IX. Army Situation:

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Situation unchanged. The day was quiet with the exception of an attack by the enemy in regimental strength west of Tim. 2 battalions succeeded in penetrating the Hungarian main line of resistance.

Central Army Group:

The pocket east of Dorogobuzh and northeast of Elnya is being further reduced.

Otherwise the situation is unchanged with no special engagements to report.

Northern Army Group:

The battle for the supply line to the II Army Corps, which began on 3 Jun. is slowly gaining ground. Enemy attacks against the line sealing off the Volkhov pocket were unsuccessful.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

The enemy is marking time and has brought up reinforcements in the area west of Bir el Gobi, without, however, proceeding to relieve the encircled De Gaulle brigade near Bir Hakheim.

5 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Items of Political Importance

France:

According to information which should be treated with the utmost reserve, due to its London origin whose content however is entirely within the realm of possibilities, the Socialist Party of France is supposed to have met in secret session. It is said to have agreed on a program for the liberation of France. This would include final defeat of the Axis, renewal of old alliances, restoration of the democratic republic and rejection of Petain.

This report gains special significance in view of the fact that the Fuehrer has ordered a moderate political line to be followed in conducting German-French relations.

General de Gaulle plans to transfer his headquarters from London to one of the Free French colonies in order to achieve greater independence and to increase his prestige.

Great Britain:

The debate on post-war policies is being continued in the House of Lords. A debate on the fuel situation has been announced in the House of Commons. For details see Political Review No. 129, Par. 2.

The arrival in Washington of Lord Mountbatten, the chief of the Commandos, is said to foreshadow increased American participation in the Commandos or even the last step in the preparation for a European invasion. According to an American radio report Mountbatten is supposed to have declared that the Allied invasion will take place before this year ends.

U.S.A.:

The Vichy government has caused a proposal to be forwarded to the Argentine and Chilean Governments to the effect that they register the 7 French tankers now lying at Martinique. U.S. Admiral Hoover, on the other hand, has requested that the French Admiral Robert turn these ships over to the American Government. The government in Washington is anxious that the Vichy government remain without influence on the negotiations on Martinique now going on between the 2 admirals. Washington feels that Vichy participation in the negotiations would bring the Armistice Commission into play. Washington, therefore, rejects the suggestion made by Vichy concerning the moving of the tankers.

This refusal probably is also based on the fear of American authorities that if these tankers are permitted to be transferred to either Argentinean or Chilean ports, they might succeed in breaking through into an Axis-dominated area. Both Germany and Japan, on the other hand, are greatly interested in having the proposal for transfer of registry carried out as rapidly as possible, since a break-through from Martinique into the open ocean is practically impossible, while the neutrality of both Argentina and Chile cannot be counted on with certainty much longer.

5 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Conference on the Situation with the Deputy Commander in Chief, Navy

I. Report of the Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff, who is at the same time the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy, at Fuehrer Headquarters

1. Because of the critical food situation, the Fuehrer authorized shipyard workers in Salamis to draw reserve rations. The Fuehrer based his decision on a report of Gauleiter Sauckel, Deputy for Manpower.

2. The Fuehrer has ordered that 20,000 prisoners of war be engaged in cleaning-up work in the shipyard of Nikolayev, directing that the work be completed within 3 months. At the same time provisions are made for 3,000 Russian shipyard workers to be transferred from Nikolayev to German shipyards. The Deputy Commander in Chief, Navy pointed out that it is advisable to organize these workers into labor battalions.

3. The Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries has expressed the opinion that the shipyard Control Staff, Riga is overstaffed and that its personnel could be reduced. The Chief, Naval Construction Division will be glad to act upon this suggestion. Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries also reports that 2 Russian 30.5 cm gun barrels are available, complete with breech assemblies. He also requests that no special unit be transferred to Windau, since the town does not have a German population. The Chief, Bureau of Naval Administration agreed to consider the matter.

4. The Fuehrer is of the opinion that either the underwater shape or the type of drive of our vessels is wrong, as an increase in speed of only 2 knots seems to require as much engine power as is required for a speed of 28 knots. The Fuehrer, therefore, has ordered that experiments be undertaken to test a bow drive. The Chief, Naval Construction division adds that this problem has been known for years and has been subjected to thorough analysis. In practice the difficulty simply lies in the impossibility of constructing a bow sufficiently strong to withstand the full driving power of the engine. The increased speed in which such a change in construction would result has been calculated to amount to a maximum of 2 knots.

II. Report of the Chief, Naval Construction Division

1. Concerning the PRINZ EUGEN

This vessel can be finished by 15 Sep. if the bunkers are not changed and if completion of one XB-submarine and of 2 destroyers is delayed by 3 months.

If the bunkers are rebuilt to increase the ship's range by 25%, its completion would be delayed by 6 weeks. During that time, however, it will likewise be possible to make alterations in the second fire control system which originally had not been completed.

The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff is of the opinion that it is very important to increase her range, for possible use in the Atlantic

5 Jun. 1942

Ocean. As regards the postponement of the completion of new constructions, he feels that a delay in the completion of a submarine can be more readily accepted than the delay of the two destroyers.

2. Concerning the Aircraft Carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN

It will not be possible to complete the ship within the 12 months previously estimated unless the C VII submarine program of the Deutsche Werft is abandoned.

The Chief, Naval Staff supported by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and the Quartermaster General, Naval Staff strongly protests against such an unfair proposal. The Fuehrer has ordered completion of the aircraft carrier and naturally promised to make available the additional number of workers required. Minister Speer received the order directly from the Fuehrer to make these workmen available and has promised details by 1 Jul.. Completing the GRAF ZEPPELIN at the expense of submarine warfare is definitely out of the question. In the event that Minister Speer should not make available the necessary additional contingent of workers contrary to the Fuehrer's directive this will have to be reported to the Fuehrer, pointing out that the Fuehrer's order concerning an aircraft carrier cannot be executed.

The Chief, Naval Construction Division added that the Central Committee of the Shipyard Industries has refused to make workers available for the GRAF ZEPPELIN.

Thus the whole controversy actually now is ready for appeal to the Fuehrer for a decision.

3. Concerning the Battleship GNEISENAU

The poor caliber of the shipyard workers in Gdynia and the imminent draft of 270 German workers into the armed forces will delay the completion of the GNEISENAU by not less than 6 months. In addition, the Chief, Naval Construction Division holds that work on the electric fire control installations would not be completed within the originally specified period of time.

The problem is to be submitted to the Commander in Chief, Navy for a decision.

As far as the Naval Staff is concerned, the statements contained in points 1 through 3, as revealed by the Chief, Naval Construction Division, are extremely painful news. Again the time at which it would be possible to conduct operations of increased striking power with at least 3 battleships and 1 aircraft carrier has been postponed considerably. The constantly increasing periods of time needed for construction and repair in our own shipyards are all the more regrettable in view of the fact that the enemy, clearly recognizing the strategic importance of an effective navy and merchant marine, has been able to multiply with ever-growing speed his shipyard output. The completion of a 10,000 GRT steamer in U.S. shipyards in not more than 105 days speaks for itself.

5 Jun. 1942

III. The Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff expressed his misgivings about simultaneously carrying out construction work in Kiel both on the GRAF ZEPPELIN and the PRINZ EUGEN.

The Chief, Naval Construction Division replied by saying that the dock in Danzig is too small for the PRINZ EUGEN. He added that Dock B will be transferred to Gdynia for the GNEISENAU.

The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff observed that the new completion date of the GNEISENAU might conceivably lead to decisions which would permit using Dock B in Gdynia for other purposes. The relief in the manpower situation which can be expected in the winter should also be considered in connection with decisions concerning long-term construction plans.

IV. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Department reports that Minister Speer has guaranteed to prepare for winter traffic the feeder road from Kvalsund to the Ivalo River leading to Reich Road 50. This work will be started only, however, if the loading capacity of Kvalsund can appreciably be increased. Otherwise Minister Speer intends to ship the supplies for Northern Norway and Lapland by sea to Helsinki; from there on northward he plans to use the railroad after expanding its capacity. The Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff would welcome this solution. However, the Chief, Naval Ordnance Division requests that first of all the possibilities of increasing the loading capacity at Kvalsund be investigated.

Special Items:

I. Situation Analysis by Group North as of 30 May:

1. The speed of convoy PQ "16" has been calculated to average 11 knots. This creates an entirely new situation for submarine warfare.
2. Therefore even earlier contact with the convoys should be attempted; the submarine groups should be echeloned in greater depth.
3. Execution of this suggestion is limited
 - a. by the danger of missing the convoy irretrievably.
 - b. by an insufficient number of submarines.

Submarines will, therefore, have to concentrate on maintaining contact with the convoy and attacking damaged ships and stragglers. This type of action promises particularly good results if there is close co-operation between submarines and the air force.

4. Fast convoys, both east and west bound undoubtedly will receive heavier remote and close escort. This probably will include carriers and submarines. This changes the conditions for attack by our pocket battleships on convoys.

5 Jun. 1942

5. Countermeasures:

a. Pocket battleships will run at greater risk.

b. All available forces in the area of Norway will be employed so as to achieve definite local superiority when attacking a convoy. Hence the attack will have to occur where the enemy has at his disposal only carrier planes and where he will be unable to bring up reinforcements from either Russia or the British Isles; in other words in the area 200 miles east to 150 miles west of Bear Island. Our planes will have to act as fighter planes in actions against the carrier planes. The increased danger they run will have to be accepted, just as the danger from submarines.

6. An operation, such as the one just described, can be repeated no more than once or twice, since it is to be expected that the enemy will so reinforce his escort, once we have been successful, that we will be unable to achieve even local superiority. With the return of the long dark nights we shall only use submarines and planes supported by mine fields in Kola Bay and at the entrance of the White Sea.

7. If surface forces are to be employed, it is particularly important to have adequate and continuous air reconnaissance, especially as a protection against the remote escort.

8. The primary target of all these operations unquestionably is shipping from the United Kingdom to Russia. Naval forces and westbound shipping from Russia to the United Kingdom are only a secondary target, i.e. they only represent a means to an end.

Comments by the Naval Staff:

1. The TIRPITZ group can only be employed, if, as in the case of the pocket battleships, there is adequate and continuous air reconnaissance.

2. Because of the need for coordination of air and naval forces, Group North should constantly be in close contact with the 5th Air Force, and vice versa. A unified command seems out of the question.

3. The use of the TIRPITZ is subject to approval by the Fuehrer.

4. The use of Arados as fighter protection may result in the loss of planes, the personnel of which will have to be picked up by the destroyers. Arados are available in sufficient numbers.

5. Oil Consumption: 16,000 to 20,000 tons fuel oil
1,500 to 2,000 tons heavy diesel oil.

6. If our planes make contact with enemy aircraft carriers, attack thereon should take priority over all other targets.

The same topic has already been discussed in the War Diary of 1 Jun. on the basis of the telegram of Group North to the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff. The situation analysis of 30 May, therefore, is primarily for the information of Admiral, Arctic Ocean; Admiral, Amphibious Forces; 5th Air Force; and Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

5 Jun. 1942

II. Concerning Blockade-Runners:

Information sent Group West concerning the new schedule for blockade-runners during the coming fall and winter months followed the lines of the discussion in the War Diary of 27 May under the heading "Merchant Shipping". The schedule was submitted to the Group for comment and to permit taking the necessary operational measures in the West Area. Copy of the instructions (Skl. IG 1068/42 Gkdos. Chefs.) in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

III. A list of enemy reports intercepted and decoded in the period from 25 to 31 May will be found in Secret Radio Intelligence Reports No. 22/42 of the Communications Intelligence Branch, Naval Staff, Communications Division.

Situation 5 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

Our intelligence service reports a convoy of 55 ships left Britain on 25 May with destination Freetown and Capetown. It allegedly is transporting 50,000 U.S. and British troops to Iran and Libya.

A QQQ signal "Suspicious Vessel Sighted" which later was revoked was intercepted. It was sent out by the Dutch steamer BLOMMERSDIJK about 1,000 miles south-southwest of Walfisch Bay.

Indian Ocean:

Our consulate in Lourenco Marquez reports that 3 U.S. vessels have arrived in Capetown, carrying mechanics to India. Canadian mechanics are presumably on their way to Rhodesia to establish an air base there. The traffic between Durban and Aden has grown heavier. Many instances of sabotage are reported on British, Greek and Norwegian ships. In Capetown, as in Durban, ships are experiencing coaling difficulties.

Japanese activity has begun quite suddenly in the area of Madagascar. Our Naval Attache in Tokyo was informed by the Japanese Admiralty that Diego Suarez was attacked by 3 small submarines. According to a report from the Vichy Telegraphic Service (Office Français Information), 1 battleship of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class and 1 cruiser of the ARETHUSA class were damaged. This report is denied by the British Admiralty. 3 steamers report they are in distress because of submarine attacks.

5 Jun. 1942

This would tend to explain the lively radio traffic encountered in this area since 31 May.

At 0802, radio station Colombo repeated a message from the steamer LYSIA stating that she had been fired upon at 0736 at a point 27° 33' south and 37° 05' east.

South Atlantic:

A distress report by the British steamer GEMSTONE was intercepted at 1210. It states that the steamer had been fired upon about 180 miles east of St. Paul's Rocks.

It is possible that this is connected with the activity of ship "23".

2. Own Situation:

As a result of negotiations between Great Britain and Spain, the neutrality zone off the northern Spanish coast has been enlarged from 3 to 6 miles. All Spanish ships in this area which are reported weekly are to remain unmolested by British naval forces.

Radiogram 1159 has instructed all vessels in foreign waters of this change. In the same communication attention is called to the necessity that officers in charge of prize crews which have been hired for Germany make and keep orderly muster rolls.

All German vessels in foreign waters have been informed of the sinking of the Swedish steamer ANNA by one of our submarines. It was added that Swedish ships under enemy charter frequently attempt to pretend they are neutrals by displaying neutral markings. Enemy situation reports went out in Radiograms 0621, 0201, 1628, and 2137.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report by a Belgian captain who is assigned to the Belgian Consulate General in Barcelona and who recently was in Britain on several occasions, experts in Great Britain consider July or August 1942 as the earliest moment at which a large-scale invasion of the continent can be counted on. So far, about 2,000 transport planes with a capacity of 60 men each are available. The use of ships has been restricted to the absolute minimum. The development of gliders is not yet far enough advanced (see Telegram 1601.)

Air reconnaissance reports 10 steamers, 2 destroyers and 4 mine sweepers on a westerly course south of Eastbourne in the forenoon.

5 Jun. 1942

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Submarine U "71", which was damaged 60 miles north of Santander by enemy planes, and has, therefore, been unable to submerge, has been picked up by mine sweepers.

Channel Coast:

During the night of 4 Jun., enemy air raids on Dieppe, Le Havre, and Ostend caused heavy damage in some places.

One harbor defense boat sank in Le Havre. Two motor mine sweepers were lightly damaged in Dunkirk on 4 Jun.

The FALKE and the KONDOR, which are on their way home, reached Le Havre and left for Dunkirk in the evening.

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla has completed its mine-laying task on the convoy route southeast of Dungeness according to plan. For a short report see Telegram C700.

Special Items:

I. According to a report of Naval Group West, 361 ships with a total tonnage of 360,200 GRT were convoyed in May 1942 in the area of the Group.

II. See Telegram 1225 for instructions of Group West concerning transfer of torpedo boats T "4", T "10", and T "14" to the west area and equipping them with 2 cm quadruple mounts, protecting paravane sweeps, and mine rails.

III. See Telegram 1130 for the request of the Commander, PT Boats for expediting the installation of radar reception sets on PT boats in the West area.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reports 16 steamers off Orfordness on a northerly course in the forenoon, 3 destroyers and 10 to 15 patrol vessels northeast of Great Yarmouth on an easterly course in the evening. There was little enemy reconnaissance activity.

5 Jun. 1942

Own Situation:

North of Norderney and Borkum, 3 ground mines were cleared. The steamer CATHARINA DOROTHEA FRITZEN has sunk. Convoy and escort service proceeded according to plan with nothing to report. In view of British operations on 4 Jun., Group North has requested the 3rd Air Force to transmit observations of enemy movements to Group North, with copy to Commanding Admiral, Battleships and to the 1st and 5th Defense Divisions. Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North and the 1st and 5th Defense Divisions are instructed to transmit all observations of enemy operations to Group North, with copy to the 3rd Air Force and the IX Air Corps, in order to assure the preparation of counter-measures without delay.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

In reaction to our extensive flank mine field off Sylte Fjord and Tana Fjord as well as to our use of submarine chasers, the enemy has recently tried to mine the shipping route with parachute mines. See War Diary 4 Jun. for details on the clearing of 2 mines.

The submarine chase off Lindesnaes was unsuccessful. Submarine chasers have reinforced convoys between Christiansund South and Stavanger.

In May 1942 a total of 681 vessels with 1,734,823 GRT were convoyed in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Norway. These convoys were attacked 6 times by enemy submarines which succeeded in sinking 1 steamer. 25 enemy air raids were made on naval forces, convoys and harbors in Norway. Two steamers were sunk by bomb hits. One enemy plane was shot down. The Navy suffered 6 dead and 4 missing. The merchant marine suffered 61 dead and 33 missing.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Vessels with 3 to 4 m draft can use Korabelny and Petrovski channels as well as the route along the Karelian Coast. Group North estimates that there are at least 20 Russian submarines ready for combat.

5 Jun. 1942

Unconfirmed prisoner reports indicate that 8 midget submarines are under construction in Leningrad. These presumably are 12 to 15 m long and have a crew of 2. Similar reports were received last year. PT boats and mine layers were observed in the area Leningrad-Kronstadt. Lively traffic of guardboats among the islands was also observed.

A prisoner report has now confirmed that the steamer ALICE KRONWALS sank because of bomb hits on 25 or 27 Aug. 1941 on the route from Reval to Kronstadt and that the steamer JAERWANAH hit a mine and sank 10 miles east of Hogland.

Air reconnaissance of Lake Ladoga on 5 Jun., indicated lively ship movements and many ships on the east and southwest shores, as well as in Schluesselburg Bay.

2. Own Situation:

Transport and escort service proceeded according to plan. In the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea 42 naval vessels, 91 merchant ships or troop transports with a total tonnage of 511,636 GRT were convoyed during the month of May. In the area of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea 5 hospital ships, 2 mine layers and 15 merchant ships with a total tonnage of 58,000 GRT were convoyed during the same month.

Group North suggests that the aircraft carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN be transferred to Kiel only after the SCHARNHORST and the PRINZ EUGEN have been completed, in order to avoid prolonged presence at one time of 4 large warships in 1 shipyard in Kiel (see Telegram 0909).

The Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff had expressed a similar reservation in the course of the conference on the situation with the Deputy Commander in Chief, Navy. See conference on the situation.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring intercepted a report from a plane concerning a successful attack on one of our submarines north of Santander. Another report concerning sighting a submarine 155 miles southwest of Brest was also intercepted.

Other reports of sighting submarines in the area of Cape Hatteras and Nantucket Island and one report on a submarine attack north of Puerto Rico were also intercepted.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "71", en route to her zone of operations, was

5 Jun. 1942

attacked in quadrant BF 9442 by an enemy plane and for a while was able to submerge only partially. Subsequently the boat reported that it would not be necessary for mine sweepers to pick her up.

No reports of successful actions off the American East Coast or in the West Indies have been received today.

In the Mediterranean, submarine U "453" reports 2 fan shots on 3 steamers in an overlapping formation on 4 Jun. She did not make a close visual observation, but does report a loud noise, similar to that made by a sinking ship, about 30 minutes later.

In accordance with instructions by the Naval Staff, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines has ordered all submarines to take the captains of sunk ships on board as prisoners, together with their papers, if this can be done without endangering the submarine or reducing her fighting potential.

Further reports from all theaters of operation and an estimate of the shipping situation in American waters as it applies to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, as based on submarine reports, will be found in the Supplement, Submarine Situation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

In the course of the day in the Channel area, 21 enemy planes were downed by our fighters, while 2 were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery; 9 additional planes were probably shot down.

During the night of 5 Jun., the enemy attacked the industrial area of northwestern Germany, bombing Duisburg, Oberhausen and Essen. For a report on the damage caused see Daily Situation report.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Harassing raids against Malta and support of the operations in Libya.

3. Eastern Front:

The attack against Sevastopol in waves was continued. Air support of the Central and Northern Army Groups.

5 Jun. 1942

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

Mediterranean:

Radio monitoring reports that British planes reported 2 destroyers on an easterly course about 28 miles north of Oran on the evening of 5 Jun. Air reconnaissance reports that 2 medium and 3 small steamers, 6 escort boats, 8 ships apparently naval vessels, and several lighters were observed in the harbor of Tobruk in the afternoon. A convoy bound for Tobruk was observed at noon, about 30 miles east-northeast of the harbor. It consisted of 6 smaller steamers, 2 escort vessels and 3 patrol vessels. Two naval vessels were also observed in Bardia at noon.

One of our submarines sighted 2 destroyers on an easterly course 20 miles east of Ras Aszaz.

Photo reconnaissance on the forenoon of 4 Jun. revealed that a battleship of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class still is in the floating dock in Alexandria. See daily situation report for further information on the ships in the harbor.

2. Own Situation:

Mediterranean:

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla patrolled the Tobruk area with 4 vessels during the night of 4 Jun., but sighted no enemy vessels.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The departure of the 2 CITTA steamers from Naples to Tripoli for the transport of Italian troops has been postponed indefinitely. For the present, 2 destroyers will take their place; they are to leave port on the evening of 5 Jun.

The steamer STURLA ran aground north of Benghazi during the night of 5 Jun., while returning from Derna to Benghazi. Other transports proceeded according to plan with nothing to report.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No new information reported by either air reconnaissance or radio monitoring services. Eight PT boats were located in the Sea of Azov.

5 Jun. 1942

Own Situation:

PT boats S "26" and S "28" left Constanta on 3 Jun. and remained in a lurking position off Sevastopol during the evening. On that occasion they observed that radio beacons and light beacons were operating. It is planned to repeat the same operation during the night of 5 Jun.

On 4 Jun. the enemy launched repeated air raids on vessels and trawlers off the northwest coast of the Sea of Azov. Slight damage resulted. Other enemy air raids were launched against Simferopol, Yalta, Eupatoria, and Kerch with no damage reported. It is reported from Taganrog and Berdyansk that small vessels fired on coast installations with light weapons.

The steamer ARKADIA temporarily ran aground on the Sulina sandbar in the course of the southbound convoy operation on 3 and 4 Jun.

VIII. Situation East Asia

No official Japanese reports have been received.

The U.S. Navy Department reports 4 air raids by Japanese planes on Dutch Harbor on 3 and 4 Jun.

Reuter reports that Japanese planes attacked Midway Island on 5 Jun. and that a large-scale action is under way there.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Our artillery, employing its heaviest calibers, continued destruction of enemy fortifications of Sevastopol as planned.

The enemy tried to cross the Donets near Balaklava at night, but his attempts were repulsed with heavy losses. It is believed enemy attacks will be resumed near Tim.

Central Army Group:

Our forces engaged in reducing the pocket in the Dorogobuzh-Zelna area continued gaining ground in the north, east, and south.

5 Jun. 1942

Northern Army Group:

The attack by the 16th Army Group, commanded by Eicke, is encountering stubborn enemy resistance. Dubovitsy was taken. On the Lovat enemy forces greatly superior in numbers succeeded in taking Prismozhye and Aleksandrovka. Our forces are staging a counter-attack. In the area of the 18th Army, enemy attacks were repulsed at the blocked-off area at Yanno after heavy night fighting. The enemy is again assembling heavy forces and tanks. South of Soltsy the enemy laid down a heavy artillery barrage lasting several hours, then proceeded to attack the bridgehead Kirishy from the south and southeast, supported by tanks. The situation there is very tense. An attack by our dive bombers in the afternoon relieved the situation temporarily.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

No action to report except for assault troop activities.

3. North Africa:

The enemy attacked in the early morning hours after extensive artillery preparation, using 2 tank brigades and 2 rifle brigades. The attack was launched against the central sector near Bir el Tamar and was supported by several tank units. This attack, which was launched from the east and north, was repulsed by our Panzer Army with heavy losses to both sides. In the afternoon our Panzer Army proceeded to a counterattack in an easterly direction. These successful offensive actions will continue on 6 Jun. The pocket of the Free French Brigade at Bir Hakheim was further reduced.

6 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

Minister Anderson declared that it is no longer a secret that large-scale actions are being planned, but no early developments can be expected. He added that the government should be credited with having been able to stave off the danger of invasion in the fall of 1940. Now an invasion need no longer be feared. He said further that the economic situation of Great Britain is not unfavorable at the present moment and that her ability to withstand the blockade continues to grow.

South Africa:

Malan, the leader of the Boer opposition, designated British imperialism and capitalism as the greatest enemies. After the declaration by Japan that she will not attack India but will promote Indian independence, he hopes for a German-Italian declaration that the Afrikaners will be permitted to form their own republic.

Sweden:

Our Legation reports that the flight by German planes over Swedish territory has caused disquiet and criticism. The Ministry of Defense tightened air defense regulations. Sweden has initiated a diplomatic protest to the German Government.

Turkey:

The German Embassy reports that German military successes in Russia have deeply impressed Turkey. The Foreign Minister expects the operations to result in a complete elimination of Russia and thus in a restoration of peace in Europe. Nevertheless, the government is anxious to preserve the impression of strict neutrality to the outside world. Censorship has practically prevented any news about the German-Turkish trade agreement from reaching the public.

U.S.A.:

President Roosevelt declared that he has received reports about the use of poison gas by the Japanese armies in China. He said that if the Japanese continued these inhuman methods in China or against any other Allied Nation, the U.S. Government will have to consider this as directed against itself and is ready to carry out reprisals in kind. The President stressed the fact that this warning refers only to Japan.

6 Jun. 1942

The Lend-Lease Agreement has been extended to cover Norway and the Netherlands.

Special Items:

According to an intelligence report, supposedly based on conversations of a Reich-German agent with leading British, principally military, personalities, the aim and purpose of the war is to eliminate dictators in Italy, Germany and in the Soviet Union. 1941 represents the turning point, since Germany was unable to defeat Russia in that year. The German leadership is said to have committed a grave mistake by having given up her defensive position with regard to Russia. Russia would not have attacked at that time regardless of provocations. The generals of the British Army have a fairly accurate idea of German personnel and materiel losses. The published figures, on the other hand, are intentional exaggerations for the purpose of propaganda. The present ratio of forces of the German Army to the Soviet Army is estimated to be 8 to 13, that of the two air forces as 1 to 1. The fighting strength of the German Army is thought to be superior, but not sufficiently so as to be able to destroy the Red Army.

The principal aim for 1942 is the weakening of Germany, particularly by Soviet Forces. If the German Army is to avoid a subsequent breakdown, it will have to reach the line Archangel-Astrakhan by fall. It is absolutely necessary to occupy Archangel, which is the principal port through which supplies reach Russia. This goal, however, does not appear to be at all within German reach; rather, it is thought that, despite German successes during the summer, the Red Army will not be beaten decisively. This then will form the basis of a German and Russian collapse. But even if this line were to be reached, Russia would still be in a position to continue the war beyond 1943 with a considerable number of troops. This circumstance is of extreme importance to Anglo-American plans. There can be no question of an invasion of France or Spain this year. It is intended to utilize the period till early fall, which is unfavorable to submarine action, to increase the number of U.S. troops in Scotland and Ireland to 250,000. Their present strength is 2½ to 3 divisions. Intensive training of airborne troops and paratroopers is now going on.

The earliest date when the invasion could take place is Spring 1943. The invasion is thought feasible, in spite of heavy coastal defenses, since it is felt that the German Army will have been weakened in the East. The biggest problem

6 Jun. 1942

is that of keeping up the supply line in view of the expected large shipping losses. Hence the principal aim is to develop a strong air force. It is believed that at least 50,000 planes will be available in the Spring of 1943, 1/3 of which are transport planes, 1/3 bombers and 1/3 fighters. The basic invasion plan depends, however, on the result of this year's Eastern Campaign. As for Japan, the Allies will limit themselves to stemming further expansion as far as possible, concentrating rather on the war in Europe. An important factor in political calculations is said to be the universal hatred of Germans. The anti-German front is said to include now not only the Spanish but even the Italian people. To repeat then, 1942 will be the decisive year of the war, regardless of the length of the war, which at the longest may extend till 1944.

It appears that this report gives a fairly good indication of responsible enemy opinion. The weakest point of the enemy is the problem of shipping space, as the report clearly indicates, and therefore this is the point where our side should exert its maximum efforts. The definite splitting of the situation into separate European and East-Asiatic strategic problems on the part of the enemy again indicates how we can effectively counter his plans, i.e. by realizing coordinated overall German-Japanese strategic ideas. This could cause a great deal of confusion to enemy planning.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Operations in the Arctic Area:

The Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters reports that he has informed the Fuehrer on the projected operation of the fleet forces, including the TIRPITZ Group. The Fuehrer did not seem to approve the operation wholeheartedly, but did not reject it either. The Naval Staff feels that the Fuehrer evidently does not thoroughly understand how this operation is to proceed and that he is not aware of the fact that this is an operation in no way entailing undue risk. The Chief, Naval Staff has ordered Vice Admiral Krancke to present this viewpoint to the Fuehrer once again. The Naval Staff is greatly interested in carrying out this operation, which, however, can only be accomplished with adequate air support (special air reconnaissance). To assure the needed air support the Naval Staff needs the

6 Jun. 1942

Fuehrer's consent, as the Air Force would otherwise cause a great deal of difficulty.

II. Submarine Action in Norwegian Waters:

The Fuehrer has ordered that the submarines which had been directed into the Arctic Ocean as a reinforcement because of recent reports on the imminent danger of a British landing in Norway can again be disposed of at the discretion of the Naval Staff. The reason for this is that the danger of a landing during the summer months can be regarded as small, particularly after the recent success of the Air Force against a PQ convoy.

The Naval Staff thus again has been given freedom of judgment, but does not intend to withdraw the boats at this time. Regardless of the question of an enemy landing, the principal problem in the northern theater now, as far as the Naval Staff is concerned, is the fight against the convoys to Russia. In any event, the situation requires a certain increase in the number of submarines. Hence there will be no change in orders.

III. Submarine off Martinique:

The submarine which had been stationed off Martinique at the order of the Fuehrer was damaged by bombs and had to be recalled. The second boat also is returning home. Hence there is no boat off Martinique just now. The Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command has replied to our inquiry by saying that no new decision of the Fuehrer is required, since the situation in Martinique is less strained at the moment.

IV. Question on the Creation of the Post of Reich Commissioner for Maritime Shipping:

The Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff has reported on his conference with Gauleiter Kauffmann, who has been appointed Reich Commissioner. The latter intends to leave pure administrative affairs in the hands of one of the administrative offices of the Ministry of Transportation, to combine all executive matters in the hands of a planning division (Tonnage Division) and to create a special Harbor Office to handle all harbor and transshipping problems. He plans to have Director Bertram of the North German Lloyd head the Tonnage Division. Gauleiter Kauffmann further has requested Captain Kaehler (of the Maritime Shipping Bureau) as an assistant, who could perhaps be utilized later in the position of a sort of "Chief of Staff" to the Reich Commissioner.

The Chief, Naval Staff has agreed to this solution, particularly since Vice Admiral Krancke reports that Gauleiter Kauffmann

6 Jun. 1942

is approaching his task in a very positive spirit and is aware of naval requirements; close cooperation thus seems assured.

V. Report by Chief, Operations Branch on the Situation with Regard to Brazil:

The situation has reached a point where a latent state of war actually exists. (Brazil follows the policy of the U.S. Government abjectly, treats all German Nationals very badly, and has completely violated all German interests. Some Brazilian ships have been sunk by submarines because their lights did not conform to regulations. There is increasing anti-German hysteria, Brazil even claiming to have sunk a German submarine during coastal patrol activities!)

The Naval Staff therefore has requested the Fuehrer to proclaim a state of war with Brazil in the near future by actual submarine operations. The Fuehrer is in basic agreement with this request, but wants to be sure that a sufficient number of submarines are available, so as to be able to counter the provocations of Brazil with a heavy blow at the very start.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines has been requested to determine when it will be possible to have a minimum of 10 submarines off the Brazilian coast.

(For details see also War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.)

VI. Japanese Intentions:

On 4 Jun. our Naval Attache in Tokyo forwarded the result of his conversations with leading Japanese Naval Officers (utilizing the estimate of the situation sent him by the Naval Staff). He makes the following points:

1. There is no question but that the Japanese recognize the vital importance of India. An attack on Ceylon still is scheduled for an early date on the operations program. The weather, however, will not permit carrying this out until fall.
2. The importance of the outcome of the war against Russia is also clearly recognized, but other pressing tasks make it impossible to participate in that war this year unless, perhaps, a Russian collapse is clearly indicated.
3. Hence an offensive will be launched against Hawaii and Australia, but the order of the projected attacks could not be determined. The first major action will start the middle of June. After that, new ones will be started approximately

6 Jun. 1942

every month.

VII. Operations Area off the American Coast:

Report by the Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division, Naval Staff.

Up until now the Naval Staff has not requested the declaration of a blockade area off the American coast, because it was not felt that this would lead to an increase in sinkings. Such a declaration would serve a useful purpose only if the blockade were perfect, i.e. if no exceptions were permitted. Hence we first wanted to wait for negotiations concerning shipping to be completed with friendly neutrals. Negotiations so far indicate that it will be very difficult to keep neutral traffic from harbors on the American east coast unless a blockade is declared. Spain alone has declared herself ready in principle to put into Gulf ports only, but expects concessions or exceptions. Portugal, on the other hand, demands the right of a neutral nation to put into ports of belligerents if the ports have not been declared as within a war zone. Argentina and Chile will probably take a similar attitude. The Foreign Office therefore expects that negotiations will be greatly facilitated if a blockade area is declared. This will make it possible to have neutral ships put into Norfolk, but no other port.

The Naval Staff is very interested in forcing neutral ships to put into Gulf ports only or, if this cannot be done, in any case to keep open only one route to the east coast, thus having a free hand in the remaining areas.

On 29 May, therefore, the Naval Staff suggested to the Joint Intelligence Division, Armed Forces High Command, also informing the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command; the Operations Staff, Air Force; and the Foreign Office, that the present operations area around Great Britain be enlarged so as to include an area limited by the following points:

45° 20'W, 20°N, 60°W, route "West", thence along the U.S. coast and the coast of Canada to Cape Harrison, Cape Farewell, and from there along the coast of Greenland up to 65° 24'N, 38°W.

The Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea have not been included so far, in order to avoid exceptions which it would be impossible to prevent at this time because of neutral shipping. The possibility of reexamining this question will however be kept in mind.

It is desirable to publish this declaration 10 days to two weeks before it becomes effective, in order to prevent neutral

6 Jun. 1942

shipping from entering the operations area and to avoid or at least reduce political complications which would result from sinking non-belligerent merchantmen.

That route to Chesapeake Bay which will be kept open to friendly neutrals will be communicated to the latter only. This will be the route from Norfolk to Bermuda and from there either in an easterly direction to a point $32^{\circ} 25'N$, $43^{\circ} 10'W$, or in a southerly direction to a point $21^{\circ} 45'N$, $60^{\circ} 10'W$; or, in the case of Swedish shipping bound for Goeteborg from $54^{\circ}N$, $30^{\circ} 50'W$ at the boundary of the present operations area to a point $45^{\circ}N$, $35^{\circ}W$ and from there in a direction $35^{\circ}W$ to the limit of the new operations area at $36^{\circ} 40'N$.

The Foreign Division, Armed Forces High Command has been asked to obtain final approval from the Foreign Office and then to obtain a decision of the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command.

Before further action is taken it is necessary that our naval attaches first inform Japan and Italy, and that all countries with a merchant marine receive notes to this effect no later than the time when the declarations of our naval attaches or military representatives are made public.

Sweden should be informed confidentially of the possibility of continuing her Goeteborg traffic, while Switzerland, Spain, Portugal and Argentina should be informed confidentially of the possibility of approved runs to Baltimore and Norfolk.

Copy of corresponding directive as per 1/Skl. I ia 11997/42 Gkdos. in Files "Directives for Warfare against Merchant Shipping".

The Chief, Naval Staff approves this proposal.

VIII. Norway Voyage of the Commander in Chief, Navy:

At the end of the conference on the situation, the Commander in Chief, Navy discussed various questions which came up during his eight-day voyage to Norway. Some of them need clarification.

Special Items:

I. The increasing demand for cargo space has caused the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command to request the Armistice Commission to renew negotiations for the cargo space

6 Jun. 1942

of non-French vessels lying in French harbors. The German Armistice Commission is not to take the first step in this matter, but is to make this offer in return for fulfilling present French demands, principally those concerning West Africa. The question should be handled as a purely military matter, which needs as little political preparation as it does political concessions. The French Government is being informed by the Foreign Office about the uselessness of political requests in this connection.

In view of these instructions, it is to be feared that the attempt at gaining additional cargo space will fail this time, too.

II. The special operation on the Rybaohi Peninsula will probably be executed in the fall of this year or in the spring of 1943. Two landing flotillas of about 60 naval barges each will be required. The Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff has been requested to supply these flotillas, which will be assembled by the Admiral, Amphibious Forces from naval barges which will be completed during the summer months. The Operations Division, Naval Staff will inform the Admiral, Amphibious Forces of the nature of the task in time to permit proper training for it. A request has been sent to the Officers Personnel Division, Naval High Command for a staff officer to be assigned to the Naval Shore Commander, Kirkenes for the same mission. This officer will also act as liaison officer to the Commanding General, Lapland and to the Mountain Troop Corps, Norway. He is to commence his tour of duty no later than the beginning of August.

III. In accordance with the Fuehrer Directive dated 7 May 1942, all departments of the Office of War Economy and Armament which are concerned with the execution of the armament program, as well as all subordinate armament sections under the Armed Forces High Command, have been placed directly under the Minister of Armaments and Munitions in order to achieve unified direction of the armament economy for the duration of the war.

The report on the war economy prepared by the Armament Office, Armed Forces High Command for the month of April, 1942 indicates no basic changes. A reprint of the report will be found in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XII.

Situation 6 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

6 Jun. 1942

1. Enemy Situation:

Indian Ocean:

The number of urgent radio messages indicates the enemy has again been engaged in the western portion of the Indian Ocean. Radio monitoring intercepted a number of emergency messages off the African coast, including a distress signal from the Dutch steamer EDAM which came from an area about 200 miles southeast of Zanzibar. They also intercepted a distress signal (RRR) of an unknown steamer which was fired upon 120 miles southeast of Beira. Colombo received a report from the Norwegian motor ship INDRA saying that she had been attacked by a plane with British markings about 50 miles north of Trincomali.

Japanese headquarters reveals a surprise attack on Diego Suarez by special units of the Japanese Submarine Arm, which took place in the early morning hours of 31 May. A battleship of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class and a cruiser of the ARETHUSA class are reported torpedoed and heavily damaged. (For British denials see War Diary 5 Jun.)

Pacific Ocean:

Reuter reports indicate that the operation off Midway is not yet completed. Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet reports heavy attacks by Japanese carrier planes on Midway Island. According to this report only slight damage was caused on the island, but the attacking planes suffered heavy losses. Presumably 1 Japanese battleship and 1 aircraft carrier have been damaged, while hits were scored on other ships.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Photographic reconnaissance reports 26 freighters, mostly under 800 tons, 20 landing vessels, 8 boats (apparently PT boats) and 6 additional smaller naval vessels in Dover at noon. Air reconnaissance observed little shipping in the western Channel.

6 Jun. 1942

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Our Naval Attache in Madrid reports that the Italian submarine TORELLI ran aground at the Spanish north coast between Aviles and Gijon during the night of 3 Jun. while heading through fog for the Spanish territorial waters after a bomb attack by enemy planes.

Group West was ordered to prepare supply ship UCKERMARK for tasks in foreign waters during the period of the new moon in July.

Channel Coast:

While returning home from Le Havre, the FALKE and KONDOR had an engagement with 2 British motor gunboats at 0200 in quadrant BF 3359. One of these was sunk, the other was heavily damaged and probably sank. For a brief report on the engagement see Telegram 0700.

During the night of 5 Jun. the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla carried out its mine-laying task according to plan without being detected. See Telegram 1230 for a brief report. The 2nd PT Boat Flotilla transferred to Ostend during the night of 6 Jun. Group West reports that the 4th PT Boat Flotilla carried out a mine-laying operation the same night.

Following a suggestion of the Naval Staff, in the interest of security, Group West will henceforth omit the locality when reporting plans of future PT boat actions.

Special Items:

The Naval Staff also approves the suggestion of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West, supported by Group West, concerning a change in the armament of naval barges so that they can be used as gunboats against enemy PT boats. The Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff, will issue the necessary orders.

6 Jun. 1942

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reports a formation of apparently 12 patrol vessels and 2 destroyers east of Great Yarmouth.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Norway:

Convoy and escort service proceeded according to plan with nothing new to report. Group North transmits the request of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, that a repeating station be set up in Kirkenes and the LUEDERITZ be left in the Northern Area. The TSINGTAU should be withdrawn instead with the 8th PT Boat Flotilla. (See Telegram 1412.)

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

The Air Force Operations Staff reports that the principal type of enemy planes used in the Tromsø-Hammerfest area is the Consolidated, operating from bases in the Murmansk area.

Own Situation:

The Naval Staff has requested the Air Force Operations Staff to mine the Gulf of Archangel, Onega Bay, the inner Kandalsksha Bay and Mezen Gulf, in accordance with the request by Group North, War Diary 4 Jun. (see Telegram 1802).

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Baltic Sea:

Convoy and patrol activities proceeded according to plan.

Mine fields "Brummbaer" I and II were laid off Kronstadt Bay in accordance with plans.

6 Jun. 1942

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The boats in the Caribbean Sea report welcome news. Submarine U "158" sank a steamer of 6,000 GRT on 2 Jun., another steamer of 4,000 GRT on 4 Jun. and another one of 4,000 GRT on 5 Jun.!

Reports of these sinkings and of an unsuccessful chase of a fast passenger ship in the same area, after one torpedo misfired, prove that shipping is quite lively in Yucatan Strait.

A 7,000 GRT passenger steamer was sunk by submarine U "107" on 1 Jun., while submarine U "68" was able to report that it sank 2 tankers of 9,000 and 12,000 GRT respectively on 5 Jun. Submarine U "502" sank the tanker M.F. ELLIOTT on 3 Jun. (6,940 GRT).

In view of this total of 48,940 GRT sunk, the Armed Forces High Command issued a special communique.

The boats in the South Atlantic and in the Mediterranean did not send in any reports.

See Supplement to Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV. for additional information.

The regulations in force so far according to directives issued to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines (see War Diary 30 May) concerning operations of German submarines off the coast of Brazil have in the meantime been superseded, since the Fuehrer has decided to strike back at Brazil by opening hostilities in the form of a massed and sudden submarine attack.

To do this it will be necessary to have an adequate number of submarines make their appearance simultaneously off the principal ports of Brazil. The Naval Staff feels that 10 to 15 boats are necessary for this task.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines was asked for his estimate of the situation and his report as to when and with what effect it will be possible to carry out this task, on the assumption that the decision of the Fuehrer will be made in 8 to 10 days. This task will make it necessary to neglect the present area of operations in the Atlantic. A copy of the

6 Jun. 1942

telegram to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines as per 1/Skl. In 1070/42 Gkdos. Chfs. will be found in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

The Commander, Submarines, Italy reports that 1 submarine is being put into action in the Eastern Mediterranean, starting 6 Jun. Its exact zone of operations is in the area south of 33°N, from 29° 10'E to the coast of Palestine, ship traffic between Alexandria and Port Said being its principal target.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

In the course of the day, 13 Spitfires were downed by fighters and 2 other planes by anti-aircraft artillery in the Channel area. Two fighter-bombers attacked the urban area and railroad installations of Bournemouth in the late afternoon. Fifty-two of our planes attacked Canterbury during the night of 6 Jun. Our losses during night raids on the English south coast have recently been rather heavy since enemy fighters continued pursuit of our planes up to the French coast. Five of our bombers were lost in this manner during an attack on Poole.

The enemy carried out an extremely effective attack on Emden during the night of 6 Jun. The very considerable material damage has resulted in an appreciable drop in production in all shipyards. For details see daily situation report.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Nuisance raids against air fields on Malta are continuing, as is air support of the operations in Libya. The number of British planes reported shot down on their flight to Malta on 2 Jun. after having left the ships on which they were transported, has subsequently been corrected from 9 to 5.

3. Eastern Front:

Waves of planes attacked Sevastopol, artillery and field positions, troop assemblies, railway batteries and anti-aircraft artillery positions in full force.

6 Jun. 1942

Special Item:

The suggestion was made to the Minister of Aviation and the Commander in Chief, Air to further the project of Graduate Engineer Mohring by building a model or a dummy of his helicopter. Copy of a letter to this effect (1/Sk1. 1L 13 471/42 Gkdos.) will be found in War Diary, Part C, Vol. V.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Mediterranean:

A cruiser of the CALEDON class left Gibraltar on 5 Jun., destination unknown. Cable layer MIRROR put out to sea on 6 Jun., in a westerly direction.

Air reconnaissance reports increased convoy and patrol activity between Alexandria and Tobruk. For details see daily situation report.

2. Own Situation:

Mediterranean:

The night of 5 Jun. witnessed an enemy air raid on Naples and Benghazi. Presumably, mines were laid at the latter place. The Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy has repeated his request that the sinking of a destroyer by a PT boat be kept secret for the time being. It is planned to release this news in connection with the activity of PT boats off Malta. (See Telegram 1025.)

According to the situation report of the THESEUS the naval situation is unchanged. The total cargo discharged at Derna was 518 tons on 5 Jun., 463 tons on 6 Jun.

It has again been reported that chromium ore is being shipped by the enemy to Egypt from Turkey in increasing quantities. The German Naval Command, Italy has therefore been asked whether Italian submarines have been or will be sent into action against this shipping. This is considered very important by the Naval Staff.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Transfer proceeded according to plans. Nothing to report.

6 Jun. 1942

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The lack of escort vessels has caused postponement of the convoy of tankers OSSAG and ELLI.

The Swedish supply ship STUREBORG has left Piraeus. Otherwise transport and escort service is proceeding according to plan with nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring reports movements of naval forces on the usual scale. Air reconnaissance indicates surprisingly few ships in the harbor of Sevastopol.

Own Situation:

The mission of PT boats S "26" and S "28" off Sevastopol was completed according to plan during the night of 5 Jun. No ships were observed with the exception of patrol vessels. PT boats S "27" and S "40" are proceeding down the Danube from Linz to Constanta. The northern convoy is proceeding according to plan.

Three more Italian submarines are in Constanta, ready for action. It is planned to have them leave for the Crimea on 7 Jun.

VIII. Situation East Asia

The Headquarters of the U.S. Army Air Force reports a heavy bomber raid on the harbor and shipping of Rangoon on 4 Jun. The effect of the raid could not be observed.

Partly contradictory reports have come in from Tokyo and Chungking concerning stubborn Chinese-Japanese fighting. Japanese troops have occupied the citadel of the city of Fuchow in the province of Kiangsi on 5 Jun. Japanese headquarters reports that 3 of the special submarines which participated in the attack on Sydney during the night of 1 Jun. did not return to their bases. The German News Agency (DNB) reports that when one of the Japanese submarines destroyed off Sydney was raised, the type revealed was not

6 Jun. 1942

the well-known 2-man submarine used at Pearl Harbor, but a somewhat larger boat with a crew of six.

For operations off Midway Island and against Diego Suarez see Enemy Situation Pacific or Indian Ocean.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Our heavy bombardment at the Sevastopol front was continuing according to plan. Enemy attacks were beaten off southeast of Balakleya and in the area of Tim.

Central Army Group:

Our offensive operations to gain control of the road from Kirov to Bryansk in the area of the 2nd Panzer Army continued successfully. In the area of the 4th Army, our divisions southwest of Vyazma reached Dorogobuzh in their westward advance. East of Yelnia, our forces pushing north made contact with a group from the north. The offensive operations around Sychevka, which is in the area of the 9th Army, continued successfully.

Northern Army Group:

Enemy tank attacks south of Lyubnitsa, as well as at Pola and Lovat Rivers were beaten off. Southwest of Staraya Russa our forces captured several localities on their southward advance. Stubborn fighting for the bridgehead Kirishi, south of Soltsy, is continuing.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

Armored units of the 1st British Armored Division were forced out of the area Bir el Harmat and Bir el Tamar and driven up to 15 km southwest of El Adem. In the course of these successful battles, heavy enemy forces were encircled and annihilated northwest of Bir el Harmat. The number of prisoners captured on 5 and 6 Jun., has reached almost 4,000.

6 Jun. 1942

In the evening of 6 Jun., the enemy again made contact with the southern wing of our central front sector. The troops which had encircled the enemy near Bir el Hacheim have fought through the outpost area and now are at the main line of defense.

7 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

The Minister of Agriculture spoke of the need for a maximum increase in agricultural production in Britain. He gave as a reason the need for cargo space, created by the heavy shipping losses and by the requirements for the offensive which it is hoped will begin soon. These losses will continue, he said, even though the United Nations are furnishing all possible aid. Less ships are available this year than last and many less than 2 years ago. It may be possible to make up these losses, but this will require much time.

According to a report by the German Legation in Lisbon, one of the leading personalities in Portuguese economic circles has expressed extremely pessimistic views on the chances of Great Britain to win the war. India is lost for Britain who herself gives evidence of widespread economic breakdown. British-Portuguese tension is said to have reached an all-time high. Salazar is said to have threatened a complete break in relations if the British continue to hamper imports from Portuguese colonies. As a result, it now seems as though Britain will give in.

These reports help to prove the strategic importance which must be attributed to operations against the British supply lines and against Allied shipping.

Special Items:

I. The Fuehrer has approved the extension of the operations area in the Atlantic Ocean as requested by the Naval Staff (see War Diary 6 Jun.). The Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff has requested the Naval Staff to see to it that this is made public in agreement with the Foreign Office, and that allies of Germany as well as neutral countries are informed of the change.

Copy of the telegram from the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, as per 1/Skl, 13664/42 Gkdos., in File "Instructions for Warfare against Merchant Shipping".

7 Jun. 1942

II. Results of Conferences between the Chief of Staff, Group South and the Naval Staff (Early June).

1. The Naval Staff agrees to having 56 small vessels shipped to Mariupol by rail as soon as possible. 26 of these vessels are suited for towing, and hence for mine-sweeping. These vessels will be manned by Croatian crews from the Coastal Defense Flotilla and by German crews of the Harbor Defense Group Mariupol. The latter are already on their way. These vessels will replace Russian cutters which have proved worthless and which will be assigned to the transport fleet of the Supply and Transports Office, Mariupol.

2. The Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff is making available 10 more vessels of the type of revenue cutters or similar types for operations in the Aegean Sea. If these vessels can be transported by rail, they will be sent to Salonika; otherwise they will be dispatched by way of the Danube and the Dardanelles. These vessels are primarily intended for patrol duty around the Greek islands.

3. The Operations Division, Naval Staff recognizes the need for continued construction of naval barges required for the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea, in view of the shortage of other types of ships and the tasks still ahead.

The Operations Division, Naval Staff will do its utmost to have additional naval barges constructed for both the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. This will be done, if possible, immediately following the completion of the present construction program, in order to be able to replace any ships lost, as well as to add to the present force. At present, 20 naval barges are being constructed in Palermo. These are urgently needed for immediate action in the Aegean Sea if only because of the imminent transfer of the Siena group and for the supply of Crete which is important for the African campaign. Hence, an additional 40 barges have been ordered as the next installment for the Aegean Sea. In addition to the barges already under construction, 40 more barges have been ordered for the Admiral, Black Sea. This excludes any orders for further barges requested from the Armed Forces High Command for the Commanding General, Southeast and the Southern Army Group. Material for them is to be provided for the Navy by the Armed Forces High Command.

7 Jun. 1942

4. The Operations Division, Naval Staff will attempt to clarify the situation with regard to Salamis, the base of the Piraeus area. It is planned to retain and expand Salamis, thus making it the only place in the whole Aegean area where it will be possible to do construction and repair work. This requires retaining the anti-aircraft defenses at their original level, as well as retaining a skeleton staff of 50 skilled submarine mechanics so that minor repairs can be made on 2 to 3 submarines at a time. It also requires speeding up the transfer of the 300 shipyard workers who have been promised by the Naval Construction Division and who are needed for continuing important repair and construction tasks. The Naval Staff also is of the opinion that the Salamis submarine base should by all means continue functioning at its present level in the interest of submarine warfare in the Mediterranean and in order to be able to commit the boats to action more rapidly. The need for this has been demonstrated by experience.

5. To enable the Admiral, Black Sea to transfer his headquarters to Russian territory, the Naval Staff will urge that communications between Bucharest and Nikolayev be improved at once and that at least 2 teletype trunks and 2 telephone trunks be made available for the exclusive use of the Navy. As explained by the Submarine Division, Naval Staff, an inquiry will have to be made as to whether the Armed Forces High Command will not have to assign German rather than Rumanian authorities to the operation of communications between Bucharest and Nikolayev, in order to guarantee their satisfactory functioning.

6. The Operations Division, Naval Staff recognizes the need for adequate personnel, from both a quantitative and qualitative point of view, particularly for the Black Sea area. The Operations Division is being requested to support corresponding requests by the Group Command.

III. The German General attached to Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces has transmitted to the German Armistice Commission the stand taken by the Italian High Command in connection with the request by the Armed Forces High Command for mining the Strait of Sicily (see War Diary 22 May):

1. The French air and naval forces available in Tunisia (34 fighter planes, 26 bombers, 5 torpedo boats, 2 rapid dispatch boats, 2 submarines, 4 armed tugs) are believed adequate for

7 Jun. 1942

preventing the ferrying of enemy planes and for stopping single coastal steamers.

2. If Tunisian coastal waters are mined, then these mine fields, together with any Italian mine fields, will block the passage to German convoys and phosphate transports as well. It would be necessary to leave an open channel for French coastal traffic in any event. Nor will it be possible to use German submarines, PT boats or planes along the Tunisian coast for blockade purposes, if incidents are to be avoided.

3. We, on the other hand, can give up our shipping along the Tunisian coast only if the enemy cannot engage in shipping either. It might be possible to achieve this by means of active cooperation with the French. The Italian High Command, however, does not consider this feasible at this time. Hence they do not think it appropriate to request the French to lay mines in Tunisian waters.

4. The Italian High Command does not consider it wise to increase French forces in Tunisia in any manner, not even to the extent of reinforcing the coast artillery, and suggests instead that the French be urged to make full use of all available weapons for the prevention of enemy supply activities.

5. This position of the Italian High Command is said to be the result of a decision of the Duce.

The German Armistice Commission in turn has submitted its report to the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff, with a copy to the Naval Staff, making the following additional comments:

The above measures have repeatedly been asked of the French. The prospects for changing the present status by again repeating this request are slim. Any real change can only be expected from the measures demanded by the Armed Forces High Command. The procedure intended by the Italians is therefore useless. The German Armistice Commission will again bring up this question in the conference to be held with the Italian Armistice Commission in Friedrichshafen on 10 Jun. At that time they will ask the Italian Armistice Commission to have the problem reconsidered in Rome in line with the suggestions made by the Armed Forces High Command.

In view of the Italian attitude with regard to Tunisia, the German

7 Jun. 1942

Armistice Commission considers chances for an Italian change of mind remote.

This negative position of the Italians unfortunately was to be expected in view of their general attitude towards the Tunisian question.

IV. Further serious shipping losses suffered as a result of enemy air raids force us to reexamine immediately the problem of whether and in what way the combining of several convoys into one would permit greater protection with the number of available fighters. An increase in enemy air raids is to be expected. This means increased danger to our convoys, without any possibility of increasing our own fighter protection.

On 6 Jun., Groups West and North were asked to examine this question at the earliest possible moment, and to comment on it.

The Naval Staff is of the opinion that the situation has changed, as compared to last year, insofar as there is a much greater shortage of fighter planes. On the other hand, fighter operations have become more efficient as a result of better command organization (communications). The question whether larger and less frequent convoys will require more escort vessels is to be examined separately.

Discussion of this question was prompted by a suggestion of the Air Force Operations Staff in connection with the rejection by the latter of the Naval Staff's request of 19 May for increased fighter protection and more mine-sweeping planes in order to protect convoys. Groups North and West have rejected the idea of combining convoys, since they feel that the present method of convoying ships has proved adequate.

On 7 Jun. Group North transmitted the detailed opinion of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North which lists the reasons against increasing the convoys to more than 8 vessels. It also repeats previous suggestions for speeding up and improving balloon protection, for equipping merchant ships and patrol vessels with rocket launchers, and for the early use of explosive rockets.

Group North, in agreeing with these suggestions, emphasizes their particular importance.

Group West, too maintains its negative attitude as concerns the

7 Jun. 1942

combining of convoys. Because of the situation with respect to enemy planes, it takes the position that convoys should proceed mostly at night time, and that they should be combined depending on the availability of naval escort forces (see Telegram 2212 of 6 Jun.).

V. See War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV for the distribution of French naval forces as of 1 Jun. 1942, as compiled by the Communications and the Operations Divisions of the Naval Staff (20410/42 geh.).

Situation 7 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

Radio Freetown transmitted the following message from Ascension Island to Slang Kop Point during the night of 6 Jun. 1942: Have received the SOS and SSS from U.S. steamer WHPH. 1. Vessel torpedoed. Send help and instructions in the clear. 2. Have you dispatched seaplane? A later message requests speedy action, since the batteries would not hold out much longer.

Indian Ocean:

According to a report by the radioman of the Portuguese aviso JOAO BELO (an escort vessel for a Portuguese troop transport to Timor), the following formation was lying in the harbor of Bombay during the month of April: The WARSPITE, the SOMMERVILLE, 1 BIRMINGHAM-, 1 KENT- and 2 ENTERPRISE - class vessels, 2 modern aircraft carriers of the ARK ROYAL type, and numerous destroyers. One badly damaged MARBLEHEAD - class cruiser entered the harbor for repairs. Three transports unloaded air force personnel from England. Other vessels in the harbor were 1 Greek cruiser, more than 100 merchant ships, and 1 dummy cruiser made of wood.

2. Own Situation:

The following short-code message was received from ship "28" at 0436: Location ES 36, have sunk British ship VPXK, American

7 Jun. 1942

ship WHPH. Proceeding to quadrant FM.

Radio monitoring indicates that these gratifying successes, the 4th and 5th successes of ship "28" have apparently been scored by means of torpedoes (see Enemy Situation, South Atlantic). Vessels VPXK and WHPH have not as yet been identified through our records.

By Radiogram 1521 the Naval Staff acknowledged the message and transmitted congratulations to ship "28".

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

The Foreign Navies Branch, Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff reports on the development of the Anglo-American naval bases in the area Londonderry/Northern Ireland in No. 26 of the News Analysis "Foreign Navies".

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One ground mine was swept off Lorient. The Gironde estuary has been reopened to shipping.

Channel Coast:

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla has carried out its mine-laying operation on the convoy route in the Strait of Dover according to plan. See Telegram 0710 for a brief report.

The 2nd PT Boat Flotilla has transferred to Ostend according to plan.

7 Jun. 1942

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

During the night of 6 Jun. 3 vessels of the 32nd Mine Sweeper Flotilla made contact with 8 enemy PT boats off Flushing. One of the enemy boats was hit. Mine sweeper M 3237 sustained 6 hits and no losses.

While on their way to Hook of Holland during the night of 6 Jun., the KONDOR and the FALKE again engaged enemy vessels. The engagement was fought with 7 British PT boats 10 miles north of Zeebrugge. Two enemy boats were set afire, and others were damaged. The FALKE sustained a few hits; 1 man was killed and another critically injured. The brief battle report by the FALKE indicates that the 2 enemy ships which had been set afire, have probably sunk. (See Telegram 0730.)

An enemy air raid on Emden during the night of 6 Jun. resulted in the sinking of the Finnish steamer HEKTOR (2,108 GRT). The Swedish steamer MASEN was slightly damaged by fire. Ships, locks, and unloading and loading installations of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North remained undamaged.

The shipyards sustained the following damages: Production at the Nordseewerke has temporarily been reduced to 50%. The submarine yard has been preserved. The submarine spare parts storehouse has been destroyed. Six submarines in the process of construction have remained undamaged. The Schulte and Bruns shipyard has burnt down almost completely. Production has been stopped 100%. The barracks of the naval station have burnt down completely.

The anti-aircraft protection of Emden consists of 3 anti-aircraft artillery battalions with 15 heavy batteries, 3 searchlight batteries and 2 reinforced light batteries (27 2 cm, 21 3.7 cm and 4 4 cm anti-aircraft guns). According to the report by Naval Station North Sea, there is no confirmation of any planes having been shot down.

2. Norway, Arctic Ocean:

Nothing to report.

7 Jun. 1942

IV. Skaggerak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Nothing to report.

V. Merchant Shipping

1. The New Construction Program of the Enemy:

Available figures have been corrected by the Foreign Navies Branch, Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff on the basis of new reports. Accordingly, the U.S. has delivered 106 vessels totalling 800,000 GRT during the period from January to April 1942. Including British and Canadian deliveries, this amounts to 176 ships totalling 1,300,000 GRT added to the enemy merchant fleet. The Chairman of the U.S. Maritime Commission has declared that U.S. shipyards now deliver 2 merchant ships a day and that production will have risen to a daily output of 3 ships by fall 1942.

2. Supplies to Russia via the Northern Route:

Sixteen convoys have reached Russian Arctic ports in the period between October 1941 and the end of May 1942. Of the approximately 250 to 300 vessels employed for this purpose, the Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff was able to identify 56 by name, and of the sunk vessels, 6 by name. From this the Foreign Merchant Marine Branch deduces an average tonnage of 5,000 GRT per vessel, with total tonnage from October 1941 to May 1942 amounting therefore to approximately 1,500,000 GRT. Of this, 40 ships totalling 218,924 GRT were sunk, and 86 ships totalling 458,493 GRT were damaged. It can therefore be assumed that about 1,250,000 GRT arrived in Russian ports, considering the fact that part of the sinkings and damages were incurred by ships on their return voyage from Russia.

Cargoes consisted of combat vehicles, guns, ammunition, airplanes, medical supplies, wheat, oil seeds, and sugar from England, as well as light tanks, trucks, cereals, raw materials, tools, and canned goods from the U.S. and Canada. This type of cargo resulted in the ships being loaded below capacity. In view of the shallow

7 Jun. 1942

waters in the ports of destination, the majority of the vessels were loaded to draw no more than 21 feet. Hence it may be assumed that 1,250,000 tons, or a monthly supply of about 150,000 tons, has been shipped to Russia. With the exception of 5 tankers, apparently no motor ships were used, but only steamships. The round trip U.S.A.—Murmansk — U.S.A. lasts on the average 3 to 4 months, that from Great Britain via Iceland and back about 6 to 8 weeks.

3. Armament of Merchant Ships:

All Brazilian merchant ships are being equipped with 7.5 to 10.2 cm guns. Each gun is provided with 50 rounds of ammunition.

A detailed presentation of the above data, as well as reports on ships and traffic in Gibraltar during the month of May 1942, and on a Japanese directive concerning the supervision of sea transports, etc., can be found in Brief Report No. 18/42 of the Series "Foreign Merchant Shipping" of the Foreign Merchant Shipping Branch, Naval Intelligence Division.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Lively reconnaissance activity in the Channel exit where 27 planes have been located. A plane reported that it attacked and damaged a submarine 10 miles north of Santander. An intelligence report from Spain discloses that the Italian submarine in question has put into Santander. The British steamer CHILE sent out a submarine warning signal on sighting 2 torpedo tracks 250 miles southwest of Freetown. None of our submarines could be involved.

Reports from the American coast spoke of a submarine sighted off Nantucket Island while another report speaks of a submarine attack in the vicinity of Havana.

2. Own Situation:

Group "Hecht" is supposed to reach the position line which extends from quadrant AK 5853 to 9484 on 9 Jun. at 0800, after having proceeded on course 50° since the afternoon of 2 Jun. So far, no targets have been sighted.

7 Jun. 1942

On 6 Jun. submarine U "693" destroyed 1 Navy tender of about 3,000 GRT and a special-purpose vessel, with a particularly heavy mast aft, near Cape Hatteras. These vessels were escorted by a destroyer and a patrol vessel. In the same area, the steamer PLEASANTVILLE (4,549 GRT) was sunk by submarine U "135".

For other reports, including some from the West Indies and the Mediterranean, see Supplement to the Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

On 6 Jun. Group North issued an order, effective immediately, according to which all submarines operating in the northern area are under the command of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean. The general situation and the formation of the 11th Submarine Flotilla were given as reasons for this action. Group North, however, reserves the right to take direct command over any of these submarines at any time, particularly if

- a. the Group is conducting operations with naval forces;
- b. special tasks have to be accomplished;
- c. there is danger of an enemy landing. (See Telegram 1554.)

This order is in basic accord with the position which the Naval Staff has consistently advocated.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

One 1,500 GRT steamer was damaged as a result of a daylight fighter-bomber attack on Ramsgate and Torquay. Thirty-five of our planes flew unsuccessful missions against ships during the night of 7 Jun.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Nuisance raids against Malta and support of operations in Libya were continuing.

The Italians report having sunk by aerial torpedoes a tanker of 3,500 GRT off Haifa on 6 Jun.

7 Jun. 1942

3. Eastern Front:

One thousand missions were flown in support of the attack against Sevastopol which the Army had launched in the early morning hours.

It is now reported that 41 planes dropped aerial mines north of Kronstadt in target area F during the night of 4 Jun., and that 34 He 111's dropped 57 aerial mines in target areas A and B during the night of 5 Jun.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Mediterranean:

Cruiser CAIRO arrived in Gibraltar in the forenoon, while the ARGUS and 1 cruiser, presumably the COLOMBO, and 2 destroyers arrived in Gibraltar in the afternoon. The ARGUS apparently was ferrying planes from England. An Italian report says that 1 DIDO-class cruiser left on a westerly course in the evening. The PENELOPE which had left Gibraltar on 11 May is reported by radio monitoring to be undergoing repairs in a U.S. shipyard. Planes report an eastbound submarine north of Bougie and an unsuccessful attack on a submarine off Sidi Barrani.

Air reconnaissance reports livelier convoy and patrol activity between Alexandria and Tobruk. On the evening of 6 Jun., one burning ship was sighted 66 miles north of Marsa Matruh. On the forenoon of 7 Jun., 1 steamer on an easterly course was sighted off Tobruk and 2 destroyers were sighted on the same course 21 miles northwest of Ras Azzaz.

Around midnight the Italian Navy reported British naval forces off Derna.

Radio monitoring in the eastern Mediterranean intercepted a message at 0912 saying that convoy "Nation", bound for Port Said, was being attacked by planes 60 miles east-northeast of that port.

7 Jun. 1942

2. Own Situation:

During the night of 6 Jun., the enemy staged an air raid on the harbor and the city of Messina without inflicting any military damage. Two planes were shot down for certain and 1 probably.

During the night of 5 Jun., the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla executed a torpedo mission in the area between Tobruk and Ras Azzaz, using 4 boats. According to a brief report by the Commander of the Flotilla, 2 boats penetrated into Tobruk Bay and attacked 2 freighters riding at anchor, with 2 torpedoes each. They observed 3 detonations but were unable to ascertain whether the ships sank, because of poor visibility and the background of the coast. (See Telegram 0820.)

This achievement merits full recognition.

During the night of 6 Jun., the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla made another torpedo attack in the same area with 2 groups of 2 boats each. One torpedo fired at a HUNT-class escort vessel missed the target. PT boat S "60" was pursued by another escort vessel of the same type for a brief period, but was not fired upon.

For a brief report by the Flotilla see Telegram 1245.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Two Italian destroyers have completed the transfer of troops from Naples to Tripoli according to plan. Steamer UNA, which had arrived from Benghazi on 5 Jun., returned on 6 Jun. for unknown reasons.

Steamer STURLA has refloated and arrived in Benghazi undamaged.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The convoy of tankers OSSAG and ELLI has been forced to turn back because of engine trouble.

7 Jun. 1942

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No change observed.

Own Situation:

Enemy planes raided Mariupol in the afternoon of 5 Jun. Gunfire was directed against naval and engineer units training with naval barges near Kerch.

An Italian submarine chaser and some motor boats went into action in the sea area of Cape Fiolyent-Cape Aiya during the night of 6 Jun. No incidents have been reported.

Convoy service proceeded according to plan.

A Russian motor boat, 18 m long, was raised in Taganrog.

IX. Situation East Asia

Nothing new to report.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The 11th Army launched an attack against the fortress of Sevastopol at dawn, according to plan. Preparatory artillery barrage had less effect than expected. The enemy is offering very stubborn resistance all along the front and is successfully covering his advancing troops and rear echelons with very intense fire from heavy coastal batteries and mortars. Pillboxes and strongpoints have to be taken one by one in stubborn hand-to-hand fighting.

The strength of the fortress is appreciably increased by its almost unchallenged sea communications.

7 Jun. 1942

Sporadic local fighting on the rest of the front.

Central Army Group:

As a result of rain, the terrain has become muddy, and movements are restricted. Any large-scale fighting is impossible. Group Byelov in the area south of Dorogobuzh has been reinforced from the air during recent nights.

Northern Army Group:

Fighting south of Soltsy is continuing. The enemy's ability to attack continues unbroken.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

At the Svir River, an enemy attack in battalion strength was repulsed. Outside of this, there was only little local fighting.

3. North Africa:

The enemy attack against the strongpoint of the XXI Army Corps was repulsed. Equally unsuccessful was the attack by forces of the 1st British Armored Division in the central sector on both sides of Trigh Capuzzo. The enemy position at Bir Hakeim was effectively shelled by our artillery.

8 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Portugal:

Apparently impressed by the intensified British air offensive against Germany, the Portuguese press concludes on the basis of arguments, some of which seem rather far-fetched, that the British military situation has improved appreciably while the foundation of German power has been shaken. The value of the American alliance is emphasized, particularly in view of the fact that the gigantic armament program is being carried out precisely as scheduled, that the Japanese offensive has come to a stop, and the peoples subjugated by the Axis are revolting.

This is a notable success of the enemy propaganda!

U.S.S.R.:

American reports indicate that the lack of food in Russia is greater now than at any previous time, including the periods of famine in former years. Russia's urgent request for food, particularly for wheat and sugar, cannot be met by the U.S. Government because of heavy shipping losses. The cargo space shortage has meanwhile become more acute, so that even in the future, an improvement in the situation will be out of the question.

Japan and China:

Authoritative Chinese circles declare that Japan is preparing an all-out blow against Chungking in order to finish the Chinese war at any cost, and at the same time to secure her land communications with Indo-China, Thailand, Burma and the Malay peninsula.

Japan would have to postpone settlement of the Russian problem until the China incident has been brought to an end. For further reports on East Asia see Political Review No. 131, Paragraphs 10 and 11.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. Report by the Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff. The Chief, Quartermaster Division discusses preparations for gradual removal of non-essential naval installations and shipyards from Emden, since the enemy is concentrating his air raids on that area. This question has already been discussed in the Armed Forces High Command. A sudden evacuation is not desirable. Withdrawal of shipyard workers, with the exception of a small group needed for repairs, should take place as construction and repair tasks are being completed. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees in principle and is ordering a report on the planned measures to be made to the Armed Forces High Command.

8 Jun. 1942

II. Report by the Chief, Communications Division, Naval Staff. It will not be possible to furnish the Italians with radar equipment in the near future, as requested, since our own needs have to be met first. The Chief, Naval Staff is in agreement with this, calling attention to the request by the Naval Station, Baltic Sea for the installation of an additional number of radar detectors in the Baltic Sea entrances in view of the increased mine danger,

III. The Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff reports on the order concerning organization of the office of the Task Force Commander in accordance with the text quoted in War Diary 3 Jun. under Special Items, V.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

The Chief, Quartermaster Division then reports on the measures taken for streamlining the command organization.

In accordance with directions by the Commander in Chief, Navy, the proposal of the Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff was submitted to Group Commands West and North and to the Commanding Admiral, France for comment. On the basis of comments received the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff now suggests the following:

1. Group West and the Commanding Admiral, France are to form a joint command staff named "Commanding Admiral Group West and France".
2. Giving consideration to the position taken by Group West, it is suggested that the operations along the coast and in coastal waters in the West Area be coordinated under the unified command of the admirals; in other words, the office of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West should not be dissolved and the present organizational set-up of the coastal areas in the west should be continued.
3. In consideration of the position taken by Group North, the Quartermaster Division suggests no change in the organization as it now exists within the command area of Group North.
4. The Commanding Admiral, Group West is put in charge of the measures to be carried out according to paragraph 1 above. The need for economizing on officer personnel is being emphasized.
5. This does not imply abandoning of the principle of combining the tasks of the admirals in command of coastal defenses

8 Jun. 1942

and coastal waters defenses, as intended. In other words, the office of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West will eventually be dissolved and the coast patrol forces will be placed under the command of the admirals. But the final decision concerning this phase of reorganization will only be made after the unification of the commands of Group West and of the Commanding Admiral, France has proved satisfactory.

6. Once the naval war in the Baltic Sea is over, the problem of streamlining the command organization in the area of Group North is to be reexamined. The aim should be to combine the patrol areas of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North and of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea or, if possible, to consolidate the tasks of coast defense and the defense of coastal waters by placing the coast patrol forces under the command of the Coastal Defense Commander or the Admiral.

Copy of memorandum on the report and text of the latter as per Skl. Qu. A II 14131/42 Gkdos. and 1113/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

The Chief, Navy Officer Personnel Division, objects to the unification, as envisaged above in 1., since he feels that this change would not result in the desired saving of qualified staff officers but merely in the elimination of a single admiral command post.

The Chief, Naval Staff, reserves his decision pending further study.

IV. The Chief, Naval Staff then mentions some of the problems which arose during his tour of Norway, such as the raising of the KOENIGSBERG, scrapping her, leaving the armament and the critical raw materials in Norway, the need for equipping the ADMIRAL SCHEER and the Trondheim batteries with anti-aircraft guns, and the lack of mine-exploding vessels.

The Chief, Naval Staff orders once more that appropriate measures be taken by fall at the very latest for reinforcing the defenses around the estuaries in the German Bight against surprise action by the enemy.

The report is followed by a discussion on the question of building midget submarines for the German Navy, assignment of the Construction Training Command to construction tasks, and employment in coastal

8 Jun. 1942

defense of catapult devices for launching rocket bombs. (The Chief, Naval Staff has expressed the wish that no possible method remain untried that could improve coastal defenses.)

V. Report by the Chief, Naval Construction Division. The Chief, Naval Construction Division repeats the points made in his report of 5 Jun. (see War Diary 5 Jun.) concerning the delay in the completion of the PRINZ EUGEN, the GRAF ZEPPELIN, and the GNEISENAU as a result of the labor shortage.

The Commander in Chief, Navy then orders that the number of workers needed be immediately determined and requisitioned from Minister Speer. Any postponement in the submarine or destroyer construction program, as envisaged by the Chief, Naval Construction Division, is out of the question. It will also be necessary to obtain an additional contingent of 1,000 workers for the GNEISENAU if the deadline for her completion is to be met.

The Chief, Naval Construction Division then reports on the proposed conversion of the SEYDLITZ to an aircraft carrier. The changes required will be very extensive, since the vessel will have to be dismantled down to the armor deck. Even then it will be possible to equip her with only 16 planes; it therefore is questionable whether this conversion is warranted. These changes could be made with much greater efficiency on the EUROPA, the POTSDAM or the GNEISENAU. A more detailed report can be made after 20 Jun. The Chief, Naval Construction Division has ordered construction of the dry dock in Trondheim to be started.

VI. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division then reports on the manpower situation, the question of steel supply, and the transport problem.

VII. The Chief, Underwater Obstacles Branch reports that the Air Force has made available only 10 planes equipped with magnetic mine-sweeping devices instead of the 42 requested by the Navy.

The original request will stand.

VIII. The Chief, Submarine Division, Naval Staff reports on damages on submarine U "573" which has entered Cartagena, and suggests that the submarine be turned over to the Spanish Navy, since repairs would take too long. He proposes further that the

8 Jun. 1942

crew be used on a new boat. The Chief, Naval Staff, approves this suggestion.

IX. The Chief, Foreign Affairs Section, Operations Division, Naval Staff reports on the request of the French Navy for approval of the intended exchange of the 2,200 men constituting the crews of the French warships in Alexandria. The Armed Forces High Command, acting on the suggestion of the Naval Staff, has empowered the German Armistice Commission to approve this request. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

In A Very Restricted Circle

The Chief, Operations Branch reports on the following:

1. The intentions of Group North as regards the carrying out of mine-laying operations designed to strengthen the "West Wall" mine fields. Mine fields 15a and 13a will be laid by the COBRA and ROLAND between 10 to 14 Jun.; the operations will bear code names "Antonius" and "Julius". Minefields 19a and 21a will be laid during the second half of June from the operations base Stavanger. This will be done by 4 destroyers which are being transferred from their home bases to northern Norway. Mine field 16 will be laid at about the same time by the Commander, Mine Sweepers using vessels OSTMARK and BRUMMER, code name "Erika". Mine fields 22a and 25 will be laid in late summer or fall, and mine field 6a when the occasion arises, i.e. as soon as 2 mine-laying vessels are available.

Other intended measures are: reinforcing of the southwest mine fields in fall; continuous mine-laying off Kola Bay by PT boats, and in the approaches to Murmansk by destroyers.

The laying of the "Kuesel" mine fields is being reexamined.

Mining operations in the Great Belt and the Sound (northern exit) have been dropped for the time being.

The Naval Staff has authorized delivery of the requested number of mines.

2. The order by Group North for the transfer of destroyers STEINBRINK, GALSTER, RIEDEL, and ECKOLDT to the northern area,

8 Jun. 1942

starting 10 Jun. This would mean that we shall then presumably have a total of 12 destroyers in that area. Their first port of call will be Stavanger. From there they are scheduled to proceed on the mine-laying mission (reinforcement of West Wall mine fields).

3. Preparatory measures for naval operations in the northern area against convoy PQ "17".

a. Operations orders from Group North to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean concerning the positions to be taken by submarines: Three experienced boats should be sent to a waiting position in the north-eastern part of Denmark Strait. They should assume this position approximately between 5 and 8 Jun. Once contact has been made with convoy PQ "17", the attack should concentrate on enemy cruisers and all heavier vessels. All combat-ready submarines should leave their bases in time, so as to be able to take a position in the area of Jan Mayen as extended in depth as the enemy situation permits, or, if the convoy is proceeding with high speed, to be able to attack all damaged steamers.

b. Estimate of the Situation by the Fleet Commander, Commanding Admiral, Battleships concerning the operational employment of naval forces in the northern area. This estimate completely coincides with the views and intentions of Group North in all important points and meets the full approval of the Naval Staff. A copy (16th copy BdS 375/42 Gkdos. Chefs.) is contained in File "Roesselsprung".

On 5 Jun. Group North emphasized the agreement between its views and the above estimate of the situation. The Naval Staff has informed the Fleet Commander (Commanding Admiral, Battleships) of its approval, adding that the fighter escort provided for passage through the Channel cannot be counted on in the Arctic Ocean, not even in coastal waters. The Naval Staff adds that complete reconnaissance of this large area is not to be expected and that torpedo boats will probably not be available as escorts. The Naval Staff states further that there is no intention of increasing the number of submarines and that the Fleet Commander cannot count on the installation of the requested anti-torpedo defenses in the entrances to Kaa Fjord and Lang Fjord. Because of the temporary nature of the operations base, the Naval Staff has advised Group North to delay the transfer of the Trondheim group as much as possible, at the same time suggesting that this be used as a diversionary measure.

8 Jun. 1942

c. The Air Force Operations Staff has been informed by the Naval Staff that the improved fuel oil situation will probably permit intensified action against Murmansk convoys, but that this requires increased air reconnaissance. "The Naval Staff is aware of the fact that increased reconnaissance will inevitably result in a withdrawal of bomberplanes, the action of which brought such gratifying results against convoy PQ "16". It feels, however, that such a step is in the common interest and that the increased prospect of success on the part of the naval forces will compensate for the withdrawal of planes". The Naval Staff therefore requests "that the pertinent Air Force commanders be instructed to meet all requests by Group North and the Admiral, Arctic Ocean which are within reasonable limits as far as the Air Force is concerned." A detailed explanation of the operational aims and requests concerning reconnaissance is being prepared for the information of the Air Force, Operations Staff through the Naval Liaison Officer assigned to the Commander in Chief, Air Force.

d. Operations orders by Group North for the action of the Trondheim and Narvik groups against a PQ convoy (code name "Roesselsprung") and an appendix entitled "Analysis of the Situation for the Employment of Heavy Naval Forces against a PQ Convoy" and "Communications Directives" (as per Gruppe Nord Gkdos. 770/42 Chefs., Ob. d, M. 1089/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in File "Roesselsprung") provide for the following chain of command:

aa. While taskforces are en route to operations bases:

1. Trondheim Group:

Strategic Command: Commanding Admiral, Group North
at his headquarters in Kiel.

Tactical Command: Fleet Commander aboard the
TIRITZ.

2. Narvik Group:

Strategic Command: The Admiral, Arctic Ocean aboard
the TANGA.

Tactical Command: Task Force Commander aboard the
LUETZOW.

8 Jun. 1942

bb. While outbound from operations bases:

The overall strategic command of surface forces and submarines rests with the Commanding Admiral, Group North at his headquarters in Kiel.

The Admiral, Arctic Ocean will retain strategic command of any detached forces, such as PT boats, in the Kola area.

The tactical command of naval forces prior to the assembly of the task force as in paragraph aa. above.

After the assembly, it rests with the Commanding Admiral, Fleet.

The headquarters of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean will act as radio relay station for submarines.

It is not intended to have the Commanding Admiral, Fleet take direct command of the submarines.

The operational directive, a copy of which has also been forwarded to the 5th Air Force, contains, among requests for reconnaissance, a request for calling the attention of the participating planes to the fact that, while our naval forces are engaging the enemy our air forces are only permitted to attack aircraft carriers and merchant ships. These instructions apply unless the situation is clearly discernible from the air or unless Group North has given special orders.

The Naval Staff does not feel that the problem of the command has been solved very satisfactorily and would prefer it if from the very outset, i.e. even while the task forces are on their way to the operations bases, only Group North (except for detached forces) or only the Admiral, Arctic Ocean were to be in strategic command.

Except for that, no objections are being raised by either the Chief, Naval Staff or the Naval Staff. The Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief at Fuehrer Headquarters is to be fully informed and will be asked to obtain the Fuehrer's approval for this operation.

c. The Chief, Operations Branch then reports on the position taken by the Commander, Submarines to the question of submarine operations in the Arctic Ocean, quoting the following:

"Conditions which are making attacks in the Arctic Ocean difficult are the reason for our failures there. Damages sustained by our

8 Jun. 1942

submarines are out of proportion to the number of ships sunk by them. The increasing need for boats to meet the tasks in Arctic waters, to attack convoys, and to act as anti-invasion defense can only be met at the expense of the warfare in the Atlantic Ocean. Prospects of increasing successes seem slight. The appropriate arm for fighting the convoys in northern waters during the summer appears to be the Air Force. There is no need for supporting these planes by submarines acting as shadowers." The Naval Staff has given detailed consideration to these viewpoints and, therefore, has not appreciably increased the number of submarines in northern waters. On the other hand, there can be no question of completely discontinuing submarine operations, particularly in view of the great and special importance ascribed to PQ convoys. Rather, in addition to planes, it is necessary to employ all available weapons against the supply line to Russia. Favorable weather conditions, stragglers, and damaged ships are also factors enabling submarines to score successes. The number of submarines now available makes it possible to have 6 to 8 boats go into action against every convoy. This is the minimum number necessary for achieving anything at all.

The Chief, Naval Staff is in agreement with this point of view.

f. The German Naval Command, Italy reports that the Italian High Command is endeavoring to launch operation "Herkules" on 18 Jul.

The Chief, Naval Staff has ordered the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to submit his plans for operations off the Brazilian coast and is reserving the right to approve the operations order prior to its being issued. As concerns plans for laying mines off New York harbor, the Chief, Naval Staff concludes by pointing out the necessity for keeping in mind that exchange ships with diplomatic status are calling at New York, for which reason the Foreign Office must be kept informed of all such plans.

Special Items:

I. On 25 May the Commanding General, West requested the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command to issue a clear directive to the Commander in Chief, Navy to the effect that, in the event of a British landing "the Admirals, Western and Northern France, who have been placed under the authority of the Commanding General, West for such a contingency are authorized to take charge of whatever naval

8 Jun. 1942

forces can be contacted (including submarines) and that Admirals are authorized to use them against landings as they see fit", in order not to lose precious and irretrievable time by being forced to obtain authority from the Naval Staff or come to an agreement with the Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

In the course of a conference, the Naval Representative on the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command corrected this totally mistaken concept of the organization of the Naval Staff on the part of the Commanding General, West. He therefore rejected as unjustified the latter's request for authority on the use of naval forces, their use being regulated by Fuehrer Directive No. 40. Hence the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command has disapproved the request by the Commanding General, West.

The pertinent paragraph of the telegram and copy of the report by the Naval Representative on the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command as per WFST/Op. (M) No. 001888/42 Gkdos. are contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIb.

II. The Air Force Operations Staff has again asked that it be promptly and regularly furnished with all reports of German submarine commanders concerning enemy air force personnel and shipments of aviation and anti-aircraft equipment aboard enemy merchant ships.

The Naval Staff has issued the necessary orders.

III. A list of ship losses during the month of April 1942 resulting from our mines has been compiled by the Naval Staff. Copy of the survey as per 1. Skl. 1e 13183/42 Gkdos. is contained in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

Situation 8 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

The German Naval Attache in Buenos Aires reports from

8 Jun. 1942

Rio de Janeiro that battleship SAO PAULO will be laid up for quite some time because of heavy damage to her engine, resulting from sabotage. Other acts of sabotage have allegedly been committed on 2 torpedo boats.

Indian Ocean:

Radio monitoring intercepted a message, later on revoked, from a British steamer in the Cape of Good Hope area southwest of Port Elizabeth about sighting a suspicious ship. Radio monitoring also intercepted distress signals from the Greek steamer AGIOS GEORGIOS in the area 70 miles west of Mozambique, reporting that she is shelled.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 2048 contains sailing instructions to the DRESDEN and the REGENSBURG.

Radiogram 2358 answers the request for supplies by ship "10", stating that wave meters cannot be supplied at this time.

Telegram 2015 informs the Naval Attache in Tokyo of the locations of the DRESDEN as established by dead reckoning, while Telegram 2245 transmits reference points for blockade runners.

Copy of the telegram as per 1 Skl Ik 1/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

A further check of the distress signal of steamer WHPH confirmed her identity as the ship reported sunk by ship "28". Steamers WHPH and VPXK have not been identified so far.

Telegram 1405 informs ship "28" to this effect.

Radio monitoring intercepted a repeat of the message from Ascension of 7 Jun. concerning the steamer WHPH, this time from the unknown British ship BOGI located at 10° 20'S, 160° 47'W. At 2256 on 6 Jun. radio monitoring also intercepted a repeat distress signal from the unidentified American ship WHPV, reading as follows: "Torpedoed at 15° S, 180° W. Crew taking to lifeboats". A repeat of this message by the BOGI was also intercepted. The Naval Staff believes that the WHPV is identical with the WHPH reported in the short-code signal of ship "28".

8 Jun. 1942

Radiogram 1940 transmits the necessary information to ship "28" and to all ships in foreign waters.

Radiograms 1942 and 0431 contain reports on the enemy situation.

At 2230, the Foreign Office transmitted a message from the Swiss Legation to the effect that the Swedish motor ship GRIPSNOLM, chartered for the exchange of Japanese and American diplomats, will leave New York for Lourenco Marquez via Rio de Janeiro on 10 Jun. at 1600. The message also outlines her scheduled course to Rio de Janeiro. The course of her voyage from Rio and of her return voyage is to be transmitted later (see Telegram 2230).

For further measures by the Naval Staff see Submarine Warfare.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

On 30 May the intelligence service quoted Russian sources as saying that de Gaulle troops will attack the Atlantic coast of France from England in the second half of June. Large quantities of arms will be brought over and distributed among the civilian population which is expected to rise in a general revolt. Simultaneous landing operations on the Norwegian coast will serve only as diversionary measures. (See Telegram 1901.)

Air reconnaissance reports very lively convoy activity along the southern coast of England.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Six mines were cut loose on the convoy route leading from Bordeaux to the Spanish frontier. The route has been temporarily closed to shipping. The ore ship JOAO RUSSAS stranded off San Sebastian.

Channel Coast:

At noon the enemy staged an air raid against Bruges, causing slight damage in the harbor area.

8 Jun. 1942

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla has carried out its mine-laying operation according to plan. For a brief report see Telegram 1010.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The British Admiralty reports about an engagement with 2 modern-type 700 ton torpedo boats (the KONDOR and the FALKE) on the forenoon of 7 Jun. The Admiralty states that 1 British vessel was slightly damaged and that a torpedo struck 1 German torpedo boat amidships, making her sinking almost certain.

According to our report (see War Diary 7 Jun.) 2 enemy boats were set afire by shelling. The report constitutes another proof of the unreliability of observations and reporting in general.

Air reconnaissance reports 40 steamers on a southerly course off Whitby, and 10 mine-sweepers and 32 steamers on a northerly course east of Great Yarmouth.

Own Situation:

At 0105 mine-exploding vessel "15" was set afire by an enemy bomb in the outer Elbe and has run aground near Scharhoern Island. An attempt is being made to salvage the ship. The KONDOR and the FALKE are on their way from Hook of Holland to Wilhelmshaven. Four mines were swept north of Terschelling and Ameland. A belated report states that on 7 Jun. an enemy plane was shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns near Borkum.

2. Norway and Arctic Ocean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Transport and convoy operations proceeded according to plan.

8 Jun. 1942

Steamer THIELBECK, 4 Italian submarine chasers, with Italian crews of 125 men, are on their way from Stettin to Helsinki to participate in operations on Lake Ladoga.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring reports nothing new.

The Canadian Press reported on 11 Apr. 1942 that a German submarine captured by a Canadian destroyer has been operating in the Atlantic for several months.

This fact is known to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines,

2. Own Situation:

Distribution of submarines:

22 in the North Area; 26 in the operations area of the Atlantic, including those in the South Atlantic; 15 on their way to the zones of operations; 15 returning from their zones of operations; 17 in the Mediterranean.

According to the operations order of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines (see War Diary 21 May), submarine U "87" was supposed to lay mines off New York. The night of 10 Jun. had been designated for this task, since all available information at the Foreign Office indicated that no ships would be engaged in exchange of diplomats after that date. The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff made a statement to that effect in today's conference on the situation when the Chief, Naval Staff raised this point. The message received tonight at 2230 from the Foreign Office (see Telegram 2230 under Warfare in Foreign Waters) changes the situation and makes it necessary to defer the date at which the submarine can start her mine-laying operation off New York.

In the evening, submarine U "124" made contact with a westbound convoy in the North Atlantic in quadrant AK 9424. Group "Hecht" has received the order to attack.

8 Jun. 1942

Submarine U "653" reports from the American coast that during the attack on a Navy tender (see War Diary 7 Jun.) she also scored a hit on an escort vessel, as unmistakably established by sound location. The escort vessel thereupon fired distress signals; it therefore can be assumed that she was sinking.

Submarine U "156" reports from the West Indies that she sank the Brazilian steamer ALEGRETE (5,970 GRT).

Submarine U "128" of the South Atlantic group reports having sunk the tanker SOUTH AFRICA (9,234 GRT) in quadrant EE 73 (450 miles northeast of the coast of Guiana). See War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV for Supplement to the Situation.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Twenty-three bombers laid aerial mines in the waters around the Isle of Wight during the night of 7 Jun. During the day photo reconnaissance was carried out over Southampton, Portsmouth, and Portland. During the night of 8 Jun. our planes raided ships and again laid mines off the southern coast of England. One steamer of 7,000 GRT is reported damaged, another probably damaged.

In the area of Lingen, Lippstadt, and Kochem enemy planes raided Essen, Krefeld, Bochum, Dinslaken, Wesel, and Duisburg, causing considerable damage to buildings, but only minor industrial damage.

Thirty-four flights are reported over occupied western areas.

There also was enemy air activity over eastern Germany, but no bombs were dropped. (Places reporting this activity are Goldap, Loetzen, Ortelsburg, Gumbinnen, while some planes were reported over the Gulf of Danzig and Insterburg.)

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Planes from the Air Command, Africa went into action

8 Jun. 1942

in considerable force in the area of Bir Hakeim and Ain el Gazala. Photo reconnaissance was carried out over Valletta, Alexandria, and Suez.

3. Eastern Front:

1075 bombers and 125 fighters supported the offensive against Sevastopol.

Railway installations were effectively raided in the area around Murmansk.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Mediterranean:

In the forenoon 1 CAIRO-class cruiser, 5 destroyers, and 1 tanker left Gibraltar on an easterly course. Air reconnaissance reports in the forenoon 1 tanker and 1 destroyer 23 miles north-northeast of Alexandria, bound for Alexandria, and 3 steamers 30 miles northeast of Alexandria, also bound for Alexandria.

2. Own Situation:

Mediterranean:

An aerial photo of Tobruk taken on 6 Jun. indicates that the torpedoes fired by PT boat S "54" hit steamers which probably were already grounded. This will make salvage operations more difficult. Enemy planes raided Cagliari and Benghazi during the night of 7 Jun. The cargo unloaded in Derma on 7 Jun. amounted to 475 tons.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Motor ships PISANI and SESTRIERE have left Naples and Palermo respectively. Together they will form a convoy to Tripoli, to be escorted by 2 destroyers and 1 torpedo boat from a point 78 miles north of Cape Bon.

8 Jun. 1942

The remainder of the supply transport, consisting primarily of empty ships returning to Italy, was proceeding according to plan with nothing to report. For details see Telegram 1655.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The convoy consisting of tankers OSSAG and ELLI did not receive the order to return (see War Diary 7 Jun.) and has arrived in Chalkis. It will continue its voyage to Piraeus with steamers DIOCLEZIANO and PIER LUIGI.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance sighted 1 steamer accompanied by 1 destroyer and 5 escort vessels in the northeastern Black Sea off Arkhipo Osiporka, proceeding on a course of 310°. Radio intelligence reports a decrease in the movements of surface naval forces. Most of the vessels have arrived at the base on the eastern coast.

Some submarines were still observed west of the Crimea.

Own Situation:

Two Italian submarines, engaged in a reconnaissance mission south of the Crimea, have discontinued their mission because of heavy seas, and have put into Yalta. Three other Italian submarines are slated to leave Constanta at 2400.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

Our Military Attache in Tokyo reports that the Japanese offensive launched from Chekiang province and moving along the rail line to Fuchow is designed to prevent the exploitation of this province by Chiang Kai-shek, at the same time providing the Japanese with suitable jump-off bases. The city of Chushanhsien was taken by an attack from Kinhawafu. The press reports that the Japanese met with appreciable resistance as they moved westward from Fuchow.

8 Jun. 1942

Reuter reports that the suburbs of Sydney and Newcastle were bombarded by an enemy submarine on the forenoon of 8 Jun.

IX. Army Situation:

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The enemy is continuing his stubborn resistance at the Sevastopol front and is keeping up the barrage from heavy coastal batteries.

Lively enemy movements were observed in front of the southern wing of Army Group von Kleist; two enemy attacks against the bridgehead southeast of Balakleya were beaten back on the northern wing.

Central Army Group:

Our operations north of Bryansk and Elnya are proceeding successfully. Our troops, coming from the south, have crossed the rail line between Elnya and Smolensk.

Northern Army Group:

Enemy troops who had penetrated our lines in the north-eastern part of Kholm were attacked. In the southern sector of the Demyansk front enemy assault troops succeeded in penetrating into our positions north of Bel. Our forces in the pocket north of Lake Ilmen crossed the rail line Novgorod-Leningrad in an easterly direction. Attacks on the bridgehead Kirishi, south of Soltsy, were being repulsed as was an attack against the rail line Leningrad-Soltsy.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Only minor fighting to report.

3. North Africa:

The attack against Bir el Hakeim continued to gain ground. There was little fighting reported on the remainder of the front. Enemy troops are waiting for an opportunity to act.

9 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain, U.S.S.R.:

Molotov has completed his trip to London and has continued on to Washington from there.

So far as can be made out, the following 2 agreements have been concluded in London: An Anglo-Russian mutual assistance pact to take effect after the war, and an agreement for the duration of the war and 20 years following it, the latter being a comprehensive military alliance. The military alliance contains among other things a clause stipulating that neither of the two countries will make peace without mutual consent and that neither will seek territorial gains. In addition, it is reported that complete agreement was reached concerning the urgent tasks involved in opening a second European front this year. It is not yet known whether this particular agreement was within or outside the framework of these pacts.

This agreement will be the beginning of a tremendous propaganda campaign on the part of the enemy. Russia's concession in renouncing all territorial gains will be the point that will be played up most and will be used as a springboard for a renewed attempt at severing the alliance between Finland and our other allies and the Axis.

It is more than doubtful, however, whether the other nations will share Britain's confidence in Russia's abiding by her treaties in view of her actions in 1917 and 1939. Nevertheless, this should not lead us to underestimate the political importance of an event which has placed Russia in France's role as the defender of British interests on the Continent. It is furthermore significant that the East Asiatic question apparently is not being touched upon. This can be explained by Russia's position with regard to Japan. Molotov's discussions in Washington will probably deal with questions concerning the Lend Lease Law and the second front in Europe; on the other hand, it is most likely that, for reasons indicated above, participation in Pacific and East Asiatic affairs will not come up for discussion in Washington either.

France:

In the course of its grandiloquent propaganda, the British radio has appealed to the coastal population to evacuate the restricted zone on the coast from the Belgian frontier to the Pyrenees because this area is likely to become a theater of military operations. As soon as the hour of liberation is near, the whole French people will be called upon to participate in the battle.

Portugal:

According to a remark by the Spanish Foreign Minister, the restoration of the monarchy in Portugal is merely a question of time and is only being postponed until the aged President Carmona has passed away.

Japan:

A Japanese government spokesman officially replied to Roosevelt's

accusation that the Japanese have used poison gas in China, saying that Japan has never used poison gas as a weapon of war and does not intend to use it so long as the enemy himself does not violate this international law.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The Chief, Communications Division, Naval Staff reports that the Italian Navy attaches very great importance to obtaining 3 German radar sets for 3 battleships. For this reason, and because it will not be possible to deliver these before autumn, all available manpower being engaged in meeting our own requirements, the Italian Navy has offered to make skilled Italian workers available for this job.

II. Report by the Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff on Italian Demands for Fuel Oil:

The German General at Italian Headquarters reports to the Armed Forces and Army High Commands that General Cavallero has pointed to the difficulties arising from the necessity of furnishing 40,000 tons of fuel oil for the Navy and 12,000 tons of fuel for the Italian Air Force as a reserve for operation "Herkules". Recently the monthly fuel oil consumption amounted to 56,000 to 58,000 tons. Unless the monthly supply of Rumanian oil increases appreciably beyond their May delivery of 43,000 tons, it will not be possible to build up the reserve necessary to enable the fleet to leave by the end of June. General Cavallero expressly asked that this situation be called to the attention of the Armed Forces High Command whose support is requested, since the execution of operation "Herkules" depends on an adequate fuel reserve. It is no longer possible to furnish fuel oil from German reserves, since Navy fuel oil reserves amount to only 130,000 tons. The only thing that can be done for the Italians on our part is to support their negotiations with Rumania for an increased fuel quota. Moreover, the employment of heavy vessels with a high fuel oil consumption may prove unnecessary for executing operation "Herkules" in view of the present enemy situation in the Mediterranean. The Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff then reports about the tug situation in Norway and various questions and problems resulting from the reorganization of the command over German maritime shipping.

In a Very Restricted Circle:

III. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff reports on the following:

1. Fuehrer Directive No. 42.

This Directive contains the following guiding principles for operations against unoccupied France and the Iberian peninsula (known as "Attila" and "Isabella"):

a. occupation of unoccupied France in cooperation with Italian forces (code name "Anton");

b. initial countermeasures against enemy action against the Iberian peninsula (code name "Ilona").

The German Admiral, Rome and Group West have been informed and have been asked for comment. (See War Diary 1 Jun.)

In compliance with instructions, the Naval Staff has reported to the Armed Forces High Command on the naval forces available for these two operations. The comments received from the German Admiral, Rome and of Group West were used as the basis for the report.

2. Possibilities for Submarine Operations against Brazil in case of an outbreak of hostilities.

Time needed for reaching operations area: 26 days in the waiting area; 6 to 7 days in the operations area. Total: 32 to 34 days.

Available Submarines:

Group I:	6 to 16 Jun.	15 submarines outbound;
	16 to 22 Jun.	submarines becoming ready to launch operations.
Group II:	22 Jun. to 4 Jul.	submarines ready to leave bases
	4 Jul. to 25 Jul.	submarines becoming ready to launch operations.
Group III:	25 Jul.	A large number of submarines ready to leave bases. Operations along the U.S. coast will have to be limited while submarines are operating against Brazil.

Chances for Successful Operations:

Unfavorable for Group I: (Full moon during operation period; no tanker available.)

Favorable for Group II: These submarines can reach the operations area around 3 to 8 Aug. At the same time, supplies for submarines operating off the U.S. coast will have to be reduced.

From a purely military point of view, Group III has the best chance but its operating period falls into a very advanced season (early September!).

In the opinion of the Naval Staff, Group III will not have sufficient operating time. Group II, on the other hand, would have both sufficient time as well as a sufficient number of boats. The latter is true in view of the fact that the submarines are scheduled to operate off the harbor entrances where hardly more than a total of 10 boats can be employed effectively. Success essentially depends on careful preparation and equipping of the boats. Group II must receive operations orders no later than 15 Jun.

The Chief, Naval Staff decides that the proposal for operations by Group II will be submitted to the Fuehrer. The Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters is to present that proposal to the Fuehrer.

Vice-Admiral Krancke has been informed accordingly as per 1/Skl I u 1105/42 Gkdos. Chefs. text in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

3. Report of the German General at Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces to the Armed Forces and Army High Commands about General Cavellero's estimate of the situation regarding North Africa and operation "Herkules".

The copy of the report, as per ObdM 1101/42 Gkdos. Chefs., as transmitted by the Naval Liaison Officer attached to the Army High Command, is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII.

The discussion on the fuel oil situation in relation to operation "Herkules" (see Par. 1), as presented by the Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff was taken from the same report.

General Bastico of the Italian High Command has been asked to report on further plans concerning North Africa after his conference with General Rommel. General Cavallero believes that, as things stand, it will no longer be possible to deal a decisive blow to the enemy. On the other hand he considers successful operations feasible at Bir Hakeim and against the Ain el Gazala position.

General Cavallero said that the present fighting in Africa is additional proof of the need for operation "Herkules". Only if that operation is successful will it be possible to prevent the British from recovering their strength and our situation from growing worse.

As soon as the German Air Force let up its pressure on Malta, the steamers ALLEGRO and GIULIA were torpedoed.

IV. Operation "Roesselsprung"

The Air Force Operations Staff has informed the Naval Staff about the instructions it sent to the 5th Air Force. These instructions state that the 5th Air Force should make an effort to comply as far as possible with the requests of Group North for reconnaissance within the scope of the group's operations against the Murmansk convoys. These instructions contain the following passage:

"Additional reconnaissance forces cannot be furnished. Under no circumstances are bombers to be used for reconnaissance tasks only."

This rejection of the Naval Staff's request is being explained by pointing to the successful air operations against convoy PQ 16. If such a success is to be repeated, it is essential that the already weak bomber force of the 5th Air Force remain untouched. Copy of the corresponding telegram from the Air Force Operations Staff as per 1/Skl 13813/42 Gkdos. in File "Roesselsprung".

Meanwhile, the Air Force Operations Staff has received from the Naval Staff detailed data on the planned large-scale operation and has been informed as well about the specific wishes of Group North. Copy of letter to this effect, as per 1/Skl I L, addressed to the Naval Liaison Officer attached to the Commander in Chief, Air Force, dated 8 Jun., is in File "Roesselsprung".

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees to the Operations Division's proposal that, should it become necessary, the attitude of the Air Force Operations Staff be mentioned to the Fuehrer since it might easily decide the success of this operation. The directive of the Operations Staff to the 5th Air Force makes it clear that the Operations Staff believes that all that is needed for attacking convoys to Murmansk are bombers. This one-sided point of view cannot go unchallenged. Although the success of the Air Force in attacking convoy PQ 16 was gratifying, a large portion of the latter, about 25 ships, did reach the port of destination. On the other hand, an operation such as "Roesselsprung" harbors the possibility of completely destroying an entire convoy if circumstances are at all favorable.

V. Ambassador Ritter's Visit with the Chief, Naval Staff on 9 Jun.

In answer to an inquiry by the Chief, Naval Staff about our policy towards France, which at present does not seem very clear, the Ambassador replied by saying that the Fuehrer is still of the opinion that we cannot make concessions to France before having attained major successes in Russia. In the last few days, however, the Fuehrer conceded that the French should be given appreciable aid in improving their coastal defenses in West and Northwest Africa, so as to be better prepared against any enemy operations. Ambassador Abetz has been ordered to ask Laval to submit requests to this effect to the German Armistice Commission. If possible, such concessions should not be initiated by our side, but should only be granted in response to requests.

This Fuehrer directive is in line with the constant and oft-repeated requests of the Naval Staff. The Naval Staff hopes only that it is not too late to prevent a repetition in West Africa and Morocco of the failure in Syria where the French defense forces were too weak, and where adequate aid on the part of the Axis powers had not been provided for.

Special Items:

I. The German Naval Command, Italy reports in connection with operation "Herkules" that the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South acting in agreement with the German Naval Command, Italy has suggested to the Italian High Command that all German naval and landing forces be combined into one invasion unit under German leadership. It is to be expected that approval and assignment of an independent task to this unit will follow in short order. The German Naval Command, Italy further suggests that a special Navy staff be formed of a type and extent similar to that of the Baltic Trials Unit. Its task would be the formation, equipment, and training of the German unit, as well as execution of operation "Herkules". Permission is requested for direct discussions with the Admiral, Amphibious Forces concerning the assignment of qualified officers for this purpose for a maximum period of 8 weeks. The Admiral, Amphibious Forces at his headquarters in Berlin will inform the Naval Staff about the details of the operations plan on or about 12 Jun.

The Naval Staff approves the activation of a "Special Navy Staff" and agrees to the direct negotiations between the German Naval Command, Italy and the Admiral, Amphibious Forces.

The Officer Personnel Division, Navy High Command is being informed at the same time.

II. Concerning Operation "Roesselsprung"

1. Copy of notes for the report by the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters (or for the Chief, Naval Staff if he should report in person) for the purpose of obtaining the approval of the Fuehrer to carry out this operation in June is in File "Roesselsprung" as per 1/Skl I op 1103/42 Gkdos. Chfs.

Situation 9 Jun. 1942I. War in Foreign Waters1. Enemy Situation:South Atlantic:

A radio message from Freetown of 4 Jun. addressed to the auxiliary cruiser PRETORIA CASTLE (with information to 2 inter-allied headquarters) indicates that she was the only auxiliary cruiser on patrol duty in the waters around St. Paul's Rocks at that time. The content of the message indicated that the ship which had been torpedoed or sunk was the steamer GEMSTONE which was en route to Pernambuco. (See War Diary 5 Jun.)

Indian Ocean:

The German Consulate at Lourenco Marquez reports that a group of 10 steamers has arrived there, some of them without cargo. At least 7 more steamers are at anchor in Delagoa Bay. It is not unlikely that the presence of Japanese submarines in the Mozambique Channel will result in the interruption of shipping. Submarine sighting reports have been intercepted from 1 British and 1 Greek steamer in that area.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 1915 transmitted the congratulations of the Commander in Chief, Navy to Ship "28" on her recent successes and conferred citations upon her crew.

The DRESDEN received sailing instructions via Radiogram 0316.

The Foreign Intelligence Section, Armed Forces High Command and the Naval Attache have concurred in the suggestion of the Operations Division, Naval Staff concerning a direct communications channel to the Naval Attache in Tokyo. The latter has been notified via Telegram 1910.

Radiograms 0432 and 2042 relayed information about the enemy situation and the course of the diplomatic exchange ship GRIPSHOLM from New York to Rio de Janeiro and Lourenco Marquez.

II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

On the basis of instructions allegedly received by the British Minister in Bern, an agent reports that 3 simultaneous British landing operations will be launched during the second half of June. Mixed Anglo-American airborne troops are to participate by landing from large transport planes. They are to be followed by troop transports. The attacks are said to be aimed at the following points:

a. Occupation of the large airfield between Amsterdam and the Hague.

b. Les Sables-d'Olonne.

c. The coast near Le Treport (diversionary measure).

The landings are to be made with 4 to 5 airborne brigades at targets

9 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

a. and b. and with half an airborne brigade at target c.

The reliability of the agent is as yet untested.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast Area:

The Admiral, French Coast reports the laying of a hawser boom barrage off St. Nazaire. (See Telegram 1830.)

Channel Coast Area:

At 0130 Group C of the 36th Mine Sweeper Flotilla (Mine Sweepers M "3635", "32", "35") had a brief engagement with enemy PT boats near Calais. No particular results.

The 4th and 2nd PT Boat Flotillas laid mines during the night of 9 Jun.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean:

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No special reports have been received.

Own Situation:

Enemy air activity over the Dutch coast during the night of 8 Jun.

Convoy and escort service in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North without particular incidents.

A further survey of the amount of damage which enemy air raids caused in Emden reveals that for the time being submarine construction can be continued on a makeshift basis in the same volume as previously and without appreciable delays.

At the shipyard of Schulte and Bruns, the shops of which have burned out except for the storehouse, there is danger that the floating dock which is being built for Wilhelmshaven will slide off the chocks prematurely because they have been shifted by air pressure.

The Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff has taken steps for the creation of a naval salvage organization. See Telegram 1500 for approval and suggestions by the North Sea Station for such an organization, the need for which has certainly been demonstrated during 2 3/4 years of warfare.

2. Norway:

A mine apparently laid long ago by the Norwegians, was swept in Ulf's Fjord near Tromsø on 8 Jun. The Commander, Mine Sweepers has left port with the BRUMMER, the OSTMARK, the ULM, and 3 mine sweepers, in order to execute the mine mission in the Varanger Fjord. 6 submarine chasers are acting as escorts.

See Telegram 1205 for the request of the Admiral, Arctic Coast to Group

North via the Commanding Admiral, Norway, with copy to the Naval Staff, concerning the laying of a double-row minefield for the protection of the convoy route and the entrance to Petsamo Fjord. The minefield is not to be laid until the middle of September, when the nights will again be dark, because prior to that time the mine layers are too much exposed to gunfire from Rybachi Peninsula. The minefield will be within range of our coastal batteries. It is therefore suggested that the deep-water submarine barrage which has been planned for the entrance of the fjord be omitted since it is improbable that submarines will still be able to penetrate into the fjord.

Group North points to the report of the 5th Air Force (Letter 2118 Gkdos. dated 30 May) that a total of 10 enemy planes reconnoitered the berths of our vessels in Narvik on 26, 27, and 28 May in order to reduce the threat to the convoy from our naval forces. On the basis of his observation the enemy then ordered his cruiser force to return home. Group North requests the Naval Staff to use the 5th Air Force's observations about the value of continuous air reconnaissance, the very measure requested by the Group, in order to obtain a sufficient number of suitable planes from the Air Force Operations Staff (see Telegram 2334).

The fundamental importance of continuous air reconnaissance has repeatedly been emphasized to the Air Force Operations Staff by the Naval Staff. So far, however, the shortage of planes has made it impossible to permit consideration of this request. As a result, the Air Force will simply have to acknowledge once more that the RAF is numerically better able to cope with the more or less self-evident fundamental requirements of any sort of naval warfare. This example shows with striking clarity a discrepancy which can never be sufficiently regretted, namely the absence of a naval air force or even a certain amount of authority of naval commanders over air forces.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Nothing to report.

IV. Skaggerak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report, the Norwegian steamer DICTO has begun reloading in Goeteborg.

2. Own Situation:

See Radiogram 1352 for a directive of Group North to Naval Station, Baltic and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea, with copy to the Naval Staff, concerning the delimitation of the areas of Naval Station, Baltic and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea. This directive enlarges the jurisdiction of Naval Station, Baltic in the Little Belt in a northerly direction.

The Naval Staff has no objections.

V. Merchant Shipping

The Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, Naval Intelligence Division is in possession of information concerning the routes of British shipping companies at the end of 1941 which confirms that almost 60% of British freighters and nearly 75% of all tankers - as determined on the basis of shipping routes - are being directed to the mother country. It was possible to determine the location of about 2/3 of the total tonnage still available to Great Britain on the basis of these principal shipping routes. About 30% of the vessels are in the Atlantic and 30% in the Near and Far East, while 50% of all tankers ply the Atlantic routes. A comparison with peacetime shipping, insofar as this is possible, shows furthermore that an appreciable number of shipping companies have maintained their previous services with often only minor deviations. This is apparently due to the fact that British shipping on the whole, although wholly under Government charter in wartime, has abandoned planning based on private enterprise only in exceptional cases, keeping of course in mind the importance of achieving maximum imports. In the meantime, events since the end of 1941 have probably resulted in appreciable shifts of the shipping areas. A complete reprint of this instructive information together with a list of the larger British shipping companies may be found in Report No. 13/42 "Foreign Merchant Shipping" issued by the Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff.

VI. Submarine Warfare:1. Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance activity of both air groups was remarkably lively in the rendezvous area.

According to an intelligence report, 1 convoy consisting of about 20 ships has left Gibraltar for the Atlantic.

Numerous submarine sighting reports were intercepted from the American coast and the West Indies. An unidentified steamer 125 miles south of Bermuda, and the British steamer FORSET (10,624 GRT) 160 miles north of Colon reported submarine attacks.

Planes in the Mediterranean area radioed submarine sighting reports, and reported a submarine attack off the Marmarica Coast. A surfaced submarine was also sighted by a plane southeast of the Balearic Islands.

2. Own Situation:

One after another, all submarines of Group "Hecht" established contact with the convoy spotted in the North Atlantic on 8 Jun. which was reported to comprise 20 steamers. Submarine U "124" initiated the series of successes by sinking a destroyer, to be followed by submarine U "94" which sank 2 steamers of 6,000 and 5,000 GRT respectively.

In the West Indies, submarine U "504" sank a passenger steamer of 8,000 GRT, 1 steamer of 3,000 GRT, and 1 small tug on 8 Jun. Submarine U "502" torpedoed a steamer of 7,000 GRT which sank according to hydrophone observation, and a tanker of 6,000 GRT which may be assumed to have been sunk for sure since she was completely afire and badly listing.

On 9 Jun. our submarines have thus sunk a total of 35,000 GRT as well as 1 destroyer and 1 tug.

In accordance with the new situation that has arisen as a result of the delay in the voyage of the diplomatic exchange ships from New York (see War Diary of 8 Jun.) the Naval Staff has instructed the Commanding Admiral, Submarines that until further notice permission cannot be given for mining of the waters off New York because of the unexpected delay in the departure of the diplomatic exchange ships. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines has been instructed to inform the Naval Staff about his plans for submarine U "87".

Submarine U "87" thereupon was instructed by the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to carry out a mine-laying operation off Boston.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the day our fighter-bombers attacked Selsey Bill, scoring bomb hits on buildings and barracks. During the night of 9 Jun., 6 DO 217's were unsuccessful in attacking ships and raided Great Yarmouth as alternate target. During the same night, the enemy flew 14 missions over the Baltic Sea entrances and the western Baltic Sea as far as Stralsund, apparently laying aerial mines.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

A large number of our planes went into action in the area of the Africa Panzer Army and prepared for action against Bir Hakheim. A group of planes from Pantelleria was sent to intercept 20 Spitfires heading for Malta which had been launched from an enemy naval force in the western Mediterranean at 0700. Although our planes succeeded in engaging the enemy planes they were unable to shoot down any of them.

3. Eastern Front:

The attacks on Sevastopol were supported by a very large number of planes. 15 enemy planes were shot down.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Mediterranean:

The tanker which left Gibraltar on 8 Jun. together with the EAGLE group returned the same day, leaving Gibraltar again in an easterly direction on the morning of 9 Jun. under escort of patrol boats.

The convoy which left Gibraltar towards 1900 is escorted by 1 gunboat and 3 corvettes.

In the morning and at noon the EAGLE group was located in the western Mediterranean about 50 miles off the Algerian Coast, proceeding on a westerly course. Radio monitoring reveals that the group had ferried east about 20 Spitfires which took off for Malta at 0700. 1 cruiser on a northeasterly course was sighted at 1500 about 60 miles east of

9 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Cartagena.

Air reconnaissance in the eastern Mediterranean observed 1 outbound tanker and 1 inbound steamer off Tobruk in the forenoon. A convoy of steamers bound for Alexandria was observed in the morning and in the afternoon. An eastbound tanker was observed off Alexandria in the afternoon. All merchantmen were convoyed by escort vessels.

Photo reconnaissance on 8 Jun. revealed the following:

Alexandria:

- 1 QUEEN ELIZABETH-class vessel in dock
- 7 light cruisers
- 11 destroyers
- 11 escort vessels
- 4 submarines
- 3 hospital ships
- 34 steamers (138,000 GRT)
- 5 tankers (33,000 GRT)
- 4 passenger ships (16,000 GRT)

Port Said:

- 3 destroyers
- 2 submarines
- 6 small naval vessels
- 32 steamers (170,000 GRT)
- 5 tankers (10,000 GRT)
- 1 passenger ship (10,000 GRT)

Suez Canal:

- 2 steamers on a southerly course
- 6 steamers on a northerly course
(total 36,000 GRT)

Port of Suez:

- 13 steamers (50,000 GRT)
- 1 passenger ship (6,500 GRT)
- 1 tanker
- 1 escort vessel

Oil Terminal of Suez:

4 tankers (13,000 GRT)
6 steamers (13,000 GRT)

Suez Roadstead:

1 ship which appeared to be either a U.S. warship or a dummy
(photograph out of focus)
1 heavy cruiser
3 destroyers
13 steamers (70,000 GRT)
2 passenger ships (3,000 GRT)

The results of this extensive reconnaissance give an impressive picture of the effort made by the enemy to defend this vulnerable hub of his power, an effort which practically seems to challenge us to concentrate our operations on that point.

2. Own Situation:Mediterranean:

During the night of 7 Jun., the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla executed a torpedo mission off Tobruk. Two misses on a patrol boat. A German radar crew reported spotting 10 to 15 ships off Derna. The German Naval Command, Italy subsequently ordered a patrol which did not sight any enemy vessels, probably because the radar report was in error. For a brief report see Telegram 1055.

During the night of 8 Jun., the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla ventured to within 35 miles east of Tobruk on a torpedo mission which likewise was unsuccessful. This evening, 7 boats of the flotilla will be sent against a convoy which has been spotted by the listening service.

Enemy planes raided Taranto during the night of 8 Jun. but caused only minor damage.

An Italian plane reports that it sank an eastbound steamer in the morning about 140 miles north of Port Said.

In the evening of 8 Jun., an enemy submarine sank the Italian destroyer USODIMIRA 70 miles west of Trapani. The destroyer was escorting the PISANI convoy.

13 Italian submarines are at waiting positions in the Mediterranean.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The convoy consisting of the PISANI and the SESTRIERE has returned to Palermo because of the loss of its destroyer escort. It is scheduled to leave port again in the afternoon of 10 Jun.

The remaining supply traffic was uneventful. Cargo unloaded in Derna on 9 Jun. amounted to 506 tons.

4. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

Enemy planes raided Candia during the evening of 8 Jun. Otherwise nothing to report.

Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

In the forenoon, 1 large and 2 small vessels were located off Bakalskaya Spit. They were proceeding towards Sevastopol at high speed under the protection of a smoke screen.

Own Situation:

All operational naval forces were concentrated in the waters off Sevastopol and Cape Sarich. Joint headquarters of the Chief, 1st PT Boat Flotilla, the Chief, Italian Forces and the Air Commander, South is located in Sak. The operations base of German PT boats is Ak Mechet, that of Italian submarines Yalta.

2 Italian submarines sighted nothing along the patrol line south of Cape Sarich. On the night of 9 Jun. 3 other Italian submarines will follow the same patrol line on their way from Constanta, and will then put into Yalta. 2 Italian submarine chasers transferred from Ak Mechet to Yalta during the night of 8 Jun. They succeeded in shaking off an enemy patrol vessel south of Cape Tarkhankut.

Off the Bessarabian coast the naval barge group conducted mine sweeping operations north of Sulina while the 17th Harbor Defense Flotilla swept mines between Ak Mechet and Ochakov.

German PT boats (S "26", "28", "72", and "102") will leave Constanta so as to be available to carry out torpedo missions in the area south of Sevastopol during the night of 9 Jun. They are to arrive in Ak Mechet on the morning of 10 Jun.

4 German motor mine sweepers (of foreign origin) are to transfer from Sulina to Constanta.

The Rumanian submarine DELFINUL is out of commission.

With this, all available naval forces have actually been put into action to support the attack against Sevastopol. It is regrettable that these forces are so inadequate because, aside from its land defense front which is favored by the terrain, the fortress depends above all on its almost undisturbed supply by sea.

IX: Situation East Asia:

The Japanese Navy informs the Naval Staff about the submarine attacks against Sydney and Diego Suarez as follows:

Air reconnaissance spotted 1 U.S. battleship and 1 heavy cruiser in Sidney. 3 special submarines were sent into action against them. Their

9 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

success could not be determined because none returned from the mission.

On 30 May air reconnaissance observed 1 battleship of the QUEEN ELIZABETH-class, 1 cruiser of the ARETHUSA-class and 1 large steamer in Diego Suarez. Three special submarines were sent into action during the following night. They were to enter the harbor. The result could not be determined here either because the boats did not return. During the night flares and detonations were observed in the harbor, and on the following morning only 1 merchant vessel and 4 small naval vessels, probably destroyers, were seen.

This information cannot be considered sufficient evidence to substantiate a claim of damage to the 2 warships.

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports the following Japanese losses at Midway: 1 large aircraft carrier sunk, 2 badly damaged. The Americans lost 2 carriers.

The Japanese have occupied several islands in the Aleutians.

X. Army Situation:

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The enemy is carrying out heavy attacks on the whole northern and northeastern front of Sevastopol, supported by tanks and artillery. All available reserves, including those of other sectors, had to be used in order to repulse these attacks. Despite ceaseless enemy fire on our spearheads our forces succeeded in reaching the intersection south of the Belbek valley and were able to gain a substantial amount of territory east of that point.

No appreciable fighting on the other sectors of the Army Group.

Central Army Group:

Enemy forces which had broken out of the pocket south of Dorogobuzh had to be repulsed and some of them had to be headed off with the help of the Air Force.

Northern Army Group:

The Volkhov pocket was drawn tighter. Enemy attacks against the Kirizhin bridgehead were repulsed.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Group:

Mostly quiet.

3. North Africa:

A tank-supported enemy thrust at the southern sector of the Ain el Gazala front was repulsed.

Enemy combat teams attempting to disrupt our supply lines in the area south and southwest of Mteifel el Chebir were driven off in southerly

9 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

direction.

Enemy forces were squeezed into a very narrow area during bitter fighting for Bir Hakheim. Enemy relief attempts were repulsed.

10 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

It was officially declared that the appointment of Swinton as Resident Minister for West Africa does not signify a change in the status of the West African Colonies but is only a war measure designed to standardize their administration and to improve their defense system.

This measure serves to emphasize the military importance of West Africa within the framework of the enemy's strategy.

Egypt:

The Council of Ministers has decided to recognize the Free French Delegation in Egypt as the representative of the interests of Free French residents in that country. The same British source reports that the Government of Iran has also established relations with the Free French National Committee in London.

Italy:

British propaganda originating in Lisbon is once again emphasizing alleged Italian plans for overthrowing the government. (See Political Review No. 133, Par. 2.)

U.S.A.:

Admiral Leahy, until now U.S. Ambassador to Vichy, is said to have declared that a large majority of the French people are on the side of the U.S. and are hoping for a defeat of the Axis. Admiral Leahy claimed that his relations with Petain were on a very cordial level.

See Political Review, No. 133, Par. 3, for a report about the growing warlike mood in the U.S. where Roosevelt's propaganda for a continuation of the war to an Allied victory is becoming more and more popular among workers, intellectuals, Jews and financiers.

Argentina:

The Government has lodged a protest with Berlin and Rome because of the torpedoing of the Argentine tanker VICTORIA in the Caribbean Sea on 21 Apr.

China:

The conviction prevails in Nanking that Chiang Kai-shek will continue to fight. He is believed willing to transfer the seat of the government and his headquarters from Chungking to the interior of the country, possibly to Lanchow, if forced to do so by military developments. In any case, he is said to be making an all-out effort to keep from being forced to a final decision before the outcome of the struggle between Germany and Russia is clearly evident.

Japan:

Once the exchange of Japanese and American diplomats has been completed in Lourenco Marquez, it is intended, according to U.S. press reports,

to use the Swedish ships DROTTNINGHOLM and GRIPSHOLM for the exchange of all women, children, and men over 60 years of age of both nations. This exchange is to be completed by September.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Operations Branch, Operations Division, Naval Staff reports on Group West's analysis of the enemy's mine-laying activities along the French Channel and Atlantic Coasts with reference to the enemy's landing intentions.

Supplementing previous information, Group West was able to make the following observations during the period since the beginning of May: A large number of ground mines have been laid in the waters between the Schelde and the mouth of the Somme. The deep-water route has been mined.

The waters between the mouth of the Somme and Lezardrieux are free of ground mines.

There are no ground mines off the coast of northern Brittany.

Along the western coast, a moderate to large number of ground mines have been laid off the harbors. A moderate number of moored mines have been laid on route "Rosa" and off the harbors; during the last few months, these moored mines have been laid at a distance from the coast in order to block the submarine lanes further out to sea.

Considering this situation, and such factors as the best (shortest) approach route (for supplies) as well as navigational and military aspects in favor of a landing area, Group West concludes that the Baie de la Seine would come closest to meeting all requirements. Neither Le Havre nor Cherbourg can be rendered useless in a hurry; there is a large airfield next to each of these harbors; the coast between both of these localities offers numerous landing points and a few small harbors. Furthermore, the Baie de la Seine is well protected against the sea. The Golfe de Saint-Malo also offers good landing opportunities except for its small and easily destroyed harbors.

The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West, in agreement with the Group Command, has therefore begun an intensive patrol service off the northern coast of France, with particular attention to the Baie de la Seine and Cherbourg. The above area is to be patrolled whenever weather conditions would permit a landing so as to provide at least some safeguard against surprise raids. The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West will also attempt to have the coast of northern Brittany patrolled during nights on which weather conditions would permit major landing operations.

Group West has forwarded corresponding information to the Commanding General, West (Army Group D), the 3rd Air Force, and to all naval stations concerned.

The Naval Staff is in complete agreement with these most valuable additions to previous observations made by Group West.

II. Report by the Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff on the following:

1. The Italians plan to transfer two more submarine chasers to

the Black Sea. They are to be held in reserve.

2. A repetition of the report about the opinion of the Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries that the Shipyard Control Staff is over-staffed with high officials and that the Chief, Naval Constructions Division will take care to correct this matter.

3. The SS, which is responsible for policing rivers in occupied territories, is interested in setting up the organization required for this task. The Danube Flotilla is being mentioned in this connection. The Chief, Naval Staff is of the opinion that the Navy does not object at all but that it cannot permit the SS to extend its activity to maritime police duties.

III. In a very restricted circle the Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff reports about the following:

1. The report of the Military Attache in Tokyo dated 5 Jun.: a landing of minor Japanese forces west of Dutch Harbor is imminent. They are to destroy the U.S. base which is being built at that point. The Japanese force is to withdraw afterwards.

No additional Japanese forces will be employed in the present fighting in China. The military situation in southern China corresponds to the description given in the War Diary of 9 Jun. under "Situation East Asia".

2. The excerpt from the war diary of ship "10" up to 25 Feb. 1942 transmitted by the Naval Attache in Tokyo.

While breaking through Natal Strait, ship "10" was justified in not attacking the tanker sighted in quadrant FL 8826. No whaling stations were encountered in the Antarctic. It is recommended that the mission be repeated in November. The Arado "196" has proved very satisfactory in 30 missions. Quadrant SE 7878 is particularly well suited as a supply and waiting area during the month of February because it is near a high pressure zone. On 23 Feb. she sank the Greek steamer PAGASITIKOS. The majority of enemy ships was plying between 15° and 20° S at the time. Individually sailing steamers were steering various courses. Operation DOGGERBANK was successful. Patrol activity continues in the Natal Strait. At the time the ship made her observations 1 auxiliary cruiser patrolled those waters. The documents of the PAGASITIKOS indicate that distance signalling shapes are characteristically German recognition signals. They are therefore impractical.

A personal letter from the ship's captain to the Naval Attache in Tokyo states that the excellent operational control exercised by the Naval Staff is reassuring and very welcome.

These suggestions are being followed up by the Naval Staff.

3. The report by the German General attached to the Italian Armed Forces High Command to the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command concerning the communication from the Italian High Command, North Africa to the Italian High Command about the future plans of General Rommel: Capture of Bir Hakheim and knocking out the Ain el Gazala position by an attack from the rear.

The Duce has approved these plans.

Special Items:I. Concerning Operation "Roesselsprung"

1. Cooperation between the Navy and the Air Force is of particular importance in this operation, not only as concerns rapid transmission of all reconnaissance data but also with reference to keeping each other constantly informed about the situation and current plans. The latter is particularly important since it forms the basis for coordinated Navy and Air Force operations. The poor communications with the Air Commanders, North Sea and Baltic Sea which were reported by the Admiral, Arctic Ocean on 29 May have caused concern. Group North, therefore, was asked on 9 Jun. to express its opinion as to whether communications channels from Kiel to Air Force headquarters in Norway are adequate for the control of operation "Roesselsprung".

Group North has answered the Naval Staff by pointing to the urgent need for equally good communications channels to the Naval Staff, the Radio Intercept Service Control Office of the Naval High Command, and the Naval Locator Service Centers in order to survey ship movements to Britain. Group North, therefore, does not consider a transfer of its headquarters or a transfer of the operational command to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean desirable. In particular, the Group is of the opinion that existing communications channels to pertinent headquarters of the 5th Air Force, the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, and the naval forces are adequate and cites the technical and operational regulations promulgated to insure smooth functioning of communications.

2. The negative attitude of the Air Force Operations Staff (see War Diary of 9 Jun.) has caused also Group North to emphasize that the entire operation will be jeopardized unless adequate reconnaissance forces are made available. Group North suggests amending Paragraph 3b of the Fuehrer Directive of 14 Mar. 1942 (concerning the defense of Norway) to the effect that "reconnaissance is a prerequisite for operations of heavy surface forces".

Such a proposal is being drawn up.

3. The Navy Liaison Officer to the Air Force High Command reports that he has submitted the data on operation "Roesselsprung" to the Chief of the General Staff, Air Force in accordance with instructions. The following forces are available for reconnaissance operations against enemy remote escorts or supporting groups:

3 squadrons of FW 200's
4 squadrons of BV 138's
and reconnaissance flights of 3 Ju 88's each.

The Navy Liaison Officer does not believe that it will be possible to effect the issuance of a basic order for the withdrawal of bombers for reconnaissance purposes without intervention by the highest authority.

II. Concerning Operation "Herkules"

1. Once more the Naval Staff has thoroughly analyzed this operation from the standpoint of naval strategy. The Naval Staff is fully aware of the difficulties involved. However, available data on the operation and the plans transmitted by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, tend to show that the operation is feasible from a naval point of view.

The operation is difficult and entails risks. In the long run, however.

10 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

the Naval Staff believes that an even greater risk will be entailed if the operation is not carried out. The occupation of Malta is in fact a strategic necessity, and therefore mandatory, as far as maintaining our African supply lines, safeguarding our position in North Africa, and a later operation against Suez are concerned. It must also be remembered that conditions for an occupation of Malta will in all probability be never again so favorable as they are this summer.

A copy of the thorough analysis by the Naval Staff has been submitted to the Chief, Naval Staff and has been made available to the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters to be used as the basis for his report. Copy as per 1/Skl Ib 1115/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

2. The Naval Staff considers it necessary that all naval barges which are to be employed in operation "Herkules" be equipped with smoke shells and smoke buoys.

The necessary directives have been issued to the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff and the German Naval Command, Italy.

III. Concerning the Use of Mine-Laying Submarines in Coastal Waters during the Polar Day:

A renewed survey of this question has revealed that, as previously asserted by the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, mine-laying operations by submarines are not feasible in coastal waters during the period of the polar day. Strong defense measures must be expected and it is impossible to approach the area to be mined without being observed, two factors which make such operations impossible. Just a few patrol boats will suffice eventually to force the submarines to surface.

Notice to this effect has been forwarded to Group North and the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, with reference to the latter's "Survey of the Possibility of Naval Warfare in the Arctic Ocean During the Polar Day" as per order 1/Skl IE 10671/42 Gkdos. Chefs. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

IV. The Admiral, Denmark reported on 30 May that the reinforcement of troops in Jutland which had been ordered by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, and which was to be obtained from the Commanding General, German Troops, Denmark, has been successfully accomplished. Copy as per 1/Skl 13 342/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

V. The Operations Division, Naval Staff transmits to the Chief, Naval Construction Division the report of the captain of the PRINZ EUGEN about improper handling of matters pertaining to repairs on the cruiser. Copy as per 1/Skl Ia 13932/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

Situation 10 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

No particular reports are available.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our ships in foreign waters.

10 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Via Radiogram 2053 the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN is being instructed to take up a waiting position in accordance with orders from ship "23", after having supplied the latter with oil.

Radiogram 2301 instructed ship "23", with copy to ship "28", to assign the southern half of the large supply quadrant to the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN as a waiting area after having refuelled.

All ships in foreign waters are being instructed to report their experiences with anti-torpedo nets on enemy ships, with details if possible, to the Naval Staff via the supply ships and the Naval Attache in Tokyo. (Radiogram 1751.)

Radiogram 2007 instructs all vessels in foreign waters about the arrival of Group "Alpha" of the Italian East Africa steamers in Las Palmas on 11 Jun., and transmits the enemy's directions for approaching Walfish Bay as well as enemy news reports.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

British press reports state that the following U.S. naval vessels are in British waters: 1 battleship; several cruisers, destroyers, and submarines as well as fast vessels of the "Task Force" (a formation similar to those used to transport British Commando troops).

Air reconnaissance reveals that a moderate number of ships is in the harbors between Cowes and Portsmouth. Relatively large convoys were observed off Southampton and near Portsmouth.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The British Mark XVI mines which were discovered near Bayonne along route "Rosa" on 9 Jun. were free of growth and their black paint was well preserved. The mine field has therefore been laid only recently.

Channel Coast:

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla carried out its mine-laying operation during the night of 9 Jun. according to plan. See Telegram 0710 for a brief report. The 2nd PT Boat Flotilla had to discontinue its operation because of engine trouble on 2 boats. See Telegram 0715 for a brief report.

Naval battery "Schuette" near Zeebrugge shot down 1 Spitfire at 1530. 2 tugs and the tanker ILL have left the area of the Group.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

3 northbound convoys comprising a total of 81 steamers and 1 southbound convoy comprising 24 steamers were observed along the east

10 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

coast of England.

Own Situation:

13 men were killed on 9 Jun. while removing duds on the island of Vlieland.

The large number of participants seems uncalled for.

The Norwegian steamer HAUGARLAND (6,049 GRT), which formed part of an eastbound convoy, hit a mine north of Terschelling and was badly damaged. Measures have been taken to aid the vessel.

2. Norway:

On 9 Jun. the BRUMMER laid section 2 of anti-submarine mine field IV (anti-submarine mines type B) northeast of Sylte Fjord according to plan. On 10 Jun. the OSTMARK and the ULM laid mine field V consisting of anti-submarine mines type B near Skeroe and a mine field consisting of standard mines type C near Varanger Fjord according to plan.

One of our planes spotted a large enemy submarine northeast of Sylte Fjord and forced her to submerge.

So far as the mine situation along the inner intercoastal island route between Tromsø and the North Cape is concerned, the Naval Staff is of the opinion that a Russian submarine laid the enemy mines in that area, particularly those forming the single-row mine field near Loppjeklyen which sank the steamer ASUNCION. It is probable that these mines had been laid prior to our flanking mine field. In addition, Russian aerial mines have repeatedly been detected and swept. Since no timing device was ever encountered, and particularly since aerial mines have been used, it can definitely be assumed that the enemy no longer intends to attack German shipping in this sector of the intercoastal island route with either surface vessels or submarines. It would seem pointless, therefore, to reinforce the flanking mine fields by laying more mines in the fall of 1942 as has been suggested by the Admiral, Arctic Coast.

Letter 1/Skl IE 13740/42 Gkdos. informs Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Norway accordingly. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Our planes reconnoitered in the direction of the eastern coast of Scotland, the waters between the Shetland and Orkney Islands, the waters between Iceland and Jan-Mayen, as well as in the direction of Spitsbergen and Novaya Zemlya. No tactical results.

One eastbound submarine was observed northeast of Vardø at 1700. Reconnaissance reports determined the present solid and pack ice borders.

Own Situation:

The Admiral, Arctic Ocean ordered 3 submarines (U "251", "376", "408") to form group "E" and to proceed to battle stations in Denmark Strait as per Group North's directives for operation "Roesselsprung".

Copy as per 1/Skl 13981/42 Gkdos. in File "Roesselsprung".

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea1. Enemy Situation:

The German Consul in Goeteborg reports that steamers LIONEL and DICTO were at their customary berths on 8 Jun. Numerous aerial mines were laid in the Sound during the night of 9 Jun.

A surfaced Russian submarine proceeding in easterly direction was sighted east of Seiskari at 0125. Shipping on Lake Ladoga has not decreased in volume.

2. Own Situation:

A Swedish steamer reported a mine detonation east of Sassnitz. A mine-exploding vessel swept a mine south of Kjels Nor.

The fact that the enemy is carrying his mine offensive into the western and central Baltic Sea is extremely disturbing. Our only hope for counteraction lies in improved air patrols and anti-aircraft defenses.

In the eastern Baltic Sea, a submarine leaving the Leningrad moles was set afire by one of our Army coastal batteries and was towed into the Korabelny fairway.

The Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea replies to a corresponding request by Naval Station, Baltic that the route from Porkkala to Helsinki can only be used by ships with less than 7.2 m draft.

The steamer RIELBEK unloaded 4 Italian submarine chasers in Helsinki.

The Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries reports that the Commanding General of the 18th Corps has promised to return Naval Artillery Battalion 531 after the Volkhov pocket has been mopped up, probably on 20 Jun. (See Telegram 1515.)

V. Merchant ShippingCargo Space Situation of Enemy Powers on 1 Jun. 1942

Report No. 14/42 of "Foreign Merchant Shipping" of the Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, Naval Intelligence Division contains an extensive analysis of enemy cargo space. The conclusion reached in the report states that the shipping space now employed is larger than import requirements. As a result, 1,600,000 GRT can be made available for special military transport purposes, in addition to 3,200,000 GRT which are suited for troop transports and a large part of which is already being used for that purpose. These calculations assume particular significance in connection with an estimate of the enemy's operational possibilities.

1,600,000 GRT still enable the enemy to undertake transport and supply operations in support of a landing, the strength of which can be easily determined on the basis of the beachhead's distance from the ports of departure. Consequently, Navy and Air Force operations which reduce the volume of enemy shipping space will produce not only the desired effect of a blockade, they serve also as a direct protection against enemy landings not only on occupied coasts but quite generally.

VI. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring intercepted only little reconnaissance activity in the rendezvous area by either air group. Only 1 submarine sighting report, from south of Haiti, was intercepted from the American coast or from the Caribbean Sea.

2. Own Situation:

Deteriorating visibility caused our submarines to lose contact with the westbound convoy in the North Atlantic.

Sinking reports were received from the Caribbean Sea concerning tankers SURREY and VAN DYKE and steamers ARDEMOOR and MONTREAL. The MONTREAL was en route from New York to Australia and carried tanks, guns, and ammunition. The above vessels represent a total of 32,729 GRT.

In the Mediterranean, several submarines established contact with a westbound convoy west of Alexandria during the night of 9 Jun. Several attacks resulted in the sinking of 1 tanker (6,000 GRT) and in the torpedoing of a second equally large tanker. This tanker later was sighted burning and therefore may also be assumed to have been destroyed. 2 steamers were also torpedoed, one of them a 4,000 GRT vessel.

The total for the day thus amounts to at least 44,729 GRT.

Details on events of this successful day will be found in the supplementary submarine situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The Naval Staff gives permission to attack all single ships on route "Anton" north of 30° N and west of 10° W. This is effective immediately until further notice.

See Telegram 1701 for the corresponding directive to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, with copy to Group West.

VII. Aerial WarfareBritish Isles and Vicinity:

6 enemy planes were again downed by our fighters, while 5 were shot down by our anti-aircraft artillery.

During a night mission on 10 Jun. staged by 13 Ju 88's 2 steamers of 4,000 to 5,000 GRT each were damaged and 1 steamer of 2,000 GRT was probably damaged; these vessels were part of a convoy off the British South coast. This report comes from a preliminary communique of the Air Force General Staff.

Mediterranean Theater:

9 enemy fighters were shot down during concentrated raids on the enemy group in Bir Hakheim.

Eastern Front:

Our planes supported Army operations against Sevastopol and the

Volchansk area in maximum strength. An effective mission was flown against the Murmansk railroad. There was extensive reconnaissance activity over the Arctic Ocean.

During the night of 9 Jun., fairly strong forces carried out mine-laying operation "Froschlaich" in the Kronstadt area.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Western Mediterranean:

The EAGLE, 1 "C"-class cruiser, 1 DIDO-class cruiser, and 5 destroyers arrived in Gibraltar from an easterly direction. Soon thereafter the destroyers again sailed in an easterly direction. The DIDO-class cruiser had left Gibraltar in a westerly direction on 7 Jun. and apparently reentered the Mediterranean, passing the Strait of Gibraltar unobserved, to join the EAGLE group. The latter had already been observed on the morning of 9 Jun. with 2 cruisers. The tanker which had sailed in easterly direction on 9 Jun. made port again on the same day without her 4 escort vessels. The following vessels were observed in the harbor of Gibraltar in the afternoon:

The MALAYA, the EAGLE, the ARGUS, 4 cruisers (1 DIDO-class, 1 CAIRO-class, 1 CALEDON-class cruiser and 1 mine-laying cruiser; the last 2 were in dock), the MAIDSTONE, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 2 destroyers, (one of them in dock), 1 submarine, 20 small vessels, 19 steamers, 6 tankers.

Central Mediterranean:

No important change in the number of ships in Valletta. Analysis of the photographs reveals 3 harbor vessels off the harbor entrance. Radio monitoring intercepted a report from a British plane concerning a successful attack on a German convoy in the waters north of Cape Bon (convoy PISANI, LESTRIERE). At 2325 another plane reported 1 heavy vessel, 2 cruisers, and 9 destroyers 200 miles south of Sicily.

Submarines were sighted 70 miles north of Benghazi and 2 submarines were spotted 135 miles west of Navarino.

Eastern Mediterranean:

Photo reconnaissance of Tobruk disclosed the following:

- 1 apparently damaged steamer of 3,700 GRT
- 2 steamers of 1,500 GRT each
- 1 tanker of 1,000 GRT
- 2 small naval vessels
- 13 patrol boats
- 1 coastal vessel
- several small lighters

Air reconnaissance observed lively convoy traffic between Alexandria and Tobruk.

During the night of 9 Jun. our submarines sighted the convoy which had already been reported during the day. It comprised 3 steamers with 2

escort vessels. When German air reconnaissance sighted the convoy during the day 70 miles west of Alexandria it comprised 7 steamers (2 of which were afire), 1 escort vessel and 3 guard boats.

Presumably the same convoy was again sighted in the evening by one of our submarines 70 miles west of Marsa Matruh. Air reconnaissance at that very time reported 2 steamers and 5 escort vessels in the same area proceeding in easterly direction. It is possible, however, that the planes made an error in observing the course of the vessels.

Successful submarine operations against the convoy are described under "Submarine Warfare". One of the steamers which had been damaged in a submarine attack was spotted in a heavily escorted tow train at 1745 about 10 miles west of Alexandria.

2. Own Situation:

Mediterranean:

Enemy planes raided Taranto during the night of 9 Jun.

During the same night 7 boats of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla executed an unsuccessful torpedo mission against a convoy east of Tobruk. The failure apparently was due to inaccurate radio monitoring.

The 6th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla is performing its scheduled convoy mission. Details in situation report of operation "Theseus" (see Telegram 2315).

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The convoy consisting of the PISANI and the SESTRIERE left Palermo for Tripoli at noon. Other operations proceeded according to plan without incidents.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy air activity in the Candia area on 9 Jun. The suspicion exists that aerial mines were laid. Transports are proceeding according to plan.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring indicates that movements of surface forces have again become very lively. 1 battleship, cruisers "E" and "F", at least 6 destroyers, 5 submarines, and 6 PT boats were located at sea.

1 submarine was sighted in the western Black Sea in the latitude of the Turkish-Bulgarian frontier. Ultra shortwave communications between 2 submarines were intercepted. Air reconnaissance in the morning observed 1 light cruiser arriving in Sevastopol.

Own Situation:

During the night of 9 Jun. an Italian submarine fired a torpedo at close range at an enemy force south of Cape Kherson. The enemy vessels were bound for Sevastopol and consisted of 1 destroyer, 1 flotilla leader, 3 PT boats, and 1 small vessel. Unfortunately the torpedo

10 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

failed to explode. Defensive enemy gunfire was ineffective.

Italian submarine chasers and PT boats spotted nothing off Sevastopol during the same night. 4 boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla sighted only 2 patrol boats and 1 Italian submarine chaser in quadrant 3558 while proceeding along their patrol line. The PT boats arrived in Ak Mechet during the morning.

The enemy staged air raids on Yalta and Nikolayev during the night of 9 Jun. but inflicted no damage on Navy installations. The Special Duties Detachment, Bulgaria has been assigned to subchasing duty south of Akhtepol and will be supported by Bulgarian planes. PT boats S "27" and S "40" have passed Turnu Severinu on their voyage down the Danube.

Caspian Sea:

Air reconnaissance spotted 6 Russian submarines near Astrakhan. They were presumably transferred by means of lifting lighters.

IX. Situation East Asia

Press reports state that U.S. authorities have announced the loss of an aircraft carrier at Midway.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Despite numerous unsuccessful enemy counterattacks at the northern and northeastern sectors of the Sevastopol front, our offensive against the fortress gained ground in southerly direction during bitter fighting in which our troops were given the unceasing support of the Air Force.

A surprise attack staged by Group Mackensen and the VIII Army Corps in the Volchansk area led to the establishment of bridgeheads east of the Donets River near Pechenegi. The pincer movement of our divisions is proceeding according to plan.

Central Army Group:

Movements of our forces in the area south and southwest of Dorogobuzh developed successfully.

Northern Army Front:

Lively fighting at the defense front of the Volkhov pocket.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

No reports have been received.

3. Northern Africa:

Enemy attacks at the northern and central front sectors were

10 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

repulsed with heavy enemy losses. Enemy forces presumably intended for relieving the troops encircled in Bir Hakheim were brought up in the Bir el Gubi and Mteifel areas. Stubborn enemy strafing and bombing attacks were directed against our encircling front at Bir Hakheim. Our forces succeeded, however, in penetrating deep into the enemy's main battle line and stormed a strategically important hill.

11 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

On 10 Jun. the House of Commons debated coal rationing and the question of government acquisition and control of the mines. The Minister of National Defense reported on the reorganization of the General Staff; the Deputy Prime Minister reported on casualties of British forces from the outbreak of war to 1 Sep. 1941 which amounted to 14,786 officers, 12,534 of whom were from the mother country, and 168,863 men, 132,469 of whom were from the mother country. The total of military personnel killed amounts to 48,872. 43,675 civilians were killed in air raids.

The loss of British lives during the first two war years is therefore extraordinarily small.

Air Marshal Harris forecast a tremendous increase in Allied air raids on Germany which are to prove the theory that the war can be won by bombings. The same procedure will be followed against Japan.

See Political Review No 134, Par. 2, for a detailed report.

U.S.A.:

Roosevelt disclosed the establishment of a Combined Production and Resources Board which is to be directed by the American Nelson and the Englishman Lyttleton, and the establishment of a Combined Food Board under the direction of the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and the Chief of the British Food Purchasing Commission in the U.S.

A Times report on the general situation in the U.S. is in Political Review, No. 134, Par. 8c.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff reports on the operations order of Group North concerning the laying of mine fields 19a and 21a (code name "Graf" and "Herzog").

Only 3 destroyers are available for this operation since the STEINBRINK is out of commission.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division reports on difficulties encountered in breaking enemy codes as the result of the introduction of the automatic cipher device by the U.S. and the fact that the British change their code every 10 days.

The Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division also reports on the request by Naval Station, Baltic for reinforced anti-air mine defenses by the installation of additional radar instruments at the Baltic Sea entrances. He states that the number of anti-aircraft radar sets in the Baltic Sea is sufficient. Naval radar instruments cannot be supplied before August since the ordered installation of instruments on the French coast has priority.

The Chief, Naval Staff points to the importance of this question for the

Baltic Sea, but approves the above suggestion.

III. The Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff reports on the following plans of the Reich Commissioner for Maritime Shipping: Employing the Organization of Naval Offices for transport operations, requisitioning of Navy cargo space, and substituting barracks for floating living quarters.

A further report concerns the progress with regard to the question of torpedo recovery vessels. Although numerical requirements have been met the situation continues to be unsatisfactory because a number of vessels is always in need of repairs. Six torpedo recovery vessels have been demanded for each of the 4 training flotillas. 32 are now available.

The Chief Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff points to the number of suicide cases which seems remarkably high.

IV. The Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reports on the published British casualty figures from 1 Sep. 1939 to 1 Sep. 1942 (see Items of Political Importance).

In a Very Restricted Circle

V. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff reports on the following:

1. A telegram from the Naval Attache in Tokyo concerning Japanese data on losses in the battle of Midway. These confirm previous reports. The telegram also relays a request from the Japanese Navy for the aircraft carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN.

This request is to be answered in the negative.

2. The plan of Naval Group South to block the northern Aegean Sea by means of mine fields between the islands of Kea Gyaros, Syra, Delos, Mykonos, Nikaria, Furni, and Samos (Aegean East-West Wall). German materiel is required. In accordance with the request, the Naval Staff has made available 400 anti-submarine mines type B and 400 standard mines type C. Copy as per 1/Skl I E 13625/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

3. The report of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South on his conferences with General Rommel on 7 Jun. This report was submitted to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff on 9 Jun. and concerned operations plans and experiences gained from the fighting in the past week. The report calls the supply operations of the German Naval Command first-rate. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South and General Rommel believe that they will be able to realize all objectives that have been set for them. The report exhibits a gratifying amount of confidence and states that Bir Hakheim and Tobruk are expected to fall by about 25 Jun. Operation "Herkules" will therefore have to be postponed for 8 to 24 days.

VI. The Chief, Naval Staff reports that the Naval Staff as well as the Chief, Naval Group North consider the differences which arose between the latter and the Admiral, Arctic Ocean as having been settled by the conference in Kirkenes. A subsequent letter to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean which reopened the matter in a sharp tenor was only intended as a final statement of the position of the Commanding Admiral, Group North.

11 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Special Items:

I. The memorandum of Group South on the results of the conference of the Chief of Staff, Group South with the Naval Staff is being forwarded to the Chiefs, Naval Staff Communications Division, Quartermaster Division, Submarine Division, and Naval Construction Division for signature. Enclosed with the memorandum is a draft by the Operations Division, Naval Staff for final decisions on individual questions.

Copy as per 1/Sk1 Ia 13869/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVA.

II. Radio Intelligence Report No. 23/42 by the Communications Intelligence Branch, Naval Staff Communications Division lists enemy reports intercepted by radio monitoring and decoding services during the week of 1 to 7 Jun.

Also these reports are as yet unable to furnish a clear picture of Japanese and American losses at Dutch Harbor and Midway. Of interest are the observations on the reinforcement of the Mediterranean forces by 3 small cruisers and 10 destroyers, the damaging of a motor gunboat by the FALKE and the KONDOR on 7 Jun., and the British order for laying mines on 4 Jun., 106° and 23 miles off South Foreland.

Of equal interest is a report on Russian convoy movements between eastern Black Sea ports and Sevastopol under escort of 6 cruisers, 2 flotilla leaders and 14 destroyers, all of which were in full fighting trim.

Situation 11 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

The Naval Attache in Buenos Aires reports that the U.S. Maritime Commission is said to have requested the Brazilian Shipping Commission to direct the largest possible number of ships plying between the U.S. and Brazil via the West Coast. In view of the improbable nature of this report the Naval Attache believes that it might be intended to mislead us.

A large convoy assembled off Rio de Janeiro on 26 May, with U.S. destroyers employed as escorts. More ships from Para and Recife joined the convoy somewhat later.

A large convoy, presumably including the cruiser CURACAO, is expected to arrive via South Africa in early June.

Indian Ocean:

A further series of submarine distress signals were intercepted from the Mozambique area. One Dutch steamer reported that 1 submarine had sunk two ships within her range of view.

As yet it cannot be ascertained to what extent Japanese submarine operations at this sensitive point of the routes to India and the Near East have caused the enemy to take

11 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

countermeasures such as rerouting his vessels.

2. Own Situation:

Radio monitoring intercepted a report from St. Johns which states that at 0156 the Dutch motor ship ALIOTH was torpedoed in 10° 10'S 18° 45' W and is sinking. The Naval Staff believes this to be the first success of ship "23".

Corresponding notice to ship "23", with copy to ship "28", via Radiogram 1021.

The Naval Attache in Tokyo has radioed in detail information which ship "10" obtained from the Greek steamer PAGASITIKOS. The Naval Staff was already in possession of most of this information. The Naval Attache has been instructed to confine himself to radioing essentials by key-words in the future. The Naval Staff will then request details whenever necessary. Corresponding directive to the Naval Attache in Tokyo via Telegram 2040.

All ships in foreign waters have been informed by Radiogram 1956 that our submarines are now permitted to attack single ships on route "Anton" north of 35° N and west of 10° W with the addition that the above area has been extended to 30° N. The same radiogram contains information about the extension of the submarine operations area off the Brazilian coast to a strip 60 miles wide*up to 18° S as of 0000, on 12 Jun. and states that no German submarines are in the operations area off West Africa.

The Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division informs all ships in foreign waters about the use of shortwave as well as of the signal groups listed on page 98 of the short code signal book (see Radiogram 1533).

Radiogram 1842 informs all ships in foreign waters about the observations of the Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff concerning shipments to Russia via the Arctic Ocean route. Radiogram 0351 informs ships in foreign waters of Japanese reports concerning the Sydney, Diego Suarez, Midway, Dutch Harbor, and Aleutian operations and the employment of large Japanese submarines north and south of the Mozambique Channel.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance observed a northbound convoy near Trevose Head (Cornwall) comprising 13 steamers and 2 patrol vessels.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

An enemy mine field was located during a check of the alternate route north of Bayonne. The main as well as the alternate route are therefore closed for the time being.

*Note: As checked in the logs of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, this distance should read 600 miles, Tr.N.

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean1. North Sea:Enemy Situation:

In the evening air reconnaissance spotted a northbound convoy of 27 steamers and 7 patrol vessels.

Own Situation:

Steamer HAUGARLAND sank north of Ameland Island.

2. Norway:

Enemy reconnaissance activity over Vest Fjord up to Bogen Bay and over Trondheim during the afternoon.

3. Arctic Ocean:Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported 8 steamers in Iokanga Bay at noon. Reconnaissance of the areas of Jan Mayen, Iceland, the Shetland Islands and the Orkney Islands produced no results.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Destroyers GALSTER, ECKOLDT, and RIEDEL are en route to Norway from the Baltic Sea.

During the night of 10 Jun. British planes dropped 11 aerial mines off the Swinemuende harbor. Navy anti-aircraft batteries shot down 1 enemy plane.

Motor mine sweeper "11" hit a mine north of Reval at 0500 and was badly damaged. She had to be beached. Many casualties (84 missing, 35 wounded).

Route "95" has been cleared of mines in a width of 2 miles.

Group North had requested anti-submarine mines type "A" for reinforcing mine field "Seeigel" which so far had been effective against submarines to only a limited extent. 1100 mines have been made available.

Copy of directive to this effect, as per 1/Skl I E 13935/42 Gkdos., in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

V. Merchant Shipping

The Ministry of Transportation informs the Naval Staff about the conference on 20 May concerning the employment of the 7 German ships totalling 14,392 GRT which are being held in Spanish Atlantic ports. The British Government already has approved their transfer to Spanish registry for the purpose of Spanish coastwise shipping. The Spaniards will recompense Germany with equivalent cargo space in the Mediterranean area. This tonnage has already been earmarked accordingly. In order not to lose control over the ships completely, the Ministry of Transportation suggests that control over them be assured by having the Shipowners Association buy into the Spanish shipping company "Atlantida".

The Naval Staff considers this transaction necessary in view of the cargo space situation in the Mediterranean, despite the danger that the Spanish Maritime Office might force the "Atlantida" to use the ships for a purpose which we consider undesirable.

VI. Submarine Warfare.1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence reports that at 0708 a plane sighted a submerging submarine about 185 miles southwest of Brest. At 0945 another plane reported a submarine about 180 miles west of Cape Ortegal. The plane attacked her with depth bombs at 1000 and was apparently successful since the submarine left oil traces. At 1122 other planes were ordered to attack the same submarine. At 1200 a coded message was sent out and repeated to warships. High priority radio messages from Gibraltar seem to indicate that patrol boats have been ordered to participate in the chase.

It is certain that the sailing of 6 westbound destroyers from Gibraltar at 0930 reported by the intelligence service has no connection with the submarine chase.

Several submarine sighting reports were intercepted from the American coast; including one from 170 miles east of Cape Race, one from south of Long Island, one from 120 miles northeast of Cape Hatteras, and one from the vicinity of Cape Hatteras where a submarine attack took place. Unidentified vessels, presumably transports, are said to have left an unidentified port en route to Halifax on 10 Jun. They are to take on U.S. troops in New York.

Submarine sighting reports from the West Indies came from 100 miles northwest of Trinidad and 200 miles southeast of Jamaica; 1 submarine attack was reported from a point 60 miles north of the northern entrance to the Panama Canal.

The Mexican Navy Minister announced that Mexican warships and airplanes are operating in conjunction with U.S. vessels in the waters between Cuba and Yucatan.

In a closed session of a Special Senate Committee, U.S. Secretary of the Navy Knox discussed plans for countering the submarine menace off the U.S. coasts which apparently provide for the employment of submarine chasers and destroyers.

11 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

The Vichy Telegraphic Service reports that installations of the Lago Petroleum Company on Aruba have been completely destroyed by fire. It is not clear as yet whether their destruction resulted from new fires or was the consequence of the recent submarine shelling.

According to Reuter, a detailed report of a special U.S. Senate investigating committee about the rise in sinkings of Allied merchant vessels is due to be published in the near future.

DNB reports from La Linea that the westbound 15 steamer convoy which left Gibraltar on 10 Jun. is escorted by 8 corvettes.

2. Own Situation:

According to dead reckoning, ship "23" must by now have passed Natal Strait. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines was therefore directed to extend the area in which single steamers may be attacked on route "Anton" to north of 30° N and west of 10° W (see Telegram 1704). See Telegram 1703 for the directive extending to a width of 600 miles the operations area off the Brazilian coast up to 18° S. The latter directive will take effect on 12 Jun. at 0000.

The first success reported after route "Anton" was opened to attacks is the sinking of a tanker of 8,600 GRT. According to information obtained from submarine U "455", the tanker was sunk at 0550 in quadrant BE 4546.

Outbound submarine U "105" was damaged by an enemy plane at 0945 in quadrant BE 9945. Although unable to submerge (see Enemy Situation), she was able to reach Ferrol unassisted.

Via the Naval Attache in Madrid the Naval Staff has arranged for the Spanish destroyer MELILIA in Ferrol to be ready to assist her in case of need and, as a precaution, informed the Air Command, Atlantic Coast that the destroyer might leave port (see Telegrams 1701 and 1702). Submarine U "105" is to be repaired in Ferrol to an extent which will permit her surfaced return under air cover to a port in western France as soon as possible.

In the northeastern Atlantic, Group "Hecht" succeeded in reestablishing contact with the westbound convoy. Steamer PONTYPRIDD (4,450 GRT) and a steamer of 6,000 GRT were sunk.

On the American east coast, steamers AMERICAN, DELFINA and SICILIEN (a total of 12,326 GRT) were sunk, and 1 steamer of 8,000 GRT was probably sunk.

Submarines U "373" and "701" report that they completed their mine-laying tasks.

In the Caribbean Sea submarine U "159", in addition to sinking 2 sailing vessels totalling 450 GRT, sank 2 steamers of 8,000 and 9,000 GRT respectively in a convoy escorted by destroyers. She also sank the U.S. steamer EDITH (3,382 GRT).

Submarine U "83" reports from the Mediterranean that she sank 2 steamers with a total of 4,000 GRT and 2 schooners with a total of 400 GRT. She also torpedoed a steamer of 6,000 GRT, the sinking of which she did not observe. The submarine is operating off the coast of Palestine.

The Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reports the following total results of submarine operations against an enemy convoy between 9 and 11 Jun. which, after the long lull in enemy supply shipments, assumes

11 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

particular importance in connection with the heavy fighting for Cyrenaica:

Sunk for certain: 1 tanker (6,000 GRT)
1 steamer (4,000, perhaps 6,000 GRT)

Torpedoed: 1 tanker (6,000 GRT)
1 steamer (6,000 GRT)
2 steamers of unknown size

The Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy correctly notes that the convoy has been shattered. (See Telegrams 1319 and 1925.)

The Naval Staff attributes particularly great importance to this success in the Mediterranean since it might have a decisive effect on British power of resistance in the fighting for Tobruk.

For detailed reports from all operations areas see supplementary submarine situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Special Items:

The Naval Staff has observed the surprising fact that recently our submarines in the Atlantic have established contact only with west-bound convoys while they seem to have missed consistently, or at least since February, all England-bound convoys located by radio intelligence. The Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division and the Naval Intelligence Division have therefore been asked for a thorough reexamination of the following:

a. Whether there is a way by which the enemy can learn about the disposition of our submarines.

b. Whether radio intelligence data is incorrectly evaluated, perhaps because the enemy code for location reports has again been changed since we deciphered it.

c. Whether, contrary to available information, inbound enemy shipping might have been rerouted as was once the case when it followed a detour via quadrant AJ, the southern tip of Greenland, and the Denmark Strait.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

36 bombers mined the area around the Isle of Wight during the night of 10 Jun.

During the night of 11 Jun. 21 enemy flights were reported over the German Bight, the Baltic Sea entrances, as well as over the Baltic Sea up to the Stettiner Haff and Stralsund. No bombs were dropped; it is presumed that they laid mines.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Strong fighter and bomber forces were active in the Akroma

3. Eastern Front:

870 bombers and 120 fighters participated in the attack on Sevastopol. During the night of 10 Jun. a 3,000 GRT steamer was sunk in the harbor of Sevastopol.

The 5th Air Force raided the Murmansk railroad with telling effect.

4. Special Items:

A detailed report by the 5th Air Force Command on the air raids on convoy PQ 16 by 5th Air Force planes is in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IIA.

The report concludes that of the estimated 50 merchant ships of PQ 16 only 25 reached their ports of destination Murmansk and Iokanga.

A precise appraisal of these statements is impossible at this time since authentic data on the number of ships actually involved is not yet available. There is, however, no question about the fact that the 5th Air Force was very successful in its operations against convoy PQ 16.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea1. Enemy Situation:Mediterranean:

In the forenoon 4 gunboats were at sea east of Gibraltar. 6 destroyers left port in westerly direction. Towards noon a submarine was located 58 miles north-northeast of Cape Misurata. The number of ships in Valletta remained unchanged.

Fairly lively convoy movements in the coastal waters between Tobruk and Alexandria. In the forenoon 5 westbound medium-sized steamers were located east-northeast of Alexandria, and 3 medium-sized steamers proceeding in southwesterly direction were located west of Alexandria. One tanker and 1 steamer escorted by 2 destroyers and 1 patrol boat were east of Raz Azzaz on a westerly course.

Radio monitoring reported that a single cruiser as well as one or two destroyer forces were probably at sea in the Eastern Mediterranean.

One light cruiser and 5 destroyers were observed in Alexandria on 9 Jun. in addition to the ships spotted on the previous day.

2. Own Situation:Mediterranean:

During the night of 10 Jun. enemy planes raided Taranto without inflicting major damage.

For a brief report by the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla on its unsuccessful raid on 9 Jun. see Telegram 1215.

For submarine successes see "Submarine Warfare".

Motor ships PISANI and SESTRIERE are en route to Tripoli under escort of 2 destroyers. The convoy was attacked by an enemy plane north-north-east of Cape Bon without success. The next convoy for Tripoli is scheduled to leave Naples on 16 Jun. It will consist of 3 ships. All other supply shipments to Tripoli and Benghazi as well as along the coast of Libya proceeded according to plan.

3. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

In the afternoon a submarine was located 45 miles southeast of Milos.

Own Situation:

Enemy air raids on the airfield of Kasteli (Crete) during the night of 10 Jun. resulted in the destruction of 3 of our planes and in damage to installations.

The Turkish supply steamer DUMLUPINAR from Piraeus arrived in Istanbul on 8 Jun.

4. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

On the afternoon of 10 Jun. air reconnaissance spotted 2 westbound convoys south of Sudak and south of Yalta, respectively.

Own Situation:

The Italian submarine chaser "573" torpedoed a motor ship of 5,000 GRT south of Cape Kherson. The motor ship was part of the convoy which air reconnaissance had spotted south of Yalta (see above). The sinking of the motor ship was not observed because 3 Russian torpedo boats drove off the submarine chaser. The Italian submarine chaser "570" fired a torpedo at a small motor ship but missed.

Enemy planes raided Mariupol on 9 and 10 Jun. Four motor mine sweepers (foreign, taken over by Germany) left Constanta in the morning en route to Ochakov via Bugaz for sweeping and checking operations along the route to Ak Mechet and around Cape Tarkhankutski. The operations base of these motor mine sweepers is Ak Mechet.

In the Bay of Odessa an enemy submarine torpedoed the steamer ARDEAL (5,695 GRT) which was sailing in our southbound convoy. The steamer had to be beached.

Special Items:

See Telegram 1910 for measures taken by Group South to insure that German supervisory personnel wields a maximum of influence in the Rumanian shipyard in Galatz. The Naval Construction Division will take care of further details. The Naval Staff agrees with Group South that in addition to Galatz we must attempt to operate Nikolayev as a repair yard as soon as possible.

IX. Situation East Asia

An official Japanese report states that during the air raids on Dutch Harbor on 4 and 5 Jun. 1 airplane hangar was destroyed, 1 oil tank set afire, and 3 flying boats, 1 heavy bomber and 13 fighters shot down. 1 tanker was sunk. Japanese losses amounted to 5 planes as a result of suicide attacks.

Navy and Army units occupied the islands of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians without losses.

A Japanese Navy spokesman announced that the enemy task force at Midway consisted of 3 to 5 aircraft carriers, about 6 heavy cruisers and several destroyers, and was supported by numerous land-based planes. In addition to the 2 U.S. aircraft carriers sunk during the battle, the Japanese claim that a third U.S. aircraft carrier was sunk on 7 Jun. by a Japanese submarine.

The U.S. radio reports that Japanese submarines have again appeared on the Australian coast.

According to a report by U.S. Admiral Nimitz more than 30 Japanese ships participated in the battle of Midway, half of which were sunk in the first 3 days.

Thousands of Japanese are said to have drowned.

One has the impression that here, as in the Coral Sea, a Japanese landing attempt was successfully warded off by the Americans with appreciable losses among the transport fleet.

X. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

The heavy fighting for Sevastopol is continuing. The eastern front of the encircling ring is subjected to strong enemy pressure, so that little ground could be gained at this point.

In the south, our forces penetrated as far as the area north and northwest of Balaklava.

Operations east of Kharkov are progressing well.

The encircling movements of our divisions are proceeding according to plan.

Our forces reached the Donets west of Saltov and crossed the river at some points.

Central Army Group:

An attack by 5 enemy battalions was repulsed near Novosil. Further progress was made in the pocket southwest of Dorogobuzh.

Northern Army Group:

After extensive artillery preparation, tank-supported enemy forces launched an attack against the eastern front of our switch position north of Yamno. Fighting is still in progress. Our ring around the Volkhov pocket was drawn tighter from the west and north.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

No reports have been received.

3. North Africa:

After enemy forces in Bir Hakheim had in vain attempted to break through our encirclement during the night of 10 Jun., our forces took the fortress during the morning hours of 11 Jun. after bitter fighting with the enemy who put up stubborn resistance to the very end. More than 1,000 prisoners were taken. Exploiting this extraordinarily important success German units kept advancing until evening, by which time they stood 12 km southwest of El Adem. The enemy withdrew in easterly direction and is assembling his armored units northeast of Bir el Harmat.

12 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance:

Great Britain:

In the House of Commons the Foreign Secretary disclosed the contents of the treaty concluded on 26 May between the governments of Great Britain and Russia. The text of the treaty was made public at the same time. See Political Review No. 135, Par. 3 for a detailed report.

In connection with the treaty the Foreign Office issued a statement containing the following paragraph:

"Both powers came to a complete agreement with regard to the urgent necessity for establishing a second front during 1942."

The House of Commons voted to accept the coal program. An amendment for socialization of the mines proposed by the independent Labor Party was defeated 329 to 8.

This vote proves that Great Britain's economic structure still rests on a solid basis.

U.S.A.:

In connection with Molotov's negotiations in Washington it was announced that here too an agreement was reached on the absolute necessity of establishing a second front in Europe during 1942. On 11 Jun. Secretary of State Hull and the Russian Ambassador signed a treaty providing for continued U.S. aid to Russia and further economic cooperation. Russia declares herself ready to subscribe to the principles of the Atlantic Charter after the war.

According to statements which Admiral Greenslade made to shipyard workers, 40,000 trucks and 30,000 tanks are awaiting shipment from ports on the East Coast. He said that the lack of ships has cost the Allies Singapore and the Philippines and may yet cost them Australia and Alaska. The shortage of shipping is a cause for anxiety. He added that the U.S. was able to commission only 138 new ships between 1 Jan. and 22 May 1942, while 191 ships have been sunk since Pearl Harbor. There are enough crews available, however, with the exception of ship's engineers.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Report of the Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division.

1. Concerning Submarine U "105".

The submarine has arrived in Ferrol. An investigation has shown that repairs to enable her to submerge would require several weeks. Since further political complications are undesirable it is planned to repair the submarine as quickly as possible to an extent which will permit her to proceed surfaced under air cover. She will probably be able to leave Ferrol on 20 Jun. Extensive measures to deceive the enemy have been planned for that occasion. Directives to this effect have been issued to the Naval Attache in Madrid, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines and

to Group West (see Telegram 1802). The Chief, Naval Staff approves.

2. Concerning the suggestion of Group North to make the GRILLE available as an accommodation and base ship to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean since the TANGA cannot be spared from PT boat training. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees that the ship be used for this purpose on a temporary basis only, since the interior equipment of this special vessel would be subject to too rapid wear.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division reports that a draft of regulations has been completed which are to govern German-Japanese cooperation with regard to communications. After having been countersigned in Tokyo they will be submitted to the Chief, Naval Staff.

III. Report by the Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff

1. The Reich Commissioner for Maritime Shipping has inquired whether the Navy still insists on the construction of the planned 5,000 GRT steamers in addition to the construction of the war transports. The Chief, Naval Staff approves the suggestion to answer this question in the affirmative.

2. The situation in Kiel resulting from the many ships in dock, which can only be relieved after 15 Feb. when the SCHARNHORST has undocked, is critical but cannot be remedied if a considerable delay in the completion dates of the ships in question is to be avoided.

IV. The Chief, Naval Construction Division reports on the estimate of additional workers needed for speeding up the completion of the PRINZ EUGEN, the GNEISENAU, and the GRAF ZEPPELIN.

405 men will be sufficient to reduce the estimated working time on the PRINZ EUGEN from 3 1/2 months to 8 weeks. Only 105 men will be needed if the work will be confined to the extension of the stern. The additional number needed also to complete construction of the bunkers within the 8 weeks is still being determined. The additional number of workers required for the GNEISENAU (1350) and the GRAF ZEPPELIN is so small that their procurement should create no difficulties. Following a suggestion by the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, the Chief, Naval Staff has ordered that a list be drawn up of the manpower needed to achieve total capacity, and that all manpower contingents to which claims had previously been waived be requested again. Requirements are to be listed with no consideration for the general improvement in the manpower situation that has been predicted for after 1 Jul.

The Chief, Naval Construction Division then reports on the West Shipyard in Wilhelmshaven where whole units of Russian workers are to be employed for Navy purposes.

V. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports on construction activity in Wilhelmshaven which might be cut down further; on the request for relinquishing part of the Navy quota of the Hamburger Motorenwerk to other branches of the Armed Forces; and on the delay of experiments with hollow charges.

In a Very Restricted Circle:

VI. Report of the Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division.

No reports on the hesitation of the Naval Staff and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines concerning the use of mine-laying submarines on the

Arctic Coast during the light summer months. He feels that it will be possible to carry out urgent mine-laying tasks during that period with destroyers and PT boats. (See War Diary of 10 Jun.) The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

An inquiry by the Chief, Naval Staff about fuel oil requirements for operation "Roesselsprung" is answered by the Operations Division to the effect that it will be necessary to fall back on several thousand tons of reserves but that this can be justified. In connection with operation "Roesselsprung" the Chief, Naval Staff points out that the Air Force must be held to its promises under all circumstances.

VII. Report by the Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff on the request of the Fleet Command for administrative subordination of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean to the Fleet Command.

The Chief, Naval Staff approves the suggestion to deny this request and to leave the present administrative set-up unchanged. In view of the planned changes in personnel (Admiral Schmundt is going to be relieved of his post) Group North has requested an organizational change in the position of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean as of 5 Jul. The Admiral, Arctic Ocean is to lose his independent organizational status and is to become a branch and part of Group Command, North as an advance headquarters. For the time being the matter is still being investigated by the Plans and Schedules Branch, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff.

Special Items:

I. Concerning the Mining of the Strait of Sicily:

Following are the Naval Staff's comments on the memorandum of the Italian High Command as transmitted by the German Armistice Commission (see War Diary, 7 Jun. 1942): "The French would of course have to mine French territorial waters off Cape Bon in such a manner that a controlled passage through the guarded gap in the mine field is always probable. French shipping would proceed undisturbed in any case. It is not certain, however, whether the French will be willing to grant passage to Axis ships while denying it to British vessels without making demands for additional means of defense, since the Anglo-Americans might consider such procedure to be favoring the Axis, and as a result might initiate reprisals against French maritime shipping, e.g., in the Strait of Gibraltar. Paragraphs a. and d. of the memorandum indicate, however, that the Italians want to propose that the French prevent the transfer of enemy naval forces and transports by force of arms. Such a procedure would prejudice the French position in the eyes of the Anglo-Americans to the same extent, if not more, as would a refusal to permit British ships to pass through the gap in the mine field. Hence it might also lead to those French demands which the Italians want to avoid. The Naval Staff, therefore, does not consider the reasons advanced by the Italian High Command a sound basis for its negative attitude. The Naval Staff sees no reason why the question of effectively mining French territorial waters near Cape Bon should not at least be discussed with the French."

The Naval Staff forwards this critique to the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, with copy to the German Armistice Commission, referring again to its previously voiced opinion. The Naval Staff points out that every supply transport reaching Malta or the eastern Mediterranean as a result of an ineffective blockade of French territorial

12 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

waters means a strengthening of the British position in that area. See Telegram 1801.

II. A survey map indicating damage and losses from enemy mines and bombs in the months of January to May 1942, is in File "Own Shipping Losses" as per 1/Skl I E 13282/42 Gkdos. The Naval Staff plans to publish this survey monthly for the information of Groups West and North, the Commanding Admiral, Norway and the Commanding Admirals, Defenses, West, North, and Baltic Sea.

III. In accordance with the suggestion of the Naval Staff Operations Division (see War Diary, 2 Jun.), the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff has requested the Naval Construction Division to issue priority ratings for the continued construction of new warships which had been interrupted.

IV. An extensive survey by the Naval Intelligence Division of highway facilities between the African West Coast and the Nile indicates that all reports available so far are primarily propaganda, and undoubtedly are greatly exaggerated. In reality, it seems that only existing roads and trails are being improved and interconnected. It is improbable, however, that all-weather highways are being constructed.

A copy of this survey is in No. 27 of the News Analysis "Foreign Navies".

Situation 12 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

A radio report indicates that the U.S. heavy cruiser SANTA FE was launched on 10 Jun., one year after the keel had been laid.

Indian Ocean:

Radio monitoring intercepted a message reporting a new submarine attack in the Mozambique Channel.

Various sources indicate that since 2 Jun. all transports of men and materiel en route to India have been ordered to proceed to Red Sea ports and Nile bases.

Because shipments from Great Britain and the U.S. are insufficient for replacing losses and setting up the necessary reserves in North Africa, it has become necessary to requisition supplies from the depots of the 9th and 10th Armies in Jerusalem and Bagdad.

2. Own Situation:

Telegram 1204 instructs ship "23" to operate south and southwest of the supply quadrant after she has completed her supply mission. The Naval Staff considers operations up to a longitude of 2° farther east than point "Maastricht" promising. The same telegram contains the information that as of 20 Jun. the DOGGERBANK will stand by for her rendezvous with ship "28" in the vicinity of point "Wagner".

12 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Corresponding directive to the DOGGERBANK via Radiogram 1213 adding that the DOGGERBANK may proceed to Japan after delivering supplies.

Radiogram 1421 informs ship "28" about sailing instructions issued to the DOGGERBANK for her rendezvous with the former.

At 1840 the following short code signal was received from ship "10":
"To supply ship: Have no task for you. You are relieved from duty.
To the NANKING: Proceed to Java."

The Naval Staff acknowledged receipt of the message via Radiogram 2210 to ship "10".

An inquiry of the Naval Staff concerning dock facilities for ship "10" was answered by the Naval Attache in Tokyo as follows: "Docking possible at Osaka or Yokohama, depending on time of arrival. Presume that Japanese port chosen so that ship may be studied? What restrictions? (See Telegram 2244.)"

A report from the Naval Attache in Tokyo on an inspection tour to the front, which contains some valuable data about Japanese operational preparations, states that probably only the naval base will be available for the loading of rubber by blockade runners in Saigon. Delays will be unavoidable. The commercial harbor is being used to capacity as a Japanese supply base.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance spotted a convoy 150 miles west-southwest of Cape St. Vincent at noon. The convoy consisted of 19 steamers and 2 patrol boats proceeding on course 310°. To the northwest of it were 3 steamers and 1 tanker followed by 1 patrol boat.

In the evening 1 northeastbound convoy of 5 ships and 1 east-southeast-bound convoy of 10 ships were located off the southern coast of England.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Mine sweeper M "4212" struck a mine on the southern tip of the convoy route to Spain and sank. 11 men are missing.

Channel Coast:

A decrease in visibility caused the cancellation of the planned mine operation of the 2nd and 4th PT Boat Flotillas. An enemy air raid on mine sweeper M "3815" caused casualties. One of the two attacking Spitfires was shot down.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean1. North Sea:Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported a southbound convoy of 20 to 25 steamers in the northern part of the Humber-Wash area.

Own Situation:

Several enemy air raids on Ems and Elbe shipping during the night of 11 Jun. The Swedish steamer SENTA (1,497 GRT) sank in quadrant AN 9575 as the result of a bomb hit. Mines are suspected to have been laid, especially in the mouths of the Ems and Jade rivers. 2 planes were shot down by anti-aircraft fire.

A Halifax bomber which was shot down by a night fighter near Terschelling jettisoned 4 magnetic mines.

Escort service and sweeping of shipping lanes in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North proceeded according to plan. Only 1 of the 11 mine-exploding vessels is ready for operation in the German Bight.

The problem of supplying mine-exploding vessels has become very acute in view of the enemy mine offensive, and requires particular attention as far as the assigning of repair facilities is concerned.

2. Norway:

Escort and mine sweeping services proceeded uneventfully. The HELA has arrived in Trondheim. See Telegram 1030 for a report by the Commanding Admiral, Norway concerning his order closing the area of Kiberg Nes to fishing.

Destroyers GALSTER and RIEDEL have entered the Norway area. The ECKOLDT has returned to Kiel because of turbine trouble.

It seems questionable, therefore, whether mine operations "Graf" and "Herzog" can be executed according to plan.

3. Arctic Ocean:Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reports 8 large and 13 smaller steamers in Pinagori in the afternoon. Extensive air reconnaissance over the Arctic Ocean remained without tactical result. The west coast of Spitsbergen and the Ice Fjord are free of ice. The drift ice ends at 75° N.

A U.S. radio report discloses that strong U.S. naval forces under the command of Admiral Giffon have joined the British Fleet in order to keep open the northern supply route to Russia.

Own Situation:

Unchanged.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

During the night of 11 Jun. about 11⁴ enemy planes flew over Denmark, Schleswig Holstein, and the western and central Baltic Sea up to Kolberg on a mine-laying mission. Our fighter defenses were unable to establish contact with the enemy. Parachute mines were dropped off Swinemuende. 1 plane was shot down by Navy anti-aircraft artillery. During the same night and on 12 Jun. the following ships hit mines at the places, and with the results, indicated: Motor ship INGRID sank near Darsser Ort; the Swedish steamer BOJAN sank east of Sassnitz; the schooner SPEER was badly damaged off Swinemuende and was grounded in the harbor.

As a result of this mine situation in the central Baltic Sea, Group North has ordered preparatory measures for shifting all training areas further to the east since the lack of ships makes it impossible to keep the waters free of mines (see Telegram 0030).

Nothing to report from the eastern Baltic Sea.

V. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

A press report indicates that a convoy with considerable quantities of war materiel may be expected to leave Boston and Jersey (Jersey City?) for Ulster in early June.

2. Own Situation:

Operation group "Hecht" against the convoy in the Northeast Atlantic is being discontinued because of poor visibility and the difficult supply situation of the submarines. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines plans to have Group "Hecht" comb the area up to about quadrant AK 69 and then return.

On 5 Jun. submarine U "94" sank the Portuguese schooner MARIA DA GLORIA (270 GRT) by gunfire without warning. The schooner had entered the blockade area and was sunk in quadrant BC 1422. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines will divide the 9 submarines which have left harbors in western France into 2 groups for operations against the convoy which left Gibraltar on 9 Jun.

From the American coast submarine U "87" now also reports completion of her mine-laying task (off Boston).

Submarines U "129" and U "107" report from the West Indies that they sank 2 steamers with a total of 13,367 GRT and 1 tanker and 2 steamers with a total of 10,159 GRT, respectively.

In the Mediterranean submarine U "77" sank 1 escort vessel of the HUNT-class in quadrant CO 9131.

In quadrant CO 9316 submarine U "431" was driven off from a southeast-bound convoy consisting of very large steamers after having missed with a spread of torpedoes.

For further details see supplementary submarine situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Special Items:

I. The Intelligence Service and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines have agreed to repeat operation "Grete" (landing an agent on the Canadian Coast by means of a submarine) by operation "Carolus", Long Island being designated as the alternate landing place. The Naval Staff gives the requested approval.

II. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines points to the serious losses resulting from ever increasing enemy air raids on German submarines entering and leaving their bases on the French west coast (4 attacks have taken place since 1 Dec. 1941 with very serious damage to the following submarines: U "563", U "71", 1 Italian submarine, and U "105"). He also directs attention to the constant and unchallenged air reconnaissance of the enemy over the Bay of Biscay. For these reasons the Commanding Admiral, Submarines considers it absolutely vital to have the most recent types of long-range fighters or long-range bombers transferred to the Bay of Biscay. (See Telegram 1255.)

The Naval Staff thoroughly approves this request and will use all of its authority to see that appropriate action is taken.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing to report.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Large numbers of planes went into action to support the Africa Panzer Army. AR 23's were employed in nuisance raids on air fields on Malta.

Eight Ju 88's and a training squadron went into action against a west-bound convoy spotted in the eastern Mediterranean.

3. Eastern Front:

650 bombers and numerous fighters were committed over Sevastopol. Large numbers of planes went into action to support offensive operations of the Army east of Kharkov.

The 5th Air Force completed its armed reconnaissance of the Murmansk railroad lines and troop encampments with good effect.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation Mediterranean:

Western Mediterranean:

In the evening of 11 Jun. 7 destroyers arrived in Gibraltar from the west. On 12 Jun. a convoy consisting of 6 to 8 steamers and 3 naval vessels as well as 1 large vessel, apparently a cruiser, passed the Strait of Gibraltar at 0230 in an easterly direction, proceeding without lights (intelligence report from Spain). The same source reports that a total of 14 vessels left port between 0400 and 0500 in an

12 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

easterly direction. Included in the group were the MALAYA, the ARGUS, the EAGLE, 1 DIDO-class vessel, 1 CAIRO-class vessel, the MANXMAN and several destroyers. Adding the reported convoy, this represents a total of 24 to 26 vessels which left port for the western Mediterranean on that morning, including 6 to 8 steamers. The following ships were observed in Gibraltar at noon: The MAIDSTONE, 1 auxiliary cruiser, 2 submarines, 1 CALEDON-class cruiser in dock, 19 steamers, 8 tankers, and 19 small vessels.

61 planes were seen on the airfield.

Italian air reconnaissance reports that task force "H" which has left port consists of only 12 vessels.

At 1543 radio monitoring intercepted a report from a Gibraltar-based plane stating that it had spotted 2 northbound destroyers 6 miles north of Oran. At 1610 another message from the same plane was intercepted which reported a target tow (apparently French vessels) following the above vessels.

Central and Eastern Mediterranean:

At 0800 1 submarine was located about 70 miles southwest of Cape Matapan.

At 0615 and 1730 reconnaissance planes spotted westbound convoys comprising 5 steamers and 6 patrol vessels northwest of Alexandria and northwest of Marsa Matruh, respectively. It is presumed that the same convoy was involved.

In the forenoon 2 more steamers and 1 destroyer on a westerly course were sighted northwest of Port Said while 1 steamer, likewise proceeding in westerly direction, was spotted east-northeast of Tobruk.

2. Own Situation:

Mediterranean:

Nothing to report.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The convoy consisting of the PISANI and the SESTRIERE arrived in Tripoli in the forenoon. All other transport movements proceeded uneventfully and according to plan.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

An enemy submarine sank a motor cutter off Thira in the evening of 11 Jun. In the forenoon of 12 Jun. the lightship tender CATURA and 1 auxiliary sailing vessel were sunk by an enemy submarine near Neapolis (northwest of Cape Malea).

Enemy planes raided Athens during the night of 11 Jun.

12 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring indicates the usual extent of warship movements and submarine activity. Evaluation of aerial photographs reveals no change in the number of ships in Batum, Tuapse, and Novorossisk.

Own Situation:

Italian submarine chaser and submarine missions during the nights of 10 and 11 Jun. were unsuccessful.

Mine-sweeping operations of the 16th Harbor Defense Flotilla in the Bay of Odessa were unsuccessful.

During the night of 9 Jun. enemy air raids were directed against Simferopol, Eupatoria, and Yalta, but caused no damage. Tugboat ROMULUS was attacked by an enemy submarine south of Odessa on 11 Jun. but the torpedo missed.

As a result of the danger from submarines off Odessa, the supply traffic has been discontinued temporarily. A flanking mine field is being laid off the Bay of Odessa.

PT boat S "26" is out of commission in Ak Mechet because the warhead of one of her spare torpedoes burned out. The PT boat is proceeding to Linz for repairs.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The offensive against Sevastopol was making progress in the north and south. "Neuhausshoehe" and "Kapellenberg"* were taken. Heavy enemy attacks had to be repulsed in the east and northeast.

A rather heavy enemy attack was repulsed also in the Izyum area.

It was still impossible to close the pincers east of Kharkov because of strong enemy resistance. It is to be expected, therefore, that enemy units will be able to withdraw from the encircled area in easterly direction. Offensive operations north of Volchansk made further progress beyond the Donets River in an easterly direction.

Central Army Group:

The pocket east of Smolensk was further narrowed down from the south, east, and west.

* New-House Hill and Chapel Hill. Whether these were German code names or German translations of the Russian names has not been determined.

12 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Northern Army Group:

South of Staraya Russa our troops gained ground in an easterly and southeasterly direction. Enemy attacks against our defense front north of Yamno were unsuccessful. Our shock troops succeeded in breaking through the western front of the pocket in an easterly direction. Stubborn enemy resistance on the northern outskirts of the pocket.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Fronts:

No reports received.

3. North Africa:

No reports received.

13 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance:

France:

Secretary of State Hull declared that American shipments to French North Africa will be resumed.

The French government has vigorously denied reports about alleged Franco-British negotiations concerning Madagascar.

In answer to a question on French Guiana, Hull said in his press conference that the U.S. Army and Navy are now making all the necessary preparations for occupying that colony since any action there on the part of the Axis might do irreparable damage.

Great Britain:

The Foreign Secretary declared in answer to a question in the House of Commons concerning the Anglo-Russian Treaty that all points have been made public and that no secret commitments or promises of any sort have been made.

German propaganda, on the other hand, is emphasizing the existence of secret agreements which deliver Europe into the hands of Bolshevism. Propaganda to this effect is being facilitated by the ambiguity of the clause concerning the renunciation of territorial claims.

For further comments on the treaty see Political Review No. 136, Par. 2.

Finland:

As a result of the German-Finnish trade agreement, appreciable quantities of grain will be exported to Finland and similar quantities of mine timber will be imported by Germany.

See Political Review, No. 136, Par. 4 for details.

Turkey:

In connection with the Anglo-Russian Treaty it is already possible to observe a slight change in the Turks' estimate of the situation and in their attitude. The Ankara radio stated that Turkey received the news of the treaty with satisfaction.

U.S.A.:

See Political Review No. 136, Par. 8 for more details on the Russo-American Treaty as well as on the new \$2,000,000,000 loan to Russia.

Argentina:

While submitting sharp protest on the sinking of the steamer VICTORIA, the Argentine Ambassador expressed extreme pessimism about the outlook for a continued Argentine neutrality policy. He added that a majority in Parliament is in favor of severing diplomatic relations with the Axis powers. Castillo emphasized in an interview with a representative of the Chilean press that a break in diplomatic relations actually means war. The decisive hour, however, has not yet come for Argentina.

13 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Similar reports from Chile also indicate that the situation there has become more acute. Hence, despite alleged British efforts to keep Chile and Argentina out of the war, it is to be expected that in the long run the situation in South America will become worse so far as the Axis powers are concerned.

China:

An air and an infantry unit of the Nanking Government have gone over to Chiang Kai-shek. Although militarily insignificant, this incident illustrates the difficulties which beset Japanese plans for China as a result of the invincible Chinese nationalism.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the following:

1. The request of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines for the transfer of long-range fighters and modern bomber units for the protection of submarines in the Bay of Biscay as per note in the War Diary of 12 Jun.
2. The estimate of the situation by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South which reads as follows:

As expected, the enemy seems to want to take advantage of the fact that the German Air Force is tied down in North Africa by supplying Malta. There appears to be a connection between the convoy which left Gibraltar on 12 Jun. and the westbound convoy from Alexandria. In recent days British air forces on Malta have been reinforced by approximately 120 fighters, 42 bombers, and 7 torpedo planes. Their operations, probably aimed at forcing Italian naval forces to withdraw in northerly direction, fit into the overall picture of the enemy operation.

A surprise attack on German and Italian air fields in Sicily is to be expected. It is estimated that the enemy was able to ship a minimum of 30,000 and a maximum of 60,000 tons of supplies to Tobruk since the start of the Axis offensive in Libya.

In a Very Restricted Circle:

3. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the following:

The situation report by the German Naval Command, Italy. The Italian Navy also believes that the enemy intends to get a convoy through to Malta from Gibraltar but does not share the opinion of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South that the movements in the west merely represent a diversion to relieve the convoy coming from the east. For the time being, the Italian Navy High Command has committed all available air forces, submarines and submarine chasers in the area of the Balearic Islands, between Sardinia and North Africa, as well as in the Strait of Sicily. The planned transfer of all naval forces in Taranto (3 battleships, 3 cruisers, several destroyers) to the southern Tyrrhenian Sea for joint operations with the vessels in Cagliari, during which the last fuel oil reserves of the Italian Navy would have been exhausted, was postponed upon receipt of news about the Alexandria convoy. The interpretation of enemy operations plans by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South was accepted instead, and the vessels were

13 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

ordered to be in readiness on short notice during the morning of 13 Jun. Messina cannot be used as a base for the Taranto forces because it is exposed to air raids.

Even before news of the east convoy had been received, the German Admiral, Rome expressed the opinion to the Italian Admiralty that with fuel conditions being what they are, a possibly futile thrust in westerly direction could not be justified because it might happen that a further change in the strategic situation will necessitate the employment of all Italian naval forces for the protection of our supply shipments to North Africa.

The Chief, Naval Staff comments that advice of this nature might increase German responsibility unnecessarily.

4. The memorandum from the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South on the execution of offensive operations during operation "Herkules". The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division takes as basis for his report the material forwarded from the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy. (See War Diary of 23 May, Special Items.) The Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff calls attention to the position taken by the Fuehrer with regard to the operations plan once presented to the Fuehrer by General Student (see War Diary of 23 May.)

Under given conditions (insufficient German forces) the Chief, Naval Staff likewise considers the successful outcome of the operation, particularly of the landing in Scirocco Bay from German PT boats and motor mine sweepers, questionable if not impossible.

The Operations Division, Naval Staff, on the other hand, takes the positive view previously stated in the War Diary of 23 May. The Operations Division calls attention to the fact that the backing of an authority like the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South is in itself a guarantee for the plan's feasibility. However, the Operations Division particularly points to the strategic importance of capturing the island, a step which must be delayed no longer unless our position in the Mediterranean and North Africa is to be exposed to renewed difficulties. Furthermore, operation "Herkules" is prerequisite to carrying out the more far-reaching projects embodied in operations plan "Aida".

The Chief, Naval Staff will discuss the problem of operation "Herkules" on the occasion of his scheduled report to the Fuehrer on 15 Jun.

5. The Chief Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff reports that the Italian High Command has requested the Armed Forces High Command to furnish 30,000 tons of fuel oil from German inventories. The Naval Staff has received a similar request from the Italian Navy.

In view of the Navy's own precarious fuel situation, the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff considers it impossible to meet this request. The Chief, Naval Staff does not consider it appropriate to furnish fuel oil for operation "Herkules" as it stands now.

The Naval Staff Operations Division and the Operations Branch, Naval Staff, Operations Division, however, again emphasize that the capture of Malta might be a factor deciding the outcome of the war, calling attention to the military and political consequences which might develop in the Mediterranean area if this step were to be omitted. The Operations Division is of the opinion that the extra fuel actually needed by the Italians, an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 tons, can and must be furnished, if for no other reason than to prevent the Italians from blaming the

13 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

German Navy for the fact that the operation is not carried out. The operation must not be cancelled because of the fuel oil problem which can definitely be solved.

The Chief, Naval Staff postpones a decision until the Fuehrer's viewpoint on operation "Herkules" has been ascertained.

Special Items:

The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, accompanied by the Deputy Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division, was away from Berlin from 12 Jun. until noon of 13 Jun. for a conference with the Army Chief of Staff, on problems arising from the war situation which are of equal concern to the Navy and the Army. The discussions resulted in far-reaching accord as to the fundamental estimate of the situation and the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. The forces actually available to the Army and the Air Force, however, impose considerable restrictions on the practical execution of strategic and operational decisions.

For details see the conference minutes in War Diary, Part C, Vol. "Fundamental Problems of Warfare".

Situation 13 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Staff expects the REGENSBURG to arrive at point 1 of route "Gelb" on 17 Jun., at point 2 on 29 Jun. The REGENSBURG has been directed via Radiogram 1632 to approach point 2 at daylight and to proceed from there at maximum cruising speed, in accordance with her fuel supply, keeping a sharp lookout for submarines and steering a zig-zag course.

Radiogram 1208 directs the NANKIN to be off Batavia on 23 or 24 Jun. The vessel is being informed that the Naval Attache in Tokyo will report her impending arrival at Batavia but that the Japanese Navy might assign her a different port.

The text of the above directives to the REGENSBURG and NANKIN has been transmitted to ship "10" via Radiogram 1059 and to the Naval Attache in Tokyo via Radiogram 1600, the latter with the addition that the NANKIN will use as identification signal the code corresponding to her name in the signals prearranged with the Japanese.

A short code signal from ship "10" at 2018 requests repetition of her dismissal order to the REGENSBURG (see War Diary of 12 Jun.) since ship "10" is not in communication with her supply ship.

The Naval Staff acknowledged receipt and compliance with this request via Radiograms 2304 and 2336 to ship "10" and the REGENSBURG, respectively.

Information on enemy situation via Radiograms 0303, 0626, and 1712.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance observed numerous steamers proceeding along the southern coast of England.

2. Own Situation:

A total of 20 mines were swept today along the Channel and Atlantic coasts by the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West.

Special Items:

a. Group West, referring to its own corresponding request, is urging approval of the request of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines for the transfer of long-range fighter and bomber planes for the protection of submarines in the Bay of Biscay. (See Telegram 1040.)

b. Group West reports that as a result of the Naval Staff's order of 9 Mar. 1942 coastal batteries in the Calais area have altogether been prevented from firing at enemy convoys in the Strait of Dover because in nearly all instances their fire can be directed only on the basis of radar location. Group West considers this to be one of the reasons for the increase in enemy shipping in the Channel and requests that coastal batteries be permitted to resume firing on the basis of radar location under favorable conditions, with consideration for the ammunition supply and the wear on the guns. The Chief, Naval Staff approves the occasional and irregular use of the guns on the basis of radar location in order to effect a continuous threat to enemy convoy movements.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance observed 45 northbound and 25 southbound steamers between Hartlepool and the Thames estuary during the course of the day.

An intercepted carrier pigeon message from Holland to England reports on German invasion fears in the Netherlands, the withdrawal of tanks and artillery, and the absence of German invasion preparations. The message requests air raids on the harbor of Den Helder and on gasoline tankers and on ammunition ships. (See Telegram 1520 for details.)

One of the numerous channels has been uncovered through which news is continuously flowing to England.

Own Situation:

The breakdown of 2 destroyers has caused Group North to

13 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

postpone the execution of mine operations "Graf" and "Herzog" indefinitely. The OSTMARK and the BRUMMER are to carry out these operations upon completion of operation "Erika", whenever weather conditions limit enemy air activity to a minimum.

The 8th Motor Mine Flotilla discovered 3 well-anchored buoys while proceeding to quadrant AN 3875 from Esbjerg. These buoys seemed too large to have been laid by fishermen. Seven smaller buoys had previously been observed on 5 Jun. on route "Blau", between 56° 11' N and 56° 40.5' N. (See Telegram 1920.)

It is conceivable that the enemy planned these buoys as markers in preparation for mine operations and raids on the Danish coast.

Otherwise nothing to report.

2. Norway:

Despite a warning, a Norwegian fishing cutter crossed the Varanger Fjord mine field on 11 Jun. and sank after having struck a mine.

One heavy and 1 light anti-aircraft battery will transfer to Alta from Trondheim on 12 and 13 Jun., respectively. They can be set up by 20 Jun. Shipping in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Norway proceeded according to plan and without incidents.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance observed about 30 ships between Murmansk and Vayenga in the afternoon.

Own Situation:

On the basis of previous experiences with enemy mine-laying activities in northern Norway there is reason to believe that the enemy is continuously laying aerial mines, and that as a result individual mines are scattered over a wide area. For this reason the Naval Staff feels that the anti-mine measures in Operations Directive No. 17 of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean (for Operation "Roesselsprung"), i.e., sweeping of the main route by a group of 2 mine sweepers, are inadequate. The Naval Staff recommends an investigation of the possibility of using bow protection gear on all naval vessels. Copy of corresponding telegram to Group North in File "Roesselsprung".

The Air Force Operations Staff has examined in detail the question of mining the White Sea harbors. In view of the present tasks of the 30th Bomber Wing the Operations Staff does not consider it possible to assign a bomber group to northern Norway for this purpose nor to have the 30th Bomber Wing take over this assignment. However, the Air Force Operations Staff promises to keep the mine operation in mind. See Telegram 1501 for corresponding notice to Group North.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea1. Baltic Sea:

Nothing to report from Baltic Sea entrances and the western Baltic Sea.

2. Eastern Baltic Sea:

Because of the mine fields and bomb damage, Group North considers it improbable that Russian battleships or cruisers will break out of Leningrad. Instead it is expected that submarines and small vessels up to destroyers will engage in offensive operations. The request to concentrate air raids on these vessels has been answered by the 1st Air Force to the effect that the operations order against Leningrad can only be changed by the Commander in Chief, Air Force. The Group asks for appropriate action. (See Telegram 1402.) The Naval Staff has initiated the necessary steps on the part of the General Staff, Air Force.

See Telegram 1358 for the Group North directive for disposition of captured enemy materiel in Reval and Baltic Port. A considerable number of items have not yet been put to use, among them eight 30.5 cm. gun barrels complete with breach and four 18 cm. guns.

The 1st Air Force is organizing a force of 19 Siebel ferries to combat enemy shipping on Lake Ladoga. Group North has called the attention of the 1st Air Force to the fact that overall direction of operations on Lake Ladoga rests with the Commanding Admiral, Finnish Fleet. The ferry force will therefore have to receive operations orders from him. The Group has also pointed out the navigational and tactical difficulties arising from the fact that the Siebel ferries are not very seaworthy. The 1st Air Force, on the other hand, has requested permission from the Commander in Chief, Air Force to conduct operations independently. In order to assure uniform navigational and tactical command of all forces on Lake Ladoga, Group North requests that all operations, including those of the ferry formation, be under the overall command of the Commanding Admiral, Finnish Fleet, and that the Commander of the 31st Mine Sweeper Flotilla be designated liaison officer and officer in charge of all German naval vessels and Italian submarine chasers, as well as navigational and tactical commander of the ferry formation. (See Telegram 0014.)

The request of the Group is fully justified. The Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff will take charge of further details.

Group North intends to lay aerial mines in the target areas "Qualle" and "Krebs" in Lake Ladoga in order to prevent any further evacuation of Leningrad and to stop the flow of supplies to the city. (See Telegram 0045.)

V. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring intercepted a message from an enemy plane claiming a successful attack on a German submarine 120 miles north of the Shetland Islands. An intercepted message from the American coast tells of a submarine attack 60 miles southeast of Bermuda.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "159" reports from the West Indies that she sank 1 steamer and 1 tanker totalling 11,693 GRT. Submarine U "83" reports from the Mediterranean that she destroyed a 500 GRT steamer off the entrance to Tripoli harbor. The steamer carried a cargo of ammunition. All submarines in the eastern Mediterranean are being sent against the westbound enemy convoy of about 30 vessels which air reconnaissance reported in quadrant CP 7412 at 1720. Further details in supplementary submarine situation report in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Daylight raids on Leamington and Chelmsford with observed effect. 5 steamers and 1 destroyer in a convoy off the southern coast of England were reported damaged in the evening.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Numerous planes reconnoitered the eastern Mediterranean. Bomber activity in the Akroma area. 1 steamer was sunk (5,000 GRT) while 2 steamers of 6,000 GRT each and 1 escort vessel were damaged during raids on a convoy north of Marsa Matruh at 1010 on 12 Jun.

3. Eastern Front:

A 10,000 GRT steamer was sunk in a raid on Sevastopol on 13 Jun. Near Cape Fiolent our planes sank 1 anti-aircraft gun carrier of 500 GRT and damaged 1 destroyer.

Rail and harbor installations and a ship repair shop in Murmansk harbor were attacked with observed effect. 17 planes were downed in the Arctic area.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea1. Enemy Situation:Western Mediterranean:

At dawn Italian air reconnaissance located Task Force "H" proceeding in an easterly direction at a speed of 14 knots. The planes tracked the task force and sent continuous progress reports. It comprised 1 battleship, 2 aircraft carriers, 4 cruisers and probably 10 to 12 destroyers with a convoy of 9 steamers, 1 tanker and about 8 to 10 patrol vessels.

For positions and courses see map in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

An intelligence report from Spain states that 800 soldiers are aboard the vessels, presumably personnel for Malta. Location at 1710 174 miles east by south of Formentera Island; course 90°; speed 14 knots.

13 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Radio monitoring intercepted a report from a British vessel of 2045 stating that she sighted a force of 2 cruisers and 3 destroyers 70 miles east of Cape Spartivento (Sardinia) on course 130° at a speed of 20 knots. (The Italian Cagliari group.)

Central and Eastern Mediterranean:

Up to 1230, German air reconnaissance reported lively traffic of east and westbound single steamers, most of them accompanied by 2 escort vessels, in the waters off Sidi Barrani, in the Gulf of Sollum, and north and east of Tobruk. Harbor vessels were engaged in what appeared to be route patrol and mine-sweeping activity off Tobruk, Valletta and the Scirocco area.

A force comprising about 30 vessels was reported off Alexandria at 1230, Italian reconnaissance giving its location at 1800 as 16 miles west of Alexandria on course 285°.

Evaluation of aerial photographs of the ships in Alexandria at 0715 revealed that 1 cruiser, 8 destroyers, 8 escort vessels, 1 passenger steamer, 7 steamers and 2 tankers had left port since 9 Jun. It may be assumed that these vessels constitute the bulk of the force sighted at 1230, about the make-up of which no accurate picture can be obtained. The photograph seems to indicate that 1 battleship actually is a dummy. At 2000 the force was reported westbound 25 miles east of Marsa Matruh. Its mission apparently is to get a heavily escorted convoy through to Tobruk or Malta, or to both points; it may also include empty steamers which are to be turned over to the escort forces of the convoy en route from the west.

The map in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV also shows locations and courses of this group.

2. Own Situation:

Mediterranean:

Enemy planes raided Benghazi during the night of 12 Jun. but caused no damage. One plane was shot down.

On 13 Jun. 13 Italian submarines at sea or at waiting positions in the Mediterranean. Three of them were off Malta and 9 in the western Mediterranean. The Cagliari force of 2 cruisers and 3 destroyers put out to sea at 1600 because of the danger of air raids and the nightly laying of aerial mines. In the morning of 15 Jun. this group is to operate against the enemy forces en route from Gibraltar in the area between Sicily and Malta since the enemy's speed is estimated at 12 knots. The Air Force, Italian submarine chasers and submarines will participate in the operation. The naval forces at Taranto will not be committed in the west because of the fuel situation, apparently by order of the Duce, while it is planned to commit at most 1 battleship, 4 cruisers, and some destroyers in the east if a definite target has been located.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

According to plan. 1,009 tons of supplies were unloaded at Derna on 12 Jun.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

2 PT boats were fired upon by enemy submarines near Euboea.

13 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

During the night of 12 Jun. the Italian submarine CB "3" fired 2 torpedoes at a heavy enemy cruiser south of the Crimea without success.

Two Italian submarine chasers and 4 PT boats were lying in wait south of Cape Kherson during the same night. A PT boat was able to fire a torpedo on a relatively large, heavily escorted two-stack steamer from a short distance without being able to observe a hit herself. Three other vessels in that vicinity observed a strong underwater explosion. PT boats S "72" and "28" were unsuccessful in their torpedo attack on an enemy torpedo boat during the night of 11 Jun. In the course of an enemy air raid on Yalta during that night the Italian submarine chaser "572" and 2 submarines sustained splinter damage.

For this reason Group South has again requested the Southern Army Group and the 4th Air Force to furnish heavy anti-aircraft guns for Yalta. A single, rather large enemy plane raided Constanta in the forenoon of 12 Jun. without effect.

VIII. Situation East Asia

The U.S. Navy Department has officially announced the loss of the aircraft carrier LEXINGTON during the battle of the Coral Sea. The vessel allegedly was sunk by the Americans themselves when they were unable to extinguish fires caused by enemy bomb hits.

Japanese sources unofficially admit the loss of 2 aircraft carriers during the battle of Midway.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Fort Stalin was captured at the northern sector during the battle of Sevastopol.

Kamary and "Sprunghuegel"* were taken in the southeastern area.

An attack on the fort south of "Riegelhoehe"* is in progress.

The pincer movement east of Kharkov was successfully concluded in the early morning hours of 13 Jun. Numerous encircled enemy groups are being annihilated.

Operations along the Burluk River and mopping-up operations in the Saltov area east of the Donets River are proceeding successfully in the wake of enemy forces withdrawing in easterly direction.

* It was not possible to determine whether these were German code names or translations of Russian names.

13 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Northwest of Kholm our forces gained territory in their advance to the north.

Enemy attacks on the defense front near Yamno were repulsed and the Volkhov pocket was drawn still tighter.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Mostly quiet.

3. North Africa:

Enemy armored forces in the area southwest of Tobruk were pressed together in northerly direction by an encircling attack of our Panzer Division and a frontal attack of the 20th Italian Motorized Army Corps. Their attempt to break out to the east and southeast was unsuccessful. The enemy rapidly withdrew in northerly direction after having lost a large number of tanks.

Since the enemy has practically no reserves left in the Egyptian area, his situation in Libya must be very serious.

14 Jun. 1942

Sunday

Items of Political Importance

Sweden:

According to a report by a reliable informant, the overwhelming majority of the Swedish people, though entertaining strong sympathy for the Anglo-Americans, wholeheartedly reject the alliance between the U.S. and Great Britain on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other. They also are reported as particularly opposed to the war on Finland. After incorporating Finland it is felt Russia will move into Norway in order to gain access to the Atlantic at Narvik. The conquest of Narvik is said to be more important to Russia than the possession of the Dardanelles, since Narvik offers more rapid and better connection with America.

Special Items:

The German Armistice Commission reports that the question of mining Tunisian territorial waters has again been raised with the Italian Armistice Commission. Stress was laid on the particular interest of the Armed Forces High Command in this problem. Because the Italian position so far was dictated by the Duce, the Italian Armistice Commission confined itself to acknowledging the German position once again and promising to inform Rome thereof. The German Armistice Commission feels that the personal intervention of Field Marshall Kesselring, who initiated the whole matter, is necessary in order to effect a change in the position taken by the Italian High Command (see Telegram 1255).

The Naval Staff cannot but agree with the opinion of the German Armistice Commission.

Situation 14 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

The following short code signal has been received from ship "23":

"Shall refuel from same tanker on 15 Jul. Have sunk approximately 15,000 GRT so far."

The Naval Staff acknowledged receipt via Radiogram 0630.

Radiogram 1825 expressed congratulations to ship "23" on her fine initial success and informed her that the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN is being informed by the Naval Staff about the date of the second refuelling.

Radiogram 1411 transmitted to ship "23" a commendation from the Commander

14 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

in Chief, Navy and conferred citations.

The short code signal of ship "10" (see War Diary 13 Jun.) is being answered by the Naval Staff as follows (Radiogram 1203):

"a. The Naval Staff was not aware of the fact that ship "10" is not in communication with her supply ship or the prize ship.

b. In similar cases the Naval Staff recommends that the auxiliary ships be dismissed with a definite date at which they are to report to a rendezvous point. The name of the ships, the rendezvous point, and the date then should be reported to the Naval Staff.

c. In the present case the Naval Staff is not sure of the location of the supply ship and the prize ship. Hence there exists the possibility of an error in dead reckoning with a subsequent erroneous report about their arrival in Japanese waters. Attention is directed to paragraph 2 of Radiogram 1105 of 4 Jun. If the dates mentioned in Radiogram 1059 of 13 Jun. are approximately correct, no further report is expected."

The DOGGERBANK is being informed via Radiogram 1048 about a message intercepted from the steamer BALTIC dated 11 Jun. This message concerns an explosion which occurred at 275° and 28.5 miles from Green Point light-house and presumably was due to self-detonation or a drifting object in the mine field laid by the DOGGERBANK.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance spotted a convoy at noon 350 miles west of Porto. The convoy was pursuing a northwesterly course and consisted of 22 steamers, 3 corvettes, and 1 destroyer.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

Channel Coast:

The 2nd and 4th PT Boat Flotillas laid mines during the night of 14 Jun.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

In the evening air reconnaissance located 43 northbound steamers off Lowestoft.

Own Situation:

The Norwegian steamer TAIWAN (5,500 GRT) which was proceeding

14 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

in our westbound convoy struck a mine north of Ameland. An attempt is being made to tow her to Borkum.

2. Norway:

The enemy carried out reconnaissance over the Lofoten Islands, west of the Vest Fjord and Trondheim.

Shipping and escort service proceeded uneventfully and according to plan.

Telegram 1755 informed the Naval Staff about the commendation to the forces of the Commander, Mine Sweepers for their winter missions by the Commanding Admiral, Norway and Group North on the occasion of the vessels' transfer from the Norway area. This commendation is well deserved in the opinion of the Naval Staff.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring it may be considered possible that a QP convoy has left Murmansk for the west. Air reconnaissance reported 30 vessels in Murmansk Bay and spotted a convoy in the area north of Iceland. The convoy consisted of 5 steamers, 2 corvettes and 2 patrol vessels, on course 800.

Own Situation:

Unchanged.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

It is suspected that 2 Russian submarines have broken through the "Seeigel" mine field. PT boats, up to 14 patrol boats, and transport vessels were repeatedly located between Kronstadt and Lavansari. For details see Telegram 0034 and 0930.

2. Own Situation:

Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Western Baltic Sea:

Nothing to report.

The request by Group North for approval of the extension of the danger area in the Skagerrak (see Telegram 1944) has been granted by the Naval Staff.

Eastern Baltic Sea:

Submarine chase west of mine field "Seeigel".

Patrol vessel "312" reported at 0125 that she exchanged gunfire with 6 enemy motor mine sweepers northeast of Hogland. The enemy vessels withdrew under protection of a smoke screen, having probably laid mines. The 1st Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla reports that on 13 Jun. at 2353 it exchanged gunfire with patrol vessels northeast of Seiskari.

14 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Mine fields "Tiger I" and "Tiger II" were laid according to plan. Enemy patrol vessels forced our motor mine sweepers laying mine field "Tiger II" to turn away.

See Telegram 2346 for directive by Group North concerning routes "95" and "96" in the Gulf of Finland.

Group North has been asked to report whether Motor Mine Sweeper "11" knew about the mine field in Reval Bay, the existence of which was reported by the Naval Staff Operations Division on 6 Mar. on the basis of a captured Russian sea chart.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Lively reconnaissance activity in the rendezvous area by both air groups. Radio monitoring located British vessels 270 and 440 miles northwest of Cape Finisterre and 120 miles northwest of Porcupine Bank. Submarine sighting reports were intercepted from the areas around New York and Boston, as well as off the southern coast of Curacao and the northern entrance of the Panama Canal.

2. Own Situation:

Submarines of Group "Endrass" succeeded in establishing contact with the convoy en route from Gibraltar which had been spotted by air reconnaissance. The submarines were able to shadow the convoy throughout the day.

No success reports have been received from the American East Coast. From the Caribbean Sea, on the other hand, submarine U "161" reported sinking a steamer of 4,000 GRT in a convoy, submarine U "504" reported sinking a steamer of 4,500 GRT, and U "158" reported sinking the steamer ADA 0 (5,234 GRT) and 2 tankers of 12,000 and 7,000 GRT.

No reports have been received from the submarines in the South Atlantic.

4 submarines in the Mediterranean are operating against the large convoy en route from Alexandria but have so far been unable to establish contact.

See Telegram 1145 for the report of the Naval Attache in Madrid on damage to submarine U "105" ascertained after her docking and on projected camouflage measures for her sailing which is scheduled for the evening of 20 Jun.

The Naval Staff requests the Recruitment Division, General Administration Bureau, with copy to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines and to the Submarine Division, Naval Staff, to make arrangements for receiving and accommodating the crew of the Japanese submarine which presumably will arrive in Lorient by the middle of July, as per 1/Skl IK 14004/42 Gkdos. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

Further reports in supplementary submarine situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing to report during the day.

See Enemy Situation, West Area for details concerning the spotting of the Gibraltar convoy.

49 planes went into action to lay mines in the Isle of Wight area during the night of 14 Jun.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

A sabotage group destroyed 16 of our planes on the Candia airfield during the night of 13 Jun. 50 hostages were shot.

6 He 111's which were to attack the convoy en route from Alexandria were unable to locate it and attacked Marsa Matruh during the night of 13 Jun. with good effect.

A number of considerable successes have been reported from German and Italian bomber raids on the enemy convoys in the eastern and western Mediterranean.

Italian torpedo planes reported in the morning hours that they scored a torpedo hit on both the MALAYA and the EAGLE, as well as on a heavy cruiser which was allegedly left sinking. The German and Italian Air Forces further report sinking 3 steamers and 1 cruiser and badly damaging another steamer in bomber raids on the force en route from Gibraltar. The Italians lost 15 planes during the attacks.

On the same day the German Air Force reports sinking 5 steamers and damaging 1 destroyer during bomber raids on the convoy in the eastern Mediterranean.

An absolute confirmation of these successes is not yet possible.

Eastern Front:

800 of our planes participated in the battle for Sevastopol. They succeeded in downing 16 enemy planes.

37 planes participated in mine operation "Froschlaich" in Kronstadt Bay during the night of 13 Jun.

The Air Force General Staff presumes that the enemy planes which raided Constanta and Ploesti on 12 Jun. were based in the Iraq area since 4 American-built planes were forced to make emergency landings near Ankara on their return flight. They were interned.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea1. Enemy Situation:Western Mediterranean:

At 1620 Task Force "H" and its convoy were 60 miles south of Cape Spartivento headed for Cape Bon. At 1850 radio monitoring reported them already east of Bizerte.

As a result of the bomber raids by the German and Italian Air Forces, individual, apparently damaged, vessels have turned and are proceeding in westerly direction; the main force, however, continued its advance into the Strait of Sicily, at least up until 2000.

Central and Eastern Mediterranean:

At 0545 the enemy naval force en route from Alexandria was reported northwestbound north of Sollum Bay. It comprised 1 battleship (presumably a dummy), 2 cruisers, 18 destroyers, 20 patrol vessels and 6 steamers. During the morning hours the vessels were proceeding in northerly direction. About 1345 its advance elements were reported northbound about 45 miles south of Nisos Gavdhos (Crete). At 1700 parts of the force were again located westbound in the area about 70 miles northeast of Derna.

2. Own Situation:

The German Naval Command, Italy reports that all available German and Italian naval forces at sea including submarines have been sent against the convoy in the eastern Mediterranean. 6 boats of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla were sent into action on the evening of 14 Jun.

The Italian Navy has ordered the Taranto based naval forces to leave port at 1300, since air reconnaissance in the morning indicated that the Alexandria convoy has passed Tobruk and seems to be heading for Malta. The group, consisting of 2 battleships of the LITTORIO-class and 4 cruisers with destroyers, has been ordered to be in readiness in the waters between 18° and 20° E and 34° and 36° N in the morning of 15 Jun.

It is planned to have a reinforced group of 12 submarines go into action against the Gibraltar group west, east, and south of Malta and to commit all available PT boats. In addition, it is also planned to have the 2 cruisers of the Cagliari-based forces and 6 to 7 destroyers in position in the area south of Pantelleria in the morning of 15 Jun.

The enemy staged an air raid on Taranto during the night of 13 Jun.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

In view of the enemy situation the departure of motor ships BIXIO and ROSELLI has been postponed until further notice. Coastal supply traffic proceeded according to plan and a total of 628 tons was unloaded in Derna on 13 Jun.

4. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

The approach of the enemy force to Crete has caused the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Southeast to assume full command in ac-

14 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

cordance with Fuehrer Directive No. 40 because of the danger of an enemy landing.

During the night of 12 Jun. infantry troops repulsed an enemy landing attempt from a submarine on the southeastern coast of Crete.

The departure of the Crete group from Piraeus has been postponed for 24 hours because the port of destination is overcrowded.

Increasing air raids, submarine sightings, and sabotage acts are signs of increased enemy activity in the Aegean area. Nevertheless, Group South does not believe that enemy operations designed to reconquer Crete are imminent; the Group is of the opinion that these are only energetic attempts to divide and pin down our forces. Although reconnaissance activity has not yet yielded a clear picture about the destination of the convoy in the eastern Mediterranean Group South, basing its opinion on the overall situation, believes it to be heading for either Malta or Tobruk.

This opinion corresponds to that of the Naval Staff.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing new to report.

Own Situation:

A combined air and PT boat attack was staged by the enemy against Yalta during the night of 12 Jun. A Russian PT boat fired a torpedo through the barrage, sinking the Italian submarine CB "V". The attacking PT boat was able to escape behind a smoke screen despite the fact that she was fired upon and one hit was observed.

On 13 Jun. enemy planes raided Simferopol, Yalta, Kerch and Genichesk. PT boats S "27" and "40" arrived in Constanta from Germany on 13 Jun.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The battle for Sevastopol is continuing with undiminished fury. The pursuit of the enemy withdrawing eastward between Burluk and Olkhovatka is continuing. The number of prisoners taken since the beginning of the attack south of Volchansk has increased to more than 22,000. Enemy attacks were repulsed southeast and northeast of Kursk.

Central Army Group:

Repeated enemy attacks were repulsed south and southwest of Byeloi. Partisan attacks were repulsed north of the Smolensk-Vyazma highway.

Northern Army Group:

The battle for the defense front near Yamno is continuing.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Mostly quiet.

3. North Africa:

After a regrouping of the Panzer Army, the German Africa Corps launched an attack to the north with heavy artillery support. Enemy tank units were forced back into the area around Akroma, and lost 52 tanks. Protected by a dense mine field, the enemy is attempting to form a new defense front south and southwest of Akroma with the aid of complete armored units and 2 motorized brigades. Air reconnaissance observed heavy eastbound truck traffic on the Via Balbia west of Tobruk. The enemy blew up ammunition dumps in the Ain el Gazala position and attempted to hide his withdrawal by attacks against the Italian Africa Corps.

*****~*****

15 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

India:

Reports received indicate that Gandhi seems to have given up the idea of passive resistance in case of a Japanese invasion. Though not yet recommending the use of force, he does seem to recommend the evacuation of invaded districts. In no case does he advocate, however, that the Indians accede to Japanese wishes. Nehru too seems to have changed his attitude and seems to have come closer to Gandhi's viewpoint that the British military should evacuate India unconditionally. The internal political situation of the country therefore can be expected to bring about increased difficulties for British control, which may result in a need for more soldiers and equipment and hence in increased shipping needs.

Hungary:

On the occasion of the visit of the Hungarian Prime Minister to the Fuehrer, the foreign press speaks of closer ties between Hungary and the Axis. Mention is also made in this connection of the increased tension existing between Hungary and Rumania. For details see Political Review No. 137, Par. 5.

Turkey:

Flights over Turkish territory and emergency landings by American planes have produced an extraordinarily unfavorable impression in Turkey. Particular uneasiness is caused by the fact that U.S. flyers succeeded in reaching Turkish military air fields. The Turkish Government is reported by the German News Agency (DNB) to plan a protest in Washington.

According to a diplomatic report, the British Ambassador is said to have made an official statement, when informing the Turkish Foreign Minister about the Anglo-Russian Treaty, according to which Great Britain has assumed the obligation to guarantee all territorial and ideological Turkish interests. Turkey is said to have refused this offer, pointing out that for all practical purposes only Russia will be able to carry out the 20 year's policing of Europe planned in case of a British-Russian victory. Determination of the territorial status on the basis of the Atlantic Charter is said to mean that Soviet Russia will retain possession of half of Finland, of the Baltic States, Poland, Bukovina and Bessarabia.

If this report is correct, the indefinite language of the treaty with respect to relinquishing territorial demands will have failed to have the hoped-for political effect on Turkey.

15 Jun. 1942

U.S.A.:

The speeches made by Roosevelt, Lord Halifax, Litvinov, etc., on the occasion of the American Flag Day (14 Jun.), which had been proclaimed an Allied holiday, did not reveal any new viewpoints, either of a political or a military nature.

For details see Political Review No. 137, Par. 7.

Great Britain:

On the occasion of the above-mentioned holiday which had been taken over from the U.S., Churchill enumerated 27 nations which have united for the fight for freedom of the world and announced that the Philippines and Mexico have decided to sign the Charter of the Allies with the pledge not to make a separate peace.

China:

A German diplomatic report deals with the Japanese goal of integrating China into the greater East-Asiatic economic sphere under the direction of Japan, and with the exploitation of China for military purposes. It outlines the reasons for the lack of a satisfactory result so far, and concludes that recently the Chinese problem seems to be getting less attention as compared to the exploitation of the newly-conquered Indian territories with their wealth of strategic raw materials.

See Political Review No. 137, Par. 8, for details.

Sweden:

The Defense Committee has approved a five-year plan for the reorganization of the entire defense of the country. This plan provides for increasing tank forces and heavy artillery, deferring the construction of 3 modern cruisers.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

No important reports or decisions were made.

In the afternoon the Chief, Naval Staff left for Berchtesgaden in order to report to the Fuehrer. Principal points of his report will be: To obtain the Fuehrer's approval for carrying out operation "Roesselsprung" and for employing submarines against Brazil. He will also try to obtain the Fuehrer's opinion concerning operation "Herkules" and concerning the request for fuel oil by the Italian Navy.

15 Jun. 1943

Special Items:

I. Since it cannot be predicted when operation "Roesselsprung" will be carried out, and since it is very important to return the 8th PT Boat Flotilla, particularly PT tenders, to home waters, the Naval Staff has directed Group North to carry out the transfer of the TSINGTAU and of the LUEDERITZ as soon as possible and to release the TSINGTAU for her return voyage with the 8th PT Boat Flotilla.

In accordance with the desire expressed by Group North to leave a tender with the 6th PT Boat Flotilla which can also function as a radio repeating station for submarines, the LUEDERITZ is being left in the northern area. It is planned to have the TANGA function as tender for the 6th PT Boat Flotilla later on, thus releasing the LUEDERITZ so that she can return home for overhaul. As reported, the GRILLE will temporarily take the place of the TANGA, since Group North has given up using the GRILLE as a mine layer.

The KARL PETERS is now available for training PT boat flotillas in home waters; after overhaul in the shipyard, the TSINGTAU and, later on, the LUEDERITZ will also be available for this purpose. A request by the Fleet Commander to assign the GRILLE as the flag ship of the Commander, Mine Layers had to be turned down.

II. The Armed Forces High Command has sent a copy to the Naval Staff of its suggestion to the Foreign Office concerning the question of the Antilles:

In agreement with the Naval Staff, the French Government is to be requested to reject the proposal of the U.S. to lease 6 French tankers to a company to be formed in a neutral country of South America.

Likewise in agreement with the Naval Staff, the Armed Forces High Command agrees to permit a steamer to supply the Antilles by shuttling between North America and the Antilles under the condition that if the steamer is seized by the Americans, an equivalent steamer is made available to the Germans in the Mediterranean.

III. In preliminary discussions about operation "Aida" on 20 Apr., the German Naval Command, Italy made a special request for reinforcing the German naval forces in the Mediterranean and declared that a total of 2 PT boat flotillas and 3 motor mine sweeper flotillas are necessary, once the offensive has been started.

The reply of the Naval Staff to the German Naval Command, Italy is filed under 1/Sk1 Ib 13995/42 Gkdos. in the War Diary, File "Aida".

IV. A report by the Fleet Branch, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division to the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command and to the General Staff of the Army concerning an increase in coastal defenses indicates

15 Jun. 1942

the following increased equipment and reinforcement of the naval coastal artillery in the coming months (time when available is indicated in parentheses):

a. Norway:

Harstad:	4-40.6 cm rapid fire (Nov. 42 to Feb. 43) (L/34)
Leines Fjord:	3-38 cm (French) (Feb. to May 43)
Senjen Island:	4-15 cm rapid fire (May 42)
Engeloe/Vest Fjord:	4-15 cm rapid fire (Jul. 42)
Kvaloe:	4-15 cm rapid fire (Jul. 42)
Senjen Bergs Fjord:	4-15 cm rapid fire (Sep. 42)
Storfossen (Trondheim Fjord:	6-15 cm (French) (Aug. 42)

b. Netherlands, Belgium:

Scheldt Estuary:	2-28 cm rapid fire (Oct. 42 to Jan. 43) (GNEISENAU)
Den Helder:	6-19.47 cm (French) ready for action
Ijmuiden:	4-17 cm rapid fire ready for action
Scheveningen:	6-15.5 cm (French) (Aug. 42)
Island Goeree (Maas River):	6-15.5 cm (French) (Sep. 42)

c. Channel:

Heyst:	4-15 cm (French) (Jun. 42)
Battery "M 34":	4-15 cm rapid fire (Aug. 43)
Alderney Island:	4-15 cm rapid fire (May 42)
Guernsey Island:	4-15 cm rapid fire (May 42)
Saint Malo:	6-19.47 cm (French) (Jun. 42)

d. Baltic Coast:

Pillau:	4-15 cm rapid fire installed
---------	------------------------------

15 Jun. 1942

Memel:	4-15 cm rapid fire	installed
Libau:	4-13 cm rapid fire (Russian)	installed

e. Gulf of Finland:

Islands:	6-15.5 cm (French)	(Jun. 42)
	6-15.5 cm (French)	(Jul. 42)
	6-15.5 cm (French)	(Jul. 42)

f. Crete:

4 batteries each consisting of 6-15.5 cm (French) guns, 12 becoming available in Sep. 1942, 12 in Oct. 1942.

It is to be expected that the availability dates will be delayed because of bottlenecks in the factories and withdrawal of workers.

V. The position of the Naval Staff on the question of fighter protection for merchant ship convoys in areas particularly endangered from the air (see War Diary 7 Jun., Special Items, Par. IV) is communicated to the Air Force Operations Staff by letter 1/Skl 1 N 13737/42 Gkdos. Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

Situation 15 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

Our Naval Attache at Buenos Aires has reported that the steamer WINDHUK is said to have received new engines in Rio de Janeiro from the U.S. and will be sent to the U.S. after the engines have been installed.

About 400 U.S. military and civilian air personnel have been seen in each of the following Brazilian harbors: Para, Natal, Recife, and Maceio. 2 U.S. cruisers and 2 destroyers are reported in Natal. So far, no U.S. Army troops have been seen in northern Brazil.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Staff has no objection to the docking place of

15 Jun. 1942

ship "10" and her inspection as desired by the Japanese Navy (see War Diary 12 Jun.). Telegram 1530 has so informed our Naval Attache at Tokyo.

Our Naval Attache at Tokyo was further informed by Telegram 2120 that it is not possible to turn the GRAF ZEPPELIN over to the Japanese, since she is needed for our purposes and since, in any case, it would be impossible to transfer her to Japan (see War Diary, 11 Jun.).

Telegrams 0125 and 2244 transmitted the enemy situation reports.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

The Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, Naval Staff Intelligence Division has concluded on the basis of fairly complete data on convoy shipping in the Thames estuary that there has been an overall reduction of about 10% in the total number of ships in coastal convoy shipping in the waters around the British Isles during the months of January to May 1942. However, this reduction may very well be compensated for by an increase in tonnage of the individual ships.

Tables representing the findings of the Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, Naval Staff Intelligence Division as per 1/Skl 14531/42 Gkdos. are in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI.

According to a report by our Attache at Buenos Aires, dated 11 May, there were about 80,000 U.S. troops in and around Glasgow at the beginning of May. They carried out landing exercises with special boats which lasted for weeks.

Air reconnaissance on 15 Jun. reported 15 steamers in Lyne Bay in the forenoon, 10 eastbound and 8 westbound steamers off Falmouth, and 25 steamers off Trevose Head in the evening on a northeasterly course.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

Channel Coast:

The 2nd and 4th PT Boat Flotillas were able to carry out their mine-laying tasks according to plan. See Telegrams 1020 and 0515 for a brief report.

Tanker MEMELLAND and escorts were attacked three times in succession off Calais-Gravelines between 0130 and 0205. Tugboat CHERBOURGEOIS V sank after being hit by a torpedo.

15 Jun. 1942

Boats of the 15th and 18th Patrol Boat Flotillas and of the 2nd Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla suffered light damage and some casualties.

According to a report by Group West (see Telegram 1930), it is certain that the 15th Patrol Boat Flotilla sank 2 enemy PT boats and damaged several others.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Mine-laying operation "Antonius" has been started.

Steamer TAIWAN which had been damaged by a mine has been towed to Emden.

12 enemy fighters strafed harbor defense vessels and ships of the Rhine Flotilla off Walcheren, causing minor casualties.

2. Norway and Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance there were 12 steamers in Iokanga Bay and 3 destroyers on varying courses were in the outer Kola Bay.

Own Situation:

5 planes dropped 1 aerial mine each in the fairway between Havoen and Hjelmsøe (west of North Cape); as a result the area was closed to shipping. Otherwise all shipping proceeded according to plan.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Nothing to report.

Group North has transmitted a report from the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea that Motor Mine Sweeper "11" hit a mine when attempting to enter Reval south of Mittelgrund through a lane which had not been opened to shipping by the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea. It

15 Jun. 1943

probably was a Russian moored mine.

Since this does not answer the question asked by the Naval Staff (see War Diary, 14 Jun.), the question has been referred to Group North, with copy to Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

The Admiralty reports the loss of the submarine OLYMPUS (1,475 t).

56 planes of the 15th and the 19th Air Groups were spotted, some in the area northwest of Cape Vilano, apparently acting as reconnaissance for the Gibraltar convoy (HG 84). At 1840 an unsuccessful depth charge attack on 1 submarine was reported from this area. Shortly before, at 1245, a report had been received, without statement of location, that a plane had successfully attacked a submarine with a depth charge. A third plane reported a surfaced submarine in the forenoon, 230 miles west of the Gironde estuary.

The reports of this one day again underline the importance of the request by the Commanding Admiral, Submarines and by Group West for increased protection of the submarines in the Bay of Biscay through assigning long-range bombers and fighters.

2 submarine sighting reports were intercepted from the American coast, and 2 from the West Indies. 3 reports from the West Indies spoke of submarine attacks.

2. Own Situation:

Contact with convoy HG 84 by Group "Endrass" was interrupted only between noon and 1722. Submarine U "552" (Lt. Topp) reported having torpedoed 5 steamers and 1 tanker.

1 hit on a 5,000 GRT steamer is reported from the American coast.

At 1000, contact was again established with the convoy in the eastern Mediterranean. The convoy was again following an easterly course at this time.

Further reports will be found in the Supplement to the Submarine Situation, War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

15 Jun. 1942

On the basis of the report by our Naval Attache at Madrid that repairs on submarine U "105" will last till 25 Jun., the Naval Staff agrees to the suggestion of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to have the submarine leave Ferrol secretly on 27 Jun. (see Telegram 2100).

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The day passed uneventfully. 51 of our planes laid mines in the area around the Isle of Wight during the night of 15 Jun. 25 planes were supposed to attack ships and raided Penzance as an alternate target.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Reports received so far do not give a clear picture of the results obtained by the German and Italian air forces against the two convoys in the Mediterranean.

An Italian report sent out in the evening speaks of sinking 2 cruisers, 1 destroyer, and 4 steamers from the western group, and of damaging 1 battleship, 1 carrier, 2 cruisers, 1 destroyer, and 4 steamers.

The German Air Force reports sinking 1 corvette and damaging 1 cruiser and 10 steamers in the eastern group and damaging 9 steamers in the western group.

During the action against enemy forces in the Strait of Sicily, 11 enemy planes were shot down.

The above figures include figures reported on 14 Jun.
The whole operation can already be adjudged a great success, though details have not been checked thoroughly.

3. Eastern Front:

Large numbers of planes went into action in the area of Sevastopol. 1 destroyer has been sunk, 10 enemy planes were shot down.

The 5th Air Force carried out a successful raid on the airfield in Murmansk, shooting down 4 enemy planes.

15 Jun. 1942

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea1. Enemy Situation:Western and Central Mediterranean:

On 14 Jun. the following ships were sighted at the time and places indicated, all ships pursuing a westerly course: 1 tanker or steamer and 1 cruiser or 2 destroyers, 150 miles north of Bougie at 0730; 2 steamers, 1 cruiser in tow 32 miles north of Cape Bougaroun at 1410; 1 cruiser and 2 destroyers at low speed 46 miles north of Cap de Fer between 1700 and 1900. Apparently these were damaged ships of the Gibraltar convoy with escorts.

The MALAYA, both carriers, 4 cruisers, and an indefinite number of destroyers appear to have interrupted their advance to the east at 1900 on 14 Jun., 45 miles west of Cape Bon. At 2050 the force with 2 cruisers and 5 to 6 destroyers was reported on a westerly course 60 miles west of Cape Bon. At 1640 on 15 Jun. its location was 75 miles north-northeast of Algiers. The number of cruisers reported by German and Italian air reconnaissance and by Italian submarines varied, but their cruising speed was generally agreed to be about 20 knots. The damage to the battleship and to the carrier can hardly have been serious, since they continued on their course after the Italians reported having hit them by aerial mines.

The remaining vessels of the forces, probably 2 to 3 cruisers, 10 to 12 destroyers, and 8 to 10 steamers or tankers broke through the Strait of Sicily in an easterly direction during the night of 14 Jun., having apparently sailed very close to the Tunisian coast. On 15 Jun. they were sighted in 2 equally large groups with a total of 24 ships at 0550, about 50 miles south-southwest of Cape Bon. The southern half of this group fought an engagement with an Italian cruiser force in the early morning hours.

Details are lacking about the movements of the enemy in this area, except for a sighting report off Lampedusa and a German reconnaissance report of 2 steamers and 10 other vessels (cruisers and destroyers) observed at 1400, 8 miles north of Lampedusa following a northeasterly course. The Italians do not expect these vessels to arrive in Malta before evening.

Eastern Mediterranean:

The Alexandria convoy turned back to the east on 15 Jun. at 0400, probably as a result of PT boat attacks and air raids during the night and in view of the fact that the Italian Taranto naval forces have left port. It has not been determined whether some steamers or tankers headed for Tobruk during the night and reached it later on.

15 Jun. 1942

This is entirely possible, however. During the day the main force was reported by German and Italian air reconnaissance to be proceeding in 2 groups with a total of presumably 40 ships, including 8 cruisers and 8 steamers as small as 1,000 GRT.

2. Own Situation:

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla fought several engagements with enemy destroyers during the night of 14 Jun. during their attack on the Alexandria convoy. The destroyers succeeded in driving off our vessels. Our attack was held back appreciably by the continuous dropping of flares by our air shadowers. In spite of a strong defense put up by the destroyers, PT boat S "56" succeeded in scoring 2 hits on a cruiser of either the SOUTHAMPTON or DIDO class at a distance of 600 meters.

5 submarines were shadowing the same enemy force. 2 of these had to turn back. Submarine U "559" sighted a sinking enemy ship in quadrant GO 5622 at 1550. This ship presumably sank as a result of a torpedo hit. No further details are known.

An Italian situation report at 0900 indicates that enemy torpedo planes attacked the Taranto naval forces 3 times during the night of 14 Jun. In the early morning hours, the TRENTO was paralyzed by an aerial torpedo hit 200 miles south of Cape Santa Maria di Leuca and sank as a result of a submarine attack at 0913.

At 0730, the Taranto naval forces were 140 miles away from the reported enemy force and were repeatedly attacked by bombers and torpedo planes. The LITTORIO received a bomb hit without any appreciable effect.

At 2000 the LITTORIO also received a torpedo hit, presumably from an enemy torpedo boat. The Italian force, which had not made contact with the eastbound enemy up to that time, thereupon apparently turned back.

No details have as yet been received about engagements that took place in the area of Pantellaria between the Cagliari group and the enemy force which had broken through the Strait of Sicily.

According to an Italian report, the enemy is said to have turned to the southwest after a lively engagement lasting 1 hour. Hits on 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers are said to have been observed. 1 Italian destroyer was damaged. The Italian Navy assumes that both convoy groups have been dispersed and that none of the steamers will be able to put into Malta before evening.

The situation on the evening of 15 Jun. is as follows:
The eastern convoy, the strategic aim of which is not clear, is on its return voyage to Alexandria. Nothing

15 Jun. 1942

can therefore be said as to how far its task has been accomplished. The western group's task to escort a convoy through the Strait of Sicily to Malta has not been completed, but will probably be completed during the course of the night. There is no doubt that both convoy forces suffered appreciable losses both in steamers and naval vessels.

The German Armistice Commission reports that an Italian plane unsuccessfully attacked a French convoy on 14 Jun. at 1915, 4 miles north of Porto Farina. The convoy was escorted by a torpedo boat and was on its way to Bizerte.

An enemy air raid was staged against Benghazi during the night of 15 Jun., causing only minor damage; presumably the planes also laid mines.

The cargo unloaded in Derna on 15 Jun. amounted to 774 tons. This is a very good record, although unloading was hampered by the fact that the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla was fuelling and taking on torpedoes at the same time.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Supplies to North Africa have been halted because of the enemy situation. Coastal supply traffic proceeded uneventfully.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

It is now reported that more auxiliary sailboats were destroyed by an enemy submarine off Cape Maleas between 12 and 13 Jun.

An Italian mine sweeper hit a mine in the mine field off the Methana Peninsula on the morning of 15 Jun.

A landing alarm on 14 Jun. resulted in transfer of 2 Italian torpedo boats to Suda where they are to be ready on one hour's notice; all transports in the Aegean were stopped.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reports nothing of importance. The Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine reports on the basis of photo reconnaissance that there is an increased number of vessels in Yeisk, Akhtari, and Temryuk which could serve a total of 7,000 to 8,000 men.

15 Jun. 1942

It is quite conceivable that the enemy is planning to undertake a landing either in the Sea of Azov or on the Kerch Peninsula.

Own Situation:

German dive-bombers sank a steamer which was being towed to Sevastopol after she had been torpedoed during the night of 12 Jun. by an Italian submarine. On the morning of 13 Jun. Italian motor mine sweepers of the Danube fleet unsuccessfully attacked enemy submarines in the Bay of Odessa with depth charges and machine gun fire.

5 motor ships destined for the Sea of Azov arrived in Genichesk from Nikolayev by rail.

The VIII Air Corps is reinforcing the anti-aircraft protection of Yalta by addition of a battery of 6-2 cm guns.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Japanese headquarters have disclosed that another U.S. cruiser and 1 U.S. submarine were sunk during the action off Midway, and that a total of 150 planes was shot down.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

In the battle for Sevastopol some more enemy positions were taken, after some stubborn resistance had been overcome, strong counter-attacks having been repulsed. Thus the ring around the fortress has been further tightened. Supported by fairly heavy artillery fire and by active planes, local enemy attacks took place at the front of the Army Group north of Taganrog.

During the advance northeast of Kharkov, our troops reached the Olkhovatka - Nikolayevka highway and the Russkaya area northwest of the highway in front of the retreating enemy.

The number of prisoners has risen to 24,700 since the beginning of the offensive in the area south of Volchansk. 266 tanks were put out of action and 208 guns were either captured or destroyed.

15 Jun. 1942

Central Army Group:

The pockets north of Bryansk and south of Elnya were further drawn together. On 14 Jun. rather heavy enemy air raids were launched against Smolensk and railroad stations in the vicinity.

Northern Army Group:

Our divisions at the Volkhov pocket proceeded to a concentric attack against heavily fortified field positions between the marshes.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

An enemy battalion was encircled and destroyed in the area west of Kandalaksha. Otherwise the day was quiet.

3. North Africa:

During the night of 14 Jun. the enemy attempted to withdraw his forces to Tobruk on the Via Balbia. This was prevented by an advance of the German Afrika Korps to the coast west of Akroma. The enemy failed in his stubborn attempts from the east and west to free the road to Tobruk.

The XXI Army Corps opened the Ain el Gazala front from the west, and by evening had penetrated into the area east of the air field of Ain el Gazala. The attempt by the 50th British Division to break out to the south during the night was largely thwarted.

The Panzer Army began the pursuit to the east via El Adem, after having penetrated the Gazala front.

The stubbornly defended desert forts on the southern approaches to the fortress of Tobruk were stormed in the evening. The number of prisoners and the extent of the captured materiel of this successful day are considerable.

The enemy is withdrawing his tank units from the area east of Tobruk further to the east; it therefore seems he needs all of his forces for the defense of the Halfaya position.

16 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

India:

See Political Review No. 138, Par. 1 for a discussion of Japanese efforts to influence the question of India.

Turkey:

The President of Turkey has emphasized to the German Ambassador the importance of German arms supplies to Turkey and has pointed out that the Russian question cannot be solved with a compromise. He said that Germany's faith in Turkey will never be betrayed, and added that the appearance of German troops in the Caucasus in the fall will create a situation necessitating new decisions. For details see Political Review No. 138, Par. 7.

Afghanistan:

A diplomatic report indicates that the Anglo-Russian treaty will bring the countries of Central Asia, particularly India, Afghanistan and Iran, into sharp opposition to Great Britain. The treaty is interpreted as a sign of utmost weakness on the part of Great Britain.

Argentina:

According to the Vichy Telegraphic Service, the Argentine Government will probably request Germany to clarify the meaning of the extension of the Atlantic blockade region. Argentine ships will continue their runs to the U.S.; however, they will make New Orleans their port of call instead of New York.

Japan:

A report by our Ambassador indicates that there is no mistaking the growing difficulties confronting the execution of further Japanese military operations as a result of the extent of the war areas, the nearness of enemy bases, and the unfavorable season. It can be expected that the waiting policy with respect to Russia will continue until a decisive change occurs in the eastern campaign. Japan counts on continued resistance on the part of Chiang Kai-shek. The situation remains unchanged as far as India and Ceylon are concerned. The operations in the Southern Pacific apparently have slowed down.

16 Jun. 1942

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Communications Division, Naval Staff reported that the launching equipment for anti-detection devices ("Bolde") has been installed on 93 submarines, and that a total of 125 launching sets are ready for use.

II. The Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff reported on the total number of naval barges and the plan for committing them and on the directive of the Fleet Branch, Section S, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division. The latter stated that any further withdrawal of naval barges will have to be deferred until 15 Aug. 1942, in view of the difficulties involved in getting crews and in training them under the command of the Admiral, Amphibious Forces. This does not affect getting the 21st Landing Flotilla ready for Norway and the 27th Landing Flotilla for the Baltic Sea as planned. This measure then assures that 2 landing flotillas of 60 boats each will be ready for operations starting with the fall of 1942, as requested by the Naval Staff. It is planned to meet the request of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West for converting 8 to 12 naval barges into gunboats by making use of the vessels which will become ready for service after 15 Aug. Delivery of supplies for the Mediterranean and for the area of Naval Group South is proceeding according to plan.

A report was also given on the request of the Air Force for 600 motorized barges with tugboats, to be supplied from the "Seeloewe" contingent. This request is now under consideration by the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff.

III. The Chief, Ordnance Division, Naval Staff reported on the following armament problems: The objections of the Navy and the Air Force to the intended centralization of the whole procurement system of all the branches of the Armed Forces in the Army Ordnance Bureau; the plans of Minister Speer concerning prohibiting other branches of the Armed Forces from expanding their production in the coastal areas which are to be reserved for the Navy; the objections of the Air Force; the setting up of new priority lists (a new priority rating "DE" has been set up for urgent development projects); the placing of all research organizations under the Reichsmarshal in order to stimulate research, etc.

It was stated that the Navy gave up 24,700 workers in the first quarter of 1942, while the Army has received 15,000 additional workers, and the Air Force 1,000 additional workers.

16 Jun. 1942

IV. Report by the Foreign Affairs Section, Naval Staff Operations Division; Compensation for damages resulting from sinking Spanish fishing vessels has been made by the Foreign Office.

The German Ambassador in Paris reports that the French Government heads have spoken again to the German Minister in Vichy about their increasing apprehension concerning Anglo-American attacks on the French Colonial Empire. The Armed Forces High Command has informed the Armistice Commission that as a result the Fuehrer had declared himself ready to allow reinforcements in West Africa. "This request offers the desired opportunity of pressing the German demands for non-French shipping."

More details as per 1/Skl 14181/42 Gkdos in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

In a very restricted circle:

V. Report by Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division

1. Concerning the directive to the submarine U "105" to leave Ferrol secretly on 27 Jun. Approved by the Chief, Naval Staff.

2. The Air Force Operations Staff has ordered the 5th Air Force to remove the naval weather station "Knospe" in Spitsbergen as soon as possible in agreement with Group North. The station has done exceedingly good work.

3. Naval Group South reports that the attack on the Italian subchaser carrying the Commanding General, 11th Army, in the course of which attack Captain von Wedel and 1 German Army officer were killed; was not carried out by a Russian fighter with German markings, but by a German plane.

It is out of the question that the Italians be informed of this for the time being.

VI. The Chief, Naval Staff reported on the decisions of the Fuehrer concerning the questions which he raised in his report of 15 Jun. For copy no. 4 of the report see 1/Skl I b 1162/42 Gkdos. Chefs in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.

Particular attention is called to paragraph 6. There the Fuehrer acknowledges for the first time to a larger audience that submarine warfare will ultimately decide the war.

16 Jun. 1942

The Naval Staff particularly regrets the decision concerning point 4 (operation "Herkules"), as this greatly limits the exploitation of military developments in North Africa, which seem particularly favorable just now; at the same time the future supply to North Africa will continue to depend on continuous action of large air and naval forces in the central Mediterranean.

Special Items:

I. In accordance with the decision of the Fuehrer, which is based on a suggestion by the Chief, Naval Staff concerning a surprise countermove with 10 submarines off the principal harbors of Brazil, an order has been issued by the Naval Staff to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines as per Telegram 1/Skl 1092/42 Gkdos. Chefs, with copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

II. Group North has been informed by Telegram 1/Skl 1163/42 Gkdos. Chefs. (in File "Roesselsprung") that as a consequence of the report by the Chief, Naval Staff the Fuehrer has recognized that operation "Roesselsprung" may be successful. As a result the intended disposition has been approved, as outlined in the operational directive of the Group. However the Fuehrer reserves final approval of the action.

III. Situation Analysis of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, dated 6 Jun. 1942

Forces in the West are inadequately and badly equipped. The situation, therefore, is and will remain tense. There is no coastal defense, at the most coastal patrol. The broadest divisional sector is 400 km, the narrowest one 34 km. All divisions have only 3 to 6 artillery battalions. Fortifications are inadequate. The coastal artillery is set up poorly. The weakest points are the Netherlands, the northern coast of Brittany, the Atlantic Coast south of the Gironde. The troops, particularly the officers, are considerably over age and will not be able to stand up to hard fighting lasting for days at a time. There are too few reserves, and those which do exist are not very good. The picture of the Army and the Army reserves as it appears on paper is deceptive, since the divisions are merely exhausted skeletons from the east, containing green recruits, unfamiliar captured weapons, and only a

16 Jun. 1942

few fixed guns. The "occupied area" actually is not occupied at all. If things came to a head, agents, French nationalists, and paratroops could easily make a "mess" of things.

Naval forces ashore are a valuable support to the Army forces, but naval forces at sea are inadequate to provide the necessary coastal protection, even at the most vital points.

The air forces are small and their action is restricted by a shortage of fuel and ammunition. They are so occupied by night bombing missions against Great Britain that only part of them could be used for any large-scale enemy landing. The situation would become excessively strained in case of operations "Anton" and "Ilona". There is no way of remedying the situation, as the necessary divisions are needed even more in the East. Some help, however, can be expected from the following measures: Transferring additional troop replacements to France under the command of the Commanding General, Armed Forces West, shortening the rest periods of divisions from the East, improving equipment, and increasing the fuel quota.

The Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff, Army is in fundamental agreement with this estimate of the situation. The available forces are inadequate, as far as strength, personnel, materiel equipment, and mobility are concerned, to be able to ward off a large-scale enemy attack. However, the forces of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West are adequate successfully to overcome limited enemy operations, now that the main danger point has been passed, due to the exchange of divisions between the East and the West. As far as the future is concerned, the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Army also considers that the probability for success of large-scale enemy operations is steadily decreasing, because of an increase in the number of fortifications, better training, and a slow improvement in the equipment.

The estimate of the situation by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West is particularly important in view of the opinion expressed by the Chief of the Army General Staff to the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff. The Chief of the Army General Staff believes that the forces in the West are adequate to meet any situation.

IV. Mining of the Strait of Sicily

The Armed Forces High Command has agreed to the suggestion of the

16 Jun. 1942

Armistice Commission that the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South try personally to change the opinion of the Italian High Command.

The German General assigned to the Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces has been directed by the Armed Forces High Command to present the German point of view to the Italian High Command, together with Field Marshal Kesselring, and to report the outcome to the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff (see Telegram 1515).

V. On 11 Jun. the Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, Naval Staff Intelligence Division transmitted its estimate of the enemy shipping situation as of 1 Jun. 1942 to the Army General Staff, Intelligence Division, West.

Copy as per 1/Skl 1131/42 Gkdos, Chfs, in War Diary, Part C, "Basic Questions Relating to the Conduct of the War".

The estimates of the Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, Naval Staff Intelligence Division merit special attention because of the decisive role played by enemy shipping space. They clearly indicate the limitations of American and British operational possibilities, and prove that the most direct and probably the only practical way to force the enemy to give in is to employ all available forces in a fight to destroy enemy and enemy-controlled shipping wherever and in whatever form it is found. The only way to do this is for all authorities to recognize that this war is a naval war in its fullest sense and that it is a war for sea communications. All other operations, however important they may be for the security of a given area and for armament and supply programs, cannot bring about an ultimate decision and an end of the war. The fact that the Fuehrer, too, has now expressly recognized the importance of this is particularly gratifying to the Naval Staff and deserves emphasis.

VI. War Experiences Gained in Mine-laying Tactics

See Report No. 10 of the Naval Staff Operations Division as per 1/Skl I E 14035/42 Gkdos, in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

16 Jun. 1942

VII. Aircraft Carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN

Reference is made to the wish expressed by the Japanese Navy and transmitted by our Naval Attache in Tokyo for possible transfer of this vessel to the Japanese Navy. The Japanese Naval Liaison Officer assigned to the Naval Staff received a written statement on 16 Jun. that the GRAF ZEPPELIN will not be completed before the middle of 1943, and that it is intended to use her for German naval purposes; details cannot as yet be foretold, but will be decided according to the situation.

Situation 16 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Southern Atlantic:

A British Admiralty report indicates that a Panamanian schooner was set afire during a bomb attack southwest of Freetown on 4 Jun.

The German Consulate reports from Santa Isabel that the coast of the Cameroons is under constant air patrol.

Two U.S., 2 French, 2 Dutch steamers and 1 British armed steamer have arrived in Duala in the last two weeks. They discharged war materiel and highway construction material which allegedly were immediately transported in the direction of Lake Chad and Egypt. No U.S. troops have landed so far, but they are expected.

The amount of war materiel transported by land will probably not be very large.

Indian Ocean:

According to a decoded radio message of the Admiralty a British steamer (presumably the ELYSIA) was sunk on 5 Jun. 360 miles east-northeast of Durban probably by 2 Japanese merchant raiders.

16 Jun. 1942

Our Consulate at Lourenco Marques reports 4 more ships (3 steamers, 1 tanker) which were sunk by Japanese naval forces, apparently submarines, in the Mozambique area.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 1542 instructed the NANKIN (Prize I of ship "10") about the use of identification signals.

Our Naval Attache at Tokyo has reported that the DRESDEN was sighted in the Karimata Strait on 13 Jun. and that she probably will arrive in Yokohama on 22 Jun.

The DRESDEN has been informed thereof by Radiogram 2106.

Radiograms 1956 and 2117 gave information concerning the enemy situation.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Convoy HG was in quadrant BE 5683 at noon. See Enemy Situation, Submarine Warfare for details.

A convoy consisting of 7 steamers on an easterly course was observed southeast of Portland in the evening.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Mine-sweeping activities were carried out on the convoy route near Bayonne.

Channel Coast:

During the night of 15 Jun. the mine-laying tasks of the 2nd and 4th PT Boat Flotillas proceeded according to plan. See Telegram 0830 for a brief report.

16 Jun. 1942

Special Items:

Group West has pointed out that the requested conversion of naval barges as gunboats should be treated as urgent in view of the present PT boat situation of the enemy. As a result, the Operations Division, Naval Staff has asked the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff to handle this request in such a manner as to have the first 8 to 12 naval barges which will be completed after 15 Aug. assigned to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West as quickly as possible. (See Telegram 1801.)

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

An intelligence report (originating at the British Embassy, Stockholm) speaks of alleged British landing preparations in Denmark, which offers excellent air-landing possibilities and is occupied by only about 20,000 German troops.

Air reconnaissance reports 51 northbound and 33 southbound steamers in convoys off the east coast of the British Isles.

Own Situation:

Mine-laying operation "Antonius" has been carried out according to plan. Steamer BILBAO of the eastbound convoy sank after hitting a mine north of Ameland.

3 enemy planes were shot down on 15 Jun. by vessels of the harbor defense flotilla and of the Rhine Flotilla. On 16 Jun. one boat of the Rhine Flotilla and 2 ferries were damaged by gunfire from planes.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

A surfaced submarine was sighted on 14 Jun. at the entrance to the Baads Fjord.

16 Jun. 1942

Own Situation:

Enemy air raids on Kirkenes on 14 and 15 Jun. resulted in relatively heavy damage and in casualties among the civilian population. An unsuccessful enemy air raid on a convoy off Ekerøe took place on 15 Jun.

Otherwise transport and escort service proceeded uneventfully and according to plan.

See Telegram 3110 for the report by the Commanding Admiral, Norway concerning the mining of the area south of Vadsoe.

PT boats will be used instead of destroyers as covering forces in mine-laying operations "Graf", "Herzog", and "Erika". These operations can be carried out, therefore, only when the weather is suitable for PT boats (see Telegram 1146).

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance spotted a heavy cruiser, presumably of the CUMBERLAND class, in the waters at the northwestern tip of Iceland on 15 Jun. at 1445. She was apparently lying to.

Search for convoy PQ 17 has remained without results so far.

9 small and medium-sized steamers and 13 coastal vessels were observed in Iokanga harbor. One 5,000 GRT steamer was beached.

Own Situation:

See File "Roesselsprung" for sailing orders of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean to submarines U "657" and U "88" for operation "Roesselsprung" (as per 1/Skl 14457/42 Gkdos.).

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Convoys and transports to Norway in the western Baltic Sea and in the Baltic Sea entrances proceeded according to plan.

Minefield "Seeigel X" was laid in the Gulf of Finland according to plan. An enemy submarine was sighted at 0110 in quadrant AO 3518,

16 Jun. 1942

that is, west of our mine field. She was chased unsuccessfully on route "96".

Motor mine sweeper "12" was unsuccessfully attacked by an enemy submarine west of Porkkala.

The following instructions were issued by Group North as a result of the appearance of an enemy submarine west of our mine fields: Submarine chase is to be continued with all available means; all merchant shipping should be rerouted through Swedish territorial waters; transport of troops on leave on the GNEISENAU and the POTSDAM is to be stopped for the time being; ships on routes "95" and "96" must be located.

In addition to fighting submarines, the principal task of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea will consist of reinforcing the mine fields "Seeigel" and "Nashorn" until there is no longer danger of Russian ships breaking through (see Telegrams 1229 and 1551).

These measures are approved by the Naval Staff.

The Finns report that a Russian patrol boat sank after hitting a mine near Shepel.

Group North has transmitted without comment the report of the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea concerning the mine hit on motor mine sweeper "11". The ship did not have the mine chart which had been provided by the Naval Staff on 9 Mar. 1942 since ships receive the exact position of mines only in their own area; nevertheless, the commander of the ship should have known that the area around Reval Bay might be mined because of his assignment in 1941.

The explanation so far is unsatisfactory and seems to indicate that the loss of this valuable ship could probably have been avoided, if instructions had been more careful. The result of the investigation must be awaited before judgement can be passed.

16 Jun. 1942

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

The HG convoy was observed in quadrant BE 5683 at 1034; it consisted of 17 steamers, 1 destroyer, and 3 corvettes. 1 Catalina flying boat was accompanying the convoy at 1240. Reconnaissance on 14 Jun. showed the convoy to consist of 22 steamers with the same number of escorts mentioned above.

Reports were intercepted which spoke of sighting submarines off Cape Charles, southeast of the Bermudas, and in the Yucatan Strait.

2. Own Situation:

The operation against the HG convoy was interrupted at 1150 on orders of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines because of the increase in enemy patrol planes in the rendezvous area. A report by our air reconnaissance seems to indicate that of the 6 vessels of the convoy torpedoed by submarine U "552", 5 have sunk.

Group Endrass has been ordered to quadrant AK 57, probably for supply purposes.

At 0900 Group Hecht was able to make contact with a westbound convoy in quadrant AK 8711. No reports of successful actions have as yet been received.

Submarine U "67" reports sinking steamer NICARAGUA (5,136 GRT) in quadrant DM 5136.

On 15 Jun. our submarines in the Mediterranean succeeded at 1600 in making contact with the Alexandria convoy force in quadrant CO 5634. Submarine U "205" (Lt. Reschke) was able to make contact at 2320 and sank an enemy cruiser by means of 3 torpedo hits scored at 0019 on 16 Jun.

This success is particularly gratifying, as it proves the undeniable fact that the German Navy is responsible for a share in the result of the total operation by the German and Italian air and sea forces.

16 Jun. 1942

For further reports, see Supplement to Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

One 2,000 GRT steamer in the convoy off Portland was damaged; the electrical works west of Brighton were raided effectively.

Two steamers were damaged in night raids directed against ships at sea at the south and southwest coasts; Portland was attacked as an alternate target.

The enemy raided western Germany, dropping bombs on Duisburg and Essen. 9 planes were shot down.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Reconnaissance activities were carried out against the Alexandria convoy and in the central Mediterranean. For results, see Enemy Situation, Mediterranean.

The German Afrika Korps was supported by effective air raids on enemy forces in the area of Tobruk and Akroma.

3. Eastern Front:

752 bombers were put into action against Sevastopol.

The 5th Air Force successfully went into action against troops and supply dumps in the area of Murmansk.

One steamer (3,000 GRT) was sunk in Iokanga harbor.

16 Jun. 1942

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Western and Central Mediterranean:

One C cruiser and 1 Dutch destroyer arrived in Gibraltar at 0745 from the west.

Task Force H allegedly is returning to Gibraltar. The only reports available are those from 2 Italian submarines received between 1145 and 1345. They report having sighted an undetermined number of ships in the area south to south-southwest of Formentera, at a distance of 80 to 110 miles from there, pursuing a southwesterly to northwesterly course.

The parts of the convoy which had broken through in the area south of Pantellaria were repeatedly sighted approaching Malta on 15 Jun.

German reconnaissance reports at 1935 that a force consisting of 1 cruiser of the SOUTHAMPTON class, 1 mine-laying cruiser of the MANXMAN class, 11 destroyers, 6 escort vessels, and 2 steamers was observed 34 miles southwest of the southern tip of Malta. Another German report of 2000 speaks of 3 merchant ships and 16 naval vessels 15 miles west of the southern tip of Malta, following a course of 90°. The difference of 2 ships between the two reports has not been clarified.

It may be assumed that this force or parts of it arrived at Malta during the night of 15 Jun. A smoke screen limited our photo reconnaissance on 16 Jun; only 2 steamers, 4 destroyers, 5 escort vessels and apparently 1 cruiser were observed in Valletta at 0955. Photo reconnaissance at 1630 disclosed 2 light cruisers, including the MANXMAN, 6 destroyers, 2 steamers, and 5 escort vessels. Radio monitoring indicated that unidentified vessels again put out to sea from Malta during the night of 15 Jun.

At 1249 a German seaplane sighted 1 steamer and 1 naval vessel 54 miles southwest of Pantellaria. The plane did not indicate either the course or other details, and thus both the nationality of these vessels and their destination remain unknown.

No reports have been received about ships putting into harbors or bays of Malta other than Valletta, but it is possible that there

16 Jun. 1942

are ships elsewhere due to damages or lack of space in Valletta.

The aim of the Gibraltar convoy force, i.e., to bring up supplies to Malta, thus has at least partially been accomplished, though of course with a sacrifice.

Eastern Mediterranean:

German air reconnaissance reported that the Alexandria convoy force was 80 miles north-northeast of Sidi Barrani at 0545, on a course of 120°. It consisted of 8 cruisers, 17 destroyers and escort vessels, and 6 merchant ships. The latest shadower report of 1435 reported the force 86 miles off Alexandria, consisting of 26 ships, and 6 patrol vessels at a distance of several miles from them. At 0910 a burning merchant ship was sighted stopped 23 miles north-northeast of Tobruk.

Italian air reconnaissance reported 4 large and 5 smaller merchantmen and 2 PT boats off Port Said at 0840.

It has not been possible to determine clearly to what extent the Alexandria convoy has succeeded. When it left port on 13 Jun. it was reported as consisting of 9 to 10 merchant ships. If it returns with 6 merchant ships, while a seventh is burning off Tobruk, the definite possibility exists that some steamers have arrived in Tobruk. It is improbable that the convoy intended to deliver supplies to Malta. It is equally possible that some steamers which left Tobruk or that some of the merchantmen which had been convoyed from Gibraltar have joined it. It is therefore difficult to determine the exact number of losses due to enemy action.

2. Own Situation:

An enemy air raid was staged against Benghazi during the night of 15 Jun.

The brief report of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla explains its operations against the Alexandria convoy during the night of 14 Jun. The report also illustrates the difficulties created for the PT boats by the stubborn defense of the convoy, unwittingly supported by the continuous dropping of flares by our shadowing planes. The PT boats, however, kept returning for an attack, until S "56" finally succeeding in scoring the reported two hits on an enemy cruiser.

16 Jun. 1942

The Flotilla was unable to stop the planes from dropping the flares since it did not have direct radio communication with them.

Copy of the report as per 1/Skl 14387/42 Gkdos. is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

The action of 5 boats of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla during the night of 15 Jun. remained unsuccessful, since the vessels were driven off by destroyers. While the use of flares helped the enemy defense during the preceding night, the absence of flares during this night was equally beneficial to the enemy; our PT boats were continuously driven off and tried in vain to find the enemy. In this instance, too, it was impossible to remedy the situation via radio communication. A copy of the brief report of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla as per 1/Skl 14463/42 Gkdos. is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

The Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy feels that now that the current operation has been concluded it is no longer necessary to keep secret the presence of German PT boats in the Mediterranean. Rather he suggests that their successful and valuable action be emphasized in the Armed Forces communique. The Naval Staff approves this suggestion and has forwarded it to the Executive Office of the Commander in Chief, Navy. See Telegram 1620.

See Submarine Warfare for details on the successful action of our submarines against the Alexandria convoy and the sinking of a cruiser by submarine U "205".

The German Naval Command, Italy has listed successful actions on the part of the German air and naval forces during the course of the entire operation in the period from 13 to 16 Jun. It reports 1 cruiser sunk by a submarine, and 1 cruiser as probably sunk by a PT boat. In addition, the German Air Force scored the following successes:

On 14 Jun.: 2 steamers of the Gibraltar convoy were heavily damaged.
 3 steamers (24,000 GRT) and 2 steamers (13,000 GRT) of the Alexandria convoy were set afire and sunk for certain.
 1 destroyer remained afloat, after being set afire.

16 Jun. 1942

On 15 Jun.: 1 troop transport (10,000 to 15,000 GRT) of the Gibraltar convoy was sunk (photograph); 1 tanker and 1 steamer were sunk, 1 steamer heavily damaged.

1 steamer (battleship dummy) of 12,000 GRT was sunk out of the Alexandria convoy; 1 cruiser was sunk; 1 destroyer was probably sunk.

In addition the X Air Corps scored the following success: Alexandria convoy: 1 destroyer, 1 steamer (6,000 GRT), and 1 escort vessel were sunk; 6 steamers (a total of 30,000 GRT) and 2 cruisers were set afire; 4 steamers (about 22,000 GRT), 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer were heavily damaged. (See Telegrams 1100 and 1835.)

It is extremely difficult to analyze this list of successes. Considering only the Alexandria convoy it adds up to the following:

sunk: 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 1 escort vessel,
2 steamers.

probably sunk: 2 destroyers, 5 steamers

damaged: 3 cruisers, 1 destroyer, 10 steamers

Since this convoy probably left port with 9 to 10 steamers and has last been reported returning to its port of origin with 6 steamers, these figures of the Air Force seem to be in need of a thorough check.

3. Situation Italy:

According to an estimate of the situation by the Italian Navy made on 15 Jun. at 2000, Italian air and naval forces sank 1 cruiser and 5 steamers east of the Strait of Sicily and probably 1 destroyer while they damaged 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, and 1 steamer. On 14 Jun. 3 steamers were reported sunk and 3 were reported damaged west of the Strait of Sicily by German and Italian air forces, in addition to the aerial torpedo hits on the MALAYA, the EAGLE, and 1 heavy cruiser. Hence we would be led to conclude that of the probable 10 steamers which left Gibraltar, eight were sunk. But since at least 2 steamers have reached Malta, and since 2 to 3

16 Jun. 1942

were observed on their return voyage in the western Mediterranean, these figures of sinkings also require thorough checking.

Destroyer VIVALDI was damaged in the course of the fighting of the 7th Cruiser Division in the area of Pantellaria, and put into Pantellaria. The Cagliari group arrived in Naples on 16 Jun. at 1100 without any further losses or damages.

The LITTORIO group, which had turned back on 15 Jun. at 2000 after a torpedo hit the LITTORIO, arrived in Taranto on 16 Jun. at 1700. That same day 15 Italian submarines were in a waiting position in the Mediterranean. They reported no successes.

Special Item:

The Naval Staff reserves final judgement on the whole operation until more data are furnished by the German Naval Command, Italy and more detailed enemy reports have been intercepted. This large-scale enemy operation, however, proves by the very extent of the forces used the unusually high significance which the enemy attributes to maintaining the bases at Malta and Tobruk. It is impossible for us to consider Malta separately from the total African problem, including Libya and even Egypt and Suez. Likewise the enemy considers the protection of Malta and Tobruk part of one overall operational plan.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Supply shipments to Tripoli and Benghazi have been interrupted because of the operational situation. Coastal supply shipping proceeded according to plan.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The invasion alarm in Crete was lifted at noon.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No special findings by either air reconnaissance or radio intelligence.

Own Situation:

The Italian submarine "CB 3" sank an enemy submarine

16 Jun. 1942

40 miles south of Cape Sarich at noon on 15 Jun.

Bulgarian planes also destroyed an enemy submarine off Cape Emine on the forenoon of 16 Jun.

PT boats S "28", "72", and "102" were in a waiting position south of Cape Sarich during the night of 15 Jun., without result. Subsequently the boats put into Constanta with the damaged S "26".

Enemy air raids on Mariupol, Genichesk, Yalta, Eupatoria, and Ak Mechet took place during the night of 14 Jun.

Apparently the Russians are attacking our bases stubbornly and purposefully.

Kerch and Ak Burnu were fired on by motor gunboats on 15 Jun.

5 Russian explosive floats were swept by motor mine sweepers 15 miles south-southeast of Odessa.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Reuter reports that U.S. planes on 15 Jun. damaged 3 Japanese cruisers, 1 destroyer, 1 gunboat and 3 transport vessels off the Aleutians. The U.S. radio reports that heavy Japanese naval forces are gathering near the Aleutians.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The fight for Sevastopol brought further local successes on the northern and eastern fronts in the face of stubborn enemy resistance.

16 Jun. 1942

No fighting is reported from the remaining front of the Army Group.

Central Army Group:

Some of the enemy group Belo succeeded in breaking out of the pocket across the highway to the south. Pursuit has begun.

Northern Army Group:

Our forces fought successful engagements west of Kholm and southeast of Staraya Russa. The enemy in the Lovat River valley succeeded in temporarily penetrating our position. Vekshina was taken.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. Northern Africa:

By 14 Jun. the British armored units south and southwest of Akroma were dispersed. The German Afrika Korps then penetrated to the coast on 15 Jun. Enemy attempts at breaking through were repulsed and enemy units were heavily beaten. The fighting for the Ain el Gazala position resulted in a total of 6,000 prisoners and in the loss to the enemy of 224 tanks and 85 guns. Heavily battered British forces have withdrawn to the Egyptian frontier from the area south and west of Tobruk. Our Panzer Army regrouped for an attack on the fortress Tobruk. In the southeastern approaches to Tobruk the German Panzer Division had already conquered some stubbornly defended strong points.

17 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

India:

According to press reports, Gandhi and Nehru have come to an agreement which can be expected to result in a resolution of the Congress Party Executive Committee in the beginning of July, demanding immediate British withdrawal from India. To be sure, Nehru designated all Fascists and friends of the Axis as enemies of India and announced resistance in case of a Japanese attack, but declared that the fight against the British Government will last until India is freed. Apparently Gandhi is trying to unite all factions, including the Moslems, and to prepare popular opinion for a civil disobedience campaign directed against all foreign influences. He knows that because of their apathy this would be the most which the broad masses of the people would be ready to undertake.

Sweden:

The Swedish note protesting against German planes flying over Bohus has been answered by the German Government by an expression of regret and the assurance that such incidents will be avoided in the future.

The Supreme Court has ordered that the Norwegian ship SOLGRY which was seized in Trelleborg be released since the Royal Norwegian Government in London is the de facto owner of the ship and is entitled to immunity!

U.S.A.:

The chief of the U.S. Office of War Production has reported that the war production of the U.S. has been exceeding that of Great Britain since last week. He asserted that this goal was not to have been reached until September.

Turkey:

On 17 Jun. Ambassador von Papen reported on the estimate of the situation by the Turkish press called forth by the most recent military developments in Libya:

"The coming days will show whether Rommel will succeed in taking Tobruk and be able to continue his attacks on Egypt. Several advantages will accrue to the Axis from the Africa Campaign. It is almost as important for the Axis to complete the campaign in the Mediterranean while the British are still making preparations as it is to put an end to the fighting in Russia. If Rommel succeeds in advancing to the Egyptian frontier now, only one task will remain for the winter, as is also pointed out by the Times. As a result, the Axis would be able to supply North Africa with troops and materiel more easily, at the

17 Jun. 1942

same time forcing the British to concentrate all of their efforts on the defense of Iran; this would be particularly true if the Eastern Campaign were to prove successful and the Axis were to meet with little resistance in the Caucasus and on the way to Iran. If Russia collapses, the Anglo-Americans are faced with 3 great problems: A German attack against Mesopotamia via the Caucasus and Iran, a German-Italian attack on Suez and the Near East, and a Japanese attack on India. It is problematical, therefore, whether the Anglo-Americans will succeed in making sufficient preparations to set up a second front in Europe in 1942."

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy has suggested that the Iron Cross be awarded to the commander of the Italian naval forces on the basis of the most recent action in the central Mediterranean. The Chief, Naval Staff has ordered that this request be treated liberally. The Naval Staff and the Officer Personnel Division will take the necessary steps.

Marginal note: The decoration was not awarded since both the Executive Office of the Commander in Chief, Navy and the Officer Personnel Division reported on 18 Jun. that this would violate regulations.

Signed: Wagner

II. On the basis of the experiences with faulty communications between the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla and German planes maintaining contact with the Alexandria convoy on 14 and 15 Jun., the Chief, Naval Communications Division lost no time in taking steps to see that the already existing regulations regarding radio communications for such occasions be put into effect in the Mediterranean area as well as elsewhere.

The Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division reported that the coastal listening sets will be installed as planned in the northern area (near Tromsø and Narvik) in August.

III. The Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff reported that the 3rd Destroyer Squadron has been supplied with torpedoes. He then reported on the results of the inspection tour of the French Atlantic Islands made by the Chief, Fleet Branch, Quartermaster Division. The construction of fortifications is fairly well advanced. The present lack of equipment and lack of instruction by Army officers will be overcome within about 2 months. Fuller participation of the Todt Organization is necessary and has been ordered.

17 Jun. 1942

IV. The Foreign Affairs Section, Naval Staff Operations Division reports that the Foreign Office plans to accede to the Argentine protest concerning the ship VICTORIA and to offer payment of damages.

In a very restricted circle:

V. The Operations Division, Naval Staff has suggested disapproving the request by the Fleet Commander (Commanding Admiral, Battleships) to leave Torpedo Boat "5" in the northern area temporarily in view of the operational situation, since the STEINBRINK and the ECKOLDT are not available. This suggestion was based on the fact that Torpedo Boat "5" would have to be replaced at the Torpedo School at the expense of the Western Area. The Chief, Naval Staff has approved this suggestion. The necessary information will be sent to Group North and the Fleet Commander (Commanding Admiral, Battleships).

Special Items:

I. The good results obtained with radar interception sets during the operations of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla against the Alexandria convoy and in the Western Area have caused the Commander, PT Boats to request an investigation to see if it is possible to mass-produce these sets and to install them on all PT boats.

Further action will be taken by the Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division.

II. For an estimate of the situation concerning Japanese operations against the Aleutians, made by our recent Military Attache at Washington, General von Boetticher, together with the comment of our recent Naval Attache there, see 1/Skl 21041 gen. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XVII.

III. See Telegram 2047 for a tabulation of the convoys of warships and merchantships carried out in the area of Group North during the month of April 1942.

Situation 17 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

No special reports have been received.

17 Jun. 1942

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Staff estimates that the DOGGERBANK will be able to transfer 600 cubic meters of fuel to ship "28".

Radiogram 2228 has instructed the DOGGERBANK to this effect.

Information on the enemy situation sent by Radiogram 2249.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported several large convoys on westerly courses off Hastings and off Brighton in the evening.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

One remote-clearance vessel sank southeast of Le Verdon when mine sweepers swept a ground mine.

Channel Coast:

Because of the weather, the 2nd and 4th PT Boat Flotillas did not lay mines during the night of 17 Jun.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Mine field operation "Antonius" has been carried out accurately to within half a mile.

Operation "Julius" was started in the evening.

The burnt-out mine exploding vessel "15" has been towed into Hamburg.

2. Norway:

The mine-sweeping activities of the 5th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla on the convoy route near North Cape were unsuccessful. (This is the area where the 5 aerial mines were dropped).

Enemy planes fired on steamer ASKARI and escort off the west coast of

17 Jun. 1942

Norway; the enemy planes gave correct German recognition signals.

This has been observed repeatedly and proves that the recognition signal rules of the Air Force are in need of improvement. The Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division has called this fact to the attention of the Air Force a number of times.

3 enemy planes unsuccessfully attacked patrol vessel "6111" with aerial torpedoes off Nordkyn.

Mine-laying operation "Herzog" had to be interrupted because of engine trouble on 2 PT boats. Operations "Graf" and "Herzog" cannot be carried out before 19 Jun., and hence operation "Erika" not before 21 Jun.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance at noon reported 1 light cruiser 70 miles north of Cape Horn (Iceland) on course 70°.

15 to 20 steamers were observed at the Kola bend, 8 to 10 small steamers in Iokanga Bay; 8 more steamers were entering the bay; 2 steamers, 1 destroyer and 5 small patrol vessels were located northeast of Iokanga on course 310°.

Reconnaissance reports of the past two days as well as the increased radio traffic intercepted by radio intelligence may indicate that a QP convoy is about to leave port.

On the basis of past experience, Group North believes that convoys QP "13" and PQ "17" will be encountered in the area of Bear Island around 21 Jun. So far there are no indications, however, that convoy PQ "17" has left port.

Own Situation:

The Admiral, Arctic Ocean has ordered submarine U "457" to leave port for operation "Roesselsprung". Copy of order under 1/Skl 14582/42 Gkdos. in file "Roesselsprung".

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Submarines were detected in the western Gulf of Finland. There was mine-sweeping activity northeast of Seiskari.

17 Jun. 1942

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report from the Skagerrak, the entrances to the Baltic Sea and the western Baltic Sea.

Eastern Baltic Sea:

Battery "Bismark" and Army coastal artillery battery "515" fired upon 11 enemy mine sweepers of the T class near Seiskari and forced them to turn away. One hit was observed.

Mine layers KAISER and M "1804" sighted torpedo tracks in the area off Cape Ristna.

The Finnish Staff reported that a submarine torpedoed a Finnish steamer off Bogskaer.

The 12th Subchaser Flotilla saw that mines were dropped on the Hogland-Kotka route in the afternoon.

In view of the new submarine situation, Group North issued the following directives:

a. Shipping to Finland is to proceed through Swedish territorial waters and the Aaland Sea. Escort service will be in accordance with directions issued by the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic Sea.

b. Route "95" will be used only in exceptional cases and only under escort.

c. Shipping from Memel to Libau, Windau, and Riga is to proceed close to the shore, preferably within the 10 mile line, without escort.

d. Escort is mandatory on route "96".

e. The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic Sea is to use all of the forces at his command in the Gulf of Finland and in the area of the Baltic islands for the fight against submarines. Mine-sweeping is to be undertaken only with very small vessels. A constant lookout should be kept for submarines at the Irbe Strait.

f. Spot-check mine-sweeping operations should be carried out on the coastal route north of Memel, Libau and the Gulf of Riga (see Telegram 1631).

This directive proves to what extent the break-through of even a few enemy submarines into the Baltic Sea has affected the situation. The Naval Staff thoroughly approves all measures that will lead to an energetic fight on the submarines and assure the safety of our shipping.

17 Jun. 1942

V. Merchant Shipping

Observations by the Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, Naval Staff Intelligence Division indicate that shipping in the harbors of Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, Port Sudan and El Kantara decreased appreciably between February and April. The enemy tonnage observed in these ports amounted to about 400,000 GRT, plus 75,000 GRT involved in shipping to Turkey, Syria and Palestine. A detailed description thereof, together with a tabulation of the troop transports observed in these harbors is in Report No. 15/42 of the series "Foreign Merchant Shipping" of the Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, Naval Staff Intelligence Division.

On 4 May the Economic Mission of the German Armistice Commission reported to the Foreign Office concerning the report of the French Delegation (Subcommittee on Merchant Shipping) which was submitted in connection with negotiations carried on for the purpose of obtaining French ships for phosphate and ore shipments from North Africa. This report was prepared in response to a German request for a detailed statement on the organization and composition of the French merchant marine, as well as on all the shipping losses suffered. The subcommittee attempted to prove that the total cargo space available for use between France, North and West Africa and the Antilles amounts to only 414,343 GRT. Special attention was called to the fact that all except 6 of the ships using fuel oil or gas oil are laid up at the present time.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

The British steamer DUCHESS OF ATHOLL (20,119 GRT) reported a submarine 280 miles northwest of Freetown. (This could not have been one of our boats; apparently this is an error.)

The Norwegian steamer BRAGA (1,671 GRT) reported being attacked by a submarine 280 miles east of Cape Lookout.

Submarine sighting reports were intercepted from southeast of New York, from the Gulf of St. Lawrence, in the Florida Strait and off the east coast of Trinidad.

2. Own Situation:

3 submarines in the Arctic Ocean, forming group Eisteufel have left port for operation "Roesselsprung".

In the Atlantic, the submarines that belonged to group Endrass have

17 Jun. 1942

been ordered to draw supplies from submarine tankers "459" and "460"; subsequently the majority of the boats are to proceed to the Caribbean.

Group "Hecht" was unable to renew contact with the convoy west of Porcupine Bank.

Submarine U "87" reported that she sank 2 steamers of 7,000 GRT each on 16 Jun. in quadrant CA 3268 off the American East Coast. They were part of a convoy.

Submarine U "502" reported that she sank 3 steamers with a total of 18,000 GRT on 15 Jun. in the Caribbean Sea.

For further reports, see Supplement to Submarine Situation, War Diary, Part IV, Vol. B.

Special Item:

The Commander of submarine U "588" reports heavy fishing traffic off Halifax and hence lively movement of ships into and out of the harbor. He therefore suggests that German fishing vessels of a similar type might be used for mine-laying or even sabotage assignments inside the harbor. He feels that such operations could definitely prove successful.

This suggestion is now under consideration.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the night Bomber Wing "106" went into action against the "HG" convoy about 300 miles west of Brest and was able to sink 2 steamers of 2,000-3,000 GRT each and to damage 3 others of similar size. The mission of Bomber Wing "77" was not successful.

The enemy staged air raids against St. Nazaire, Brest, Lannion etc., during the night of 17 Jun. No reports of damage have been received.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Our planes were effective in the area of Tobruk, where the downing of 9 enemy planes without a single loss to us is proof of our air supremacy. Reconnaissance operations were carried out in the central and eastern Mediterranean.

3. Eastern Front:

960 of our planes participated in the battle for Sevastopol.

17 Jun. 1942

7 small steamers of 300-400 GRT were sunk at the entrance of the harbor.

3 steamers were damaged by planes at the Kola bend, in the Arctic Sea area.

During an enemy attack on our airfield south of Izyum, the enemy was able effectively to interfere with our anti-aircraft fire by laying a new type of phosphorus smoke screen.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Western Mediterranean:

An intelligence report from Spain indicates that the MALAYA, the ARGUS, the EAGLE and 7 destroyers arrived in port from the east in the forenoon. A cruiser of the SOUTHAMPTON class towed by a destroyer, 2 additional destroyers, and 2 gunboats arrived in the afternoon. No details could be obtained because of fog. An Italian report says that the MALAYA and the EAGLE had a slight list and that the EAGLE and the ARGUS unloaded dead and wounded personnel.

At 0630 air reconnaissance sighted 1 cruiser and 4 destroyers about 50 miles north-northwest of Cape Bon on a west-northwesterly course; about 90 miles west of that an unescorted cruiser was observed on west-northwesterly and westerly courses. The cruiser and the 4 destroyers were observed continuously and were last reported at 1530, 18 miles north of Cape Bougaroun, on a westerly course, speed 28 knots.

Central Mediterranean:

The vessels which had been reported southwest of Pantellaria on 16 Jun., i.e. 1 warship and 1 steamer, actually are Italian salvage vessels. Air reconnaissance reports that 1 cruiser and 4 destroyers again left Valletta during the night of 16 Jun.

A submarine was sighted repeatedly in the northern Adriatic Sea during the forenoon.

A sea rescue plane picked up 10 shipwrecked British sailors who were from a warship which had been sunk southwest of Pantellaria on 15 Jun. at 1230.

Eastern Mediterranean:

Increased convoy activity was observed between Alexandria

17 Jun. 1942

and Tobruk. Air reconnaissance located the following ships: 3 steamers and 1 tanker escorted by 2 destroyers were sighted 22 miles north-northwest of Alexandria during the forenoon on a north-northwesterly course; a large steamer, 4 medium-sized and 3 small steamers, as well as 6 patrol boats were sighted off Ras Azzaz at 0940 and later; they were following southeasterly and easterly courses. The origin of this convoy remains unexplained. It may be that this is part of the Gibraltar convoy which, after having met the "Cagliari" group, reached the area off Tobruk at the time observed proceeding at a speed of 14 knots. It is also possible that these ships originally were part of the Alexandria convoy. If either of these assumptions is true, it would of course be necessary appreciably to reduce the success claimed by the Air Force.

Photo reconnaissance gave the following picture of Alexandria at 1000: 1 battleship of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class in dock, 2 cruisers of the SOUTHAMPTON class, 3 cruisers of the DIDO class, 1 cruiser of the AURORA class, 1 anti-aircraft cruiser, 14 destroyers, 9 escort vessels, 4 submarines, 4 passenger ships, 5 tankers, 37 freighters, and others. The cruiser which was thought to be the ADELAIDE because she had 3 funnels when seen in port had only 2 funnels when at sea, and therefore is probably a camouflaged anti-aircraft cruiser.

The British Admiralty reports in connection with the operations of 13 through 16 Jun. that the British Navy and Merchant Marine have carried out supply operations for the garrisons at Malta and Tobruk in cooperation with the R.A.F. and the U.S. Army Air Force. "Our operations were carried out in spite of violent attacks by superior enemy air and naval forces and were not without losses. Fantastic enemy claims to have sunk a cruiser and to have damaged 1 battleship and an aircraft carrier are without any basis." The report also mentions that the TRENTO and at least 2 destroyers were sunk, and that heavy damage was inflicted on our air forces.

Discussing the situation in North Africa, the British press states that insufficient cargo space is available at the present to supply larger armies in Libya and that it therefore would be pointless to send more divisions there.

2. Own Situation:

All vessels of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla arrived in Derna by 1200. The cargo unloaded at Derna amounted to 605 tons on 16 Jun.

3. Situation Italy:

The damaged cruiser VIVALDI was towed into Trapani from Pantellaria. 22 Italian submarines were at sea in the Mediterranean.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Steamers WACHTFELS and ARGENTEA have left Trapani for Naples

17 Jun. 1942

under escort. No other significant ship movements have been reported.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The Crete group has left Piraeus for Candia. PT boats, the hospital ship GRAZ, and an Italian torpedo boat from Suda were used as sea rescue vessels.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring reports 3 submarines in the western Black Sea.

Own Situation:

Italian submarine chasers and midget submarines went into action off Cape Sarich and Cape Kherson, but have nothing to report. It is planned to commit 5 boats of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla in the same area during the night of 17 Jun. and to have them return to Ak Mechet afterwards.

PT boat S "26" has left Constanta for Linz.

IX. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Our forces succeeded in taking a number of bastions in the course of vigorous fighting at the northern front of Sevastopol. Rumanian forces have begun an attack from the east.

During the night of 7 Jun., the enemy undertook reconnaissance raids on a wide front, directed against the Kerch Peninsula from the north. A disembarked enemy group southeast of Cape Tarkhan was destroyed.

17 Jun. 1942

The enemy seems to be evacuating valuable materiel from Sevastopol and to be transferring it to Novorossisk.

No other fighting is reported from the other sectors of the Army Group. The war council met in Moscow from 10 to 12 Jun., with Stalin presiding. It is said to have decided not to force an attack, but rather to prepare everything for the defensive. A regrouping has been ordered on the line Rostov - Don River - Volga River, in order to protect the Caucasus. New and young officers are being placed in command.

Central Army Group:

The fighting in the pockets is continuing. After extensive artillery and bomb preparations, the enemy attacked northeast of Rzhev, supported by tanks, but the attack was repelled.

Northern Army Group:

Our operations north of Kholm and south of Staraya Russa continued to be successful. The enemy vainly repeated his tank-supported attacks against the defensive front north of Lake Ilmen.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Nothing to report.

3. North Africa:

Our forces were able to take a principal strong point in the area of El Adem during the fighting for the approaches to the fortress of Tobruk, after having repulsed on the whole an attempt of the encircled enemy to break out from there during the night. 500 prisoners were taken. Other strong points were cut off in the course of the day. Reconnaissance forces pushed through to the fortress between the strong points.

The German Africa Corps and the Ariete Armored Division pushed forward in an easterly direction towards Gambut and south of it during the afternoon, in order to protect the attack on Tobruk. They threw the 7th Armored Division back to the east in a determined advance all along the front and reached the area south of Gambut in the evening.

18 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

France:

In a speech favoring the sending of French workers to Germany, Laval declared that he is for a German victory, since a German defeat is equivalent to the bolshevization of Europe and of France.

A high official in the Navy Ministry has expressed the opinion that a British-American offensive against the north and west African coastal areas can be expected in the near future. The French forces will oppose such attacks both on land and on sea, he said, but are afraid they might possibly be left in the lurch by Germany. Laval recently expressed a similar opinion; he declared that Petain had instructed him to bring these apprehensions of his to the attention of the German government. The British may attack so unexpectedly that it may not be possible for the two countries to reach an understanding on a coordinated defense.

Great Britain:

According to a report by our legation in Lisbon, there exists an agreement between the British and the U.S. governments according to which there will be a continuation of the air offensive against Germany and of the commando raids against France. London, however, does not agree with the intention of the U.S. to land also in Casablanca and to occupy the Portuguese Atlantic islands. Rather, London considers it more appropriate first to incite revolutions in Spain and Portugal. The Union of South Africa favors the plan of the U.S. in view of the Portuguese possessions in South Africa. Prime Minister Salazar, on the other hand, expressed his opinion that there are no definite signs of Allied intervention, but does consider it significant that all American concerns in Spain and Portugal have been asked to wind up their affairs by 30 Jun. The Americans have also been asked to return to their mother country as soon as possible.

Australia:

Australia's Prime Minister declared that the victory in the Coral Sea has saved Australia just as Dunkirk saved Great Britain. He said that a complete defeat of the Allies in the Middle East would have dire consequences for Australia, since the enemy then would dominate the Suez. He said the submarine situation is also very difficult.

U.S.S.R.:

According to a Japanese report, no definite promise was given Molotov with regard to opening a second front in Europe this year. Eden in particular pointed out that the shortage of shipping and the doubtful position of Turkey do not now permit such a step.

Japan:

The Japanese Military Attache made the following points in a conversation with the German Naval Attache at Rome, which undoubtedly represent the point of view of the Japanese Admiralty:

There is little doubt that Great Britain views the growing losses of merchant shipping with increasing alarm. The most effective methods,

18 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

however, of making the British choose peace would be to destroy their warships. A successful mass attack by torpedo planes and bombers on a British warship base would affect their morale to a decisive degree. The destruction of the HOOD is said to have caused a low in British morale.

Estimates of the Japanese Admiralty place British merchant shipping losses at 12,350,000 GRT, U.S. losses at 1,650,000 GRT up to the end of April.

The Japanese Embassy at Rome has received reports to the effect that Molotov's request for a second front has been answered by a request in London and Washington for Russia's entry into the war against Japan. Japan feels that the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian treaty means that Russia is very skeptical as far as the course of the war is concerned.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. Report of the Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division

Radio monitoring reports that the U.S. designated as undecipherable our submarine messages which they had picked up. This is renewed proof of the safety of our code.

The Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division has again called the attention of the Chief of Air Force Communications to the inadequacy of the recognition signals of our planes. This has been proved by the enemy's repeated use of our signals. The Chief, Naval Staff feels it may be necessary to take the matter up with the Fuehrer, in case the situation does not improve very rapidly.

The Secret Radio Intelligence Station at Kirkenes which was installed for purposes of intercepting enemy radio traffic in the northern area has fully proved its value.

II. Report of the Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff

1. The fuel oil supply of Italy by Rumania has improved. 37,000 tons have been supplied so far; it is estimated that 60,000 tons will have been supplied by the end of the month. This quantity should meet the needs of the Italian Navy without difficulty.

2. The reorganization plan of the Plans and Schedules Branch, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division places the Commanding Admiral, Submarines directly under the Commander in Chief, Navy. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines has suggested that all submarine flotillas in the western area be placed under a Commander, Submarines, West for administrative purposes. The latter then would also constitute the first jurisdictional level. It is planned to assign Lieutenant Commander Roesing to that post; he would, however, keep his assignment as Chief of the Central Division of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines. This measure would result in reducing the administrative load of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines. Once organizationally developed, it may later lead to the creation of a command entitled Commander, Submarines, North. Both the Quartermaster Division and the Naval Staff recommend this measure. The Chief, Naval Staff approves.

3. After an additional delay which was necessary in order to get the submarines ready for transport, they will be ready for operations

13 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

in the Black Sea as follows: Submarine U "24" on 26 Oct., U "9" on 9 Nov., and U "19" on 29 Nov.

4. After the necessary training is completed, the SCHARNHORST will be ready for operations on 1 Oct., the PRINZ EUGEN and the NUERNBERG some time early October, and the KOELN early in July. These dates were set by the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff, in agreement with the Naval Construction Division.

Test runs of the coastal mine layers have proved satisfactory. The Operations Division, Naval Staff calls attention to the inadequate armament of these vessels. For the time being 4 of them (later a total of 10) have been earmarked for use on Lake Ladoga, while 6 will be used in the area of Naval Group South. It is doubtful that these vessels are seaworthy enough to be used in the Black Sea.

5. It will be necessary to consider the request for an increase in the money allotted to the Navy in Greece from 2,000,000,000 to 11,000,000,000 drachmas in view of the growing inflation there.

In a very restricted circle:

III. Report by the Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division

Group North does not consider it impossible that the enemy will have the QP convoy leave port independently of the PQ convoy. In that event it has instructed the Admiral, Arctic Ocean that there is no objection to having the submarines which are to be used for operation "Roesselsprung" attack the QP convoy which may be passing, if this does not cause them to miss the operation against the PQ convoy. Reconnaissance of the PQ convoy is the most important task.

Both the Naval Staff and the Chief, Naval Staff approve.

The Naval Staff transmitted to the Naval Section, of the Air Force Operations Staff the decision of the Fuehrer concerning the execution of operation "Roesselsprung", with the request that the Chief of the Air Force General Staff be approached, and his attention be called to a memo sent some time ago emphasizing the value of air reconnaissance.

The Chief, Naval Staff approves.

IV. The Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff reported that the Armed Forces High Command denies that the Fuehrer ordered shipyard workers needed for submarine construction exempted from the draft as a result of the last report of the Chief, Naval Staff to the Fuehrer. It is said that the Fuehrer merely ordered consideration of this problem. The Chief, Naval Staff thereupon ordered a telegram sent directly to the Fuehrer, requesting clarification of a situation which is perfectly clear.

Special Items:

I. For operational order of the Fleet Commander and Commanding Admiral, Battleships, ordering the fleet to go into action against a PQ convoy in the northern area (code name "Roesselsprung"), see 1/Skl/ 1164/42 Gkdos. Chef. in File "Roesselsprung".

18 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

II. Group North has transmitted the order of the 5th Air Force Command concerning cooperation between the 5th Air Force Command and naval forces in the operation "Roesselsprung".

The reconnaissance which has been ordered actually exceeds the request made by Group North, and, if the weather is favorable, it should suffice to prevent any surprises, in the opinion of Group North.

The Naval Staff is of the same opinion.

Since bombers may not be used for reconnaissance purposes, by order of the Commander in Chief, Air Force, provision has been made for supplying the necessary reconnaissance planes.

III. Top Secret Radio Intelligence Reports No. 24/42, put out by the Chief, Radio Intelligence Branch, Naval Staff Communications Division, contain a summary of enemy reports intercepted by radio monitoring and intelligence during the week of 8 to 14 Jun.

They contain the report that the convoy which left Alexandria on 13 Jun. consisted of 30 merchant ships. This is not confirmed by reports of air reconnaissance received by the Naval Staff.

Situation 18 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

Our Naval Attache at Buenos Aires reports that there's a rumor that the Brazilian steamer SANTAREM which had Brazilian troops aboard was sunk on her way to Fernando Noronha.

According to a report by the German Consulate in Monrovia, the majority of U.S. ships make the Liberian harbor Marshall-Junk their port of call. This is the principal transshipment point of the Pan American Airways Corporation and of the Firestone Plantation Corporation.

Indian Ocean:

Radio monitoring reports a northbound convoy with 2 cruiser escorts off Lourenco Marques on 16 Jun. Part of the convoy was destined for India. Apparently these are the steamers which had been reported in Delagoa Bay and which had joined the convoy coming from the south.

One of the ships sunk by gunfire from Japanese submarines in the Mozambique channel was the Norwegian steamer WILFORD. A total of 50,000 GRT is supposed to have been sunk by Japanese forces in that area.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "28" has been instructed to make sure that the DOGGERBANK keep sufficient fuel for her voyage to Japan. The Naval Staff estimates that ship "28" will be able to take over about 600 cubic meters of fuel from the DOGGERBANK. (See Telegram 0314.)

Radiogram 1044 has given the NANKIN sailing orders for her arrival in

18 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Schildpad Bay.

The Naval Staff estimates that she will arrive there about 22 or 23 Jun.

Telegram 1450 has given the necessary instructions to our Naval Attache at Tokyo.

The Naval Staff has informed ship "10" through Radiogram 2216 that it is planned to have her engines overhauled for about 6 weeks, starting in the middle of September. This is to be done either in Osaka or Yokohama. Radiogram 2321 requests her to indicate the necessary repairs.

Telegram 1515 answers the request of the Naval Attache at Tokyo for information on the successful action of the Axis in the Mediterranean from 14 to 16 Jun. His attention is called to the official German and Italian communiques; he is also informed that these reports have not yet been fully checked and evaluated.

Radiograms 0537 and 1913 give information on the enemy situation.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring reports 23 steamers and 3 patrol boats on the west coast of Ireland, 90 miles west-northwest of Cape Clear at 0725 on an easterly course.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The 2nd Mine Sweeping Flotilla and the 2nd Motor Mine Sweeping Flotilla swept a total of 37 mines from the minefield at Bayonne on 17 and 18 Jun. The harbor of Lorient has been closed because of suspected mines.

Channel Coast:

A French fishing flotilla was fired upon at noon by enemy planes off Le Treport. The guardboat of the fishing fleet was heavily damaged and suffered personnel losses.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Mine Operation "Julius" has been completed according to plan.

Forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North swept a total of 14 ground mines in the course of the day. This means that a total of 44 ground mines has been swept in the German Bight since 1 Jun.

The steamer ALSTERDAM hit a mine near Borkum and was damaged; she has entered the Elbe.

18 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

In view of the increasing shipping losses suffered as a result of mine hits, particularly in the area Texel - Borkum, the Naval Staff deems it necessary to consider shifting the route away from the coast, perhaps somewhere near the route which the Naval Staff once considered for operation "Cerberus".

See Telegram 1414 for a corresponding memorandum to Group North and to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North.

2. Norway:

Mine-sweeping in the area of Hjelmsoe has remained without result so far, but will be continued in view of the possibility that the enemy mines are equipped with a delayed release.

Transport and escort service proceeded uneventfully.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance for convoy PQ "17" was without result. See daily situation report for the pack ice and solid ice borders.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring reports that during the last few days 4 submarines were at sea in the eastern Gulf of Finland. In addition to mine sweepers and patrol ships, survey ship BAKAN was also seen in the Lavansaari-Kronstadt area. There was lively mine-sweeping activity according to radio monitoring and air reconnaissance services.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report from the Skagerrak, the Baltic Sea entrances, and the western Baltic Sea.

Eastern Baltic Sea:

Group North believes that Russian submarines are breaking through coastal island waters, north of the "Nashorn" mine field. It has therefore initiated all necessary measures effectively to mine these waters in cooperation with the Finns, leaving only one lane free for our own use.

According to the observations of a patrol boat near the Nordvinov bank on 15 Jun. and according to radio intelligence reports, it may be assumed that 3 or 4 enemy submarines have been destroyed by mines.

On the basis of instructions from the Naval High Command, Group North assigned 8 motor mine sweepers from the Second Admiral, Baltic Station to the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea, in order to strengthen his subchasing facilities.

18 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Submarine chasing and mine sweeping are made very difficult by continuous enemy air raids since there is no German or Finnish air defense. 2 motor mine sweepers are already out of action and further losses must be expected, unless fighter planes are provided very soon. The Russians are sweeping mine field "Tiger I" unmolested. Group North has requested the 1st Air Force to take steps to prevent this. The 1st Air Force also has been asked to attack the harbors of Seiskari and Lavansaari, which are full of ships. The Group has asked the Naval Staff to press these requests with the Air Force Operations Staff, since the 1st Air Force seems to have inadequate forces to meet these requests.

The Naval Staff thereupon immediately initiated the necessary steps with the Air Force Operations Staff.

Meanwhile the Air Force Operations Staff, in accordance with the request of the Naval Staff, ordered that air raids in the Kronstadt Bay area concentrate on small naval vessels, PT boats, mine sweepers and submarines, rather than on larger ships.

The Finnish report that a Finnish steamer was torpedoed near Bogaskaer has been answered by the Swedish Navy through their Naval Attache. The reply states that mines are being laid near Understen only in the places announced heretofore, and that other mines will be laid only upon specific German or Finnish request. The Oeland mine field can be laid at once, if so desired. The mine field near Soederarm would be a new one and would therefore require a diplomatic demarche and a government order. Furthermore, all merchant shipping has been transferred to Swedish territorial waters effective immediately, with warships being placed at various points along the coast in order to direct merchant ships. Until 19 Jun. all ships are being instructed in the new regulations daily. Shipping will be compelled to go through the coastal island waters of Stockholm; escort service has been provided for Swedish-Finnish merchant shipping from Arholma to the Swedish territorial boundary.

The Swedish Navy informed the Finnish Naval Attache that the Understen mine field is being laid with the understanding that the Finns will also lay their mine field off Understen immediately, in order to close the Gulf of Bothnia effectively against Russian submarines. The attitude of the Swedish Navy with regard to instituting escort service depends on whether they can get the fuel oil replaced which is used up in these operations.

The Finnish Naval Attache has replied that it has not yet been confirmed that the submarines are breaking through, and that nothing will be undertaken by the Finnish Navy for the time being. This is in agreement with Rear Admiral von Bonin

This Finnish reply notwithstanding, the Swedish Navy will lay the Understen mine field, will reroute merchant shipping, and will patrol the mined area off Oeland.

Our Naval Attache at Stockholm has transmitted a report of the situation, pointing to the delay and increase in the difficulties of merchant shipping resulting from these Swedish measures and has asked if he should take steps to have them relaxed.

Group North comments that it has been proved that Russian submarines are breaking through, in spite of the position taken by the Finns, and adds that the Swedish measures are necessary and should be welcomed in the interest of safe merchant shipping.

The Group feels that the resulting delay must be accepted for the time

being, particularly as it may be assumed that the danger from submarines will decrease as mine fields "Seeigel" and "Nashorn" are extended.

The Naval Staff thoroughly agrees with the position taken by Group North.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring, British and American merchant ships were ordered on 10 Jun. to keep west of 86° 20' W between the Yucatan Strait and 14° N until ordered otherwise. Except for this, there is nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Heavy aerial bombs damaged submarine U "214" in quadrant BF 8135 and forced her to turn back. It was impossible to obtain the fighter protection which the Commanding Admiral, Submarines had requested.

This is a renewed proof of the urgency of the request now pending.

In the North Atlantic, submarine U "124" made contact with a convoy in quadrant BC 3157. The convoy consisted of 8 large ships escorted by 4 destroyers and several corvettes and was pursuing a westerly course. She sank 2 steamers of 6,000 and 7,000 GRT and torpedoed a third steamer of 6,000 GRT. No successes were reported from the American coast.

Submarine U "68" sank the tanker FRIMAIRE (9,242 GRT) in the Caribbean Sea, although the Naval Staff had explicitly instructed the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to spare this French ship which had been chartered by the Portuguese.

Submarine U "126" reports from quadrant ED that she sank a small sailboat, 1 steamer of 7,000 GRT, and the tanker KAHUKU (6,062 GRT) on 15 and 16 Jun.

Submarine U "561" has carried out a new mine-laying mission off Port Said in the Mediterranean. For further reports, see Supplement to Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

On 17 Jun. the Air Command, Atlantic Coast sent an armed long-range reconnaissance force against a convoy of 21 steamers 300 miles west of Brest. All planes with the exception of one made a mistake and attacked a fishing flotilla in quadrant BF 1418 instead of the convoy. They sank several fishing vessels and a British destroyer which was in the vicinity. Only 1 plane of the second wave made contact with the convoy in quadrant BE 3628 at 2236.

Fighter bombers were able to score a direct hit in the harbor of Brixham.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The Air Force went out in force to support the Africa Corps, making effective raids on Tobruk. 12 enemy planes were shot down.

3. Eastern Front:

600 planes went into action in the area of Sevastopol.

The 5th Air Force was able to carry out in force a successful raid of the city and the ship repair facilities of Murmansk. One 6,000 GRT steamer was sunk in the harbor. See daily situation report for details.

The air raid on Iokanga Bay resulted in damage to one 5,000 GRT steamer and in well-placed hits on the pier and traffic installations.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and in the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Western Mediterranean:

The following ships arrived in Gibraltar from the east on the afternoon of 18 Jun.: 1 mine-laying cruiser, probably the MANXMAN, 1 DIDO-class cruiser, 1 FIJI and 1 CAIRO-class cruiser, and 2 destroyers. The following ships were in the harbor of Gibraltar: the MALAYA, the ARGUS, the EAGLE, 5 cruisers, 1 of which was in dock, 1 mine-laying cruiser, and 12 destroyers, 4 of which were in dock. No report has been received of the 8 steamers which are missing, as compared to the previous day.

An agent reports that the vessels coming in from the east have shown the following damage:

The LIVERPOOL apparently hit by a torpedo at the stern
The MANXMAN heavy list with visible hit at the stern, upper deck
partially flooded (Italian report)

2 destroyers are said to have docked immediately upon arrival.

The unloading of dead and wounded from the ARGUS and the EAGLE has already been reported. According to an Italian report, the ARGUS left port in westerly direction at 2230, accompanied by 4 destroyers.

Central Mediterranean:

Photo reconnaissance on 17 Jun. showed the following ships in the harbor of Valletta at 1840: 2 destroyers, 5 escort vessels, 2 freighters, and 1 harbor tanker. Hence the second destroyer which had been seen in the harbor on 16 Jun. meanwhile must have left port. These observations seem to be confirmed by the reports of ships which have arrived in Gibraltar.

Photo reconnaissance of Tobruk harbor at 0805 on 17 Jun. showed that, as compared to 6 Jun., 1 passenger ship, 6 steamers, 1 small tanker, 8 escort vessels, and 1 coastal patrol boat have left the harbor. No ships have been observed arriving in the harbor.

18 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

The eastbound convoy which had been reported 50 miles east of Sidi Bar-rani on 17 Jun. at 2100 was reported to be 25 miles east of Marsa Matrüh at 0940. Photo reconnaissance showed it to consist of 6 freighters, 1 passenger ship, and 9 small naval vessels. These may very well be the ships which have left Tobruk, judging by their destination and by the type of ships in the convoy.

Eastern Mediterranean:

Little convoy and patrol activity was observed in the area of Alexandria. Photo reconnaissance of the harbor showed the following: 1 battleship in dock, 7 light cruisers, 14 destroyers, 9 escort ships, 4 submarines, and 1 large warship of unidentified class, as well as a large number of passenger ships, steamers, and tankers.

Today's observations of the enemy also do not enable us to gain a clear picture of the losses suffered by the enemy between 14 and 16 Jun. The number of war and merchant ships which has been observed, however, leads us to fear that the number of sinkings reported by both air forces is not accurate.

2. Own Situation:

Italian radio monitoring reports that the Norwegian tanker TOULOUSE (7,000 GRT) sank off Port Said.

This may be due to a mine from our submarines.

22 Italian submarines were either in a waiting position or cruising in the Mediterranean.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

No ships left Italy for North Africa. The coastal supply shipping in Africa proceeded uneventfully. The cargo unloaded at Derna amounted to 570 tons on 17 Jun.

Total cargo unloaded in Benghazi during the period of 1 to 31 May 1942:	56,988 tons
Of this the total of German goods was:	34,620 tons
Total cargo loaded in Benghazi during the same period:	4,622 tons
Of this the total of German goods was:	3,944 tons
Maximum amount of cargo unloaded on any one day:	2,800 tons

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The 18th Crete group which arrived in Candia on 18 Jun. transported approximately 1,600 troops. Nothing else to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reports that 4 torpedo boats arrived in

18 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Sevastopol in the afternoon. Lively patrol activity by small vessels was observed near our side of the Kerch coast.

Own Situation:

The Italian submarine CB "2" sank another Russian submarine south of Cape Sarich.

This is the third enemy submarine which has been destroyed in the Black Sea within a short time.

1 of the 5 Italian motor ships which went into action at the southern coast of the Crimea during the night has not returned so far.

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla unsuccessfully attacked a steamer with 3 torpedoes south of Cape Sarich during the night of 17 Jun.

As a result of sabotage, the steamer LOLA was damaged in Nikolayev on the evening of 17 Jun.

See Telegram 1720 for the request of Naval Group South that nets be made available for the harbors of the Crimea.

This will be taken care of by the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Press reports indicate that the Australian Air Force raided Salamaus and Timor while the Japanese Air Force raided Port Darwin and Port Moresby. It is reported that Dutch forces are still offering resistance on Java in the area of Bandoeng.

U.S. broadcasts report that large flying boats were used for night missions for the first time in the action off Midway.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Enemy resistance was broken at the bridgehead position near Lyubimovka during the fighting for Sevastopol. A battery position at Shishkovka was stormed and our forces passed through Bartenyevka to the south. The 22nd Infantry Division took the Donets fortifications and reached the northern shore of Severnaya Bay. German and Rumanian troops were able to make only slight advances in the face of stubborn enemy resistance at the northeastern and the eastern fronts.

Nothing to report from the remaining front of the Army Group.

Central Army Group:

Some forces of the enemy Belo group have reached wooded terrain west of Kirov. The enemy has been observed clearing his own mine fields north of Kirov. This leads us to suspect that the 10th Russian Army will

18 Jun. 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

attempt to open a path to the east for the Belo group.

Northern Army Group:

Nothing to report.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

No important fighting is reported.

Forest fires at the northeastern front have destroyed some Russian mine fields and military installations.

3. North Africa:

Mopping-up activities in the area of Gambut resulted in the capture of 400 more prisoners and of large supply depots. We closed the ring around Tobruk east of the line of fortifications by advancing north over the Via Balbia. Thus Tobruk is entirely surrounded on land.

19 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

Questioning in the House of Commons clearly brought out the concern felt because of British shipping losses. It was demanded that figures on losses again be made public. The Government is going to consult with the Admiralty to see whether it would be possible to make public figures up to the end of March.

Churchill has arrived in Washington for conferences with Roosevelt.

Such trips on the part of Churchill have so far been undertaken when the situation was particularly critical.

U.S.S.R.:

See Political Review No. 131, Paragraph 3 for the speech of Molotov to the Supreme Soviet on the British-Russian treaty. The speech naturally contained a denial of any secret clauses and emphasis on the complete agreement obtained with regard to the very urgent creation of a second front in Europe in 1942.

U.S.A.:

The Naval Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives has voted to order 30 new aircraft carriers and 400 new warships.

The vote is looked upon as a victory for the adherents of a new naval strategy who advocate building aircraft carriers with the best possible buoyancy and greater fire power, instead of building battleships. The only battleships to be completed are those now being built including those laid down this year. All new aircraft carriers that will be ordered are to be completed in 1943! As a result of this concentration of shipbuilding capacity, it will probably be necessary to delay the completion of the 4 battleships of the JAVA class which were to be finished in 1945. It is further planned to build 600 submarine chasers, 200 torpedo boats and 200 patrol vessels. The whole plan, which provides for the construction of 500,000 tons of aircraft carriers, 500,000 tons of cruisers, 900,000 tons of destroyers and destroyer escorts, in

19 Jun. 1942

addition to the submarine chasers just mentioned, was unanimously approved in the House of Representatives. The cost is estimated at \$8,500,000,000.

All of the above information was taken from American publications, but undoubtedly is largely correct. Planning in the U.S. Navy seems to take into account to a large extent the experiences made up to now. These plans will assume great importance in case the war lasts several years more, even if they are not all completed.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. As a result of a report of the Chief, Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff, the Chief, Naval Staff decided to delay the transfer of the GRAF ZEPPELIN to Kiel until the SCHARNHORST has left Kiel; this will probably be at the end of August.

II. The Central Committee for the Shipyard Industry has expressed concern lest the withdrawal of workers from the Emden shipyards, a move the Navy has planned in connection with a gradual reduction in submarine construction in Emden, might result in a general decrease in the efficiency of the entire shipyard industry. In spite of this objection the Chief, Quartermaster Division suggests that the plan be carried out. The Chief, Naval Staff is of the same opinion.

III. The Chief, Naval Construction Division reported about the difficulties encountered with the 4 Blohm destroyers, the turbine plants of which have proved to be of faulty construction. The Chief, Naval Staff orders that Staatsrat Blohm be asked for comment.

The Chief, Naval Construction Division then reported about his differences with the Central Committee concerning the assignment of submarine U "552" to a shipyard in order to complete final fitting operations. The Central Committee declines to assign the boat to a shipyard in order not to interfere with new constructions. This would delay the operational readiness of submarine U "551" by several weeks.

CONFIDENTIAL

19 Jun. 1942

The Chief, Naval Staff orders that the position of the Central Committee be rejected. Interference with the military requirements of the Navy exceeds the authority of the Committee.

IV. The Chief of Naval Administration then reported how deferring shipyard workers has affected the replacement needs of the Navy. The release from active service of about 15,000 shipyard workers who belong to the naval replacement reserve has been ordered.

This raises the shortage of the Navy in 1943 to 39,000 men. The shortage can be reduced, however, by various measures, especially by the extensive economy drive for the entire Navy planned by the Bureau of Naval Administration together with the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff. Therefore, the situation is not considered very serious just now.

V. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division made a report about the Fuehrer directive concerning the Reich Research Office, and the manufacture of French artificial rubber (Zellgummi) by German firms.

VI. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division Underwater Obstacles Branch reported that 20 polarity reversing devices will be ready for mine-exploding vessels by the end of the week.

Special Items:

I. Group North has submitted a part of the operations order of the 5th Air Force for operation "Roesselsprung" (see War Diary of 18 Jun.). The order provides for reconnoitering the area as thoroughly as possible, going as far as 300 miles out from the Norwegian coast or to the ice barrier. The reconnaissance is to be organized in such a manner that 4 hours after observation the same area will again be reconnoitered. It is also planned to have close escort and fighter protection for the transfer of the naval forces and their approach to the battle area. These measures as planned by the 5th Air Force exceed the original requests by the Navy and will exclude surprises to a large extent if the weather is satisfactory. They thus create the prerequisites for operation "Roesselsprung".

19 Jun. 1942

A communication to this effect has gone out for the information of the Naval Adjutant of the Fuehrer, the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy, and the Naval Section of the Air Force Operations Staff, in order to prepare for a decision by the Fuehrer concerning the offensive phase of this operation.

II. According to a report by the Naval Section, the task of employing air forces for naval purposes is a great burden on the Air Force Operations Staff. The assignment of a Naval Liaison Officer to the 3rd Fighter Command has proved very valuable. The question of protecting submarine lanes in the Bay of Biscay is creating many headaches. The need is fully recognized, but the assignment of the necessary planes is very difficult. A serious attempt is being made to solve this problem. A Croatian bomber squadron is to be assigned to the 1st Air Force to help relieve the situation in the Gulf of Finland, though this is only an emergency measure.

III. It will be necessary to make use of radio monitoring in order to intercept Russian ship and ice reports as this will help in analysing the possibilities of using surface forces in the eastern Barents Sea and in the waters around Novaya Zemlya. The Chief, Naval Communications Division is given the necessary orders, accompanied by a request to transmit all information thus obtained to the Naval Staff Operations Division and Naval Group North, using the code word "Neuland". The Chief, Naval Communications Division has also been asked to what extent the locating facilities of the Russians would permit special fishing vessels used in the Arctic Ocean for ice and weather reconnaissance to send out short signals.

IV. Notes on operation "Herkules" which were given the Chief, Naval Staff for his report to the Fuehrer on 15 Jun., as per annex 4 of 1/Skl I b 1115/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII, were forwarded to the Naval Liaison Officer on the Army General Staff; the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, Navy; and the Naval Liaison Officer at the Air Force Operations Staff for their personal information.

V. The Commander, Destroyers reports that torpedo boats "4", "10", "13", and "14" will be ready for transfer to the western area after 11 Jul. They will be under the command of the Chief, 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla.

19 Jun. 1942

VI. A brief estimate by the Naval Staff Operations Division concerning the question of Germany's capacity of endurance comes to a definitely positive conclusion with regard to the food and materiel situation and the morale of the people. A copy of the report, dated 8 Jun. 1942, is in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

Situation 19 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Indian Ocean:

Radio Station Simon's Town broadcast warnings of drift mines which were sighted on 18 Jun., 95 miles southeast of Simon's Town.

According to an Italian report, a convoy consisting of 18 U.S. ships arrived in Basra on 13 Jun., carrying tanks and planes for Russia.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "10" reported on the evening of 18 Jun. that she captured and sank the Panamanian tanker OLIVIA (6,307 GRT), having cut her radio equipment, on 14 Jun., and that she will send her second prize, the Norwegian tanker HERBORG (7,892 GRT), on her way on 20 Jun. Ship "10" is in large quadrant KU, her rendezvous point on 24 Jun. is "Schneekoppe".

These two new and very gratifying successes of this ship have raised the total enemy tonnage sunk or captured by her to 44,956 GRT.

Radiogram 1819 gives new sailing orders to Prize I (NANKIN), since the Japanese Navy has failed to clarify the mine situation in Schildpad Bay.

Radiogram 2221 transmitted the enemy situation report.

19 Jun. 1942

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

The Admiralty has announced the sinking of the mine sweeper FITZROY (800 tons) without giving details as to time or place.

A convoy of 15 to 20 steamers was observed off Hastings in the evening on an easterly course, while a northbound convoy of 14 steamers was observed off Trevose Head.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Our Naval Attache at Madrid reports that on 17 Jun. a British plane which had flown over Ferrol was forced to make an emergency landing near Cape Ortegal because of Spanish anti-aircraft fire. (Submarine U "205" is in Ferrol.)

Channel Coast:

At 0235 enemy boats torpedoed and fired upon a German convoy in the Baie de la Seine near Barfleur. Mine Sweeper TURQUOISE (800 GRT) and motor mine sweeper R "41" **received** torpedo hits. When the motor mine sweeper was being towed away, the enemy attacked again; mine sweeper "3800" was so badly damaged that she had to be beached. The TURQUOISE and motor mine sweeper R "41" sank. According to a report by the 4th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla 2 enemy PT boats were sunk for sure, while a third one was probably destroyed; others were damaged. 27 Britishers were captured. See Telegram 1830 for a brief report by the 4th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported a large northbound convoy

19 Jun. 1942

off the Humber in the morning; it consisted of 60 steamers, 5 destroyers, 7 patrol boats and PT boats. In the evening a convoy which consisted of 14 steamers was observed on a northerly course between Lowestoft and Orfordness.

Own Situation:

During the night of 18 Jun., mine operation "Julius" was carried out according to plan.

In the same night several enemy planes flew over the German Bight. It was observed that mines were dropped. During the day, naval anti-aircraft guns shot down two enemy planes out of fairly heavy fighter forces which were attacking harbor defense vessels and gunboats in the **Wielingen channel**. **1 harbor defense vessel** was slightly damaged; there were losses of personnel. During the afternoon, a low-flying Bristol Blenheim plane was spotted near Heligoland. Our fighters, however, were unable to intercept it when it flew back along the Frisian Islands.

8 ground mines were swept in the German Bight.

The Swedish steamer CEYLON, which is not equipped with degaussing gear and had not been demagnetized, hit a ground mine off Borkum and had to be towed in.

Mine-exploding vessel "173" had to interrupt her task because of damages sustained.

2. Norway:

Mine-sweeping and convoy service proceeded according to plan.

The Admiral, West Norwegian coast reports that naval coastal battery "Væra" is ready for duty with 2 guns, while the Admiral, North Norwegian Coast reports that naval coastal battery "Amøy" is ready with 4 guns.

See Telegram 1610 for the order of Group North concerning the immediate transfer of the 8th IT Boat Flotilla, together with the TSINGTAI, to home waters.

19 Jun. 1942

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

It is planned to pick up weather station "Knospe" the end of July. (See Telegram 2327.)

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

A submarine was sighted 8 miles northwest of Nargen. 20 vessels were observed on the evening of 18 Jun., while engaged in sweeping the "Tiger" mine field. 20 more vessels were observed near Shepel.

2. Own Situation:

Group North has issued orders to the effect that all training and experiments in the Danish area are to be restricted to a minimum because of the dangerous ground mine situation, for reasons of secrecy, and in order to save foreign currency. (See Telegram 2322.)

This order conforms completely with intentions of the Naval Staff.

Eastern Baltic Sea:

The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic Sea considers the measures which Sweden plans to carry out necessary (see Telegram 1650). The Naval Liaison Staff, Finland does not consider it necessary to lay the Understen mine field, and reports that the Finns do not plan to lay any mines there, but intend rather to use them to strengthen the "Seeigel" mine field, etc. In contrast to the report of the Finnish Naval Attache at Stockholm, both the Finnish Staff and the Chief, Naval Liaison Staff, Finland are of the opinion that there can be no question that submarines have appeared outside the Gulf of Finland. (See Telegram 1800.)

19 Jun. 1942

The submarine chase north of Nargen was without observed effect.

V. Merchant Shipping:

See Brief Report No. 19/42 "Foreign Merchant Shipping" of the Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, Naval Staff Intelligence Division for reports about the Swedish directive for the prevention of sabotage on merchant ships, about the sale and chartering of Finnish ships, about the increased Goeteborg (Sweden-South America) traffic in the months of April and May, etc.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio monitoring intercepted the report of an airplane which sighted a submarine north of the Shetland Islands, and of one which sighted a submarine in the Bay of Biscay; also intercepted were reports about submarines attacking off Cape Hatteras, off the Florida Coast, and in the Caribbean Sea, and reports about submarines being sighted in the Gulf of Maine as well as in the Mediterranean 45 miles north of Port Said.

2. Own Situation:

7 submarines are in the operational area in the Arctic Ocean.

Submarine U "107", which had been surprised by a patrol boat in the fog off Cape Hatteras, was able to destroy her in a gun duel lasting 1½ hours.

Submarine U "172" sank the tanker LEBORE (8,289 GRT) and a 3,500 GRT tanker in the Caribbean Sea.

Asked about the sinking of the tanker FRIMAIRE, U "68" reports that she was traveling without Vichy markings.

Submarine U "81" sends in a belated report that she unsuccessfully attacked the convoy which was returning to Alexandria in quadrant CP 7226. 3 submarines are being posted in a patrol line off the

19 Jun. 1942

harbor of Tobruk in the event that Tobruk is evacuated. For further details see Supplement to Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Special Items:

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines commented again, on 2 Jun. on the question of using submarines in the Northern Area. He is of the opinion that the difficult conditions of attack which prevail there, according to experiences with convoy PQ 16, would result in failure. In view of these conditions and because of increased losses as a result of damages, the attempt to perform the tasks in the Northern Area, i.e. fighting the convoys as before and preventing enemy landings, will result in a steady increase in the number of submarines which will have to be used. This will have a very serious effect on the warfare in the Atlantic. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines is of the opinion that the prospects of success are in no acceptable ratio to the number of submarines necessary to achieve that success. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines believes rather that the Air Force is more suited to combat convoys in the North during the summer, and does not believe it necessary that the Air Force be supported by submarines shadowing the convoys, since there is continuous daylight.

The Naval Staff, on the other hand, feels that the primary task of all naval forces stationed in the Northern Area is to fight against the Murmansk convoys. The Navy, therefore, will have to direct all available means toward this aim and will have to accept the resulting disadvantages in other areas. The Naval Staff does not fail to recognize the unfavorable and difficult conditions prevailing during the period of continuous daylight. For the reasons given by the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, the Naval Staff has purposely refrained from appreciably increasing the number of submarines in the Arctic Ocean. Nevertheless, the Naval Staff is of the opinion that we cannot do entirely without submarines for attacking the convoys. There are always opportunities for chance successes when the weather is favorable, and for action against stragglers and damaged ships. The use of submarines for shadowing the convoys is also most important for the actions of the Air Force, since the weather changes frequently. The Naval Staff feels that it is necessary to send 6 to 8 submarines into action against every PQ convoy. It is for this reason that 4 additional submarines have been ordered made available. It is not planned to increase this number.

19 Jun. 1942

Copy of letter to this effect to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, as per 1/Skl I u 1084/42 Gkdos. Chfs., is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The destroyer which, it was gratifying to learn, was sunk in the course of the mistaken attack on the fishing flotilla on 17 Jun. was the WILD SWAN. The fishing flotilla consisted of Spanish vessels.

Nothing to report for the day. During the night of 19 Jun., enemy planes attacked the North German coastal area, dropping bombs on Emden and particularly on Osnabrueck. See daily situation report for damage done in Osnabrueck.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Planes of the Air Command, Africa went into action in the area of Tobruk.

3. Eastern Front:

The Air Force went into action in force in the area of Sevastopol. Nothing to report from the area of the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic Ocean.

The Air Force Operations Staff reports that high altitude planes have been assigned to the 3rd and 5th Air Force in order to enable them to increase reconnaissance of bases.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Western Mediterranean:

A large ship, presumably a cruiser, left Gibraltar at 2315 in a westerly direction. She was accompanied by 3 destroyers.

19 Jun. 1942

Eastern Mediterranean:

Convoy shipping was slight in the coastal waters of Alexandria - Tobruk, while it was more lively in the area Alexandria - Port Said. The convoy which probably came from Tobruk was observed 9 miles from Alexandria. Photo reconnaissance showed 7 patrol vessels, 4 naval vessels, 1 vessel which is apparently a submarine, 1 coastal vessel, 1 hospital ship, and several small lighters in Tobruk at 0913.

2. Own Situation:

The enemy staged an air raid on Benghazi during the night of 18 Jun.

The commander of submarine U "205" reports that the cruiser which was sunk out of the Alexandria convoy on 16 Jun. was a vessel of the GLASGOW class.

The first group of Italian ships carrying repatriates from East Africa arrived in Gibraltar on 18 Jun., while the second group arrived in Las Palmas the same day. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South has expressed his appreciation to the German Naval Command, Italy of the record amount of cargo unloaded in Derna on 12 Jun. (1,009 tons) and of the sea rescue of 17 Air Force men by submarines. (See Telegrams 1415 and 1408.)

The reports to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff on the action against the 2 British convoys in the Mediterranean from 13 to 16 Jun. do not yield a clear picture of the successes scored. The Air Force Operations Staff has, therefore, been asked to request a checked final report from the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South (see Telegram 2130).

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

It is planned to have supply shipments to Tripoli and Benghazi start again on 20 Jun. Motor ships PILO and REICHENFELS are to sail to Tripoli, while motor ships BIXIO and ROSELLI are to sail to Benghazi.

The departure of the coastal supply steamer TRAPANI from Tripoli to Benghazi was delayed for 24 hours because of the weather.

19 Jun. 1942

Steamer STURLA returned to Benghazi on the afternoon of 18 Jun. from her Benghazi - Tripoli voyage because her escort vessel was having engine trouble.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

An agent reports on 17 Jun. that vessels of the Black Sea Fleet have received orders to cruise north and west of Sevastopol. 6 transport ships carrying paratroopers are said to be among these ships. Another intelligence report states that 16 submarines have been assigned to shuttle between Novorossisk and Sevastopol in order to transport ammunition.

Own Situation:

The 1st PT Boat Flotilla reports a gratifying success: PT Boat S "102" sank a troop transport with about 3,000 men off Sevastopol during the night of 18 Jun. Equally gratifying is the news that the Italian submarine chaser MAS "571" sank another Russian submarine south of Yalta on the evening of 19 Jun. 2 prisoners were taken. The Italian motor vessel which had been reported as overdue on 18 Jun. arrived in port in the course of the day.

Italian submarine chasers and motor craft report that they had a lively engagement with Russian landing vessels on 18 Jun. They report having probably sunk 2 of the Russian vessels.

The Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus estimates that it will take 10 to 14 days until all fortifications have been conquered and Balaklava has been occupied.

IX. Situation East Asia

Our Naval Attache at Tokyo has transmitted the description of the action at Midway, as given by the Japanese Admiralty. This action

19 Jun. 1942

had as its principal aim the destruction of U.S. aircraft carriers. Copy as per 1/Skl 21771/42 geh. is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

The most important thing learned was that the fire protection of aircraft carriers is in great need of improvement. Both U.S. and Japanese carriers sank as a result of fire and apparently by explosion of fuel.

The report also briefly discusses the attack against the Aleutians which took place at the same time. The occupation of the western islands took place without any difficulties. It is difficult to destroy the U.S. air base at Dutch Harbor since it is built on rock.

So far the Japanese Admiralty has published the sinking of 10 merchant ships in the Indian Ocean. It is noteworthy that the Admiralty admits that the official communiques regarding successes in Sydney and Diego Suarez are unconfirmed. The Admiralty has requested to be informed of any news about successes reaching the Naval Staff. The report concludes by stating that a German News Agency (DNB) report about the rescue of part of the crew of the LEXINGTON by the Japanese in the Coral Sea is not true.

According to press reports, air engagements on the Australian coast, and attacks by the respective sides on Port Moresby, Port Darwin, Salamaua, and Timor are constantly on the increase.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

On the Sevastopol front the remainder of the enemy forces which were still holding out were thrown back near Bartenyevka. Assault troops penetrated into the Lenin lines. The dry dock and the area around the shipyard south of Bartenyevka were taken. Enemy attacks were repelled in the northeastern sector of the front. The German aim is to occupy the peninsula southwest of Bartenyevka and the heights east of the Bay of Sevastopol and 5 km south thereof, in order to cause the Russian front to collapse

CONFIDENTIAL

19 Jun. 1942

in front of the Rumanian Mountain Corps. This would create the necessary conditions for a further attack against the inner belt of fortifications.

It was impossible to carry out the regrouping south of Kharkov because of cloudbursts. Our attack northeast of Kharkov aimed at straightening our front was successful. Our forces advanced and were able to gain 15 to 20 km of ground between Belgorod and Volchansk. The enemy had been completely surprised and retreated en masse to the northeast.

Central Army Group:

Nothing to report except for partisan activities.

Northern Army Group:

There was successful action south of Staraya Russa. An attack against our new positions north of Kholm was repelled. The enemy succeeded in penetrating the defense front north of Lake Ilmen with several tanks. These were halted from the south, the west, and the north.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Nothing to report.

3. North Africa:

The Panzer Army was engaged up to 19 Jun. in making preparations for the attack against Tobruk. The attack will get under way in the early morning hours of 20 Jun., with extensive support to be provided by the Air Force.

Consolidated reconnaissance forces and an Italian armored division are protecting the rear of the Panzer Army in the area of Gambut and south of there; they are carrying out armed reconnaissance to the east and southeast.

During the afternoon, heavy reconnaissance forces of the enemy probed to the north beyond Bir el Gubi.

20 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

Public opinion is preoccupied with Churchill's trip and the bad news from Libya. Commenting on the problem of the sinkings, The Observer demands creation of a large commercial air fleet, since it feels that it will no longer be possible to supply the country by sea alone.

Spain:

Signs are increasing that a domestic crisis is imminent. The Cabinet, presided over by Franco, has decided to relieve General Queipa de Llano of his post and to effect a major change in the officer personnel occupying high posts. It is said that Franco has abandoned his opposition against the restoration of the monarchy. On the other hand, it is said that the Spanish Communist movement is growing.

It would not be surprising if an attempt were made to return to a monarchy as a way out from the untenable domestic tension. Such a change would probably alienate Spain from Germany to a certain extent.

Portugal:

The restoration of the house of Braganza is assuming new significance, also for the United States, in view of the planned marriage between the Pretender to the Throne and a princess from the Brazilian line of the same house.

Such a development in that country would also have unfavorable effects on Germany.

U.S.A.:

For reports on domestic questions of the U.S. see Political Review No. 142, Par. 8.

The Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives disclosed that merchant ships are being converted into aircraft carriers.

Apparently he is referring to the otherwise hardly credible report (see War Diary of 19 Jun.) that the aircraft carriers which had been ordered will be completed as early as 1943.

20 Jun. 1942

Special Items:

I. The Ministry of Economics has made available the report by Captain Schottky concerning the construction of concrete ships. This will be given further consideration by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch.

The report makes the important point that the principal task is to construct as soon as possible some kind of additional shipping space. We simply shall have to accept the fact that the first concrete ships will be less economical. The only way to stimulate the initiative of the manufacturers and to keep up the interest of the builders is to have the ships built on a mass production and a free enterprise basis, rather than building merely a few experimental ships.

The Naval Staff takes this occasion again to stress its very great interest in any method which can serve to alleviate the shortage of shipping space and to create more tanker space, and asks to be kept informed of developments.

II. See Telegram 1800 for the position of Group North towards the suggestion of Stations North Sea and Baltic Sea for the creation of a central rescue and salvage command. (See War Diary of 9 Jun.)

Situation 20 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 0057 confirmed the short signal of ship "10" concerning the sinking of the OLIVIA and the taking of **prize no. 2**, the HERBORG.

The Naval Staff assumes that the HERBORG started out from large **quadrant** KU on 20 Jun. and will reach point "Saale" on 24 Jun.

The Naval Staff therefore has reported the prize ship to Japan. Radiogram 1139 has instructed ship "10" thereof and tendered her the congratulations of the Naval Staff.

Radiogram 2200 expressed the congratulations of the Chief, Naval Staff and awarded war decorations to ship "10".

The HERBORG was informed about the announcement of the Naval Staff to Japan by Radiogram 1039.

Telegram 1340 announced the arrival of the HERBORG to our Naval Attache at Tokyo.

20 Jun. 1942

A short signal of ship "28", received at 0317, requests that the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN be sent to quadrant GE 74, and reports ship "28"s intention to transfer her prisoners to the DOGGERBANK.

Acknowledgement by Radiogram 0643.

The Naval Staff estimates that there are about 200 prisoners.

Radiogram 1442 gave the necessary instructions to the DOGGERBANK.

Radiogram 1736 instructed the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN to go to point "Konrad" as soon as she has completed her rendezvous with ship "23" and to wait there for ship "28".

Radiogram 1905 informed ship "28" about the preceding order.

Our Naval Attache at Tokyo confirmed the fact that the NANKIN had received new sailing orders (Telegram 0130).

Telegram 1700 instructed our Naval Attache at Tokyo that the Dutch steamer BOSCHFONTEIN is camouflaged to look like the KULMERLAND.

Radiograms 0648 and 2054 gave information about the enemy situation.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported at 1500 that 1 destroyer and 12 steamers were east of Portsmouth, and that 9 steamers were off Cowes. 80 tugboats were observed south of Southampton, and 70 barges were seen southwest of Poole. Ten steamers were seen southwest of Portland at 1700, and at 2200 10 to 15 steamers were seen in Plymouth and 1 aircraft carrier and 10 to 15 patrol boats were observed in Falmouth.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

Channel Coast:

Mine-laying was carried out according to plan by the PT boat flotillas during the night of 19 Jun. See Telegram 1010 for a brief report.

20 Jun. 1942

12 enemy bombers raided Le Havre at 1533 without causing any particular damage. German convoys were attacked by enemy planes and PT boats near the Channel Islands and off Calais. Details are still missing.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

A total of 31 ground mines were swept in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North during 18 and 19 Jun. 2 of these were swept by the ALSTERDAM and by the CEYLON. 11 more ground mines were swept on 20 Jun. The steamer CEYLON has been brought to the Borkum roadstead. Mine-exploding vessel "11" has interrupted her work because of damages suffered as a result of a mine hit. Enemy planes attacked boats of the Rhine Flotilla off Westkapelle and dropped bombs in the area of Wilhelmshaven in the evening and during the night of 19 Jun. **While fighting off enemy planes staging a bomb attack, our battery at Terschelling-West hit our own radar location set, causing regrettable casualties.** (See Telegram 1945.) During the day the enemy flew over Emden, Wesermuende, and Norderney. During the night of 20 Jun., fairly heavy enemy bomber forces raided the area Norderney-Emden.

2. Norway and Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported on 19 Jun. that 3 cruisers were off Cape Teriberski, and that 1 convoy consisting of 2 steamers and 5 naval vessels was off Ostrovo, on a southeasterly course.

The enemy flew missions against Petsamo and Vardoe, dropping 25 bombs in Busse Sound.

Own Situation:

Mine-sweeping and escort service proceeded according to plan and uneventfully.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

About 20 motor mine sweepers carried out mine-sweeping in the "Tiger" mine fields.

20 Jun. 1942

2. Own Situation:

Baltic Sea Entrances:

The Danish steamer ANNA hit a mine near Samsoe and a launch did likewise at point "Rot 18". Both ships sank.

Convoy and escort service has proceeded uneventfully and according to plan.

Eastern Baltic Sea:

Continued submarine chasing remained unsuccessful. Mine fields "Seeigel XI" and "Seeigel XII" were laid on 19 Jun. according to plan.

The Naval Liaison Staff, Finland reports that the Finnish Naval Staff insists that it is much simpler for the enemy to break through a mine field than through the coastal island waters. They claim that the Russians broke through the Juminda mine fields in 1941 without regard to losses.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

The Times discloses that British merchant shipping losses were 8,600,000 GRT up to the end of 1941. The sinkings are said to exceed the number of ships launched. The problem cannot be solved by mere replacement of the sunk ships, it is claimed. The paper instead demands that a courageous counteroffensive be initiated against submarines and submarine bases.

The British Air Ministry disclosed on 19 Jun. that 1 Sunderland plane probably sank a German submarine in the Bay of Biscay. Reuter reports that a Norwegian steamer sank a German submarine in the Western Atlantic and rescued 28 survivors.

Radio monitoring reports that 4 planes chased a submarine 40 miles southwest of Cadiz at 1330. (This cannot be a German boat.)

A U.S. broadcast reports at 0717 that the entrances to the Chesapeake Bay and Delaware Bay have been mined. A guard ship ordered a submarine chase in the Chesapeake Bay.

2. Own Situation:

The following successes have been reported from the West Indies: Submarine U "158" (Lt. Comdr. Rostin) sank a fast steamer (6,000 GRT) and tanker MOIRA (1,560 GRT) on 17 Jun.

20 Jun. 1942

This boat has been very successful, having sunk about 60,000 GRT since leaving her base at the beginning of May.

Submarine U "161" sank a small sailing vessel on 16 Jun.
Submarine U "159" sank the tanker FLOMAR (5,551 GRT) on 18 Jun. and the steamer ANTE MATKOVIC (2,710 GRT) on 19 Jun.

In the Mediterranean, submarine U "561" was probably sighted by an enemy plane while engaged on her mine-laying task off Port Said. The success of her mission is thus questionable.

For further reports, see Supplement to Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Special Items:

On the occasion of the report of the Chief, Naval Staff to the Fuehrer on 15 Jun., the latter expressed the wish to have an operational submarine group ready in order to be able to intervene without losing time in case of a possible sudden enemy operation against either Madeira or the Azores.

The Naval Staff feels that:

a. Such a group can always be rapidly formed on very short notice from the many submarines leaving port.

b. If the need arises, such a group can also be readily formed from the boats in patrol lines without an appreciable loss in time.

The Naval Staff intends to avoid keeping boats ready for action in western France, or having to assign boats to the vicinity of endangered areas as a preventive measure.

The Naval Staff has informed the Commanding Admiral, Submarines thereof and has asked for comment.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The British Admiralty discloses that 6 German planes were shot down during the attack of 12 Ju 88's on 17 Jun., in the course of which the destroyer WILD SWAN and some Spanish fishing vessels were sunk.

Enemy air raids along the North Sea Coast took place during the night of 20 Jun. The focal point of the attack was Emden where 50 bombs and 200 incendiary bombs were dropped. Damage was done to the city and to the shipyards.

20 Jun. 1942

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Waves of about 600 planes supported the attack against Tobruk.

3. Eastern Front:

Planes supported the Army in the attack against Sevastopol and in the heavy fighting in the Volkhov sector.

Special Items:

The Naval Liaison Officer attached to the Air Force Operations Staff has reported that the Operations Staff reported to the Armed Forces High Command on 17 Jun. that the sea reconnaissance squadron which is protecting the sea lanes in the Black Sea is being reinforced by 8 planes, and that 40 He 114's are being assigned to the Rumanian Air Force; 5 of these already are in transit.

On 18 Jun. the General, Fighter Planes answered a request of the Naval Staff dated 6 Jun. to the effect that lately no complaints have been reported about cooperation between the Navy and fighter forces.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Western Mediterranean:

The LIVERPOOL docked in Gibraltar on 19 Jun. The cruiser which left port on the same day in a westerly direction was a ship of the FIJI class and later on probably took an easterly course.

Intelligence reports from Spain, based on observations by agents, present the following picture:

- a. The MALAYA: no (perhaps **minor**) damage by shell fragments.
- b. Destroyer G "30": damaged by a torpedo explosion in the center torpedo tube.
- c. Destroyer H "36": docked with unidentified damage.
- d. The EAGLE: loss of 11 planes. 1 burnt plane was unloaded.
- e. Between 100 and 300 wounded are reported. 50 dead supposedly have been buried at sea.

20 Jun. 1942

f. 94 Italians are reported taken prisoners.

A force evidently consisting of 1 cruiser and 3 destroyers, which was reported to have left port at 2300 on 19 Jun. has been repeatedly reported as pursuing a westerly course.

Central and Eastern Mediterranean:

Lively ship movements were observed in the area of Tobruk.

During the forenoon, 3 destroyers and 1 steamer with 3 escort vessels approached the harbor, while 2 steamers left the harbor. Another steamer also arrived in port. Late in the evening several ships were observed 44 miles east-northeast of this harbor. They were pursuing a southeasterly course and apparently had come from Tobruk. At 0930, the following ships were observed in the harbor: 8 escort vessels, 6 small naval vessels, 1 coastal vessel, and 1 auxiliary ship.

Submarines were sighted off Otranto and Messina.

Little shipping was observed off Alexandria.

Special Items:

The Times expressed the hope on 19 Jun. that Tobruk can be held this time, also. The disadvantage lies in the fact that the Axis powers are able to get reinforcements and supplies to Libya in 5 to 6 days through the Mediterranean, while Great Britain needs at least 3 months for the least reinforcement of its forces in North Africa, since everything has to be shipped around the Cape of Good Hope.

2. Own Situation:

The enemy staged an air raid on Benghazi during the night of 19 Jun. The steamer MENES was slightly damaged.

The town and harbor of Tobruk was taken by German panzer forces at 1842.

The Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy thereupon immediately ordered the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla and the 6th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla to leave Derna. The task of the PT boat flotilla will be to intercept any enemy ships that may have been left in Tobruk and that now may attempt to flee. Subsequently the flotilla will form a patrol line north of Ras Azzaz in order to protect the 6th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla. The task of the latter will be to sweep a lane into Tobruk.

Three submarines are on their way to Tobruk.

The significance of this brilliant victory of the forces in North Africa is tremendous. Quite apart from its political importance and the prestige **gained** through this victory, together with its potential **effect** on the enemy and on all neutrals, **the**

20 Jun. 1942

fact that we now hold this coastal fortress and excellent harbor has definite tactical and strategic implications requiring very quick military and naval decisions. The fall of Tobruk leaves the route to Egypt open and operation "Aida" has suddenly moved into the realm of possibility. It is obvious that the primary task for the time being is to exploit fully the defeat of the enemy 8th Army. This will create the basis for later carrying out the operations with the Nile Delta as their ultimate goal. This victory will also extend the task of the Naval Staff, since the Naval Staff now will have to assume responsibility for transporting and convoying increased troop and supply shipments, together with the Air Force. It will no longer be possible to delay carrying out operation "Herkules" now, if the victory at Tobruk is not to remain a mere episode but is to be the beginning of a large operation which may decide the outcome of the war. Recognizing his critical situation, the enemy will put all of his available forces into action, particularly his air and naval forces. He will desperately attempt to prevent our conquest of the Delta by trying to smash our troop and materiel supply. The battle for air and sea supremacy in the Mediterranean has entered its decisive phase. The faster we are able to deal the first blows, the more effective they will be. Every delay gives the enemy the time he needs for bringing up reinforcements.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The 2 convoys PILO-REICHENFELS and BIXIO-ROSELLI have left port according to plan for Tripoli and Benghazi respectively.

564 tons were unloaded in Derna on 19 Jun., while 701 tons were unloaded on 20 Jun. (Compare this with the average amount of cargo of 80 tons unloaded daily during April.)

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Italian reports indicate that preparations are under way in Syria and Cyprus for sudden attacks on the Greek islands which are to be staged with the help of U.S. planes and paratroopers.

20 Jun. 1942

Own Situation:

Transport and escort service proceeded uneventfully.

5. Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

There was increased air activity on the north coast of the Sea of Azov.

Radio monitoring reports 8 submarines, 3 destroyers, 2 flotilla leaders, 1 PT boat tender, and 1 mine layer at sea.

Unconfirmed prisoner reports indicate that the following losses and damages were suffered by the enemy:

On 20 Apr.: destroyer SMYSHLENI hit a mine and sank.

On 11 Jun.: destroyer of the "S" class was sunk by 4 bombs; the steamer CRUSIA was sunk in the North Bay.

On 12 Jun.: The steamer AVKHAZIYA sank in the South Bay. Destroyer SVOBODNY was gutted by fire in Sevastopol, while the transport SEVASTOPOL was sunk after she unloaded in Sevastopol.

On 15 Jun.: Destroyer DERZHINSKY was destroyed by a mine; she was carrying 200 tons of explosives.

Own Situation:

During the night of 17 Jun., 2 enemy PT boats attacked Yalta; they had joined the force of Italian submarine chasers. Two torpedoes exploded in the harbor and damaged buildings. Our artillery reports that it probably sank one of the two attackers.

In addition to reporting the sinking of an enemy transport by PT boat "102" (see War Diary of 19 Jun.), the 1st PT Boat Flotilla reports misses on 1 destroyer and 1 steamer during the night of 18 Jun. Pronounced phosphorescence of the sea permitted the targets to turn away in time.

Shell fragments damaged the Italian submarines CB "2" and "3" at noon of 19 Jun.; it therefore will be necessary to send them to Constanta for repairs.

South of Mariupol a motor fishing vessel hit a mine on the forenoon of 20 Jun.

20 Jun. 1942

Transports had to be restricted because of insufficient fighter protection and the **uncertain** mine situation.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Position "Lenin" was taken in hard fighting on the western flank near Sevastopol, and the northeastern tip of the gun emplacements was reached. Our forces penetrated up to the coast in the eastern part of the northern suburb.

The enemy seems to be withdrawing from the Rumanian troops at the eastern front. The vicinity of the old fort and the memorial bridge were reached in stubborn fighting at the southern part of the eastern front.

Desperate attempts by encircled enemy forces to break out were repulsed northeast of Kharkov.

Central Army Group:

West of Kirov about 4,000 men of the Belo group attempted to break through to the east. Otherwise there was only local fighting.

Northern Army Group:

Evasive movements on the part of the enemy took place north of Kholm and south of Staraya Russa. We were able to restore our previous line on the defensive front. Difficult terrain has delayed the concentric attack which was to be launched against the Volkhov pocket.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

It is expected that the enemy will attack the power station at Svirstroi with tanks.

20 Jun. 1942

3. North Africa:

Two-thirds of the fortress of Tobruk, including the harbor, were taken after hard fighting lasting from the early morning till the evening. The western portion is still holding on. Several thousand men, 70 tanks, and a very large quantity of materiel fell into our hands.

21 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance:

Great Britain - U.S.A.:

The Churchill-Roosevelt meeting is taking up very much room in the press. The speculations about matters being discussed cover practically all questions in connection with the war. The New York Times remarks appropriately that Rommel's victory has moved the question of establishing a second front in Europe into the more distant future, while the London Times warns in connection with the topic "Is Libya Already the Second Front?" that no weakening of the British position in the Mediterranean should be permitted, whatever other actions may be decided on elsewhere.

According to the United Press an agreement has been concluded between Cuba and the U.S. in which Cuba offers the U.S. War Department certain facilities for the training of Air Force personnel and for operations against submarines.

According to a report by the German Legation in Lisbon, Colonel Donovan told the chief of the Polish secret service in Washington that the U.S. Government believes that Russia will hold out until the arms production of the U.S. is equal to the demand. At the same time it will be necessary to replace the shipping space which is needed to make possible active intervention on the part of the U.S. No action of the Allies in Europe can be counted upon this summer. Both the U.S. and British diplomats are spreading rumors calculated to mislead the Germans to think that large-scale actions are under way.

This last remark no doubt is absolutely true. It can be assumed that a large part of the information reaching us through intelligence reports received lately concerning landing operations either in France or in Norway can be regarded as the outcome of the efforts of Anglo-American policy referred to above.

Special Items:

I. The analysis by the Intelligence Division, Naval Staff of the enemy's shipping space (see War Diary of 16 Jun.) contains such remarkable conclusions that the Naval Staff has seen to it that the pamphlet is circulated among the specialists of the Armed Forces High Command, of the General Staff of the Army, and of the Air Force Operations Staff.

A covering letter to this effect as per 1/Skl. I b 1131/42 Gkdos. Chfs. is in War Diary, Part C, File: "Fundamental Questions on the Conduct of the War."

21 Jun. 1942

II. The Commander in Chief, Navy has requested from the Minister for Armaments and Munitions additional labor contingents to be used in the shipyards; this was done in accordance with the order which resulted from the report of the Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer on 15 Jun. A copy of this letter as per 1/Skl 15023/42 Gkdos., copies of which were sent to the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command and to the Deputy for Labor, are in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

Situation 21 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

Decoding of an Admiralty radio message has revealed that the auxiliary cruiser PRETORIA CASTLE saw the schooner REINE MARIE STUART (1,087 GRT) burn at 7°N, 22°W on 4 Jun. This was probably caused by a surface raider. The position given in the intercepted message is 410 miles from the location indicated in the merchant raider distress signal (QQQ) of the steamer GEMSTONE on 5 Jun. (See War Diary of 5 Jun.)

The results of radio intelligence clearly indicate the increasing tendency to shift enemy shipping off the La Plata zone back into the Freetown area. Only escorted ships, particularly those from Brazilian ports, seem to go north along the Natal coast, while the conditions prevailing in single steamer traffic are the same as at the end of 1940.

A change in routing has also been observed in the Cape of Good Hope-Freetown shipping where the direct route in use until now has been abandoned in favor of a wide detour in the direction of the Gulf of Guinea. The appearance of German auxiliary cruisers and submarines in the South Atlantic is probably the reason for the change in routing. The swift adaptation to the given situation in the routing of enemy shipping is noteworthy.

Indian Ocean:

According to radio intelligence, several British warships arrived in Diego Suarez on 10 and 11 Jun., including 1 auxiliary cruiser and a hospital ship.

The convoy which was reported northbound from Lourenco Marques is said to have been joined by 100 more ships at sea, according to a report by our Consulate. (See War Diary of 18 Jun.)

Pacific Ocean:

A report from Valparaiso indicates that the British consul has requested the Navy dock in Talcahuano for 2 large steamers for 15 Jul. and 12 Aug.

21 Jun. 1942

2. Own Situation:

Ship "28" has asked via short signal for 4 airplane engines.

Radiogram 0413 confirms this request and adds that the city and harbor of Tobruk are in German hands.

Radiogram 1328 informed the DOGGERBANK about a warning issued on 19 Jun. concerning a drift mine 95 miles southeast of Simon's Town.

Information on the enemy situation was transmitted in Radiograms 1306 and 1600.

II. Situation West Area

1. Atlantic Coast:

The mouth of the Gironde has been closed to shipping because it is suspected mines have been laid. A British plane again flew over Ferrol. Anti-aircraft fire was unsuccessful. The Spanish Government intends to lodge a sharp protest.

2. Channel Coast:

During the night of 20 Jun., the steamer EUGENIO and her escort were attacked at Calais by 3 or 4 PT boats and at the same time by several planes, but were able to put into port without any damage or losses. During the same night, 2 patrol boats were attacked by 8 enemy fighter planes, in the vicinity of the Channel islands. They suffered appreciable losses of personnel.

The 2nd and 4th PT Boat Flotillas left port in the evening in order to make a torpedo attack along the convoy route. As a result of an enemy air raid on Dunkirk in the afternoon of 21 Jun., 1 motor barge sank, while another was heavily damaged. A naval signal station was destroyed by a direct hit.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

During the night of 20 Jun., the 32nd Mine Sweeper Flotilla had an engagement with enemy PT boats near Zeebrugge. 3 motor gunboats were sunk, while some others were probably damaged.

21 Jun. 1942

The fight was broken off by the enemy. Mine Sweeper M "3230" was **severely damaged**, but was able to reach Zeebrugge. Our losses amounted to 6 killed and 10 wounded.

3 attacking planes were shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns at Emden in the course of enemy air raids that same night. See Telegram 0721 for further details of these raids.

The Swedish steamer EGNOE (1,847 GRT) hit a mine and sank near Roter Sand at noon. 3 mines were swept and 2 were destroyed in the German Bight. Mine-exploding vessel "173" shot down an attacking enemy plane near Den Helder. Naval anti-aircraft artillery also shot down an enemy plane near Bergen-op-Zoom. Thus a total of 5 planes has been shot down by naval anti-aircraft guns in the area of Naval Group North since the afternoon of 20 Jun.

2. Norway - Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

According to an agent's report to the Commanding General, Norwegian Theater, an agent in Monte Carlo concluded from a conversation he **had** with Prince Alexander of Greece on 22 May that the British have decided to land in Narvik. Preparations are being made energetically. The Americans will participate in this operation. The Naval Staff has transmitted this information to the Naval Adjutant of the Fuehrer, the Naval Representative on the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff, the Naval Liaison Officer attached to the Army General Staff, and the Naval Liaison Officer attached to the Air Force Operations Staff.

This report, too, may well be considered as being intended to mislead us.

According to air reconnaissance, a group of 28 steamers was observed off the Humber in the forenoon, on a northerly course. 18 steamers were on a northerly course off Orfordness in the evening.

Own Situation:

Mine-sweeping and escort activities proceeded according to plan in Norway. No reports have been received from the Arctic Ocean.

IV. Skaggerak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Eastern Baltic Sea:

Torpedo recovery vessel TF "5" sank in the evening of 20 Jun. near Neufahrwasser as a result of having collided with TF "2".

21 Jun. 1942

Our Naval Attache at Stockholm reports that the Danish steamer ORION was torpedoed off Gotska Sandoe in the evening of 19 Jun.

A surface rack mine was exploded east of Nargen.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

A plane reported a submarine west of Ouessant at 1355. The search for the submarine continued until evening. Radio intelligence intercepted a report about a submarine sighted 200 miles southwest of Cape Farewell and one sighted 140 miles east of the mouth of the Mississippi. According to a communique of the U.S. Navy Department the loss of the 2 steamers off the coast of Virginia on 20 Jun. was due to mines.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "461" is the third submarine tanker to leave port.

New areas of operations have been assigned to Group "Eisteufel" in the Arctic Ocean. No reports of successes have as yet been received from the operations areas.

For further details, see Supplement to Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During night sorties on 22 Jun., 68 planes raided Southampton with good effect. Only a few enemy planes flew over our coastal areas. During the afternoon a group of 11 enemy bombers with heavy fighter protection raided the city and harbor of Dunkirk. See Situation West Area for results.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Reconnaissance activities took place, but without any significant results.

21 Jun. 1942

3. Eastern Front:

Our planes went into action in force in the area of Sevastopol and in front of the northern flank of the Southern Army Group. 28 planes were shot down.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Western Mediterranean:

The mine-laying cruiser MANXMAN left Gibraltar on 20 Jun. at 2300, at first in an easterly, later in a westerly direction. Supplementary intelligence reports from Spain indicate that the MALAYA has not suffered any damage, but that the EAGLE and the ARGUS have suffered minor damage as a result of bomb fragments.

Central and Eastern Mediterranean:

A number of vessels which had left Tobruk were observed in the area of Ras Azzaz in the early morning hours of 21 Jun. These included 1 decoy ship, 3 small naval vessels, 4 rather small steamers, and about 6 escort vessels.

Fairly lively convoy activity was observed off Alexandria during the forenoon.

Radio intelligence indicates that a British escort vessel was attacked by a plane at 0850, 50 miles west-northwest of Alexandria. A radio message which has only now been decoded reveals that air raids on Alexandria on 8 Apr. resulted in the sinking of 1 mine sweeper and 1 whaler, and in probable damage to 3 more vessels.

2. Own Situation:

An enemy air raid was launched against Benghazi during the night of 20 Jun. A bomb hit on the Italian naval repair station caused slight damage. 4-motor bombers were observed for the first time in that attack.

Beginning in the early morning of 21 Jun., the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla was engaged with small British vessels which had broken out of Tobruk. The engagement lasted till noon and took place about 45 miles north-northwest of Sidi Barrani. According to reports from land, 1 freighter and 1 escort vessel were sunk and 1 tanker captured. Further details are still missing.

At 1130, 6 vessels of the 6th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla arrived in the inner harbor of Tobruk and started mine sweeping. Preparations have been made to start supply shipments to Tobruk.

21 Jun. 1942

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The steamer REICHENFELS was sunk by enemy torpedo planes off the Kerkenna Islands at 1240. 6 of the attacking planes were shot down.

This loss is particularly painful as it involved the last German steamer still equipped with heavy derricks. It is proof of the danger to transports to North Africa as long as Malta has not been eliminated completely as an enemy base.

Other convoys proceeded according to plan.

4. Area Naval Group South:

No situation report has been received from the Group.

Group South calls attention to the increasing losses suffered by the light naval forces in Yalta as a result of air raids at a time when these forces are particularly important as well as successful. Because of other commitments, it has so far proved impossible to increase anti-aircraft defenses adequately though this has been attempted repeatedly. The Group feels that in similar cases in the future it would be desirable to set up heavy mobile naval anti-aircraft batteries. (See Telegram 1245.) This matter will be attended to by the Quartermaster Division, Naval Staff.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Additional positions were taken near Sevastopol, on the peninsula southwest of Bartenyevka. The northern fort is in German hands. There is stubborn fighting in the suburbs. Rumanian troops succeeded in reaching the "Schachbretthoehe"* in the east. Further to the south the old fort was taken, and the hilly terrain south of Nov Shuli was reached together with German troops.

* Chessboard Height; it was not possible to determine whether this is a German code name or the German translation of the Russian name.

21 Jun. 1942

The enemy threw 5 bridges across the Donets north of Taganrog, near Yama. While re-grouping, our forces were attacked by Russian planes southeast of Kharkov.

Central Army Group:

9 enemy attacks which were launched with 2 to 4 **battalions** had to be repulsed west-southwest of Sukhinichi. The mopping-up operation in the area of Dyatkovo met with complete success.

Northern Army Group:

A German attack south of Staraya Russa which was directed southward was successful in the face of stubborn enemy resistance. The enemy succeeded in breaking through our defense front near Yanno after heavy artillery preparation. At the same time he succeeded in penetrating from the west; the situation has thus become very tense.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Fronts:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

See daily situation report for the report of the African Panzer Army on the attack and capture of Tobruk on 20 Jun. So far, 5 generals and 28,000 prisoners have been taken; more than 70 tanks were **put** out of action; 30 undamaged tanks have been surrendered to us and a very large number of guns and heavy weapons were captured. Large stores of food and ammunition and some airplane fuel dumps fell into our hands.

22 Jun. 1942

Items of Political ImportanceFrance:

New reports confirm the opinion that Laval's position has recently been considerably strengthened. For details see Political Review No. 143, Paragraph 1.

Great Britain:

The entirely unexpected breakdown of the 8th Army in Libya and the loss of Tobruk have put a sudden end to the propaganda campaign which has been conducted for about 2 months to increase the optimism of the people, and which was already largely successful due partly to the combined efforts of the British and American information services. The growing anxiety caused by the numerous successes of the submarine warfare has also helped to lower the morale. Worry about the situation in the Mediterranean and the Battle of the Atlantic is probably primarily responsible for Churchill's trip to Washington. British circles are well aware that a serious Russian defeat during this summer will delay an Allied victory for years. The situation, however, would be even worse if the British or the American fleet were eliminated due to unfortunate circumstances. Similarly the reputedly pro-British Goeteborgs Handels-och Sjoefartstidning and the British Labor paper Daily Herald raise the question whether Roosevelt and Churchill might not be discussing a possible Anglo-American defeat rather than prospective victory in these talks which are said to represent a turning point in the war.

The Transocean News Agency reports that the British ship owners have presented the following post-war demands to the government:

1. Immediate re-establishment of private initiative.
2. Termination of government control 9 months after the cessation of hostilities at the very latest.
3. Rights for British vessels equal to those of all other ships.
4. On the day of the cessation of hostilities, all British shipping companies and ships under U.S. administration must be returned to their British owners.

India:

Gandhi declared that he has no intention of calling on any foreign power to liberate India. He said that he does not attribute the slightest significance to the protestations of friendship on the part of the Axis powers and therefore rejects the policy of Subdha Chandra Bose. He asserted that since the presence of the British in India is necessary in China's interest, he is willing to tolerate them, but never in the role of rulers. He believes that dissatisfaction with the British would turn into open sympathy the moment the Japanese would try to invade India.

Italy:

For a report on Italy's domestic situation see Political Review No. 143, Paragraph 4.

22 Jun. 1942

Spain:

Reuter reports that the Spanish Foreign Minister has released a statement denying that Spanish ships are supplying Axis submarines.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Naval Staff raises the question whether the fact that we are concentrating on sinking merchant ships off the American coast might not benefit imports to the British Isles at least for the time being. The Naval Staff already raised this question some time ago and ordered the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch to investigate the matter.

II. The Chief of the Naval Staff Communications Division compares the results of German and British location finding in the Channel area. Unfortunately, according to the experience of the Commander, PT Boats it cannot be denied that the British are more successful at the present time. The reasons for this situation are being investigated.

III. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports on the number of mine-detonating vessels in service:

Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West	: 12 large 16 small vessels
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North	: 3 large 15 small vessels
Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea:	4 large 5 small vessels
	<u>19 large 37 small vessels</u>

In addition, 13 large and 16 small vessels are being either converted or repaired, making a total of 32 large and 53 small vessels available for this important task.

Of the vessels in service, polarity has been reversed on 4 large and 8 small ones; the same change is now being made on 3 large and 11 small ones.

Losses to date: 1 large and 5 small mine-detonating vessels.

The mine-detonating vessels cannot possibly be returned to the merchant marine because so many of them are constantly in need of repairs because of the nature of their work. Such a measure could not be considered even if the problem of higher repair capacity, which is becoming more and more urgent, were solved in a satisfactory manner.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

IV. The Chief, Naval Construction Division will report today to the Fuehrer in the presence of the Commander in Chief, Navy, on the conversion of ships to aircraft carriers (SEYDLITZ, EUROPA, POTSDAM, GNEISENAU).

V. The Chief, Naval Intelligence Division reports on a communication sent by Feller from Cairo to the Military Intelligence Service in the U.S. War Department. On 19 Jun., Feller expressed the opinion that the eastern Mediterranean is primarily an aerial war theater and

22 Jun. 1942

that heavy bombers in the Middle East could control the ship traffic in that area. This is the only way, says Feller, in which Rommel's ultimate defeat can be brought about. The British view that India's defenses must be strengthened because India's fall would mean the loss of the Middle East is erroneous. Rather, India will be lost if the Middle East falls. Therefore it will be necessary to reduce the U.S. air forces in India in favor of the Middle East as soon as Rommel's intention to attack Egypt becomes apparent.

In a Very Restricted Circle:

VI. The Chief of the Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Branch reports as follows:

1. According to a communication from the Special Staff for Economic Warfare, operation "Suedsee" has been postponed until further notice.

Thus the conversion of the steamers designated for this task can be suspended.

2. Mine operations by submarines are planned or have started off Port Said and in the estuary of the Mississippi River.

3. The German Foreign Minister has certain objections against attack operations outside of and in Brazilian harbors, since neutral ships could too easily be affected. He intends to report these objections to the Fuehrer.

Ambassador Ritter has been notified that the original intention of the Naval Staff was merely to obtain permission for submarines to attack Brazilian war and merchant ships, since according to official Brazilian and U.S. announcements, these ships have repeatedly taken hostile action against Axis submarines. The Fuehrer's plan for a large-scale operation by 10 submarines interferes with the real task of submarine warfare to such an extent that the Naval Staff is not particularly interested in carrying it out.

The Chief, Naval Staff orders that no action be taken until the Fuehrer has made a decision after the Foreign Minister's personal report on the matter.

Submarines which depart for that operations zone in the meantime are to be provided with orders for other operations in case this one should be called off.

Special Items:

I. Acting upon the suggestion of the Commanding Admiral, Group North with reference to the command authority over the Admiral, Arctic Ocean (see War Diary 12 Jun.), the Commander in Chief, Navy has decided as follows:

The command headquarters of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean must retain its independent status, particularly in view of later tasks which will have to be carried out in cooperation with the Commanding General, Lapland and the Mountain Corps. Therefore the Commander in Chief, Navy does not intend to grant the request of the Commanding Admiral.

22 Jun. 1942

Group North. The Admiral, Arctic Ocean will remain under the administrative command of the Commanding Admiral, Norway and under the operational command of Group North. It is not intended to change his position with respect to the administrative command. If the Admiral, Arctic Ocean were put under the Group in matters of administrative nature, an unnecessary burden would be placed on the Group. The best solution is therefore to place the Admiral, Arctic Ocean under the Commanding Admiral, Norway particularly in view of the relationship between operations in the Arctic Ocean and in the Norwegian area.

The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Plans and Schedules Branch recommends that Group North submit a new proposal with regard to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, so as to clarify the operational situation.

II. The instructions issued by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command supplementary to Fuehrer directive No. 40 pertain to those commands which are directly subordinated to the Armed Forces High Command in tactical matters for the execution of the tasks outlined in the Fuehrer directive. Only with the Fuehrer's approval may the High Commands of the three branches of the Armed Forces dispose otherwise of the forces assigned to these specific tasks.

For copy of this order pertaining to command authority on the coast see 1/Skl 15017/42 Gkdos. in File I op IV. (OKM Skl Qu A II Org. v. 1458/42 Gkdos.)

III. A conference of the Chiefs of Staff at the Naval Staff Operations Division is to take place between 8 and 10 Jul.

IV. In News Analysis No. 29 "Foreign Navies", the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Navies Branch has issued a report on controlled minefields and coastal defenses in the British Isles and Iceland as of 6 Mar. The report is based on captured British data.

Situation 22 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

The damaged engines of the steamer WINDHUK are now being repaired at Rio de Janeiro. The ship has been leased to the U.S.A. as a naval transport ship.

On 12 Jun., 6 Brazilian destroyers, 4 submarines, and 2 mine layers were in Rio de Janeiro; the cruiser BAHIA, the battleship MINAS GERAES, and 1 tanker were at sea. West of Rio de Janeiro, in the vicinity of Isla Grande, the battleship SAO PAULO and 6 destroyers were on patrol duty. The cruiser RIO GRANDE DO SUL and several destroyers were in Sao Salvador (Bahia). A radio report announced that about 500,000 men 19 to 21 years of age have been drafted in Brazil.

Indian Ocean:

An Italian report from an allegedly reliable source states that 1 battleship was hit and the ARLETHUSA was sunk in Diego Suarez.

22 Jun. 1942

The total number of steamers sunk by the Japanese in the Mozambique channel is said to be 15.

Reuter reports that 400 French officers and men, the majority Senegalese riflemen, taken prisoner near Diego Suarez, went over to De Gaulle after landing in a British port in Africa.

Pacific Ocean:

Radio intelligence intercepted a message from the Summit radio station reporting a submarine attack which occurred some 80 miles south of Burica Point off the south coast of Panama on 21 Jun. (Japanese submarine.)

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our vessels in foreign waters. No incidents of interest occurred.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

A westbound convoy of 20 to 25 steamers was located in Lyme Bay. Photographic reconnaissance carried out on 21 Jun. shows an increase in the number of small vessels in the areas of Portsmouth, Southampton, and Weymouth, particularly a great number of small special purpose vessels not previously seen which were beached in the Exbury estuary south of Southampton and in Poole Harbour. The number of these small 25 to 30 m boats crowded together had also increased in the harbor areas of Southampton and Portland, as well as in the small river estuaries and inlets in the direct vicinity. On the other hand, there is no evidence of any changes in the other harbors outside the Portsmouth-Portland sector.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The 2nd Mine Sweeper Flotilla removed 10 British moored influence mines. The harbor and roadstead of La Pallice were closed since they are assumed to have been mined.

Channel Coast:

On the night of 22 Jun., 8 vessels of the 2nd and 4th PT Boat Flotillas carried out a mine operation.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report, a British submarine is on permanent reconnaissance duty between Skagen and Lindesnaes. The

22 Jun. 1942

Swedes are said to have located the submarine on the basis of her radio messages.

Own Situation:

On the night of 21 Jun., the 17th Mine Sweeper Flotilla had a brief engagement with 2 enemy PT boats off the Scheldt estuary. The 8th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla swept 4 British Mark XIV mines 90 miles northwest of Esbjerg. Altogether we have swept 6 mines so far in this area, apparently laid by surface vessels. In addition, 6 ground mines were swept in the German Bight.

2. Norway:

On 21 Jun. at 1810 enemy planes raided Vardoe. No bomb damage was caused. Minesweeping and convoy operations, as well as ship movements, are being carried out according to plan, with no incidents to report.

Group North has authorized the execution of mine operations "Graf" and "Herzog". The Commander, Mine Layers is to try to carry out these operations during the present moon period. Operation "Herzog" is scheduled for the night of 22 Jun.

On 20 Jun., 5 boats of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla and the TSINGTAU transferred to Kirkenes. In Kirkenes, the ADOLF LUEDERITZ joined the 6th PT Boat Flotilla and the TSINGTAU joined the 8th PT Boat Flotilla. Then the TSINGTAU left Kirkenes together with the 8th PT Boat Flotilla to return home. Three vessels of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla have remained in Narvik as PT Boat Group Narvik under the command of the captain of PT boat S "76". Two other vessels of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla are out of commission in Trondheim.

3. Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

At noon, air reconnaissance located a cruiser north of Iceland. Reconnaissance was incomplete because of unfavorable weather. One of our planes, which was fired on by an unseen enemy south of Jan Mayen, sighted long oil slicks at intervals of 3 km. Similar observations were made at the time of our operations against convoy PQ 16.

Own Situation:

Our submarines have been sent into the area south of Jan Mayen to investigate.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence located 8 submarines at sea on 21 Jun. and on 22 Jun. intercepted a message from a coast guard patrol boat which was damaged by a mine en route from Lavansaari.

2. Own Situation:

The Swedish press reports that at 1300 the Swedish steamer

22 Jun. 1942

ADA GORTHON was torpedoed by a submarine near Norra Moeckleby off Oeland Island and sank 2.5 miles off shore. The Swedish Navy is as yet unable to announce details of the sinking. In particular, the Navy cannot say whether the ship was torpedoed within Swedish territorial waters.

Convoy and transport operations are proceeding as scheduled.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence intercepted reports about submarines sighted 250 miles north of Cape Vilano, south of Long Island, south of Halifax, northeast of Cape Hatteras, and on the east coast of Florida. British vessels were located 420 miles west of Rockall Bank and 180 miles southwest of Porcupine Bank. Furthermore, a special warning to all U.S. warships was intercepted, according to which the ships must not approach the Stellwagen Bank near Boston until further notice.

2. Own Situation:

Successes have been reported from the Caribbean Sea. For details see Supplement to the Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

On the night of 22 Jun., 275 planes were sent into action against Southampton and the eastern tip of the Isle of Wight. On the same night, 29 enemy planes penetrated into the Reich area, concentrating their attack on Erden. Details of the substantial damage to industrial targets are still lacking.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

No incidents have been reported.

3. Eastern Front:

Nine hundred planes were in action over the Sevastopol area. One 1,000 GRT steamer was set afire. One tug was damaged.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Western Mediterranean:

No new information has been obtained on the Gibraltar area.

22 Jun. 1942

Central and Eastern Mediterranean:

Air reconnaissance observed a number of small vessels at sea in the area of Marsa Matruh. One burning ship was sighted 6 miles east of Tobruk. On the night of 22 Jun., radio intelligence intercepted a message from a British plane reporting an attack on a convoy consisting of 2 merchantmen and 1 destroyer 26 miles west of Palermo.

In the evening, 2 merchant vessels, 5 escort vessels, and 1 harbor tanker were riding at anchor in Valletta. During the afternoon, 3 medium-sized and 5 small merchant vessels, as well as 5 naval vessels were located in Marsa Matruh. On the morning of 21 Jun., photographic reconnaissance counted 6 light cruisers, 13 destroyers, 6 escort vessels, 6 submarines, 3 depot ships, 3 hospital ships, and 48 steamers in Alexandria, in addition to the battleship in dock.

The intelligence center in Wilhelmshaven reports as follows on the interrogation of 10 members of the crew of the mine layer ML "130" which was sunk by German PT boats off Malta on 7 May:

In addition to details on armament, crew, and past activities, the statements concerning the defense and supply situation in Valletta are of special interest. The Naval Intelligence Division will evaluate this information. The following points deserve special mention: one or 2 Italian PT boats have fallen into British hands undamaged. A large number of torpedoes in the torpedo dump on the Misida Creek have been destroyed. Submarines are continuously replenishing the stocks of ammunition, spare barrels for anti-aircraft guns, torpedoes, and fuel, great quantities of which are available. Besides, supplies are brought in by destroyers and by particularly fast vessels, supposedly of the ABDIEL class, which are said to reach a top speed of 45 knots. The largest of the 5 steamers convoyed to Malta at the end of March and beginning of April, a 20,000 GRT vessel of the Clan Line, sank before entering port as a result of a torpedo or mine hit. While entering the harbor, the freighter BRECONSHIRE (9,776 GRT), converted into an auxiliary cruiser, was damaged by a bomb hit and grounded. The 3 remaining steamers reached Grand Harbor but all three were sunk by bomb hits before their cargo could be unloaded. Only part of the cargo could be salvaged by divers. It was confirmed that the destroyer JERSEY sank in the harbor entrance of Valletta as a result of a mine hit around 2 Jun. 1942, and the destroyer LANCE sank after the ships of the March-April convoy were sunk in the harbor. The following statements likewise deserve to be mentioned: with the commissioning, a few months ago, of the ANSON and the BEATTY, all 5 battleships of the KING GEORGE V class are now ready for duty. The LION and the TEMERAIRE either are or will soon be commissioned. Two wooden dummies of an aircraft carrier under construction in Belfast are being built in another shipyard. The construction time for corvettes, which are continually being produced, is said to be only 6 weeks from keel-laying to commissioning.

2. Own Situation:

According to a report from the Operations Staff, North Africa, of the Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy beginning in the early morning hours of 21 Jun. the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla intercepted the small British vessels which escaped from Tobruk on the evening of 20 Jun.; in combat often bitter and at close range they sank 1 patrol steamer, 1 tug, 1 auxiliary sailing vessel, 3 landing barges, 1 motor boat, and 1 steamer of 4,000 to 5,000 GRT which had already been damaged by the Air Force, and captured a large motor barge of 300 to

22 Jun. 1942

400 GRT and 2 landing barges. The enemy ships were equipped with automatic weapons and covered by fighter planes. Besides losing 175 prisoners, the enemy suffered heavy casualties, since no survivors could be rescued. The battle lasted from 0500 to 1300. It seems that none of the enemy vessels escaped. Our losses: the captain of PT boat S "58" killed, the medical officer of the flotilla, 6 petty officers and seamen wounded, some of them badly. All vessels were hit many times. As a result, 2 of the vessels will be out of commission for a short time.

For brief report of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla see Telegram 2305.

The Naval Staff fully agrees with the opinion of the Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy that these successes are due to the aggressive fighting spirit of the flotilla, its commander, and the captains of the individual vessels.

On 21 Jun., the 6th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla already reconnoitered the entrance to Tobruk and started mine-sweeping operations. In order to prepare the harbor and the unloading facilities, an advance detachment of the North Africa Command arrived in Tobruk on 21 Jun., and the commanding officer himself arrived in Tobruk on the evening of 22 Jun. and took over.

On the night of 21 Jun., enemy planes raided Benghazi. Two of the attacking planes were shot down.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The steamer PILO, which was accompanying the REICHENFELS when she was sunk on 21 Jun., arrived in Tripoli on the same day. The convoy of the BIXIO and the ROSELLI returned to Palermo on the night of 21 Jun.

Thus, the interference with our supply transports is causing considerable difficulty.

As far as the coastal transport of supplies is concerned, the steamer BROOK is scheduled to leave for Tobruk together with 4 landing craft on the evening of 22 Jun.

The fast work of the German Naval Command, Italy deserves special recognition.

Total cargo handled in Tripoli from 1 to 31 May: 83,110 tons. Of this 32,164 tons were German cargo.

Total German cargo unloaded in Derna: 7,474 tons.

4. Area Naval Group South

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

On 22 Jun. a submarine attacked the river motor mine sweepers FR "1" and "11" south of Sulina. No other incidents were reported.

22 Jun. 1942

VIII. Situation East Asia

According to press and radio reports a new Japanese offensive has been launched in the Fukien province. New battles are raging on the borders of the Honan and Shansi provinces. Combat activities are also lively in the province of Kiangsi. The Japanese troops are slowly penetrating from Canton towards the north. The most important of the Molucca islands, including Buru Island and Sanana, have been completely occupied by the Japanese. U.S. planes raided Japanese ships off Kiska (Aleutians). A French source reports that 3 Japanese submarines are operating along the Mozambique coast.

Survivors from the Russian steamer ANGARSTROI have landed in Dairen. A submarine torpedoed the steamer in the western Pacific on 1 May. The Japanese claim that it was a U.S. submarine while the Americans assert that the submarine was Japanese. The matter is still unsettled. A Japanese submarine fired on a radio station on Vancouver Island on the evening of 20 Jun.

IX. Army Situation:1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

Enemy resistance on the peninsula west of Bartenyevka collapsed. Our troops have reached the shore southwest of Bartenyevka. The attack west of "Waldkreuz"* in southerly direction was started according to plan. Our forces reached the northeast side of "Judennase".*

Our forces began a converging attack northwest of Kupyansk in the area east of Izyum and have reached their objectives.

Central Army Group:

Enemy attacks northwest of Rzhev and southwest of Byeloi were repulsed.

Northern Army Group:

An enemy attack at the breakthrough west of Yamno was likewise repulsed.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Nothing to report.

3. North Africa:

The enemy withdrew elements of the 7th Armored Division along the line Maddelana-Scheferzen.

The Panzer Army which is to be employed against enemy forces at the Egyptian border is moving into position.

During the seizure of the harbor of Tobruk, the Panzer Army sank 1 gunboat and 6 small transport steamers. The majority of the soldiers

* It was not possible to determine whether these were German code names or translations of Russian names.

22 Jun. 1942

aboard were rescued. The harbor and its installations fell into
German hands undamaged.

23 Jun. 1942

Items of Political ImportanceFrance:

On 22 Jun., Laval delivered a long radio address in which he outlined his political program. He expressed his firm intention to reestablish normal relations with Germany and Italy, based on mutual confidence, and stated that it is necessary to integrate France into the new Europe, which is bound to fall victim to Bolshevism unless Germany wins. These statements are generally considered to have great political significance. The impression created in America and Britain by this unequivocal stand of the head of the French Government stresses the value of his attitude towards Germany. The German press shows deliberate reserve in dealing with this matter, in order not to show Germany too receptive to the wishes expressed by Laval.

For details see Political Review No. 144, Paragraph 1.

Great Britain:

In connection with the situation in North Africa, a government official stated that the Battle of Egypt has now begun. This battle and the outcome of the fighting on the Russian front will decide whether the war will end with an Allied victory within a reasonable time or whether it will drag on for years. After a period of fruitless optimism, Great Britain must now face the grim reality of a hard and ruinous war. The Transportation Minister stated that Tobruk would never have fallen if enough ships had been available to bring troops and materiel to Libya. Sufficient quantities of materiel are being produced both in Great Britain and in the U.S. but ships for its transportation are lacking. These problems are now being discussed in Washington. The excitement over the loss of Tobruk continues unabated. The debate on this subject in the House of Commons will be taken up after Churchill's return.

It is not clear to what extent this defeat has seriously shaken the Prime Minister's position. In any case, it is unlikely that the question of a new Government will be raised at this time.

Portugal:

Referring to an authoritative British statement, Portuguese Government circles assert that for the present, Portugal need not be afraid of an Allied invasion. According to this source, the Americans intend to occupy Tangier as their first African base, before landing in Freetown and Liberia. They believe that Spain will not take any serious steps in view of the menace to the Canary Islands and her domestic political situation.

U.S.S.R.:

On the occasion of the anniversary of Germany's war with Russia which started one year ago, the Neue Zuericher Zeitung takes a positive view of Germany's preventive war measures. The newspaper states that it is hopeless to expect a compromise peace. The struggle will continue as a war of attrition. All forces sent into action against Russia have up to now been swallowed up in the very vastness of that country. After the experience of the last 12 months, nobody can dare to predict the final outcome of the war.

23 Jun. 1942

Greece:

The Greek Prime Minister has notified the German and Italian Governments of the resolution passed by the Cabinet, according to which Greece is no longer in a position to pay for the occupation costs and requests a joint discussion of the existing situation.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports that an agreement has been reached with the Air Force to exchange the air defenses in Danzig and Hanstholm. The Navy will take over Hanstholm.

Group South has requested an increased number of landing craft for the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. According to the present construction program, a total of 70 landing craft is to be made available in the Mediterranean area for Italy, 60 for the Black Sea, and 20 for the Aegean Sea. Group South now requests an additional 40 landing craft each for the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea. Since the facilities in Varna cannot be expanded, the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division intends to have these additional 80 vessels built in Palermo.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

II. The Chief, Naval Construction Division reports on the Fuehrer directive for installations in Norway (submarine shelters and dock in Trondheim). The Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has refused to make available to the Navy the required transport tonnage for these installations. The Chief, Naval Staff orders the Chief, Quartermaster Division to obtain the Fuehrer's decision in this matter.

The Chief, Naval Construction Division reports further on tests conducted with the Voith-Schneider power unit for submarines. Results were not satisfactory.

III. The Chief, Naval Staff orders the question of ground and ship-borne personnel for aircraft carriers to be taken up in time, thus laying a foundation for a naval air force, as far as personnel is concerned.

IV. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports that the battery "Grossdeutschland" has harmonized 2 of the scheduled three 40 cm guns.

V. The Chief, Naval Construction Division reports that completion of the SEYDLITZ will take 7 months. According to the latest instructions, it will be 2 months before work on the GRAF ZEPPELIN will be resumed.

In a Very Restricted Circle:

VI. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports about the conference on the situation at Fuehrer Headquarters on 22 Jun., as follows:

Field Marshal Rommel plans to continue his offensive. The Duce refuses to agree, and instead wants to pull out the forces earmarked for operation "Herkules". The Fuehrer will obtain freedom of action for Rommel through the German General attached to the Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces and, if necessary, by a telephone call to the

23 Jun. 1942

Duce. In this case, the Fuehrer believes that the execution of operation "Herkules" should be set not earlier than at the end of August.

Situation 23 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

According to an Italian report, all steamers available in U.S. harbors are being held back, the reason being that beginning around 1 Jul. the majority of the American ships will be used exclusively for transporting materiel and troops.

South Atlantic:

The steamer MILWAUKEE is said to have departed from Buenos Aires on 19 Jun. According to a Vichy telegraphic service report, Natal is to be developed as a naval base and will get a dry dock which will be 140 m. long, 16 m. wide, and 10 m. deep.

The motor ship PRETORIA CASTLE has been ordered to return to Freetown. A report from the Consulate in Luanda states that around the middle of May the harbor of Matadi was closed because of the arrival of 3 U.S. transport ships.

According to Reuter, survivors from a Panamanian steamer reported that a "pirate ship", so large that it looked like the QUEEN MARY, is responsible for the sinking of their vessel. (It was ship "23".)

Pacific Ocean:

A submarine warning was issued for the area 100 miles south of Vancouver. The U.S. cruiser CONCORD and 1 destroyer arrived in Valparaiso for an official 4 day visit.

2. Own Situation:

Sailing instructions were sent to the DOGGERBANK via Radiogram 1724. All vessels in foreign waters were notified via Radiogram 1603.

The Attache in Tokyo has been directed to have the NANKIN come to Japan, if possible, after coaling in Batavia, in order to ascertain the value of her cargo for Germany.

The plan to offer the ship to the Japanese should be communicated to them only after she has been declared a prize. The Attache is being further notified that the Naval Staff intends to employ the HERBORG as a blockade runner (see Telegram 2300).

Information on the enemy situation is contained in Radiograms 0521 and 2200.

23 Jun. 1942

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported that in the evening 25 to 30 steamers were proceeding on an easterly course north of the Isle of Wight, while 2 destroyers and 4 steamers were located northwest of the Island. Some 80 tugs were observed in the vicinity of Exbury.

Group West adds that photographic reconnaissance of 22 Jun. indicates that of the small vessels located in the Portsmouth-Portland area, 185 are special vessels for landing purposes, while the other vessels do not necessarily seem to be meant for that purpose.

Group West is keeping the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West (Army Group D) informed.

2. Own Situation:

Two mines were swept in the Atlantic coast area off Brest, 3 in the Gironde, and 2 in the vicinity of La Pallice. The Loire estuary is temporarily closed on account of mines dropped in that area.

Channel Coast:

The mine operation of the PT boats on the night of 22 Jun. was executed according to plan. For brief report see Telegram 0740.

Mine-detonating vessel "183" sank off Dunkirk as a result of a mine detonation. The majority of the crew, with a few wounded, has been rescued. Only 2 men are missing.

At 1525, 12 enemy bombers raided dock installations in Dunkirk.

Referring to the loss of the mine-detonating vessel "183" and the heavy damage sustained by mine-detonating vessel "14", the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West demands that neither the Sauckel plan nor the standard ship program be permitted to reduce the shipyard capacity in the west area, including Holland, at the expense of mine-detonating vessels, since otherwise submarine escorts as well as the entire submarine warfare will be imperiled. (See Telegram 1230.) The Naval Staff already expressed a similar view before. Further steps will be taken by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence reports that in the morning a total of 53 steamers were at sea off the eastern coast of England, 40 of them proceeding on a southerly and 13 on a northerly course.

According to radio decoding, the battleship ANSON will be commissioned with impressive ceremony in Rosyth on 27 Jun. and will be part of the Home Fleet. In view of the fact that a great many high dignitaries, including the King, will be present in Edinburgh-Rosyth from 26 to 28 Jun., Group North believes that an air raid before or after the

23 Jun. 1942

commissioning would be very effective (see Telegram 1005). The Air Force Operations Staff is notified to this effect.

Own Situation:

Damage to various industrial installations was caused during the enemy air raid on Emden on the night of 22 Jun. The bow of a submarine was slightly damaged by bomb fragments. As a result of numerous incendiary bombs, damage to shipyards affected primarily the wood-working shops. As usual, the loss of production has proved less than was assumed at first. (See Telegram 1300.)

Three ground mines were swept in the German Bight and 4 British moored mines in the mined area northwest of Esbjerg. On the night of 22 Jun. a harbor defense vessel shot down an enemy plane in the Ems River estuary.

2. Norway:

The mine operation "Herzog" has been executed according to plan within 1 mile of the planned limits. Execution of operation "Graf" is set for the night of 23 Jun.

A Russian land battery fired 91 salvos on 5 landing craft proceeding from Petsamo to Kirkenes, which returned the fire. One of the vessels received 2 hits. All vessels have arrived in Kirkenes.

3. Arctic Ocean:

For the order to submarines U "255" and U "655" to depart on mission "Roesselsprung", see 1/Skl 15067/42 Gkdos. in File "Roesselsprung".

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance located 6 Russian submarines north of Lavansaari. According to radio intelligence, the submarines were en route from Kronstadt to Lavansaari on the night of 23 Jun.

2. Own Situation:

Baltic Sea Entrances, Western Baltic Sea:

A drifting mine in the vicinity of Skagen was detonated by gunfire. Two ground mines were swept in the outer Kiel Foerde.

Convoy operations in the western part of the Baltic Sea are proceeding as scheduled.

Eastern Baltic:

According to an intelligence report, an enemy submarine torpedoed not only the Swedish steamer ADA GORTHON but also the Swedish steamer ORION, the Swedish steamer SIGNE, and the Finnish steamer ARGO.

Group North requests that steps be taken to have the Swedish minefield off Oeland Island laid without any delay. The Group also orders that

23 Jun. 1942

the gap in the Gjedser minefield be closed at once, that 4 vessels of the training flotilla under the command of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea be transferred temporarily to the Commander, Mine sweepers, Baltic Sea, and that the patrol in the southern outlet of the Sound be reinforced by vessels from the Little Belt. Furthermore, the Group has ordered compulsory escort for troop transports and large tankers proceeding from the Gulf of Danzig to Finland effective immediately.

The Naval Staff promptly directs the Naval Attache in Stockholm to induce the Swedish Navy to lay the minefield off Oeland Island immediately. At the same time, the Naval Attache is directed to ascertain as speedily as possible the details concerning the torpedoing of the steamers ORION, SIGNE, and ARGO, and to find out, in particular, whether they were torpedoed within Swedish territorial waters or possibly even in the inshore waters and also whether the losses might have been caused by ground mines (see Telegram 1801).

The submarine chase in the Gulf of Finland and in the waters around the Baltic islands has so far been without results.

V. Merchant Shipping

Notwithstanding all possible defense and security measures taken by the Navy in cooperation with the Air Force, a great number of ships have been lost to date due to the greatly increased enemy activity in the North Sea. We must be prepared for the possibility that these losses might become so great in the future that we would be unable to maintain shipping at the present rate. As a precaution, the Naval Staff has therefore called the attention of the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping to this possible development and has suggested that arrangements be made for redirecting some of the transports to inland waterways which are now routed via the North Sea.

In this connection the Naval Staff has further suggested that the Ministry of Transportation investigate to what extent the inland waterways of the Netherlands and the port of Delfzijl could be used to relieve the ship traffic to Rotterdam.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence reports that a plane attacked a westbound submarine 300 miles northwest of Cape Vilano and that another plane attacked an eastbound submarine northwest of Cape Ortegal. Reports on submarine attacks were intercepted east and south of the Mississippi estuary, as well as 200 miles east of Martinique and 190 miles northwest of the Yucatan Strait.

According to an official Argentine statement, an Argentine steamer sank off the U.S. East Coast. Associated Press reports that the U.S. Navy Department has established a convoy system along the U.S. East Coast.

2. Own Situation:

On her return voyage, submarine U "753" was badly damaged by

23 Jun. 1942

an aerial bomb in quadrant BF 8125. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines has ordered 3 submarines and planes to be sent to her aid. In addition, 3 mine sweepers from Lorient have been sent to aid the damaged submarine. The Air Force has promised to assign 4 twin-engine Ju 88 fighter planes to the Bay of Biscay. Thus the grave menace to arriving and departing submarines from the air may be counteracted to some extent at least.

Submarine U "84" reported that she had sunk the steamer TORVANGER (6,568 GRT) off the American coast. On 23 Jun., submarine U "202" sank a steamer in quadrant CA 5627 which later proved to be the Argentine steamer RIO TERCERO. The steamer carried neither a flag nor any insignia of a neutral power. Only after the captain had been taken aboard, was the ship's nationality identified.

Excusable as the submarine commander's action may be, from the political point of view such an incident is highly undesirable under the present circumstances.

Submarines U "459" and U "460" are being refueled according to plan. Since the special operation "Brasilien" will presumably not be executed, the task of refueling the submarines off the American coast will be considerably easier.

Submarine U "158" reports from the West Indies that she sank the steamer HENRY GIBBONS, probably 5,000 GRT. Submarine U "68" reports from the same area sinking a 5,000 GRT U.S. tanker, probably the ARRIGIA. For further reports see Supplement to the Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

No reports have been received, except for reconnaissance data. A total of 176 planes were sent into action during the day.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The number of our planes on reconnaissance missions over Libya, Egypt, and the eastern Mediterranean totalled 110.

3. Eastern Front:

Altogether 400 planes operated in the Black Sea area. During the air raid on Sevastopol, 1 small steamer was sunk, and 2 other steamers and a patrol vessel were damaged. In the Arctic Ocean, the 5th Air Force sent 184 planes into action. An effective air raid was carried out on Murmansk.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

No reports of interest have been received.

23 Jun. 1942

2. Own Situation:

In reply to an inquiry of the Naval High Command, Executive Office, the German Naval Command, Italy has submitted a list of all successes achieved by the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla in the Mediterranean. For copy see 1/Skl 22099 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

The mine and torpedo successes of the flotilla prove that it has fulfilled to an increasing extent the purpose for which it was transferred to the Mediterranean theater.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The departure of the motor ships PISANI and SESTRIERE from Tripoli to Naples has been postponed until further notice. The convoy of the BIXIO and ROSELLI left Palermo again on the evening of 22 Jun. and passed through the Strait of Messina at 0630. It is to proceed to Benghazi via Navarino.

The steamer BROOK and 4 landing craft arrived in Tobruk in the morning.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The "ZG 3" is acting as escort leader of the 19th Crete group for the first time. Otherwise there is nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Due to a defect in the communications system, no daily situation report has been received.

IX. Situation East Asia

The Military Attache in Bangkok reports that the Thailand Army has come to a standstill because of the monsoon rain period. The Japanese Army Headquarters has been transferred from Saigon to Singapore. The oil supplies and oil wells in operation captured in the Dutch East Indies are sufficient to cover the requirements of the Japanese Navy. Most of the oil wells have been closed up with concrete; fuel production therefore can not be expected before 2 to 3 years.

It is reported that women and children have been evacuated from Sydney. U.S. long-range bombers are being ferried to Australia by air, while fighter planes are being transported on ships. The main base of the Australian air forces is in Townsville. Port Moresby is an advanced base for fighter forces and Horn Island in the Torres Strait for bombers. As before, the Americans and Australians possess air superiority in this area.

With the introduction of the convoy system in Japan, the merchant ship losses resulting from U.S. submarine attacks have been substantially reduced.

A report from Chungking states that the number of Japanese divisions in Manchuria has been raised from 18 to 30.

23 Jun. 1942

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Despite occasionally stubborn enemy resistance, German and Rumanian operations on the northeastern and eastern fronts of Sevastopol are making good progress. Various hills have been taken.

Our forces, advancing in the area of Izyum and Kupyansk, have gained further ground. While fighting rear guard battles, the enemy is retreating across the Oskol towards the east. The spearheads of our panzer forces are some 20 km. west of Senikovo. North of this point our troops have reached the region of Kupyansk.

Central Army Group:

No noteworthy combat activity has been reported.

Northern Army Group:

An enemy attempt to break through our front west of Yamno was foiled. The breakthrough on the western front of our defense line has been mopped up.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Fronts:

An enemy attack on the Svir front was repulsed. The Army High Command, Lapland has been renamed High Command, 20th Mountain Army.

3. North Africa:

During the afternoon, the Panzer Army launched a major attack against enemy forces on the Egyptian border.

Details about the operations, which were carried on during the night, are still lacking.

The number of prisoners taken at Tobruk has increased to 33,000.

24 Jun. 1942

Items of Political ImportanceFrance:

Relations between De Gaulle and his British guardians have deteriorated recently. The Madagascar campaign was carried out without De Gaulle's participation, and De Gaulle's General Koenig was blamed for the fall of Tobruk. In Syria, the increasing tension has already resulted in violent fights between the soldiers of the two opposing parties.

Great Britain:

For Attlee's statement in the House of Commons on the situation in Libya see Political Review No. 145, Paragraph 3 b. A small group of Conservatives will introduce a motion for a vote of no confidence in "the central war leadership". This will be the first motion of no confidence since Churchill took over the Government.

Argentina:

Replacing President Ortiz, who resigned because of ill health, Vice President Castillo will carry on the presidency until 1944. The torpedoing of the steamer RIO TERCERO is considered to have seriously impaired the relations between Germany and Argentina.

Vatican:

According to a report of the Air Attache in Rome from an "apparently reliable source", in which the Vatican is properly termed a center of enemy espionage and propaganda, with the fastest and best connections to authoritative enemy government agencies, Vatican circles believe that the defeat of the Axis powers, which they consider certain, is still very far off. The Vatican believes that in the near future the Russians will be defeated and the Anglo-Americans will be compelled to make an all-out effort, with Africa as the starting point of the decisive battle. The positions in Egypt and in the Near East must be held by all means. Submarine successes are said to have almost paralyzed the ship traffic between North and South America. Only the adoption of British defense measures, which have proved so successful in the Atlantic, can restore the freedom of movement which the Americans need for supplying Africa (western coast and Egypt), in order to be able to attempt to conquer the Mediterranean theater from Africa beginning in 1943.

U.S.S.R.:

According to a Vichy telegraphic service report, Litvinov expressed his regret about the fact that the Anglo-American supplies for Russia are not yet sufficient for the magnitude of the task.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief of the Naval Staff Communications Division reports about the successes achieved over enemy submarines by the 20 Italian torpedo boats equipped with German search receivers. 12 certain and 10 probable sinkings are attributed to this equipment.

It is advisable to point out to the Italians that even those sinkings which they assume to be certain should be most carefully scrutinized so as to avoid a false optimism as to the effectiveness of our defenses.

24 Jun. 1942

Even a loss of 12 submarines in the Mediterranean area alone within a comparatively short period would be an unusual drain on the enemy's resources.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees to the unification of the communications organization in the west area, although the planned merger of the naval offices of Group West and the Commanding Admiral, France is not to be carried out for the time being.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports that the Reich Commissioner of Maritime Shipping has agreed that the Navy remain responsible for the transport tasks in the Black Sea and in the Aegean Sea, as requested by the Navy.

III. Since it is expected that the enemy plane attacks against localities on the coast will continue, the Chief, Naval Staff orders measures taken without delay to provide those localities with smoke-screen protection. In view of the favorable results obtained, the Air Force should be persuaded to install similar equipment for localities under its jurisdiction.

IV. The Naval Attache reports that the Italian Navy has finally agreed to deliver 45 cm. torpedoes to the Finnish Navy.

Army Group D will demonstrate a landing maneuver in the Scheldt estuary to a Japanese commission. Participation of representatives of the Navy is assured.

Special Items:

I. Distribution of forces

1. The cruiser KOELN will be allocated to Group North in the middle of July after completion of repairs. Some time ago the Fuehrer ordered that the ship be made ready for operations in the Norwegian area. This order is being carried out.

2. Around the middle of February the Naval Staff allocated the 4th, 5th, 7th, and 22nd Mine Sweeper Flotillas to the Commanding Admiral, Norway. Since then, the 4th and 5th Mine Sweeper Flotillas have been operating in Norway. Formation of the 7th Mine Sweeper Flotilla has been postponed to permit the 6th Mine Sweeper Flotilla (Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West) to be organized first; this flotilla will not be transferred before several months from now. Meanwhile, 6 (coal burning) vessels of the 22nd Mine Sweeper Flotilla are ready for action, but at present they are operating in the area of the Commanding Admiral Defenses, North.

The Naval Staff therefore requests Group North to report on what date it plans to transfer the 22nd Mine Sweeper Flotilla to Norway.

II. Antilles

The German Armistice Commission, France reports that as the result of negotiations between Admiral Robert and the Americans essential parts of the engines on French warships in the Antilles have been dismantled, leaving the cruiser EMILE BERTIN completely unable to operate, and the carrier BEARN and the cruiser JEANNE D'ARC able to operate only

24 Jul. 1942

to a limited extent. The guns of the 3 vessels remain intact. The guns of the auxiliary cruiser BARFLEUR were removed, with the exception of anti-aircraft guns, but the vessel's sailing ability is unimpaired. At first the Americans wanted the dismantled engine parts taken to America; later, however, they agreed to let the parts be shipped to Casablanca. The French intend to ship the parts, already packed in cases, on the steamer SAGITTAIRE.

Since Germany has so far failed to authorize the procedure, Admiral Robert suggested to the Americans that the parts be laid up either in Cayenne or at the U.S. Consulate in Martinique under American control.

Under these circumstances, the German Armistice Commission, France very urgently requests permission for steamer SAGITTAIRE to proceed to Casablanca.

The Naval Staff has approved the position of the Armistice Commission as stated to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff.

In the meantime, the Naval Staff has learned from the German Armistice Commission, France that the Antilles case is being dealt with exclusively by the Foreign Office; therefore the Armistice Commission had to declare that it was not authorized to decide when approached by the French with a new request to ship the engine parts to Casablanca on the auxiliary cruiser BARFLEUR, instead of on the steamer SAGITTAIRE.

In reply to the Naval Staff's inquiry, the Foreign Office communicated on 23 Jun. that the German Government views the arbitrary immobilization of the warships in Fort de France as a one-sided measure in favor of the enemy, and consequently as a violation of the Armistice terms. In order to keep the effects of this transgression at a minimum, the French Government via the Embassy in Paris has been ordered to have the engine parts brought to North Africa and from there to France; the Foreign Office has authorized the departure of the BARFLEUR to Casablanca. France will be held responsible in case of enemy seizure. Laval has already accepted these terms but pointed out that the Americans will not permit the BARFLEUR to proceed unless she returns to the Antilles.

It is to be regretted that the Foreign Office has handled this matter entirely without consulting the Naval Staff.

For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

III. The Chief, Naval Staff Operations Division, Mine Warfare and Anti-Submarine Section reports about his presence at the conference of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West with the Commander, Coast Patrol Force, as well as about his conversations with Group West, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, and the 3rd Air Force.

Copy in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

Situation 24 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

No reports of interest have been received.

24 Jun. 1942

2. Own Situation:

Via Radiogram 1344, ship "28" was ordered to assign to the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN the southern half of the large supply quadrants as her waiting area after completion of her mission.

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reported that the Japanese Navy has designated Batavia as the port of destination for the HERBORG. Since the Naval Staff wants the tanker to be converted as speedily as possible into a blockade-runner, and since for this purpose the Naval Attache in Tokyo must evaluate the ship and settle the personnel question, he is directed to obtain the Japanese Navy's authorization for the ship to make a non-stop voyage to Japan. Sailing instructions for the HERBORG in case she enters Batavia are being issued via Radiogram 1710.

The situation report to all vessels in foreign waters concerning operations in the Mediterranean from 14 to 16 Jun., the PT boat success off Tobruk, the Eastern Front, and operations in the Coral Sea and off Midway Island is contained in Radiogram 1221.

Information on the enemy situation was sent out via Radiogram 2211.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Another photographic reconnaissance mission over the south coast of England showed that there are still numerous special vessels crowded together in the harbors of Plymouth, Salcombe, Kingswear, and Brixham.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The damaged submarine U "753" was met by 3 submarines. The La Pallice roadstead and harbor have been reopened. 4 ground mines were swept off Lorient and one was swept off St. Nazaire.

Channel Coast:

The 12th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla removed 21 mines southwest of Etaples.

Group West fully endorses the opinion of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West concerning the shipyard capacity for mine-detonating vessels in the West Area (see War Diary 23 Jun.). (See Radiogram 1245.)

The mine operations of the 2nd, and 4th PT Boat Flotillas are set for the night of 24 Jun.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Nothing to report.

24 Jun. 1942

2. Norway, Arctic Ocean:Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence reports that on the night of 23 Jun. British vessels in the Archangel-Murmansk area exchanged numerous radio messages. On 24 Jun. at 1300 air reconnaissance sighted a heavy cruiser proceeding on a southeasterly course in the Denmark Strait. According to an intelligence report from Portugal, a convoy of about 100 ships is expected to leave Portree for Russia on 29 Jun. The report originated in the British Legation in Lisbon. On the evening of 23 Jun. photographic reconnaissance of Murmansk showed 6 destroyers, 6 patrol vessels, 1 PT boat, 1 submarine in dock, 36 steamers, 2 tankers, and 2 steamers in dock.

Own Situation:

Mine operation "Graf" was executed unnoticed and according to plan during the night of 23 Jun. The 8th PT Boat Flotilla and the TSINGTAU have left Kirkenes to return to Germany.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea1. Enemy Situation:

No noteworthy reports have been received.

2. Own Situation:

Convoy and patrol operations in the Baltic Sea entrances are proceeding according to plan without any incidents.

The Swedish Navy confirms that the minefield off Oeland Island will be laid at once. According to the Swedish Navy, the steamer ADA GORTHON was sunk within Swedish territorial waters east of Oeland Island. It was not the Finnish steamer ARGO which sank in Kalmar Sound; the ARGO was the Finnish steamer reported sunk at Bogskaer some time ago.

The 1st Air Force is unable to mine the areas "Qualle" and "Krebs" in Lake Ladoga, as requested by Group North, since the Commander in Chief, Air Force has ordered the 4th Bomber Wing transferred. Since the small coastal mine-laying craft and the Italian subchasers are not expected to be ready for action before around 5 Jul. and the Air Force ferry unit is not expected to be ready before the beginning of August at the earliest, and furthermore, since these light forces can hardly be expected to have a lasting effect, the Group requests the Naval Staff to get the Commander in Chief, Air Force to carry out the operation at least with a few planes as it is in the interest of all the branches of the Armed Forces to prevent or interfere with supply and evacuation transports on Lake Ladoga. (See Telegram 1814.) The Naval Staff has approached the Air Force General Staff as requested.

According to the Air Force General Staff the 1st Air Force has been ordered to attack submarines in the Gulf of Finland and to report why no such attacks were carried out on 23 Jun.

24 Jun. 1942

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reports that several planes were searching in vain from noon until evening for a submarine which had been sighted 200 miles west of the Gironde estuary.

From the U.S. coast reports have been received about submarine attacks off Cape Hatteras and east of Cape Lookout. A report from the West Indies states that a submarine was sighted 30 miles north of Port of Spain.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "376" was given permission to operate against the enemy cruiser reported in the Denmark Strait.

An enemy plane made a surprise attack and damaged submarine U "332" off the American coast. The submarine is withdrawing from the coast. Submarine U "202" chased the Portuguese steamer NYASSA sailing as a diplomatic exchange ship, but did not attack her.

Submarine U "404" sank a 6,000 GRT steamer in quadrant DC 1223 and a 10,000 GRT steamer from a 9-vessel convoy in quadrant DC 1228. A 7,000 GRT tanker received 2 hits and has probably sunk.

In the Caribbean Sea, submarine U "128" reported sinking the steamer WEST IRA (5,681 GRT) and a 14,000 GRT naval tanker, while submarine U "156" succeeded in sinking the steamer WILLIMANTIC (4,857 GRT).

47,538 GRT sunk in one day is a notable achievement.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

On the night of 24 Jun. 80 planes were sent into action against Birmingham.

Numerous enemy incursions over northern and western France, concentrating their attacks on St. Nazaire.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Forces of the Air Commander, Africa supported the operations of the Panzer Army.

3. Eastern Front:

During the air raid on Murmansk, one 7,000 GRT steamer and one 4,000 GRT steamer were sunk, and one 6,000 GRT steamer was damaged. Fighter planes of the 5th Air Force shot down 9 enemy planes. The 1st Air Force attacked ships in the Lavansaari-Seiskari area. Definite data on these successes is not yet available.

24 Jun. 1942

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Western Mediterranean:

On the night of 23 Jun., the MALAYA departed with 3 destroyers from Gibraltar for an unknown destination.

According to an Italian report, a convoy escorted by heavy vessels is expected to leave Gibraltar within the next few days.

This may be another attempt to supply Malta.

Central and Eastern Mediterranean:

2 submarines were sighted at sea off Benghazi. Air reconnaissance reports lively convoy traffic in the area of Alexandria and Port Said. For details see daily situation report. On the night of 24 Jun., British air reconnaissance sighted 2 northbound merchant vessels and 1 destroyer in the Gulf of Taranto.

2. Own Situation:

Unfavorable weather prevented PT boat and motor mine sweeper operations.

11 Italian submarines were at sea in the Mediterranean.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Unfortunately, enemy action resulted in several painful losses on our side. The Italian steamer SAN ANTONIO was sunk by a submarine while proceeding from Tripoli to Benghazi. The steamer REGULUS was torpedoed by another submarine south of Benghazi and was beached. A naval barge is salvaging her cargo. At noon, on 23 Jun., enemy torpedo planes attacked the BIXIO and ROSELLI convoy. The ROSELLI was hit and must be towed to Taranto. The BIXIO also returned to Taranto.

The steamer PILO arrived in Benghazi via Tripoli on 24 Jun. 2 Italian transport submarines carrying aviation fuel are en route from Italy to Derna and Benghazi. The steamer TRAPANI, the motor ship JAEDJOR, and 2 naval barges entered Tobruk. 500 tons were unloaded in Tobruk on 23 Jun. and 459 on 24 Jun.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

In the morning the 19th Crete group, with the "ZG 3" as escort leader, departed from Piraeus.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence observed little activity of surface forces.

24 Jun. 1942

Own Situation:

Unfavorable weather conditions prevented operations by light naval forces in the area of Sevastopol and the south coast of the Crimea.

VIII. Situation East Asia

No incidents have been reported.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

After a new division had been brought up to the front north-east of Sevastopol, the attacks on the Gaytany heights were continued. On the eastern sector, Rumanian divisions attacking Bastion II fought stubbornly in the trackless forest.

Large concentrations of enemy ships were observed in the eastern part of the Azov Sea and in the Don estuary.

Our divisions advancing on the Izyum-Kupyansk sector have reached their objectives. The new line runs from Izyum along the Oskol up to 10 km east of Kupyansk and from there north-northwestward in the direction of Burlyuk. Numerous prisoners and large quantities of materiel fell into our hands.

North of Volchansk our forces set out to improve their positions and, with the splendid support of the Air Force, reached the line from Russkaya westward up to the point where the Korenny touches our positions.

Central Army Group:

No noteworthy fighting was reported.

Northern Army Group:

An enemy attack south of Demyansk was repulsed. Mopping-up operations on the eastern front of our defense line near Yamno are making little headway due to strong enemy resistance.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Fronts:

With the end of the thaw period, the enemy started to develop lively reconnaissance activity, using long-range reconnaissance patrols against roads and railways in the rear area of the 20th Army High Command.

3. North Africa:

Major enemy forces have fallen back under the Panzer Army attack in the area of Marsa Matruh-Bir Gellaz-Gerawla, where they are

24 Jun. 1942

apparently preparing for battle. The Panzer Army has crossed the Egyptian border on a wide front and after a vigorous pursuit took the line from Sidi Barrani up to a point 50 km southeast.

25 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

The Minister of Production said in a speech that he cannot predict whether the merchant ships now under construction will entirely meet the needs of the Allies, but they will very soon compensate for ship losses, since America will meet her production schedules for 1942 and 1943. In a few months British production will reach its peak, which cannot be exceeded because of manpower shortage. The time is near when Britain will no longer be able to increase her industrial capacity without resorting to the armed forces for labor. American production is limited only by the supply of raw materials. Once the Allied production has been brought up to the planned level, it will be enormous.

On the basis of statements by a person who recently returned from England, the Naval Attache in Lisbon gives a few glimpses of the situation there. During the attack on St. Nazaire, 800 men, i.e. 60% of the forces employed in the operation, were either killed or taken prisoner. For this reason, the military authorities believe that further landing attempts on the European coasts promise little success.

At present, about 45,000 American troops are said to be in Scotland and 15,000 in northern Ireland.

The authorities are worried about the difficulty of getting seamen for merchant ships.

Fleet vessels and passenger steamers are, as a rule, stationed on the west coast. Kirkwall on the Orkney Islands is the main submarine base.

Russia's participation in the war on the side of the Allies is being capitalized for propaganda purposes, with the effect that the bulk of the people are very optimistic and confident that the war will end this year. Labor is showing a growing interest in communism, while the intelligentsia remains very skeptical. The authorities are doing everything in their power to counteract developments within the country along Soviet lines. They are trying to conceal the real situation on the military front.

Egypt:

The Prime Minister declared in Parliament that the British Government has assured him definitely of its determination to do its utmost in repelling any attack on Egypt. He also denied once more the rumors about British demands that Egypt mobilize and declare war on the Axis powers. He stated that the Egyptian Government is determined to keep the country out of the war, while taking all precautions necessary to safeguard the population. The most important thing at present is to keep calm and to cooperate fully with the British troops in Egypt.

This strange statement can be easily understood if it is true, as reported by a French diplomatic source, that the Egyptian population un-animously wishes the Axis powers to win and hopes that Rommel will invade Egypt, so that the hated British troops may disappear. King Farouk himself is said to have advised the departing French Ambassador to wait till Rommel moves into Egypt.

This evaluation of public opinion is not without significance for possible future developments. However, the influence of the King and of the broad masses should not be overestimated.

25 Jun. 1942

U.S.A.:

No mention is made of the Second Front in Roosevelt's and Churchill's joint statement. The U.S. press confirms this fact, while stressing the pre-eminence of the shipping shortage over all other problems of the day. On the other hand, the press states that continued preoccupation with post-war plans is merely detracting from the war effort.

Argentina:

The Government has sent a note to Berlin protesting against the attack on the steamer RIO TERCERO.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. Operational Submarine Groups: On request, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines has expressed his opinion on the advisability of organizing submarine groups for special assignments, as desired by the Fuehrer (see War Diary 20 Jun.). He points out that the most important and decisive task of the submarines is to sink as many enemy ships as fast as possible, and that all other tasks must be subordinated to this one. Moreover, during the time when operation "Brasilien" is scheduled, from mid-July to mid-August, there will be particularly few submarines in the operations area. This situation will not improve before September. He believes that a separate submarine group reserved for operations against enemy landings promises very little success, while submarine operations against transports of supplies would bring good results. In any case, enemy landings can only be hampered but never prevented by submarines. Therefore, in the opinion of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, if submarines were set aside for a special purpose the result would be a heavy drop in the all-important sinkings without any corresponding gain in some other respect. In case enemy operations should necessitate quick action, we will thus have to rely on calling together submarines en route to the operations areas.

In this connection, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines repeats his demands that all necessary measures be taken to increase the number of submarines at sea and, in particular, to increase the number of workers in the submarine repair yards in Germany in order to save time, and to maintain and increase the number of workers in the shipyards in western France. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines considers the solution of the manpower problem as the most important measure for making submarine warfare more successful.

The Naval Staff agrees in general with the opinion of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines. The Chief, Naval Staff objects, however, to the Commanding Admiral's statement concerning the few submarines available in July and August, since the Commanding Admiral himself told the Fuehrer at the last conference that a considerable increase in the number of submarines is to be expected during the next few months. The Chief, Naval Staff thinks that the Commanding Admiral, Submarines is painting the situation darker than it probably will be.

The Naval Staff will reexamine the matter, particularly with regard to shipyard capacity and the labor situation.

In conclusion, the Chief, Naval Staff states that neither he nor the Naval Staff considers it advisable to set up special operational submarine groups. In view of this fact, the detailed report of the

25 Jun. 1942

Commanding Admiral, Submarines was really superfluous.

II. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports about a communication from Rio de Janeiro sent by the Naval Attache in Buenos Aires concerning measures taken by the Brazilian Navy (patrol duty for warships and planes, with orders to attack Axis ships), which again demonstrate that our request for permission to use arms against Brazilian war and merchant ships is justified.

III. The Chief, Naval Staff points out that the shifting of the main war effort in the Mediterranean to the east makes it necessary to clarify in advance a possible overlapping of the authorities of the Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy and the Commanding Admiral, Group South. To this, the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff states that it is quite clear that the submarines, PT boats, and motor mine sweepers in the eastern Mediterranean are under the Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy.

In a Very Restricted Circle:

IV. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division gives the following details from the report of 23 Jun. sent to the Armed Forces High Command by the German General attached to the Italian Armed Forces Headquarters:

The letter from the Fuehrer was delivered to the Duce on 22 Jun. On the morning of 23 Jun., telegrams were received from Rommel, Kesselring, and Bastico, proposing that the offensive be carried on into Egypt. On orders from the Duce, the Italian High Command in cooperation with German and Italian naval officers examined the problem of supplies and transports and reported to the Duce.

After taking note of the Fuehrer's letter, the Duce ordered the German General to communicate to the Fuehrer that he agrees with the Fuehrer that this is the historical moment for the conquest of Egypt and that it must be utilized. The difficulty lies in the sea transport situation which has again reached a critical stage due to Malta's recovery. For this reason it is absolutely necessary to neutralize Malta, since an attack for the final conquest of the island cannot be launched immediately. To do so, the air forces on Sicily must receive reinforcements. Kesselring has offered to send back 1 bomber group and 1 fighter group. The Italian Air Force will transfer further units from Italy to Sicily. In addition, the Duce requests that the 2 bomber groups and 1 fighter group from Germany which, according to a report from the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South are earmarked for operation "Herkules" be immediately made available for Sicily. It is essential to paralyze Malta in order to be able to supply the Panzer Army and to push ahead safely to the Nile delta.

The Duce is grateful to the Fuehrer for his promise to investigate the question of fuel oil, because it is necessary to supply the fleet with enough fuel oil to enable it to participate in the offensive against Egypt if necessary.

The German General's report states further that the Italian High Command has postponed the execution of operation "Herkules" until September. As for the sea transport situation, it is planned to drop the western route entirely until Malta has been paralyzed more effectively. The eastern route will be improved by making use of Tobruk and Bardia, although the unloading capacity of Tobruk does not exceed 500 to 800 tons per day. It is therefore impossible to dispense with Benghazi.

25 Jun. 1942

V. The German Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that the Japanese Navy has refused to take over war prisoners from a German auxiliary cruiser before settling the financial problem involved. This strange attitude is possibly a reaction to the German demand for payment of German military equipment deliveries to Japan. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees to the Naval Staff's suggestion that the matter must be promptly settled by the Foreign Office through diplomatic channels.

Special Items:

I. The military developments in North Africa have prompted the Naval Staff to consider in detail their effect on naval warfare in the Mediterranean theater. For a preliminary situation evaluation see 1/Skl I b (plan), dated 25 Jun. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

II. The Foreign Office was informed of the order of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines for submarine U "166" to mine the southwest and south passes of the Mississippi River (New Orleans entrance). On 26 Jun., the Foreign Office communicated that the operation may be executed.

III. In accordance with the directive of the Naval High Command, the Deutsche Werke at Gdynia has informed the 22nd Submarine Flotilla that repair of the GNEISENAU has first priority. For this reason, only work now in progress will be completed, and no new repairs will be accepted. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines states that this measure will gradually immobilize the 2nd Submarine Training Division and will thus seriously affect the manning of new operational submarines. The approximately 20 submarines and 10 motor mine sweepers of the 22nd Submarine Flotilla, which operate under a heavy strain, cannot be kept in operating condition unless they undergo repairs every weekend. Their transfer to other shipyards in the east is not feasible because these shipyards are absolutely overburdened with work on other submarines. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines demands that more repair personnel be provided for shipyards working on submarines, so that these vessels can be completed more quickly.

The Submarine Division of the Naval Staff, which is working on the matter, has given it first priority.

IV. The Fuehrer has ordered the preparations for the capture of the Rybachi Peninsula to be continued with emphasis. Whether the attack can still be executed in the late summer of 1942 or not until the late winter of 1943 depends on developments in the Finnish theater and sea transports to Finland.

The Naval Staff has transferred the over-all command of the operation to Group North which is to order the Admiral, Arctic Ocean to carry it out.

The corresponding directive of the Naval Staff is issued to Group North, the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, the Commanding Admiral, Norway, and the Naval Shore Commander, Kirkenes, with copies to the Naval Staff, Quarter-master Division and Communications Division. See 1/Skl I op 957/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in file "Fischerhalbinsel".

V. The following is a list of important German demands met by the Danish Government since 9 Apr. 1940, according to the Embassy in Copenhagen:

25 Jun. 1942

The Danish Navy has agreed:

1. To hand over 40 2cm. anti-aircraft guns.
2. To hand over 6 of its newest torpedo boats.
3. To participate in mine-sweeping operations in Danish waters.
4. To take full charge of the light and radio beacons on the Danish coasts.
5. To mark with buoys the mine-free routes in the Baltic Sea entrances.
6. To maintain a mine-clearance service at sea and along the Danish coasts.
7. To set up 70 air observation stations on land and 6 on lightships.
8. To rebuild the light and radio beacon at Mandehoved for the gap in the minefield in the southern approach to the Sound.
9. To develop a usable mine-sweeping gear for non-contact mines and surrender Danish patents for the construction of 40 such devices for the German Navy.
10. To give Germany access to suitable coastal zones for:
 - a. Listening tests of German submarines near Bornholm.
 - b. Experimentation by the Mine-Laying Experimental Command and the Communications Equipment Experimental Command.
11. To maintain a police patrol service in the entire Sound area.
12. To supply ice-breakers for German war and transport vessels.

VI. On 1 Jun. the Naval Staff asked Group West and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to submit their suggestions for the protection of slow vessels which arrive and depart without direct submarine escort. On the basis of these suggestions and experience, gained during the past blockade-runner season, the Naval Staff finds that the only benefit from a submarine escort would consist in being able to take aboard the crew of a ship in case she is sunk. The Naval Staff has therefore decided that, subject to special regulations for individual cases, blockade-runners should in the future arrive and depart without direct escort by submarines. Instead, in accordance with the suggestion of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, provision should be made in advance for instructions and signals which would enable specific submarines in the area in which a ship is thought to be without further instructions to go to her aid in case of danger, or would enable the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to order a search at once on his own authority. The Naval Staff does not want the ships to cancel their distress signals by radio as requested by the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, since this would endanger the valuable ships; for the same reason submarines are not to send radio reports about sighting the ships unless specifically ordered to do so.

This decision is being sent to Group West and to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines. The latter is requested to make the necessary preparations for the coming blockade-runner season on the basis of a

25 Jun. 1942

preliminary timetable.

VII. Food Situation Report No. 15 considers the situation in the Reich as of 15 Jun. to be better than was to be expected after the severe crop damage during the winter and the weather conditions in the spring. As before, transportation is the bottleneck in food production and distribution. The expected shortage of 3,000,000 tons of bread grains can probably be compensated for by the surplus of feed grains and potatoes. Vegetable production has doubled since 1938. The meat supply will be adequate due to the fact that rations have already been cut. Bulgaria and Rumania expect a good harvest, Italy and Spain an excellent one, Belgium and to a certain extent, Holland as well as Finland will again have shortages. No food deliveries can be expected from the occupied territories in the East this year. The most critical point will be the supply of fats. Thus, whale oil from Japan for margarine production becomes even more important.

VIII. Radio Intelligence Report No. 25/42 of the Naval Staff Communications Division, Communications Intelligence Branch contains a compilation of enemy reports intercepted by radio decoding and radio intelligence up to 21 Jun. The reports do not contain any new data of interest.

The following vessels are presumed to be in British home waters:

Battleships: KING GEORGE V, DUKE OF YORK, HOWE (doubtful whether ready for operations), ANSON (to be commissioned on 27 Jun.), NELSON (in repair), RODNEY, and the U.S. battleship WASHINGTON.

Aircraft carriers: VICTORIOUS, IMPLACABLE, FORMIDABLE (not ready for action), and UNICORN.

Cruisers: BERWICK, DEVONSHIRE, KENT, NORFOLK, SHROPSHIRE, ARGONAUT, BELFAST, NIGERIA, UGANDA, VINDICTIVE, and in repair AURORA and SHEPHERD. Also the U.S. cruisers TUSCALOOSA and WICHITA.

Situation 25 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

Radio intelligence reports that the WARSPITE, which early in May was presumed to be still in the Indian Ocean, has probably returned to home waters via the Panama Canal. The battleship was located for the first time in the waters of northern Scotland on 18 Jun. The RENOWN left Scapa Flow on 9 Jun. to escort 5 large tankers in the direction of Newfoundland (agent report). These tankers had arrived from Trinidad in Rosyth at the end of May and are expected to be back in July. Radio intelligence intercepted messages from the RENOWN for the last time on 8 May while she was departing from Gibraltar in a westerly direction to undergo repairs in the United States, as reported later by an agent.

The light beacons for ships entering the Atlantic from the Panama Canal have been changed.

25 Jun. 1942

The U.S. tanker, BEACON sent the following RRR distress signal from a point some 540 miles southwest of the Cape Verde Islands: "Am being pursued by a raider." Half an hour later the message was cancelled.

Pacific Ocean:

The U.S. naval authorities announced the establishment of a 20 mile wide danger zone for ships off the coast of Alaska.

2. Own Situation:

A British source reports that the British steamer SUDAN (6,677 GRT) struck a mine off Cape Agulhas on 15 May and probably sank. This is the first report of a success resulting from the mining of this area by the DOGGERBANK.

The Naval Staff Communications Division has found that the majority of commercial radio receivers can be detected from as far as 15 to 30 km. All vessels in foreign waters have therefore been given the necessary instructions. The commands are directed to lock up all private radio apparatus. For details see Radiogram 0708.

Another directive to all vessels in foreign waters concerns the use of short waves and orders that the 13 m. wave length, which has been used very little, be dropped after 1 Jul. See Radiogram 2058.

A report on the enemy situation is contained in Radiograms 1207 and 2237.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

The 3rd Air Force has summed up the results of the photographic reconnaissance of the southern coast of England from Dover to Plymouth and compared them with the figures of 3 Jun. The summary shows an increase in

Harbor and coastal vessels	from 201 to 479
Small vessels up to 15 m length	from 735 to 1,491
Landing vessels and barges	from 210 to 832
Total:	from 1,146 to 2,802

Assault landing craft were located for the first time in Chichester on 23 Jun. The main concentration points of vessels suitable for landing operations are in the areas between Selsey Bill and Portland and between Brixham and Plymouth (see Telegram 1440).

Group West shares the opinion that both the assault boats located in the vicinity of Chichester and the vessels in the areas of Portsmouth and Plymouth undoubtedly serve military purposes, to judge from their disposition and type. The Group points out explicitly the fact that their number has been approximately tripled (see Telegram 0239).

According to photographic reconnaissance carried out at 0700 on 25 Jun. 2 destroyers, 7 steamers, 9 tankers, and some 30 coastal vessels were

25 Jun. 1942

located in Falmouth.

Interrogation of the crew of the British steam gunboat (S.G.B.) No. 7 sunk off Cherbourg yielded data on this new type PT boat with steam turbine drive, oil firing, and equipped with guns and torpedoes. A flotilla of 8 such vessels has now been completed. With a displacement of 120 tons and a 2.5 m. draught, they can reach a speed of 45 to 46 knots. The flotilla was transferred to Portsmouth at the beginning of June and is under the command of the Rear Admiral, Coastal Forces.

In view of the weakness of our forces assigned to counter the enemy operations, this increase in the strength of the enemy's light naval forces and their adaptation to the special tasks of the Channel war is extremely disagreeable and presents a very serious menace to our ship movements in the Channel.

While the enemy is emerging with considerable numbers of destroyers, torpedo boats, motor gunboats and torpedo gunboats, our convoys must rely upon protection by their weak escort forces. However, we have at present no more than 8 PT boats ready for action against enemy convoys and naval forces. In view of this overwhelming superiority of the enemy, special recognition must be given to the fact that the devotion with which our escort divisions are fulfilling their assignment has been able to keep our losses up to the present time within reasonable bounds.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Submarine U "753", escorted by 3 mine sweepers, arrived in La Pallice.

Channel Coast:

The operation by the 2nd and 4th PT Boat Flotillas, which was set for the night of 24 Jun., was prevented by bad weather. The mine operation, with a subsequent transfer to Cherbourg, is now set for the night of 25 Jun.

The enemy air raid on 2 vessels of the 2nd Mine Sweeper Flotilla northeast of Ouessant has resulted in casualties among our personnel. The fighters summoned for protection probably shot down 4 planes.

Special Items:

Group West announces that the revised instructions concerning location of mines and sailing directions will be put into effect as of 1 Jul. (See Telegram 2220.)

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Photographic reconnaissance of Scapa Flow at noon located

25 Jun. 1942

the following ships: 2 battleships of the KING GEORGE V class, 3 heavy and 6 or 7 light cruisers, and 7 destroyers. Air reconnaissance located 1 carrier of the ILLUSTRIOUS class with 3 destroyers on a 330° course northwest of the Orkney Islands. 3 convoys totalling about 70 steamers were sighted off the east coast.

Own Situation:

Line-detonating vessels swept 6 ground mines in the German Bight on 24 Jun. and one on 25 Jun.

Unfavorable weather curbed mine-sweeping operations. On the night of 25 Jun., enemy planes were very active over the coastal area of Northern Germany, concentrating their attacks on Bremen and Hamburg.

2. Norway, Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported 1 destroyer and 9 small steamers in the Iokanga Bay at 0830 and 3 steamers on a 300° course south of Jan Mayen at 1430.

Own Situation:

At 0830 enemy planes raided and severely damaged the radio station at Vardoe.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

The Danish steamer POLYP struck a mine and is grounded south of Samsøe.

During an enemy air raid on vessels at Kotka, 2 enemy planes were shot down.

In view of the submarine menace in the Baltic Sea, Group North has ordered new Gjedser minefields to be laid immediately by the SCHUETTE and the NAJADE (see Telegram 1039.)

See Telegram 1502 for Group North's suggestion to reorganize the commands in the western Baltic by dissolving the Baltic Sea Entrance Patrol Command, as requested by the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division will take up the matter.

Group North reports the following points from a communication of the 1st Air Force:

1. German and Finnish air and naval forces are cooperating to fight enemy forces that break through in the Gulf of Finland.

2. The I Air Corps is keeping constantly on the lookout for enemy submarines and surface vessels with single planes. Stronger forces are employed only when there are groups of submarines or other ships which would make profitable targets.

25 Jun. 1942

3. In the Finnish reconnaissance area, the I Air Corps attacks at the request of either the German or the Finnish naval forces.

4. Reconnaissance over the Gulf of Finland by the I Air Corps and the Buschmann Special Squadron is to be intensified.

5. Cooperation with German and Finnish forces is to be ensured by transmitting all reconnaissance and success reports, as well as all our plans, to the Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries and to the German Liaison Officer at the Finnish Air Force.

The Naval Staff approves the above measures.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, 1 eastbound convoy consisting of 11 steamers, 1 ship presumed to be an aircraft carrier, 2 destroyers, and 1 corvette passed Tangier at 0930.

Radio intelligence reports that a British submarine is en route from New London via Bermuda for Gibraltar and that she is proceeding submerged during the daytime.

A belated decoding of an intercepted Admiralty directive of 20 May shows that ships of ON and OS convoys which are bound for ports south of Boston will receive instructions in Boston to proceed to New York via Cape Cod. Other sailing instructions for ships sailing from the American East Coast north of the Chesapeake Bay to Puerto Rico, Trinidad, the eastern coast of South America, and the southern coast of West Africa were incomplete.

On the night of 24 Jun. the steamers MANUELA and another unidentified steamer were torpedoed off Cape Lookout.

According to a special warning, which was intercepted, minefields have been laid in the entrance to Charleston.

2. Own Situation:

Submarines U "153" and U "67" reported sinking the steamer ANGLO CANADIAN (5,268 GRT) and an AHAMO-class tanker (8,500 GRT).

For details and further reports see Supplement to the Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Reconnaissance activity was reported. For results see Enemy Situation, West Area, North Sea, and Arctic Ocean.

On the night of 25 Jun., 120 enemy planes penetrated into the areas of Husum, Kiel, Muehlhausen, and Malmedy. They concentrated their attacks on Bremen, Hamburg, Emden, and Hanover.

25 Jun. 1942

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Air forces supported the Panzer Army operations in North Africa.

3. Eastern Front:

On 24 Jun., planes raiding Sevastopol sank one 500 GRT vessel and 1 patrol boat. On the same day, 1 mine sweeper was sunk and one 400 GRT vessel damaged in the Gulf of Finland. On 25 Jun., 1 enemy submarine was definitely destroyed.

The 5th Air Force carried out raids on the airfield of Murmashi and on shipyard installations in Rostov. 8 enemy planes were destroyed.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

According to Italian reports, the MALAYA and 4 destroyers left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean. Radio intelligence gives no additional information. Another Italian report states that 2 U.S. cruisers and 6 destroyers flying the British flag (which is most unlikely) are in the Mediterranean. According to still another Italian report which is also unlikely, the MANXMAN, which left Gibraltar on 20 Jun., returned on 25 Jun. listing and with her stern flooded. The mine-laying cruiser had already been reported in the same condition on her return from the Mediterranean on 17 Jun. and no confirmation of the damage could be obtained at that time either.

No change in the number of ships at anchor in Valletta on 25 Jun. was observed.

Air reconnaissance located 3 westbound and 4 eastbound steamers between Marsa Matruh and Alexandria.

Radio intelligence reports that British planes made contact with Italian vessels off Cape Colonne and in the Gulf of Taranto and communicated their observations to submarines.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

On the night of 24 Jun. enemy planes raided Benghazi. Operations of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla in the coastal zone as far as east of Sidi Barrani, carried out in the same night, were unsuccessful. No enemy vessels were located in Sollum. For brief report of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla see Telegram 1030.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

On the night of 24 Jun., enemy planes again unsuccessfully attacked the motor ship ROSELLI which has now entered Taranto.

A third transport submarine departed for either Bardia or Derna.

Transport of supplies in coastal waters up to Tobruk is proceeding as scheduled, without any incidents.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

On the evening of 24 Jun. a German battery fired without

25 Jun. 1942

effect on an unidentified motor vessel off the northeastern tip of Lemnos. Lack of vessels prevented pursuit of the motor vessel.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No noteworthy reports have been received.

Own Situation:

On the night of 24 Jun. 5 German PT boats unsuccessfully attacked 1 enemy destroyer west of Cape Sarich.

Operations by motorboats and Italian subchasers south of Yalta failed to yield any results.

The mine operations in the bay of Odessa were started on 24 Jun. and continued on 25 Jun.

VIII. Situation East Asia

No reports of interest have been received.

IX. Army Situation:

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Operations on the northeastern and eastern fronts of Sevastopol are progressing in the face of extremely stubborn enemy resistance.

On the night of 22 Jun., an enemy attempt to land small forces near Mariupol was repelled. Coastal defenses were temporarily reinforced by naval personnel in the strength of 150 men.

During the fighting in the Oskol sector we took 18,500 prisoners and captured more than 100 tanks and 150 guns. North of Kupyansk fighting to reach the Dvurychnaya sector continues.

Central Army Group:

Local engagements, fought mainly against guerrilla groups behind the front, helped to clear the situation further.

Northern Army Group:

Fierce fighting continues around and in the Volkhov pocket. The front sealing off the pocket in the west was reestablished.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

No noteworthy fighting is reported.

25 Jun. 1942

3. North Africa:

The enemy is biding his time. Lively enemy reconnaissance and air activity is reported.

The Panzer Army continued its pursuit toward the east. On the southern wing, the German Africa Corps and the 90th Light Infantry Division joined; the Italian XX Motorized Corps is now in the area 40 km south of Sidi Barrani. The XXI and X Army Corps pushed forward on the Via Balbia.

The Panzer Army High Command has asked that the German naval patrol forces and landing craft remain assigned to the Panzer Army as long as the operation continues, since their withdrawal would make it impossible to supply the Panzer Army in its present area of operations.

This refers to the withdrawal of naval forces for operation "Herkules", originally planned by the Duce, which, however, is no longer under consideration.

26 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

France:

After Laval came to power, the Americans increased their efforts to impair France's relations with the Axis powers. Since Laval has managed skillfully to evade America's extortionary tactics and has won a large following among the French people, the Americans have now changed their policy and are now trying to discredit Laval with the Axis powers by propagandizing him as their man, while carrying on their undercover fight against him inside France. For details see Political Review No. 147, Paragraph 1.

Great Britain:

A report originating in American Legation circles in Lisbon states that at their latest conference Churchill tried to obtain from Roosevelt more U.S. cruisers and destroyers to be manned by British repair ship crews.

In the House of Commons it was stated that the constant discussion in articles and speeches of the need for a Second Front is absolutely undesirable.

Portugal:

Salazar's broadcast contained the noteworthy remark that the Anglo-Portuguese alliance is of no decisive importance even though it is being maintained. The speech outlined the dangers which would threaten Europe in case of a Russian victory. For details see Political Review No. 147, Paragraph 3.

U.S.A.:

Reuter reports that Churchill gave an optimistic picture of the situation at the session of the War Council in Washington and dispelled completely the prevailing anxiety over the fate of Egypt.

The War Department announced the nomination of General Eisenhower to the post of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in the European Theater.

Argentina:

The German Embassy reports that the economic pressure exercised by the U.S.A. is constantly increasing. If Great Britain should give up her policy of supporting Argentina's neutrality, the country would hardly be able to resist the resultant joint Anglo-American pressure. More important than anything else, however, is the shipping problem, which is the focal point of Castillo's political program. Should the latest measures on the part of Germany make it impossible to maintain this shipping, Castillo would be forced, much to his dislike, to break off relations with the Axis powers.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief of the Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports that, after the KOELN has been repaired and has carried out the "Kunigunde" mine operation, Group North intends to transfer her to Narvik and to assign her to the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers.

26 Jun. 1942

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

A further report deals with a list of successes achieved by the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla in the Mediterranean as reported by the German Naval Command, Italy (see War Diary 24 Jun.).

II. The Fuehrer's decision in connection with the report of the Chief, Naval Construction Division of 22 Jun., ordering that the SEIDLITZ be converted into an aircraft carrier and the steamers EUROPA, POTSDAM, and GNEISENAU into auxiliary aircraft carriers, has led to new discussions about the problem of shipyard workers, which can only be solved by allocation of additional manpower. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division will bring out this viewpoint at his conference with Minister Speer; he points out, however, that the skilled workers required for the job can be made available only by drawing on the Armed Forces, including the Navy. In the meantime, the Armed Forces High Command has issued a directive for the transfer of all shipyard workers from the replacement reserves of the other branches of the Armed Forces to the Navy. The Recruitment Division of the Naval High Command has not yet received the directive; it is, therefore, not yet clear whether the Navy will have to furnish replacements from other skilled groups.

The Chief, Naval Staff Officer Personnel Division stresses the great difficulties involved in providing officers for the aircraft carriers.

The Naval Staff welcomes the Fuehrer directive from a general operational point of view. However, not only will it be difficult to solve the problem of personnel in the future, but the working capacity of the shipyards will even at the present moment hardly suffice to carry out the new task in addition to the current urgent work program, unless very radical measures are introduced. The Naval Staff considers it necessary to make sure that the submarine and light vessel construction program is not curtailed, in case the required number of skilled workers cannot be supplied. The Naval Staff will inform the Naval Construction Division and the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division to this effect. It will be necessary to set up a new priority schedule for the construction projects.

III. The Chief of the Naval Staff Ordnance Division reports that mine-detonating vessel "183" which sank as a result of a mine hit had been repolarized. Since repolarization has proved very satisfactory in all instances in the past (the detonation points were advanced by about 200 m), it is quite possible that mine-detonating vessel "183" touched off a contact mine.

IV. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports that the French Navy has requested authorization for the manufacture of 3 gun barrels for the RICHELIEU and 4 for the JEAN BART. Since construction will take 1 1/2 to 2 years, the Naval Staff suggests that authorization be granted for the manufacture but not for the mounting of the gun barrels.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees, subject to approval by the Fuehrer.

In a Very Restricted Circle:

V. Vice-Admiral Krancke reports that the Fuehrer has decided to keep the shipyards in Emden in full operation since Minister Speer and Staatsrat Blohm made clear that a reduction of shipyard work in Emden as planned by the Navy would cause a substantial drop in the total shipyard production in the Reich.

26 Jun. 1942

VI. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division delivers the following report in connection with the estimate of the situation by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South:

Rommel could carry his operations as far as the line leading from El Daba to the Qattara Depression even if the transport of supplies becomes more difficult, provided the Air Force supports him to the same extent as heretofore. He also could hold this line. It is, however, not possible to pull out the forces required for operation "Herkules".

During the operation, movements of large vessels must be suspended. The most needed supplies will have to be transported by submarines, fast vessels, and planes. Losses such as the recent ones are unbearable.

In view of the enemy's flexible retreat, any more distant goal aimed at with the available forces in the face of the growing transportation crisis would jeopardize all the previous achievements.

After the completion of Rommel's advance, it will be necessary to increase the air forces on Sicily to 3 or 4 German and 3 or 4 Italian fighter groups, and 6 to 8 German and Italian bomber groups. This would restore our air superiority within a few days and would make it possible to rush the accumulated convoys through to their destination, if the enemy submarines are systematically fought off.

Situation 26 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

The Naval Attache in Buenos Aires reports that the Brazilian warships are not employed in convoys but are carrying out patrol duty. The entire Brazilian coast is patrolled by planes. Warships and planes have received orders to attack Axis vessels (see War Diary 25 Jun.).

According to an Italian report, 41 steamers were located on 23 Jun. in the harbor and the roadstead of Lourenco Marques and 30 in the area off the harbor. During the last few days, a convoy of 20 steamers is said to have departed from Durban to North Africa, and a convoy of 50 steamers carrying U.S. troops from Cape Town to Australia. The latter report is confirmed by the German consul in Lourenco Marques, who also states that 30 U.S. ships are expected to assemble shortly off Lourenco Marques in order to form a convoy.

2. Own Situation:

On 27 Jun. at 0000 the extension of the blockade area in the Atlantic will come into force. From that hour on, immediate attack without warning against any vessels and planes within the new boundaries of this area is permitted.

The corresponding directive is being sent to all forces in foreign waters, with mention of exceptions, via Radiogram 1623.

The Naval Attache in Tokyo reports that the REGENSBURG passed through the Sunda Strait on 23 Jun. and will presumably arrive in Yokohama on 6 or 7 Jul.

26 Jun. 1942

Via Radiogram 1215 the Naval Staff transmits to the REGENSBURG the directive of the Naval Attache in Tokyo advising her not to declare any prize cargo but simply not to list it at all. This measure is probably due to difficulties connected with the Japanese customs.

The Naval Attache in Tokyo is being notified that the Naval Staff has undertaken further steps with reference to the Japanese position on taking over prisoners. The Attache in Tokyo has been requested to keep the Naval Staff informed about the status of this matter, as well as about any difficulties in connection with prizes or cargos, insofar as they cannot be settled in Tokyo; also to communicate whether the HERBORG has received permission to proceed to Japan (see Telegram 1130).

After the Attache in Tokyo assured the Japanese Navy that the HERBORG will stay in Batavia only a short time, the HERBORG is directed to enter Batavia, to get her further sailing instructions there, and to set out for Japan as soon as possible. The Naval Staff expects the ship to enter Batavia on 29 or 30 Jun. (See Radiogram 1619.)

The Attache in Tokyo is being notified accordingly via Telegram 1950.

Information on the enemy situation is sent out via Radiograms 1907 and 2350.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

In the evening air reconnaissance located 8 destroyers off Hastings.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

During the air raid on St. Nazaire on the night of 24 Jun. slight damage was caused in the shipyard area.

The Commander in Chief, Air Force has ordered the first 4 Ju 88 C (twin-engine-long-range fighter) planes coming off the assembly line to be allocated to the 3rd Air Force in Bordeaux without crews. The 3rd Air Force is to employ these planes exclusively for the protection of damaged submarines arriving from the Atlantic and for the escort of blockade-runners.

Channel Coast:

The PT boat operation set for the night of 25 Jun. could not be executed because of bad weather. The mine operation in the area off Hastings is set for the night of 26 Jun. In the morning enemy fighters attacked 6 drifters of the 38th Mine Sweeper Flotilla off Dieppe; 1 plane was shot down. During the air raid on the 2nd Mine Sweeper Flotilla off Ouessant (see War Diary 25 Jun.) the vessels of the flotilla shot down 3 of the attacking planes.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

During the enemy air raid on Bremen on the night of 25 Jun.

26 Jun. 1942

the officers' quarters in the Deschimag yard received a direct hit. Among others, 2 submarine commanders were badly wounded.

For further effects of the raids in the area of East Frisia see Telegram 2001.

Unfavorable weather conditions hampered convoy and mine-sweeping operations.

2. Norway, Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

According to a British Admiralty report of 7 May decoded by our radio intelligence, torpedo planes sank 3 medium-sized British ships from a departing convoy bound for Russia.

According to an Admiralty report of 21 Apr., 4 ships of the south-bound QP 10 convoy were lost due to enemy action.

An Admiralty report of 19 May reads as follows:

"On 17 May, around 2020, 27 torpedo planes and a fighter escort of 8 Beaufighters and 6 Blenheims attacked the PRINZ EUGEN off the Rolland Lighthouse after air reconnaissance had twice reported sighting the PRINZ EUGEN and 4 destroyers. 2 torpedo hits were reported but details are lacking. 5 enemy planes were shot down and 9 British planes failed to return. On the night of 17 May, 60 planes were sent on mining missions over enemy waters".

The last sentence of the report confirms the assumption that strong enemy forces are carrying out the mine-laying offensive.

Reconnaissance in the Arctic Ocean in search of convoy PQ 17 was unsuccessful.

Own Situation:

A submarine has been ordered to reconnoiter the ice boundary west of Jan Mayen and to investigate whether convoys can pass through the waters north of Jan Mayen.

Convoy and ship movements are proceeding according to plan, without any incidents.

In the area of the Admiral, West Norwegian Coast and of the Naval Shore Command, Oslo Fjord, the Territorial Commander for Southern Norway has ordered a first-degree alert as the usual security measure for bad weather.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence reports that on 25 Jun. 6 submarines were at sea in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. The commander of a motor mine sweeper division was ordered to continue mine sweeping operations. Unidentified vessels reported an unsuccessful attack by

26 Jun. 1942

Ju 88's. An inquiry of 24 Jun. was intercepted asking how many mines a certain plane laid and from what height they were dropped. A force of 4 PT boats was observed en route from Kronstadt to Lavansaari.

2. Own Situation:

The Finnish Air Force reports that an enemy submarine was definitely destroyed in quadrant AO 3612 on 25 Jun.

Minefield "Seeigel XV" has been laid according to plan. An Estonian sailboat which had disregarded her course instructions sank in our minefield in the Reval Bay. A subchaser attacked an enemy submarine in quadrant AO 3289. No success has as yet been reported.

The Swedish Navy completed laying the Oeland minefield on 25 Jun. at 0300. According to a Swedish Navy report, the ferry service between Sassnitz and Trelleborg in the southern part of the Baltic Sea has been temporarily suspended because of the submarine menace. The Swedish Navy established a patrol service in the Swedish territorial waters along the south coast of Sweden. It is not intended to extend the escort by Swedish vessels to the territorial waters south of Garpen. Suspension of the ferry service between Sassnitz and Trelleborg was the result of the appearance of 1 or possibly 2 submarines outside the Swedish territorial waters in the latitude of Trelleborg. (See Telegram 1600.)

The Naval Staff has notified Group North and the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea to this effect.

For Group North's directive concerning recognition signals for German submarines in the area east of the Gjedser minefield see Telegram 1358.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

On the evening of 25 Jun., radio intelligence located a convoy proceeding from Iceland to the British Isles at 63° 30' N, 22° 10' W. Submarine sighting reports were intercepted from the Gulf of Maine, off the east coast of Florida, and east of the Florida Strait.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "376" has been assigned to reconnoiter the ice boundary west of Jan Mayen.

Submarine U "404" intercepted a convoy off the American east coast, but is being driven off by a 4-funnel destroyer. Submarines in the North American area will be refuelled by submarines U "460" and "459".

Submarine U "203" sank the steamers PUTNEY HILL (5,216 GRT) and PEDRINHAS (3,666 GRT) en route to the Caribbean Sea. Submarine U "129" reports sinking the steamer MILLINOCKET (3,274 GRT) carrying a cargo of bauxite. The submarine observed that the oil loading station near Paolo Blanco was not in operation and that there was no traffic in the Tampico roadstead and north of it.

In connection with the extension of the blockade area, the submarines have received orders concerning the restricted use of arms against neutral vessels.

26 Jun. 1942

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

In the afternoon enemy planes attacked the area of Le Havre, causing damage to communications. 4 planes were shot down.

The Air Commander, Atlantic Coast reports that 5 Ju 88's have been transferred to Bordeaux for missions with the Commanding Admiral, Submarines. The corresponding directive of the Air Force General Staff mentioned only 4 planes. (See Situation West Area.)

On the night of 26 Jun. 60 of our planes were sent into action against Norwich. Only 6 enemy incursions, evidently for the purpose of dropping mines, were observed over the coast between Borkum and Norderney. Approximately 40 incursions, also probably for the purpose of dropping mines off St. Nazaire and Lorient, were reported from western France; in addition a small number of demolition bombs were reported dropped in the harbor area of St. Nazaire.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The air forces under the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South are currently employed to support Rommel's Panzer Army.

3. Eastern Front:

No noteworthy reports have been received.

According to a communication by the Air Force Operations Staff, a report from Africa states that a Spitfire attacked a Ju 88 at an altitude of 12,000 m. No such altitudes have been previously recorded for fighter engagements.

4. Special Items:

(1) As of 28 May, the Commander in Chief, Air Force ordered the 506th Coastal Air Group incorporated into the 26th Bomber Wing. This eliminates the last force over which the Commander, Naval Air still had jurisdiction in the southern part of the North Sea. Now the Commander, Naval Air no longer has any forces at his disposal.

(2) The Air Force Operations Staff has announced that very soon the British Air Force will be fought by attacks on its ground installations.

(3) The Commander in Chief, Air Force has also transmitted information about radar sets used on planes for locating ships. The following 3 types have been developed so far:

The Rostock set, with a range of 30 km.

The Lichtenstein set, with a range of 80 km.

The Hohentwiel set, with a range of more than 80 km.

The first 2 of the available 20 Rostock sets will be installed in the FW 200's which are to be assigned to the 5th Air Force.

(4) The Naval Liaison Officer to the Commander in Chief, Air Force has communicated the Navy's findings with regard to inadequate recognition signals on planes. The Air Force believes that the main

26 Jun. 1942

problem is the necessity of simplifying the signals. However, the Air Force will follow up the Navy's suggestions.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

On 25 Jun., a convoy of 11 steamers coming from the west entered Gibraltar. As expected, the alleged damage to mine-laying cruiser MANXMAN, reported by the Italians on 25 Jun., has not been confirmed by a German intelligence report from Spain. The MANXMAN left port again around midnight, departing in a westerly direction.

No reports were received from the western Mediterranean on the whereabouts of the MALAYA, which leads to the assumption that she departed for the Atlantic.

No noteworthy reports have been received from the central Mediterranean, and the interpretation of photographs taken over Alexandria on 25 Jun. failed likewise to yield any results of importance.

An agent reports from Port Sudan that British Fleet vessels are being concentrated in the Red Sea.

On the evening of 26 Jun. radio intelligence intercepted instructions issued by the French Admiralty to the naval forces interned in Alexandria in case of a British evacuation. The ship commanders are ordered not to call at any British port, to remain under the French flag in Alexandria, or to scuttle their ships. In no case must they fall undamaged into foreign hands or follow the fleeing British vessels.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

Bad weather prevented operations of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla on 25 Jun. Enemy planes raided the harbor of Tobruk on 25 Jun. No damage was reported.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The steamers OSTIA and ISEO have been en route from Italy to Tripoli since 25 Jun. On the night of 25 Jun. enemy planes unsuccessfully attacked the tanker PANUCO between Messina and Taranto.

On the evening of 25 Jun., 4 naval barges escorted by a motor mine sweeper departed from Tobruk in the direction of Sidi Barrani. On 25 Jun. 385 tons were unloaded in Tobruk.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

While being loaded with fuel for Tobruk, the steamer AVIONIA caught fire. She is now a total loss. Fire destroyed 47 German depth charges in the dump in Canea.

Since 1 Jan. 1942, the 10th Crete transport group has ferried 26,000 men from the mainland to the island and 5,500 in the opposite direction. The only loss was that of the steamer CITTA DI LIVORNO which was sunk by a submarine; her crew, however, was saved, with the exception of 11 men.

26 Jun. 1942

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reports that on the evening of 25 Jun. a number of destroyers were observed entering Sevastopol. They departed on the morning of 26 Jun. Evidently the fortress can now be safely supplied only at night.

Own Situation:

On the night of 25 Jun. 2 German and 2 Italian PT boats, as well as 2 motor boats and 1 Italian submarine were operating off Sevastopol and south of it. No successes have been reported.

On the evening of 25 Jun. the Italian submarines CB "2" and CB "3" entered Constanta. On 26 Jun., the harbor of Taganrog was unsuccessfully fired upon from the sea.

The Bulgarian training force engaged an enemy submarine south of Varna, probably successfully.

VIII. Situation East Asia

According to an official Japanese report, the performance of the U.S. torpedo planes is poor, and they attack in insufficient numbers.

Japanese forces occupied the island Espirito-Santo in the New Hebrides. Australian air forces, presumably in cooperation with submarines, have been observed launching operations between New Caledonia and the north-eastern coast of Australia; the aim of the operations is not yet known.

Press reports state that, after having occupied the islands Kiska and Attu in the Aleutians, the Japanese mopped up enemy forces on the neighboring islands.

The dispute about who sank the Russian ship ANGARSTROI is still going on. So far, no clear picture could be obtained.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The offensive against Sevastopol is making progress on the northeastern and eastern fronts at times, despite very stubborn enemy resistance. On the night of 25 Jun., the enemy again attempted to land small forces northeast of Kerch. These attempts are evidently small-scale partisan operations, without any tactical significance.

In the area north of Izyum our troops took Dvuryechnaya in their thrust toward the northeast. Enemy positions on the eastern bank of the Oskol River are being reinforced.

Central Army Group:

In the Bryansk area our forces continued to mop up the

26 Jun. 1942

partisans according to plan.

Northern Army Group:

Enemy tank attacks against the eastern front of the defense position near Yarnno were repulsed. Operations to narrow down the Volkhov pocket continued. Enemy attacks at the bridgehead south of Soltsy were beaten off.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

No noteworthy engagements were reported on 25 Jun.

3. North Africa:

By 26 Jun. in the evening the attacking advance elements of the motorized forces of the Panzer Army seized the area 15 km. south of Marsa Matruh. Motorized units of the Infantry Corps cut off the Marsa Matruh fortress from the west.

27 Jun. 1942

Items of Political ImportanceGreat Britain:

Despite all the criticisms voiced in view of the prevailing military situation, Churchill and his government can still be expected to weather the storm once more. On the other hand, the previous proposal to induce Churchill to resign as Minister of Defense is again under discussion, with General Wavell generally mentioned for this post. Churchill is now back in England.

Egypt:

The Transocean News Agency reports that British military authorities have ordered the arrest of a number of Egyptian political leaders, particularly those who were members of the former green shirt organization, and have deported them to Palestine. The British Commanding General has rejected the Egyptian demand that Cairo be declared an open city, since such a measure is technically impossible and would only increase the prevailing panic.

India:

A report from a diplomatic source states that Churchill and Roosevelt also discussed the Indian problem during their talks in Washington. Roosevelt is said to have recommended immediate political independence for India, thus winning her support for the British defense measures in that country.

Portugal:

The fall of Tobruk has increased the anxiety of official Portuguese circles about the possibility that the deterioration of the political situation in South Africa might induce Smuts to advance again his previous plans with regard to Portuguese colonies.

Turkey:

According to a German Embassy report, the Turkish Embassy in Teheran submitted a detailed account of the Russian excesses against Turkish minority groups in Iran, which have now called on Turkey for protection. Since all representations made to the Russians proved unsuccessful, the Turkish Government has been compelled to take defensive measures on the Iranian border.

Chile:

The Foreign Ministry announced that any future developments which affect the national security of Chile, such as an attack on the Panama Canal or on merchant shipping in the Pacific between Panama and Cape Horn, are bound to affect Chile's neutrality.

Japan:

With reference to the growing nervousness in Manchuria about an impending war between Japan and Russia, the Embassy reports that although a Japanese action against Russia is being systematically prepared and may be considered certain, the date of the attack is still undetermined and no indications of an early outbreak of the war are apparent.

27 Jun. 1942

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. In accordance with the stand taken by the Foreign Minister, the Fuehrer has given up the plan to strike at Brazil by a sudden submarine operation. The Naval Staff's proposal concerning the permission to use arms against Brazilian war and merchant ships will be decided upon as soon as possible.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff will be present at the Fuehrer Headquarters today, on the occasion of Field Marshal Mannersheim's visit to the Fuehrer.

The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff suggests to the Commander in Chief, Navy that the Fuehrer be told again as soon as possible that the Japanese must intensify their action against the British sea communications in the western part of the Indian Ocean. The Fuehrer should also be advised to have the German views communicated officially to the Japanese Command through the highest German military or political authority. The Naval Staff has repeatedly emphasized to Nomura's Japanese Liaison Staff the necessity of shifting the main effort of the Japanese naval war to the western Indian Ocean. It pointed out the necessity of concentrating our efforts in the Indian Ocean at present in the interest of the joint conduct of the war, even if this were to result in a temporary postponement of the Japanese plans in the Pacific, since for the time being there is no indication of any threat to Japan from the Pacific area.

The Naval Staff has exhausted all possibilities for influencing the Japanese. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees to the suggestion and will, if he possibly can, discuss this matter with the Fuehrer.

III. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division gives the following account of the radio report sent to the Armed Forces High Command by the German General at the Italian Armed Forces Headquarters:

On 25 Jun. a conference was held in Derna between General Cavallero, Field Marshal Kesselring, General Rintelen, Admiral Weichold, General Bastico, and General Marchesi. The following points were discussed:

a. Support of the Panzer Army advance by German and Italian Air forces. A reduction of German forces is out of the question. For a rapid advance of the German Air Force it is necessary to halt the Italian Infantry Corps and to utilize its motor vehicles to transport the necessary ground personnel. Air reconnaissance has observed heavy traffic of enemy motor vehicles from Marsa Matruh to the east, which proves that the British apparently do not intend to join battle there.

b. To avoid a grave crisis in the transport of supplies toward the middle of July, it is necessary that supply shipments from Italy be immediately resumed. Consequently, it is also absolutely necessary to paralyze Malta. Cavallero considers the available fighter forces still inadequate. Admiral Weichold proposes to push the coastal transport of supplies up to Marsa Matruh as soon as the latter is captured.

The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division discusses also Field Marshall Kesselring's report about the above conference. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South had been out of contact with Rommel since 23 Jun. and it was not before 26 Jun. that he learned from Cavallero about the operations plans of the Panzer Army. The situation with regard to motor vehicles had deteriorated to such an extent that the dive bomber wing and the long-range fighter group had to wait till

27 Jun. 1942

the fighter planes could be brought up to what was the most advanced area on 25 Jun. The measures undertaken on the initiative of Marshal Weichold will become effective in the Sidi Barrani area tomorrow, and the Marsa Matruh area the day after tomorrow. Otherwise the report coincides with the presentation by Rintelen.

Another item discussed by the Chief of Operations Branch is General Rintelen's report to the Armed Forces High Command about the conference between Field Marshal Rommel and General Cavallero held in the vicinity of Sidi Barrani, with Field Marshal Kesselring, General Bastico and General Fougier participating.

(1) The situation of the British 8th Army calls for the fullest exploitation of previous successes.

(2) Nevertheless, the difficulties posed by the supply problem must not be disregarded. Malta has resumed its offensive activity as an air base. The Tripoli route must be dispensed with for the time being. The Cyrenaica route is likewise endangered. The plan is therefore to paralyze Malta more effectively, even if this requires that forces be transferred from Germany. In the meantime a critical period will be inevitable. However, everything will be done to bring a few convoys to Benghazi and, if possible, a few steamers to Tobruk, to increase the transport of supplies by air, and to employ submarines for fuel supplies.

(3) Under these circumstances, the stocks of supplies in Africa must be utilized to leave the enemy no time to rally his forces. Close co-operation between ground and air forces must be assured.

(4) The Duce therefore orders as follows:

(a) As the first step, to occupy with major forces the stretch between the Arabs Gulf and the Qattara Depression, which is to constitute the starting point for further action.

(b) To take the fortifications in the Matnik-Bagush area and annihilate the enemy forces in the area of Marsa Matruh before continuing the advance.

(c) To keep the operations which extend beyond the aforementioned stretch in line with the over-all situation in the Mediterranean.

(5) The German and Italian air forces must be brought up with greatest speed since the enemy can quickly reinforce his own air forces.

(6) The oases Giarabub and Siwa are to be occupied as early as possible.

General Rintelen reports further on Rommel's plans to attack the British positions near and south of Marsa Matruh on the afternoon of 26 Jun. and to carry the thrust to the stretch east of El Daba. From there the offensive will be carried on, depending on the situation, either in the direction of Alexandria or via Cairo as far as the Suez Canal. Except for artillery, the Italian infantry divisions will have to march on foot. At present, 50 German tanks are ready for action and 200 are in repair. Part of the latter will be ready soon.

The Naval Staff greatly welcomes the course which the developments in North Africa have taken owing to the Fuehrer's intervention. From the very beginning the Naval Staff has emphasized the decisive importance of the Suez area, and it feels entitled to consider the Fuehrer's letter to the

27 Jun. 1942

Duce, a copy of which is recorded in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV under the date of 27 Jun., as a confirmation of its views. These views were for the first time outlined in the Naval Staff's evaluation of the situation in the Mediterranean from the point of view of naval and military strategy submitted to the Italian Navy on 10 Jan. 1942. They were communicated to the Fuehrer and to the Armed Forces High Command in the Naval Staff's memorandum of 25 Feb. 1942 in answer to the question: What should be the strategy of the Tripartite-Pact powers in their further conduct of war in view of the present situation?

Special Items:

I. A report of 2 general staff officers from the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff about their official trip to the west area contains the assertion that the Navy has somewhat modified its views about possible enemy landings. Thus, for example, the Navy is said to consider it now quite possible that the enemy might land in the southern area of the 7th Army, while a landing in that area was previously held unlikely.

In this connection, the Naval Staff refers the Naval Liaison Officer to the Army General Staff to its extensive study of the landing possibilities on the coasts within the German sphere of influence (1/Skl I op 288/41 Gkdos. Chefs of 26 Mar. 1941), where a landing on the western coast of France south of the Gironde is considered possible only on rare occasions and under great difficulties; on the other hand, a landing is considered possible from the Gironde up to north of Lorient. This opinion is in no way contradicted by the Naval Staff's reply of 28 Apr. 1942 (1/Skl I op 6224/42 Gkdos.) to the Army General Staff's deliberations on enemy landings in Western Europe, since it considers merely the area between the Loire and Gironde estuaries, disregarding the area south of the Gironde in accordance with last year's statements.

II. The Naval Staff Operations Division points out to the Executive Office of the Commander in Chief, Navy that a drop in the number of submarine successes, such as might be expected in the next few months, will have to be countered by a cautious and reserved policy in handling news releases. For details see 1/Skl I p 15426/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

III. On 22 Jun. a conference was held between Admiral Nomura and the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff. The main points discussed were the war in North Africa, the situation in the Pacific, the submarine warfare, and the voyage of the Japanese submarine to western France.

For minutes of the conference see 1/Skl I b 15785/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

IV. For the security regulations sent by the Naval Staff Operations Division to the Administrative Staff of the Executive Office of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with copy to the Naval Attache Section, concerning the arrival of the Japanese submarine in a harbor of western France see 1/Skl I k 15272/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

27 Jun. 1942

V. News Analysis "Foreign Navies" No. 30 of the Naval Staff Intelligence Division contains a description of the defense installations in Gibraltar.

Situation 27 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

According to an Italian report, 4 aircraft carriers are being built in the New York shipyards. One of them, the MAURETANIA, is already fully equipped. Two of the carriers have not yet been named, but the fourth is called ILE DE FRANCE.

South Atlantic:

Radio intelligence reports that on 25 Jun. 1 U.S. cruiser and 1 destroyer were located on the equator at 35° W. According to a Portuguese source in Angola, heavy traffic has been observed in the harbor of Banana.

Indian Ocean:

On 14 Jun. 4 unidentified vessels departed from Kilindini (near Mombasa) in the direction of Durban.

2. Own Situation:

Via Radiogram 1118 the DOGGERBANK received information about the sinking of the British steamer SUDAN off Cape Agulhas as a result of a mine hit, along with congratulations on this success.

Information about this probable mine success of the DOGGERBANK, as well as about the arrival of the DRESDEN in Yokohama on 23 Jun. was transmitted to all forces in foreign waters via Radiogram 1022.

The Japanese Navy communicates that the Japanese submarine I "30" will be south of Capetown on 27 Jun. From there she will proceed to West Africa and her position on 15 Jul. will be west of the Cape Verde Islands. The submarine is informed about the presence of German auxiliary cruisers in the South Atlantic and has received orders identical with those issued to our submarines.

Via Radiogram 2009 all forces in foreign waters are being notified of the above, as well as of the external characteristics of the Japanese submarine.

Via Radiogram 1429 ship "10" is being informed about the latest positions of the ships which she will use for cover names.

The characteristics of the Dutch steamer TJIBADAK serving as a cover name for the RHAKOTIS were communicated to the Naval Attache in Tokyo via Telegram 1945.

27 Jun. 1942

Information on the enemy situation was sent out via Radiograms 0721, 1838, and 2332.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Group West has transmitted a detailed report of the 3rd Air Force about photographic reconnaissance of the southern coast of England carried out between 20 and 23 Jun. For copy see Telegram 0200. The 3rd Air Force has arrived at the conclusion that enemy landings may be considered impending. On the other hand, the 3rd Air Force does not exclude the possibility that the enemy might be staging a large-scale feint, because of the surprising fact that the vessels are assembled in large groups, apparently without any attempt at camouflage.

The views of the 3rd Air Force are absolutely correct.

According to an intelligence report, British troop landings in northern France were planned for the end of June. For the time being, however, their execution has been postponed pending the outcome of the negotiations between Churchill and Roosevelt in Washington, which will decide whether this plan is to be executed within the next few days or whether, instead, troop reinforcements should be sent to Egypt.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

6 ground mines were swept in the St. Nazaire area and 2 north of Belle Ile. On the night of 26 Jun. enemy planes were active over the area of St. Nazaire and Lorient. Enemy planes probably dropped mines off the Loire estuary. The planes also bombed and strafed vessels of the harbor defense flotillas without causing any damage or casualties. The ban on the Gironde traffic has been lifted.

Channel Coast:

On the night of 26 Jun. the 2nd and 4th PT Boat Flotillas executed the mine operation off Hastings according to plan. Off Cape Gris Nez enemy fighters attacked PT boat S "78" three times, en route from Rotterdam to Boulogne. The vessel suffered casualties. For brief report of the 4th PT Boat Flotilla see Telegram 0735. On the evening of 27 Jun. both flotillas transferred to Cherbourg.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Execution of the "Grossfuerst" mine operation (minefield 22A) is set for the night of 27 Jun. Otherwise there is nothing to report.

2. Norway, Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, at 1230 a British plane

27 Jun. 1942

reported the presence of 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, and 4 destroyers in the Aasen Fjord.

Our air reconnaissance over the Arctic Ocean failed to yield results.

Own Situation:

At 0338, a convoy was unsuccessfully attacked by gunfire from the Rybachi Peninsula; northeast of Tanahorn one of our planes forced an enemy submarine to submerge. Convoy and mine-sweeping operations are proceeding according to plan.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence is intercepting numerous messages of Russian vessels reporting German air attacks and the damage caused.

2. Own Situation:

Convoy and mine-sweeping operations in the entrances and the western part of the Baltic Sea are proceeding as scheduled.

The Naval Attache in Stockholm has conveyed to the Swedish Navy the German wishes concerning the resumption of the ferry service between Sassnitz and Trelleborg. However, the Swedish Navy does not think that it can take the responsibility for it at the present moment. The Swedish Navy refers in this connection to the report of the Chief of the Naval District, Southern Coast, according to which a submarine was definitely sighted southwest of Trelleborg. The Swedes make the resumption of the ferry service dependent on better weather conditions. This decision would not be affected by assigning a German escort to the ferry service. (See Telegram 1745.)

The Naval Staff regrets this attitude of the Swedish Navy because of the difficulties arising from it for the traffic between Germany and Sweden. The decision is the more regrettable since Germany has received no indications of a submarine menace in the central part of the Baltic to date.

The compulsory escort in Swedish waters is likewise very annoying to German shipping. Due to the prevailing ice conditions, the ore shipments from Lulea were delayed for 3 weeks and were not resumed until 27 May. By 15 Jun. only 149,000 tons of ore had been shipped, as a result of the shortage of ships, compared with 370,000 tons shipped in the corresponding period last year. In view of these difficulties, the Commissioner of Maritime Shipping expressed the wish that the traffic with Sweden be facilitated as much as possible even if this involves certain risks. The Naval Staff therefore asked Group North on 26 Jun. to determine the earliest date on which compulsory escort could be changed to voluntary escort, and the regulation concerning the departure of ships from territorial waters could be canceled.

In view of the uncertain situation, Group North does not consider the time opportune for a change of the orders issued, since it is not possible to estimate the risk at the present moment. Once compulsory escort has been imposed, Group North does not think that there will be

27 Jun. 1942

too much delay. The Group will, however, keep this matter in mind.
(See Telegram 1749.)

See Telegram 1235 for the new urgent request of the Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries asking Group North to cut off the Kronstadt Bay fairway by means of suitable batteries (railway battery "Gneisenau" and a 10.5 cm. naval or coastal anti-aircraft battery), since the Army and Navy batteries available there are not suited for fighting small fast vessels.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

At 1442 radio intelligence intercepted a message from a plane about an allegedly successful attack on a submarine 200 miles northwest of Cape Ortegal. Furthermore, British vessels were observed 180 miles northwest of Porcupine Bank and 210 miles southwest of Rockall Bank. On 25 Jun., 1 U.S. cruiser and 1 destroyer were located north of Fernando Noronha, probably en route to Rio de Janeiro. A submarine attack was reported from a point 65 miles east of Cape Lookout. An announcement of a controlled zone in the area off Boston was intercepted.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "404" reported from the American east coast that she sank the steamer MOLDANGER (6,827 GRT). Submarine U "153" reports sinking the steamer NARCISSUS (5,000 GRT) in the West Indies, and submarine U "123" sinking the tanker LEIV EIRIKSSON (9,952 GRT) en route from Trinidad to Gibraltar. For further reports, particularly on submarine operations in the Mediterranean against troop and materiel transports from Syria, Palestine, and Port Said to Alexandria see Supplement on Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

On the night of 27 Jun., 53 of our planes were sent to attack Westow and Portland. 50 to 60 enemy planes penetrated into northwestern Germany, concentrating their attack on Bremen. According to reports received so far, night fighters shot down 6 enemy planes. Another 6 were shot down by anti-aircraft guns, and 2 crashed.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Air forces under the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South supported the operations of the Panzer Army in Africa. Italian planes raided Malta.

3. Eastern Front:

During the operation against Sevastopol, on 26 Jun. dive bombers sank 1 destroyer and 1 submarine. 2 vessels belonging to a force of 15 vessels which tried to pass through the Kerch Strait from

27 Jun. 1942

the south were sunk.

4. Special Item:

The Commander in Chief, Air Force has changed the Office of Aerial Torpedo Inspector into the Office of Deputy for Aerial Torpedoes. The Deputy for Aerial Torpedoes is under the command of the Commander in Chief, Air Force, has the same rank and authority as a division commander, and is at the same time commander of the aerial torpedo wing (26th Bomber Wing).

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, a convoy is expected to depart soon from Gibraltar. On 27 Jun. at 0930, 13 east-bound steamers were sighted off Cape Tegata, proceeding under air escort close to the coast. U.S. troops are expected to arrive in Gibraltar in order to reinforce the garrison.

Aerial photographs of Alexandria, taken on 26 Jun., do not show any changes in the number of warships in that harbor. No ships were located in Marsa Matruh on 27 Jun. at 0700. Several eastbound steamers were sighted between Marsa Matruh and Alexandria. According to an intelligence report, the French admiral in Alexandria has ordered cancellation of all leave and permanent readiness for the crews. The British admiral apparently intends to transfer the French ships to Aden.

Radio intelligence located 3 British cruisers and 4 destroyers in the northern part of the Red Sea.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

On 29 Jun., 3 boats of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla (PT boats S "60", "61", "33") are to proceed from Augusta via Suda to Tobruk. Otherwise there is nothing to report.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

On the evening of 26 Jun. the steamer GUALDI entered Tripoli. Transport of supplies is being carried out according to schedule, with no incidents.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Instead of the steamer AVIONIA which was gutted by fire, the steamer PONTINIA carrying aviation fuel departed from Candia for North Africa.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

At 0830 air reconnaissance spotted 2 cruisers, 1 large destroyer, and 4 to 6 PT boats on a westerly course 30 miles south of the Kerch Strait.

27 Jun. 1942

Group South presumes that the Russian transport of supplies to Sevastopol by steamers has been almost completely suspended and that only fast light naval forces, primarily destroyers, which are able to arrive and depart during the same night, are being used as the main carriers of supplies. Group South attributes this reduction of the steamer traffic to the operations of our light naval forces; the fact that Russian plane attacks are made on their bases shows the importance of these forces.

According to an intelligence report, 10 torpedo boats and numerous PT boats are said to have arrived in Novorossisk from Batum on 26 Jun. It is expected that the Black Sea flotilla will launch operations from Novorossisk and Genichesk in the near future.

Own Situation:

The mine operation off Odessa has been executed according to plan. On the night of 26 Jun. the 17th Harbor Defense Flotilla executed a mock operation off Sevastopol designed to feign a landing. No contact with the enemy was made during the operation.

For Group South's request concerning the reinforcement of anti-aircraft protection for the Crimean bases after the fall of Sevastopol see Telegram 1400.

The matter is being attended to by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division.

According to a report of the 11th Army Headquarters to Group South, orders from the Fuehrer for the execution of landing operations either in the Kerch Strait or in the Azov Sea, depending on the situation, may be forthcoming at any time. Preparatory maneuvers of the Army units are now in progress. Group South considers it necessary that experienced naval officers advise the Army units, especially since the Siebel ferry battalion assigned to the Azov Sea has just been set up. Group South requests Captain Riewe to make available for the above purpose additional qualified officers for several weeks (see Telegram 1940).

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

A further attack by German and Rumanian forces forced the enemy to give up his positions on the hills of Gaytany. Northeast of Shuli, Rumanian troops reached and crossed the Chornaya River.

Army coastal batteries cooperating with artillery and air forces dispersed an enemy naval force which tried to reach Cape Taman in the Kerch Strait from the south. No fighting of importance was reported from the other sectors of the Southern Army Group.

27 Jun. 1942

Central Army Group:

No fighting other than against partisans was reported.

Northern Army Group:

An enemy attack in the Yamno area was repulsed. Our troops, pushing forward from the north, south, and west joined forces and split up the Volkhov pocket. Another enemy attack on the bridgehead south of Soltsy was beaten off.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Except for lively assault troop activity, no fighting was reported.

3. North Africa:

The Panzer Army broke through enemy forces in the area south-east of Marsa Matruh. Part of its forces pushed forward from the coastal highway to 20 km southeast of Marsa Matruh. On 26 Jun. the commander of the Italian XX Motorized Corps and several of his staff officers were killed in an air raid.

28 Jun. 1942
Sunday

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain, U.S.A.:

A joint statement about the Washington conference says that all the principal problems of the war were discussed and that difficulties were by no means underestimated. The armament production shows a satisfactory development, with the monthly production rate rapidly approaching the scheduled maximum. Since the theaters of war have been extended, the problem of transportation becomes particularly important. The German submarine campaign continues to inflict considerable damage upon Allied merchant shipping, but the Allied production of new ships is increasing greatly each month. There is complete agreement as to the further conduct of the war. Russia will receive aid. Extensive aid to China is also important. Future operations will in any case serve to divert the impact of the German attack from Russia. The over-all situation is better than during the previous meetings.

Reuter states that the main topic of discussion was a diversionary attack on Germany. The defeat in Libya is considered merely a temporary reverse which does not affect the general strategy.

Special Items:

I. On 24 Jun. the Naval Liaison Officer with the Army General Staff reported to the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff about the latest developments and requested information as to whether the Navy intends to activate a landing flotilla to be used in connection with operation "Blau". (Caucasian offensive.) The report furthermore suggests that the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff investigate whether it is possible to ship equipment to the Caspian Sea, since it would be of decisive importance for the eastern campaign to cut off Russian oil supplies from Baku to Astrakhan.

The Naval Staff recognizes the importance of a landing flotilla, and Group South is already making preparations for assembling all available vessels for landing operations. Special operations staffs, to be formed in each case, will take over command of the separate operations. Every opportunity is being utilized to furnish all types of vessels. Landing craft from the Azov Sea will also be transferred unless the vessels are more urgently needed elsewhere.

The Naval Liaison Officer with the Army General Staff has been notified to this effect.

II. The Naval Construction Division had asked the Naval Staff Operations Division to confirm the decision concerning postponement of preparations for operation "Suedsee", as transmitted by the Armed Forces High Command, Special Staff for Economic Warfare (see War Diary 22 Jun.) In view of the fact that the situation has remained unchanged since April 1942, the Special Staff for Economic Warfare has provided in its communication that the operation be postponed until further notice, and states that special orders will be issued should the operation become necessary.

The Naval Staff confirms to its Construction, Quartermaster, and Hydrographic and Meteorological Divisions, with copy to the Armed Forces High Command, Special Staff for Economic Warfare, that all preparations are to be suspended until further notice. The Naval Staff

28 Jun. 1942

adds that this measure makes it impossible to resume the plan in 1943 in view of the present circumstances, and that consequently any orders can apply only to 1944.

III. According to a report to the Armed Forces High Command by the German General attached to the Italian Armed Forces Headquarters, the Italian High Command issued the following orders on 27 Jun.:

After the enemy has been beaten, operations should be launched from the area between the Qattara Depression and the Arabs Gulf as follows:

1. The goal is the Suez Canal which should be reached by an advance toward Suez and Ismailia and from there as rapidly as possible to Port Said.
2. As a prerequisite, Cairo must be safely in our hands.
3. The roads from Alexandria must be blocked until Alexandria, too, can be occupied.
4. The Army must be protected against landings in its rear.
5. The Duce expects an equal percentage of German and Italian forces to participate in the advance toward the Suez Canal.

IV. The Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy points out that the question of ownership with regard to the Egyptian harbors requires immediate clarification between Germany and Italy. Up to now, it has been accepted that all ships, installations and property first seized by the German naval forces and naval headquarters belong to the German Navy. Thus, great values are at stake. The German Naval Command, Italy suggests that harbor command headquarters and registration centers be established immediately, as well as a guard command with strong forces under a senior officer who, in turn, will be under the command of the Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy. To save time, personnel should be procured from the Greek area and transported as quickly as possible by air to the Marsa Matruh area. (See Telegram 1940.)

The Naval Staff fully endorses the views of the Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy and directs the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division to take up the matter.

Situation 28 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

There is nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our vessels.

Information on the enemy situation was sent out via Radiograms 1637 and 1852.

28 Jun. 1942

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance observed 3 convoys totalling 45 to 50 steamers off the southern coast of England.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

On the night of 27 Jun. submarine U "105" departed from Ferrol as scheduled. On the night of 28 Jun. she will be brought in by mine sweepers off Cape Vilano.

The roadstead of La Pallice was temporarily closed on account of mines.

Channel Coast:

8 boats of the 2nd and 4th PT Boat Flotillas transferred to Cherbourg according to plan.

Off Cherbourg, 2 Spitfires attacked 2 patrol vessels. One of the planes was shot down. The other fighter rammed the patrol vessel VP "211", blew up and crashed. Altogether, 14 men were wounded on the 2 patrol vessels.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance spotted 30 steamers and 2 destroyers on a northerly course off the Humber River.

Own Situation:

On the night of 27 Jun., unnoticed by the enemy, the "Grossfuerst" mine operation was carried out according to plan within an accuracy of 1 mile.

Convoy and patrol operations proceeded as planned.

During enemy flights into German-controlled areas on the night of 27 Jun. naval anti-aircraft guns shot down 3 planes in the coastal area, while another plane was brought down either by naval anti-aircraft guns or by a night fighter. For details on enemy air activity during the night of 27 Jun. see Telegram 0716.

The German steamer FRIELINGHAUS (4,338 GRT) proceeding in a convoy sank northeast of Ameland Island after hitting a ground mine.

In the afternoon, 12 Spitfires attacked vessels of the Rhine Flotilla off Domburg.

2. Norway, Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported that at 1400 an enemy force

28 Jun. 1942

consisting of 1 battleship, presumably of the TEXAS class, and 3 destroyers was observed proceeding at first on a northeasterly and then on a southerly course in quadrant AE 2850 off the northern coast of Iceland. Our planes were taken under well-aimed heavy and light anti-aircraft gunfire.

According to photographic reconnaissance, the number of ships in Yokanga has been reduced by some 25 steamers, 2 destroyers, and several escort vessels, as compared with the last count. This would confirm the assumption that convoy QP 13 has departed.

Own Situation:

Convoy and transport operations proceeded as scheduled. On 27 Jun. Norwegian fishing vessels detonated 5 mines at the Sylte Fjord minefield. The minefield was laid on 9 and 24 Jun.

During the bombardment of the Petsamo convoy on 26 Jun. the 5th Naval Coastal Artillery Battalion was hit several times.

3. Special Items:

The berth which is being constructed on the southern shore of the Foetten Fjord is designed for aircraft carriers staying in Trondheim for some time. The Naval Staff considers it necessary to provide an unloading platform, as well as a direct communication from the airfield to the carrier. The Naval Staff believes that this can be done only by building a berth on the shore of the fjord near Lade and at the same time adapting the airfield which exists there.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway; the Admiral, North Norwegian Coast; the Air Force General attached to the Commander in Chief, Navy; and the Air Minister and Commander in Chief, Air Force have been informed to this effect, and were requested to make the necessary preparations for the Air Force General attached to the Commander in Chief, Navy to investigate the matter. No representative of the Naval Staff or its Quartermaster Division can participate.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence reports that 4 Russian PT boats are scheduled to make a thrust from Lavansaari toward the west on the night of 28 Jun.

2. Own Situation:

It was reported that at 2224 a submarine unsuccessfully fired on the German steamer FRITZ SCHOOPE 25 miles northeast of Rixhoeft. 3 transports carrying men on furlough arrived in Abo in the forenoon. 5 transports under escort left Utoe for Neufahrwasser.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence reports that 3 submarines are probably

28 Jun. 1942

en route from Gibraltar to England. A report about a submarine attack 75 miles northeast of Cape Lookout was intercepted from off the American coast.

2. Own Situation:

Group "Eisteufel" was ordered to shift its attack areas by 60 miles in a 225° direction.

A number of gratifying reports about submarine successes have been received from the American coast. Submarines U "107", "701", "203", and "505" sank the steamers JAGERSFONTEIN (10,083 GRT); SAM HOUSTON (7,200 GRT), the latter on her first voyage to Cape Town with a cargo of powder, automobiles, and lubricating oil; a heavily armed steamer (6,900 GRT) of the ROBIN HOOD class, carrying a deck cargo of planes and automobile tires; and 2 tankers of 12,000 and 8,000 GRT. Submarine U "701" also torpedoed another steamer.

From the Mediterranean, submarine U "97" reported sinking a 3,000 GRT steamer and a 2,000 GRT tanker in quadrant GP 5953.

The successes reported during the day totalled 49,183 GRT.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Anti-aircraft defenses brought down 8 enemy planes on daylight missions over the west area. 3 planes made emergency landings. This includes successes scored by naval anti-aircraft guns.

On the night of 28 Jun. 53 planes were sent into action against Weston (resort southwest of Bristol). To the Naval Staff's knowledge, there are no military or industrial objectives in that locality. On the night of 28 Jun., strong enemy air forces penetrated into the area of western France, concentrating their attack on St. Nazaire.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Planes supported the Africa Corps in the area southeast of Marsa Matruh. Italian planes were sent into action against Malta. Reconnaissance was active over the eastern Mediterranean.

3. Eastern Front:

Strong air forces were operating in the Sevastopol and Kursk areas. Major forces of the VIII Air Corps have transferred to this area. The Air Command, South, which has been reinforced by several dive bomber groups from the VIII Air Corps, took over the main burden of the Crimean campaign.

No success was observed after the bomber operation of the 5th Air Force against Kola Bay.

4. Special Items:

(a) During the operation against Norwich on the night of 26 Jun. it was observed that 30 to 40 rounds were fired simultaneously in a cluster. In addition, a slow projectile was seen rising to a

28 Jun. 1942

height of 2,500 m. There it burst, releasing wires to which other detonating explosives were attached.

(b) Since convoy PQ 17 has not yet been reported, the Air Force General Staff took up again the question of laying mines off Archangel and Kandalaksha. The 30th Bomber Wing will probably be assigned to carry out this mission.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

Air reconnaissance spotted 4 harbor vessels en route from Valletta to Marsa Scirocco. Only slight convoy and patrol activity was observed in the Alexandria area during the morning. Radio intelligence reports that in the afternoon a submarine was located in the area of Haifa.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

On the night of 27 Jun. enemy planes raided Tobruk. An Italian motor mine sweeper sustained slight damage.

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla was not engaged in any operations. It is planned to transfer it to the east.

From an interview given by the commander of the Cagliari task force to a German journalist it appears that during the naval battle of Pantelleria the Italians destroyed a total of 1 British cruiser of the CARDIFF class, 3 destroyers, and 6 steamers. Unfortunately the Naval Staff has not yet received any report from the Italian Navy on this engagement.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The Italian dispatch ship DIANA carrying Italian troops departed from Messina to Tobruk. The transport of supplies proceeded as scheduled.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

No special reports have been received.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No new reconnaissance results have been obtained.

On the night of 26 Jun. enemy planes raided Feodosiya, Eupatoria, Yalta, and the northern shipyard of Sevastopol.

On the morning of 27 Jun. an Italian submarine attacked 2 enemy destroyers south of the Crimea. As a result of strong defense action by depth charges, the submarine arrived in Yalta slightly damaged.

28 Jun. 1942

The 8th Harbor Command occupied the northern shipyard of Sevastopol, took over nets, cables, and mine gear, and took measures for the defense of the shipyard. The dock is mined and is under enemy gunfire.

The naval barges escorting the steamer ARDEAL observed a heavy detonation in the bay of Odessa.

VIII. Situation East Asia

There is nothing to report.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Outside Sevastopol, our troops broke the last enemy resistance in the area of Gaytany. Our forces took the northern part of Inkerman and set out for an attack toward the northwest in the direction of the bridge across the bay. On the night of 27 Jun. artillery fire forced several vessels off the northwestern coast of Kerch to turn away. Lively traffic was observed in the harbor of Taman. Enemy attacks in the area of Yama and Volchansk were repulsed.

East and northeast of Kursk the Von Weichs Army Group launched its attack according to plan. This marks the start of operation "Blau". The Tim River was crossed on a wide front, and the bridges fell into our hands undamaged. On the first day, our troops gained 10 to 45 km of ground. The enemy, at first taken unawares, increased his resistance in the course of our advance.

Central Army Group:

No fighting of importance occurred.

Northern Army Group:

After many weeks of fighting, the enemy forces in the Volkhov pocket have finally been annihilated. We took 32,756 prisoners and either captured or destroyed 649 guns and 171 tanks. Thus, the enemy's attempt to roll up the Leningrad front has definitely been smashed.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Fronts:

Brisk artillery and patrol activity is reported from the Svir front.

3. North Africa:

After replenishing its supplies, the Panzer Army took up the pursuit of the enemy forces withdrawing to the east. On the evening of 28 Jun. the Panzer Army reached the area 10 km. southwest of Fuka. The ring around the enemy troops enclosed in Marsa Matruh and south-east of it was tightened. During the break-through attempts on the

28 Jun. 1942

night of 27 Jun. our forces took approximately 1,000 prisoners.

29 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

France:

Representatives of all labor unions irrespective of their political affiliation recommended supporting Laval's efforts to recruit labor for Germany, as a token of solidarity with the prisoners of war.

Reports about General Nogues' attitude are highly contradictory and make it almost impossible to form a clear picture of his political convictions.

Great Britain:

The Fuel Minister opened the Government's drive for greater fuel economy. He declared that the Government would take over the entire coal industry on 1 Jul. which from then on would belong to the nation. The waste of coal must be stopped by all means. The Labor Minister announced another large-scale conscription for the Armed Forces which would exempt, for the time being, only the coal industry.

India:

Reports from India do not present a clear picture, particularly about Gandhi's attitude. The reports are colored anti-or pro-British depending on whether their source is Japanese or British. However, the general impression prevails that Gandhi at this moment has no intention of undertaking any serious steps for the immediate withdrawal of the British forces from India, although he insists on complete independence.

Sweden:

The Government protested to Moscow against the torpedoing of the Swedish steamer ADA GORTHON by a Russian submarine. Russia promised a speedy investigation of the matter.

Spain:

The German Embassy reports that the British Embassy at Madrid told the Spanish Government with regard to an article in a Swedish newspaper about an alleged secret agreement between Great Britain and Russia that this report is a falsification for propaganda purposes.

U.S.A.:

Churchill stated before sailing that the day will come when British and American forces will jointly set foot on foreign soil in order to liberate Europe from the Nazi yoke. The chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee remarked in this connection that the second front will be established before winter.

Argentina:

Large anti-German demonstrations took place at Buenos Aires.

29 Jun. 1942

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Permanent Deputy to the Chief of the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports on guided missiles.

II. It is reported that the Fuehrer has ordered the transfer of 250,000 GRT of shipping space from the Navy to the Merchant Marine. This concerns primarily freighters, which are to be replaced by ships serving as living quarters. The construction of barracks is to be initiated through Minister Speer.

III. The announcement that there are no more shipyard workers available in the domestic labor market brings up another discussion of the construction and repair program. It may become necessary to consider postponing repair of the GNEISENAU. The Chief of Operations Division, Naval Staff points out once more the importance of submarine construction and the repair of submarines, and of auxiliary vessels required for submarine training; the same importance is attached to the repair and new construction of light naval vessels. All of the foregoing must be given precedence over other plans which cannot be realized for some time. In this connection, escort and minesweeping vessels must be given priority. Convoy traffic, for which the Navy is responsible, is very considerable and very dangerous, but it is vital for strategic and economic warfare. Every ton of shipping space lost on account of the lack of escort and patrol vessels is a direct loss to our war effort and is almost irreplaceable. For this reason the highest priority is required for mine-exploding vessels. As far as other construction is concerned, the Naval Staff considers it necessary to proceed according to the following priority list:

Naval barges; construction and repair of battleships, cruisers, training and school ships, experimental vessels;

Blockade runners;

Supply ships for warfare in domestic and foreign waters;

Construction of shipyards and supply bases;

Merchant ships;

Auxiliary cruisers.

Only if labor, etc. should still be available after these demands are met can the construction of auxiliary aircraft carriers be considered.

Any shipyard workers who might be allocated specifically for construction of the aircraft carriers would also have to be used primarily for the more urgent projects.

This matter is being worked out in this manner between the Naval Staff Quartermaster and Operations Divisions.

IV. The Chief, Naval Staff reiterates that the Fuehrer ordered that work in the Emden shipyards continue uncurtailed and approved the Naval Staff's suggestion regarding the French heavy gun barrels.

V. The Fuehrer recognizes the necessity of making Japan realize that the focal point of naval warfare must be shifted from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean, as suggested by the Chief, Naval Staff. The Foreign Office has already informed Ambassador Oshima to this effect. The Fuehrer believes, for unexplained reasons, that a Japanese attack on

29 Jun. 1942

Russia is imminent.

VI. The Chief, Foreign Affairs Section, Naval Staff Operations Division reports concerning the French warships in the Antilles as outlined in War Diary of 24 Jun. Auxiliary cruiser BARFLEUR will sail for Casablanca on 30 Jun.

In a Very Restricted Circle:

VII. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports that the code name for the operation against the Rybachy Peninsula is "Wiesengrund". (See War Diary of 25 Jun.)

VIII. The Naval Staff had asked the German Naval Command, Italy for comments on and plans for the possible rerouting of transports from Italy to North Africa, and also the possibilities of shipping part of the supplies to Tobruk from the Aegean area. In this connection the German Naval Command, Italy reported that preparations to utilize Tobruk had already been initiated long before the place was captured and had been given highest priority by all German and Italian agencies concerned. Prior to the proposed rerouting of transports from Italy, it is necessary to determine the available unloading capacity and to protect the harbor against attacks from sea and air. The British were able to unload only about 500 tons per day. Defense measures have been initiated. Large vessels cannot be accommodated at the moment and they should be used only on special occasions in the near future. Coastal supply shipping has already been started.

The German Naval Command, Italy further reports the outcome of the conference on 25 Jun. between the Chief of Staff and Admiral Sansonetti:

a. It has been established that the air forces available at present will probably not suffice for the offensive in North Africa and for paralyzing Malta at the same time. Thus the central Mediterranean is gravely endangered.

Not only supply operations but also naval warfare ~~has~~ been shifted to the eastern Mediterranean.

b. Consequently the supply service to North Africa must be safeguarded under all circumstances and with all available means. This can be done only if the most important shipments are routed through the Aegean area. For the same reason Italian naval warfare must be shifted to the eastern Mediterranean.

c. In order to carry this out, the Italian Navy has already taken appropriate steps: Transports from Brindisi and Taranto, consisting of steamers of from 1,000 to 2,000 tons, are routed through the Corinth Canal and are transshipped at Suda, if necessary. The possibility of using larger motor ships is under investigation. Measures have been taken to intensify the defenses on the Greek west coast and in Peloponnesian waters.

It is planned to transfer Italian naval forces to the western Greek and Aegean areas as follows:

a. The 7th Cagliari Division is to provide protection from the west.

b. The LITTORIO and 2 DUILIO-class ships to be stationed at Naples, 3 heavy cruisers to be disposed in a central location at Messina.

29 Jun. 1942

c. Harbors on the Peloponnesos and in the Aegean Sea: 4 light cruisers and 7 modern destroyers. In reserve: the DUILIO and 4 destroyers, possibly another DUILIO-class ship, in case a U.S. battleship should show up at Alexandria. Realization of this plan and date depend primarily on the solution of the fuel problem.

The German Naval Command, Italy finally points out in advance that the fullest support will have to be given by Naval Group South and the Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea with regard to shipping space and protection.

The Admiral, Aegean Sea reports on the measures planned in this connection for the protection of the anchorages of cruisers in Piraeus and Suda; he calls attention to the fact that shipping space and anti-submarine forces for the North African supply service can be spared only by curtailing the facilities available for the tasks in the Aegean Sea. The decision about the transfer of shipping space rests with the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Balkans. The stores in the Aegean area hardly permit supplying fuel to the Italian cruisers and destroyers.

In this connection Group South demands the immediate allocation to the Aegean area of adequate tanker space, because the land transport situation makes it impossible to cope with the supply problem; the Group further demands that the shipping space needed for North African transports be provided by Italian ships and finally, that patrol vessels equipped with search gear be assigned in view of the anticipated increased threat from submarines.

For the time being, the Naval Staff need not take any action with regard to the above demands, since the German Naval Command, Italy was informed directly. Furthermore there are no objections to the viewpoint of the Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea.

IX. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division further reports with regard to submarine operations in the Mediterranean: The German Naval Command, Italy, taking into account the change in the situation, plans to commit submarines to the eastern Mediterranean and to the area east of 30° E for the purpose of disrupting enemy supply shipping to North Africa, since it must be expected that supplies of materiel and troop transports to this area will be stepped up, and since no worthwhile traffic has recently been observed in the present zone of operations between Alexandria and Sollum. The German Naval Command, Italy requested the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South to instruct the air forces that the area east of 30° E is closed to attacks on submarines.

This plan conforms with the viewpoint of the Naval Staff.
The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

X. The Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports also on the reports to the Armed Forces High Command by the German General at the Italian Armed Forces Headquarters as outlined in War Diary of 26, 27, and 28 Jun. and in the text of the Fuehrer's letter to Mussolini of 23 Jun. (See War Diary of 27 Jun.)

XI. After considering the opinion of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines regarding the organization of a special submarine group (see War Diary of 25 Jun.) the Naval Staff Operations Division concludes that on the whole his analysis of the submarine situation is correct. The statements of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines apply to the conditions prevailing on the American coast and in the Caribbean Sea. While a

29 Jun. 1942

large number of submarines will be produced at home during July and August, thus providing the Commanding Admiral, Submarines with a larger number of operational submarines, as he recently reported to the Fuehrer, this will not influence submarine operations in the American war zone for some time. The voyage there requires 5 weeks, if fuel is supplied from tankers, and 8 weeks if fuel has to be taken aboard in western France, so that the greater numbers will make themselves felt in the zone of operations only by the end of August or the beginning of September at the earliest..

The Naval Staff Submarine Division is investigating how the finishing period can be shortened by increasing shipyard capacity and workers, as suggested by the Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

Special Items:

I. In issuing a directive to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean concerning the transfer of the KOELN to the Commanding Admiral, Cruisers in the latter half of July, and concerning the cruiser's berth, Group North informed the Admiral, Arctic Ocean about the situation with regard to PQ convoys and asked whether after the operation against convoy PQ 17 the Admiral, Arctic Ocean could dispense temporarily with about 5 submarines, which would be used for warfare against merchant shipping under the Commanding Admiral, Submarines between the beginning of July and the middle of August.

However, after receipt of the Naval Staff's directive concerning operation "Wiesengrund", the Group dropped the idea.

II. The Chief of Naval Staff Operations Division conferred on 27 Jun. with the Japanese Naval Attache about the war prisoners to be taken over from German blockade runners by the Japanese authorities. For copy see 1/Skl I k 15.553/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

III. The Naval Staff Submarine Division is investigating the stand taken by the Naval Construction Division concerning the report of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines about difficulties encountered by the Gdynia shipyard with regard to weekend work on vessels of the 22nd Submarine Flotilla on account of work done on the GNEISENAU. (See War Diary of 25 Jun.)

In the opinion of the Naval Staff Operations Division, it is quite all right to consider repairs on the GNEISENAU as stop gap work.

Situation 29 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "28" reported at 0318 by short signal that she dismissed the DOGGERBANK and CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN on 27 Jun.; the ship is

29 Jun. 1942

now equipped with a 5 months supply of fuel and is transferring to the Gulf of Guinea. Receipt of this message is acknowledged by the Naval Staff through Radiogram 1023.

DOGGERBANK and CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN are informed by Radiogram 1109.

The Naval Staff gathers from ship "28"'s report that she met the DOGGERBANK as well as the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN as planned and can operate for 5 months. The Naval Staff agrees to the shift to the zone of operations to the northeast, and at the same time informs ship "28" that the supply ship UCKERMARK will probably arrive in the South Atlantic early in August. This fact should not interfere with the activity of ship "28". The supply ship will be ordered to remain in a waiting position. (See Radiogram 2024.)

The DRESDEN's voyage to Yokohama was uneventful. On 4 May the ship sighted a blacked-out vessel headed for Montevideo or Freetown at 04° 30' S, 19° 08' W, and was in radio communication with a Japanese torpedo boat one day after passing the Sunda Strait. All ships in foreign waters are informed of the above by Radiogram 2208.

An inquiry of the Naval Attache at Tokyo as to the sailing dates of the blockade runners from western France is answered by the information that the sailings are planned for the new moon periods of the coming months, starting in July. (See Telegram 1215.)

Enemy situation report by Radiograms 1900 and 2352.

Special Item:

Sailing order of the Operations Division, Naval Staff to supply ship UCKERMARK: Object is to supply the auxiliary cruisers ship "28" and "10", possibly also ship "23", to pick up edible fats from Japan and bring them to western France. The sailing date will be regulated by special order of Group West. After longitude 30° W has been crossed, the Naval Staff will take over command. The success of the operations of the auxiliary cruisers depends to a very large extent on the delivery of supplies by the UCKERMARK. To make her mission a success, it is therefore necessary that the supply ship is not detected or at least not identified by the enemy. For copy of the sailing order see 1/Skl I k 1158/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

In the evening, the radio intercept service reported 3 convoys totalling 54 steamers between Dungeness and Trevose Head.

Based on statements of a Portuguese naval officer who was a member of a commission in England, the Naval Attache at Lisbon reports as follows: German acoustic mines still represent a serious menace to the British who have not yet developed an effective sweeping gear. The mines are allegedly subject to spontaneous detonation off the coast in heavy seas. (This possibility is denied by the Chief of the Underwater Obstacles Branch.) German magnetic mines are still swept with regular tow lines to which numerous strong magnets are attached. The Portuguese commission was strongly impressed by British statements that 1,000 vessels per day are engaged in minesweeping.

29 Jun. 1942

According to a message from the German Legation at Dublin on 17 Jun., Irish newspapers reported a recent landing of a large number of U.S. troops in Northern Ireland, equipped with a great many light and medium tanks and "individual weapons". The transport is said to have made the crossing, probably from the Panama Canal, under escort of British and U.S. warships in record time.

According to Swedish press reports of the middle of June, Great Britain has begun to withdraw from regular shipping all vessels suitable for an invasion, although this measure causes considerable restrictions, extending even to the import of foodstuffs.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Submarine U "105" was met by mine sweepers at 0240 off Cape Vilano.

The destroyer CAMPBELTOWN was raised and removed to the Normandy locks.

An enemy air raid on St. Nazaire, causing little damage, took place during the night of 28 Jun.

Channel Coast:

PT boats will resume activity only after the full moon period. The Fecamp boom barrage has been laid.

During the night of 28 Jun. enemy planes attacked a convoy off Calais. Mine-exploding vessel "21" was damaged below the water line. 1 motor mine sweeper and 1 patrol vessel were slightly damaged and suffered minor casualties. A low-level attack on the 4th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla off Barfleur was repulsed.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Convoy and mine-sweeping operations proceeded according to plan without major incident.

2. Norway and Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

At 0345 air reconnaissance spotted a heavy cruiser escorted by 3 destroyers on an easterly course 60 miles off the northeastern tip of Iceland. This is probably the same force which was reported on 28 Jun. as a battleship with destroyer escort.

Submarine U "376" reports that convoys cannot sail the western route around Jan Mayen.

Own Situation:

Convoy and patrol missions met with no major incidents. It is reported that the tanker FORBACH touched ground on 23 Jun. in Tjeld Sound and lost 200 tons of fuel oil.

29 Jun. 1942

The Naval Staff is taking steps to insure that the British Intelligence Service will soon receive reports stating that the German pocket battleships ADMIRAL SCHEER and LUETZOW are ready to sail and are to be sent to the Atlantic again, fully equipped for several months of operations. Supposedly, the ships are at Narvik at the moment and are to break through the Denmark Strait together as soon as weather conditions permit.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Regarding the shift of reference points "Schwarz 26" and "Schwarz 26A" owing to the expansion of the closed area in the Skagerrak see Telegram 1600.

Telegram 1728 contains the directive of Group North to Naval Station, Baltic and the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea about the immediate resumption of shipping between Swinemuende and Memel and shipping to Sweden, Finland, and in the Gulf of Bothnia, retaining however the compulsory escort of troop transports and large tankers plying between Danzig and Finland; also regulations concerning coastal traffic between Memel and Riga or Arensburg, compulsory submarine escorts for troop transports and large tankers in the central Baltic Sea.

The Group has no objections against keeping up ferry traffic between Sassnitz and Trelleborg, even at some risk. Submarine training is to be continued according to plan. Nor is there any objection against maneuvers of fleet forces consisting of ships up to the size of destroyers in the area south of Oeland and the closed area.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Very lively reconnaissance activity in the northern rendezvous area and the waters of Iceland.

600 miles east of Newfoundland we intercepted a message of motor ship WAIWERA (12,435 GRT), stating that she had been torpedoed by a submarine and would have to be abandoned.

The radio decoding service belatedly established that a U.S. submarine and a surface vessel had planned maneuvers in the latter part of May in an area extending from 43° 30' N, 69° 30' W to 70° 00' W.

Northwest of Trinidad an SOS call of steamer RIO BRANCO (4,925 GRT) reporting a submarine attack was intercepted. Reports of submarine attacks were also heard in the Gulf of Mexico and 360 miles northeast of the Lesser Antilles.

In the Mediterranean, submarines were reported by planes about 90 miles southwest of Cyprus and 14 miles north of Alexandria.

29 Jun. 1942

2. Own Situation:

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines requested the following information:

a. Whether it can be expected that section 10° N to 5° S of route "Anton" will be opened for operation between 19 Jul. and 20 Aug., since the Commanding Admiral, Submarines is planning to dispatch 4 or 5 submarines to the area extending from Freetown to Cabo de Sao Roque.

b. Whether there are objections of political nature against operations off the La Plata estuary outside territorial waters.

The Naval Staff replies in the affirmative to the first question as such. Since a fast supply ship is expected to leave western France during the June new moon period and slow supply ships in the August new moon period, the route will probably be open for operations only between 25 Jul. and 25 Aug. By the early part of July it will be possible to fix the dates more accurately.

Any operation at this time off the La Plata is undesirable from a political viewpoint. However, the Naval Staff requests information about the kind of operation planned in order to discuss it with the Foreign Office.

Today our submarines operating off the American east coast and in the West Indies report sinking 10 ships totalling 52,561 GRT and probably sinking a 5,687 GRT tanker. The submarines U "754", "153", "333", "128", "154", "505", "129", and "158" contributed to this success. The last-named submarine used her last 10.5 cm shell to set the steamer EVERALDA afire, and then sank her by opening the seacocks. Secret route orders, recognition signal codes and charts of the minefields in Chesapeake Bay were captured.

For details see Supplement to Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

50 planes attacked Bedford during the night of 29 Jun.

55 to 60 enemy planes penetrated into the northwest German coastal area; attacks concentrated on Bremen.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Our planes supported the operations of the Panzer Army, North Africa. During the night of 28 Jun. 16 type A aerial mines were dropped in the Alexandria area, 4 of which detonated.

Italian planes attacked Gibraltar.

3. Eastern Front:

Very large numbers of our planes operated off Sevastopol and in the Kursk area. Planes of the 5th Air Force attacked Murmashi airfield and ships at the west shore of Kola Bay with good results; 2

29 Jun. 1942

steamers of 6,000 GRT each were damaged by bomb hits.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

The British transport MARKUNDA (16,632 GRT) arrived with troops at Gibraltar from a westerly direction on 28 Jun. under escort of 3 destroyers.

At 1400 on 29 Jun. the following ships were observed at Gibraltar: EAGLE; 4 cruisers of which 2 were in dock; 5 destroyers of which only 1 was still in dock; 2 corvettes in dock; at least 6 submarines of which 3 were in dock; 2 passenger liners; 37 steamers; 9 tankers; 1 auxiliary cruiser; and the MAIDSTONE.

The ship situation at Valletta remained unchanged.

No traffic was observed west of Alexandria until noon. 2 small convoys and 2 destroyers proceeding at top speed on a westerly course were sighted between Alexandria and Port Said.

11 freighters, 3 tankers, and 1 hospital ship were in the harbor of Haifa at 0700, 1 destroyer, 4 steamers, and 1 tanker at Beirut at the same time.

Continuous photo reconnaissance of Alexandria and observation of the harbors of Cyprus would be very valuable.

According to an Admiralty communique, destroyer NESTOR sank in the Mediterranean on 15 Jun. and the British submarine UPHOLDER has been overdue for quite some time. It cannot be determined whether the NESTOR was one of the destroyers the loss of which during the convoy operation was announced in the House of Commons, or whether this is an additional loss.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

Motor mine sweeper R "13" arriving at 1800, was the first vessel to enter Marsa Matruh after the fall of the city in the morning.

No operations by the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla. 7 vessels of the 6th Mine Sweeper Flotilla did escort duty between Benghazi and Marsa Matruh. 3 German planes were destroyed during an enemy air raid on Derna on 28 Jun. During the night of 29 Jun. enemy planes attacked Tobruk and dropped mines.

The German Naval Command, Italy supports the request of the Commanding Officer, Supply and Transports, North Africa that the required personnel for the Sea Transport Offices Tobruk, Marsa Matruh, Alexandria, and Port Said be sent. This matter is being handled by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division. (See Telegram 1220.)

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

No reports were received of any supply ships arriving at North African ports from Italy.

29 Jun. 1942

Steamer STURLA is being loaded at Tripoli. Steamer SAVONA is en route from Benghazi to Tobruk. 2 other steamers are en route from Benghazi to Derna. 4 naval barges arrived at Tobruk from Sidi Barrani, the steamer JAEDJOR and 2 naval barges arrived at Sidi Barrani. 464 tons of materiel were unloaded at Tobruk. 3,082 tons of cargo are awaiting transshipment to the east at Tobruk.

The interruption of large supply shipments from Italy to North Africa is highly deplorable. Every attempt must be made to resume shipments soon.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Naval Group South suggests that an energetic rear admiral be sent in charge of the Naval Shore Command, Attica, in view of the importance of the tasks, the great extent of the command area, and the seniority of the Italian Chief of Staff to the Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea. (See Telegram 1315.)

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring, the surface forces have put into bases on the east coast with the exception of 2 destroyers and some small vessels. Submarine activity was still extraordinarily lively. 14 submarines were located at sea.

Air reconnaissance reported a concentration of numerous small vessels in the Temryuk area.

Own Situation:

A southbound convoy of 6 steamers departed from Ochakov. A northbound convoy of 1 steamer and 2 tankers is scheduled to sail for Ochakov on 29 Jun.

The transfer of tanker DRESDEN from the Bosphorus to Burgas was accomplished according to plan during the night of 28 Jun. Engineer barges laid 79 type B river mines off Kamish Burun on 28 Jun. according to plan. Moderately strong enemy air activity between Taganrog and Berdyansk on 28 Jun. and during the following night. A Russian landing attempt by 5 boats at Melikino was repulsed. No report has yet been received about the joint operation of all available German and Italian naval forces with the 11th Army east of Cape Fiolent. The mining mission of the 1st PT Boat Flotilla was postponed for 24 hours on account of this operation.

A naval company of the Naval Shore Command D has been operating in support of the Army since 24 Jun. and has so far carried out 2 successful scouting missions.

The Admiral, Amphibious Forces is unable to comply with the request of Naval Group South that a number of officers be provided temporarily in order to prepare landings in the Kerch Strait, since 4 officers have already been assigned to operation "Herkules". The Chief of Staff of the Admiral, Amphibious Forces is particularly indispensable. (See Telegram 1830.)

29 Jun. 1942

VIII. Situation East Asia

According to a communique of the U.S. Naval High Command at Pearl Harbor, the 4 Japanese aircraft carriers AKAGI, KAGA, SORYU, and KIRYU were sunk with all planes during the battle of Midway. In addition, 2 heavy cruisers and 3 destroyers were allegedly sunk and a great number of light cruisers and destroyers and 4 transports probably sunk or damaged. There is no way of checking these evidently exaggerated reports at the present moment.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Army Group South:

Our offensive against the fortress city of Sevastopol made good progress. A number of important dominating positions were captured.

The attack of the Von Weichs Group was pushed farther southeast and reached Rykovo and Matveyevka.

Central Army Group:

Successful fighting against partisans in the rear area.

Northern Army Group:

German troops advancing north of Kholm in a northerly direction captured Navolok. The destruction of enemy forces encircled near Volkhov continued; enemy tank attacks south of Soltsy were repulsed.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Fronts:

The situation remained unchanged.

3. North Africa:

The enemy succeeded in pulling out his forces from Marsa Matruh before it was reached by our troops during the forenoon. German forces which advanced beyond Fuka established contact with the enemy near El Daba. Enemy positions between the Qattara Depression and the Arabs Gulf are apparently poorly fortified.

30 Jun. 1942

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

On 27 Jun. an agreement was concluded at Moscow between Great Britain and Russia about financing war material deliveries; Great Britain undertook to continue furnishing supplies without payment.

The debate in the House of Commons was opened today. Churchill will speak on 1 Jul. The parliamentary fight will probably center around the question whether Churchill will resign as Minister of National Defense.

The British public is beginning to talk about the possibility of losing Egypt. In this connection it is recalled that the Mediterranean had to be abandoned temporarily in Napoleon's day until Nelson's victory at Abukir restored the situation. However, the possible loss of Egypt is generally considered a grave catastrophe.

Spain:

Late reports confirm that one of the objects of Sener's visit to Italy was to persuade the Italian Government to influence the German Government in favor of restoring the Spanish monarchy. Ciano allegedly promised to feel out Berlin's reactions. The prospects for this project are, of course, not very favorable.

U.S.S.R.:

According to reliable information, London and Moscow have reached an agreement to undermine the Axis front by increased communistic propaganda. The Secret Service is therefore withdrawing from France and Italy and leaving this territory to the Comintern.

The Russian news agency Tass denied that the Swedish steamer ADA GORTHON was sunk by a Russian submarine.

Reuter reports that Russia is building defenses on the Siberian border and that all males in Siberia between the ages of 20 and 40 have been drafted. According to Chinese reports, Japan has concentrated 35 divisions in Manchuria.

Special Items

I. The Japanese Admiralty informed the Naval Staff by way of the Naval Attache that it intends to extend the operations of Japanese submarines and auxiliary cruisers off the East African coast, originally planned to last from the middle of May to the middle of July, until the end of 1942; the Japanese Admiralty is giving official notice in accordance with the military agreement because the demarcation line agreed upon, namely the longitude of 70° E, is being overstepped once more.

The Chief of the Naval Staff Operations Division informed the Japanese Naval Attache of the Naval Staff's consent and emphasized that Germany greatly welcomes this Japanese measure. Furthermore he reiterated that Japanese naval forces are also needed in the western Indian Ocean; this would be of particular advantage for the successful operations in that area (offensive in Libya) and therefore of greatest benefit to the common war effort.

30 Jun. 1942

See 1/Skl 1 k 15784/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

II. The Naval Staff has investigated how to increase the effectiveness of warfare against merchant shipping through the use of air forces; this has led to the demand for the construction of aircraft carriers, which are particularly suitable for warfare against merchant shipping because of their range, speed, and seaworthiness, as well as because of their planes and armament. The Naval Staff submitted its demands in this respect to the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division requesting that the Naval Construction Division and the Naval Ordnance Division consider the matter.

For copy see 1/Skl IIIa 12215/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

III. The Naval Attache at Rome reports that the 14 German merchant vessels (transports) ordered from Italian shipyards will be delayed by at least 2 months, because deliveries of German materials were delayed. Original delivery dates were between October and December 1942.

The Naval Construction Division was requested by the Naval Attache to comment on this highly unsatisfactory situation.

IV. The problem of sovereignty and property rights in the occupied Egyptian area (see proposal of the Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy in War Diary of 28 Jun.) is being clarified by the Permanent Representative of the Commander in Chief, Navy at Fuehrer Headquarters. So far, the Fuehrer has not decided on this matter but favors a solution generous to Italy.

Independent of this the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division has decided that only such naval commands and agencies are to be established at the moment which are necessary to discharge the urgent tasks of naval warfare, that is maritime transport, communication and requisitioning. The appointment of port commanders, harbor captains and harbor defense detachments is to be left to the Italians.

The Naval Staff Operations Division withholds its opinion until the Fuehrer's decision becomes known.

Situation 30 Jun. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

Decoded radio messages reveal that the auxiliary cruiser ALCANTARA is assigned to patrol the area in which, according to British assumption, German auxiliary cruisers have operated thus far. Intercepted orders show that shipping is being detoured around the area between 10° and 20° S and 0° and 10° W.

A U.S. steamer reported a submarine at 33° S, 13° E (approximately 250 miles west of Simon's Town).

30 Jun. 1942

2. Own Situation:

Ship "10" is informed that Japanese operations in the western Indian Ocean are to continue according to agreement with the Naval Staff. See Radiogram 2200.

It has been established beyond doubt that a German seaman from ship "16" who was captured by the British while he was in a prize crew, is regularly addressing the German Armed Forces over the British Broadcasting System.

All captains and officers of our auxiliary cruisers are therefore instructed to impress on their crews once more that strictest secrecy is essential concerning all plans in order to prevent treason. See Radiogram 2108.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

A British reconnaissance plane was observed over Ferrol at 1300 on 29 Jun. The departure of submarine U "105" was evidently not detected until then.

Air reconnaissance spotted a convoy of 9 steamers escorted by a light cruiser at 2200 close to shore in Cardigan Bay, heading in northeasterly direction.

2. Own Situation:

No events of any importance to report.

The Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, West reported to the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command that all defense measures against enemy landings in his area have been increased due to the information on the English south coast gathered by air reconnaissance on 20 to 23 Jun. He requested the Navy to take the necessary measures at sea. Group West consequently transferred the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla to the Cherbourg area, laid flanking minefields in the Seine estuary, reinforced patrols in the Seine Bay and Brest areas and laid a special alarm minefield.

For copy of the report of the Commander in Chief, Armed Forces West see 1/Skl 15798/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

According to the Naval Representative on the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff, the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff is convinced that the Navy can attack the concentrations of small vessels on the English south coast. The Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff is closely watching the developments. While it is not possible at present to increase the air forces, mobile Army units are under way to reinforce the troops of the Commander in Chief, Armed Forces West.

30 Jun. 1942

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance sighted normal convoy activity on the south-east coast.

Own Situation:

A mine-exploding vessel swept 6 ground mines north of Terschelling and Ameland on 29 and 30 Jun.; due to damage sustained on this occasion, the vessel has temporarily been withdrawn.

During the night of 29 Jun. the Navy shot down 6 enemy planes in the Jade and Ems areas.

The Naval Shore Commander, Northern Holland reported that the mine-laying missions off Engelschman Gat has been completed.

2. Norway and Arctic Ocean:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance spotted a convoy of 39 steamers and 10 escort vessels (QP 13) on a westerly course at 1640 in quadrant AC 4320 (180 miles north of Nordkyn). Owing to fog, contact could not be maintained. The overall weather situation is unfavorable. On the basis of past experience, Group North is correct in assuming that convoy PQ 17, too, is about to sail or has already sailed. Unfavorable weather has prevented continuous reconnaissance of the waters from Jan Mayen to Iceland since 28 Jun. The enemy forces sighted northeast of Iceland on that day support the assumption that PQ 17 has left. A great number of patrol vessels on different courses were observed in the vicinity of the Faeroe Islands. 12 Bristol Blenheims were observed during the night of 19 Jun. north of Bergen. It is suspected that mines were dropped south of Fedje.

Own Situation:

The waters south of Fedje were closed to shipping due to suspected mines.

Convoys and transports proceeded according to plan.

So far, no reports which would indicate that convoys QP 13 and PQ 17 are at sea have been received from our submarines.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

Group North is convinced that there is at least 1 enemy submarine in the central Baltic Sea up to a line from Cape Rixhoeft to the southern tip of Oeland, and possibly 2 more submarines in the area between Hogland and Reval. For compilation of additional enemy reports in Enemy Situation, East No. 6 of Group North, see Telegram 1300.

30 Jun. 1942

Radio monitoring discloses a lack of fuel for patrol vessels on Lavan-saari.

2. Own Situation:

Convoy and patrol operations in the Baltic Sea entrances according to plan.

The PT boat tender KARL PETERS was damaged by a detonation below her waterline at 1600 in Proverwik off Sassnitz, and returned to Sassnitz.

Owing to the sighting of a submarine by the 5th PT Boat Flotilla, Group North cancelled maneuvers of all war vessels larger than destroyers and escort vessels in the central and eastern Baltic Sea with the exception of boats of the Second Admiral, Submarines and ordered compulsory submarine escort for warships. This order was revoked a few hours later, probably because the presence of an enemy submarine off Ruegen seems unlikely after all.

Complying with the request of the Commissioner for Maritime Shipping transmitted by the Naval Staff, Group North has eased the restrictions previously imposed on merchant shipping to Sweden and Finland (see War Diary of 29 Jun.); and has ordered the Naval Station, Baltic Sea and the Commander, Mine Sweepers, Baltic Sea to designate temporary rerouting and closed areas in case of danger. (See Telegram 1931.)

The submarine hunt off Rixhoeft proved futile.

The minefields "Nashorn" 6, 7, and 8 in the Gulf of Finland were laid according to plan.

V. Merchant Shipping

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, in a commentary to its report no. 14, points out that the enemy shipping space of 1,600,000 GRT believed available for possible military use would have to be withdrawn from the different areas where it is now engaged in import and supply operations.

The commentary mentioned above and a review of the Portuguese overseas shipping situation is contained in report no. 16 of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Spain, a convoy of 22 steamers escorted by 1 destroyer and 3 corvettes sailed from Gibraltar in a westerly direction during the evening.

A deciphered radio message of 11 Jun. reveals belatedly that the steamers HOPESTAR (5,267 GRT), EMPIRE MOUFLON (3,232 GRT), PONTYPRIDD (4,458 GRT), POBBENA and 1 other steamer, all belonging to convoy ON, were torpedoed.

A great number of submarine sighting reports were intercepted by radio monitoring from off the U.S. coast, the West Indies, and the eastern

30 Jun. 1942

Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "372" sank a transport of 13,000 GRT out of a convoy north of Alexandria.

Additional reports in Supplement to Submarine Situation in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing to report.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Forces of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South resumed the round-the-clock attacks on Malta.

Continuous support of the Panzer Army, North Africa and continuation of mine-laying operations in the harbor of Alexandria in the face of heaviest anti-aircraft defenses during the night of 29 Jun.; 9 type B aerial mines were laid.

3. Eastern Front:

1,000 sorties were flown against Sevastopol and 3,000 in the area of the Central Army Group.

On 29 Jun. 1 enemy PT boat was sunk, and 1 PT boat and 1 mine sweeper were damaged by bomb hits in the Gulf of Finland.

On 30 Jun. the Murmashi power station and the Rosta shipyard were attacked with observed good results by 17 Ju 88's. 8 enemy fighters were shot down.

During an enemy attack on our Banak airfield, 4 Ju 88's were destroyed and 14 damaged. In view of the fact that enemy convoy traffic is starting up, this is a painful loss.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea

1. Enemy Situation, Mediterranean:

Nothing to report from the western Mediterranean.

The Air Attache at Budapest reported on 9 Jun. that a British submarine is using the island of Shipan off Dubrovnik as a base. An Italian destroyer is reported to have been attacked unsuccessfully by a submarine in Cattaro Bay.

German reconnaissance planes report from the eastern Mediterranean that troops were seen embarking in the harbors of Haifa and Beirut. According to an unconfirmed agent's report, 2 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 4 submarines,

30 Jun. 1942

and 3 tankers arrived on 27 Jun. at Famagusta, where preparations have been made for the accommodation of major naval forces. Radio monitoring intercepted a message from a British gunboat about the sinking by plane of steamer AIRCREST (5,237 GRT) out of a convoy 15 miles southwest of Haifa.

In reply to a German inquiry, the French Delegation informed the Armistice Commission, France about the condition of the French warships at Alexandria. The agreement reached between Admiral Godfroy and Admiral Cunningham in July 1940, which is to stay in force except in the case of war between France and Great Britain, provides that the ships remain fully equipped; only the gaskets of the breech blocks of the heavy guns, the breech blocks of the light guns, and the torpedo firing pins are to be deposited at the French Consulate ashore. The French ships will not scuttle themselves nor will they attempt to escape, unless British authorities should try to seize them by force.

It is doubtful to what extent this agreement would remain in force in case of Alexandria's capture by the Axis Powers. So far it was adhered to in spite of all incidents which occurred, such as in Syria.

2. Own Situation, Mediterranean:

Analyzing the general situation in the Mediterranean, the Naval Staff concludes that the British Gibraltar fleet will strike in the direction of the eastern Mediterranean. It is to be expected according to past experience that the ships will break through the Strait of Sicily by way of French territorial waters. Aside from an effective barrage to be laid by the French, being discussed at present, the Naval Staff considers it necessary to close the channel through French territorial waters in the vicinity of Cape Bon by a minefield to be laid as soon as possible. Potential disadvantages arising therefrom for German merchant shipping must be borne in view of the general situation, and of the purpose and urgency of this barrage. Any disadvantage will be of a temporary nature, since the minefield can be swept if the situation changes. The measure may be of decisive importance and should therefore be prepared under all circumstances and with all possible speed.

Information to this effect is given to the German Naval Command, Italy (copy to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff) together with instructions to report immediately the results of discussions on this subject with the Italian Supermarina. For copy see l/Skl Ie 15775/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

In connection with the above directive, the German Naval Command, Italy reports that the Italian Supermarina shares the Naval Staff's viewpoint, according to information from the Chief of Staff of the Italian Supermarina, and that preparatory measures for laying the minefield in conformity with the Naval Staff's plans are in the making. Details will be communicated to the German Naval Command, Italy on 1 Jul.

The Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy reports from Tobruk that the situation regarding the operation of PT boats is critical, since fuel deliveries from Italy have ceased almost completely. The German Naval Command, Italy is therefore compelled to request fuel deliveries from the Aegean area and from Crete. (See Telegram 1647.)

Concerning the sinking of a transport out of a convoy northeast of Alexandria by a German submarine see Submarine Warfare.

30 Jun. 1942

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The dispatch vessel DIANA, en route to Tobruk, is overdue. Air reconnaissance reports sighting a great number of shipwrecked men 60 miles northeast of Derna, so that it appears certain that the dispatch vessel was destroyed by the enemy.

The arrival of steamer ISMO at Tripoli on the evening of 28 Jun. was reported. Steamer OSTIA en route to Tripoli had to put in to Sfax to take on coal. Steamer PONTINIA arrived from Crete at Tobruk on 28 Jun.; tanker FACIO from Taranto is en route to Tobruk. 3 transport submarines are proceeding from Taranto to Derna. A convoy of 3 motor ships is scheduled to sail from Taranto to Benghazi in the evening of 30 Jun.

In coastal shipping steamer SAVONA ran aground between Benghazi and Tobruk. The cargo from the aft holds is being unloaded by lighters. 735 tons of material were unloaded in Tobruk today.

5 landing barges carrying approximately 370 tons of gasoline for the Army and Air Force were unloaded at Sidi Barrani.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Tanker CELENO was slightly damaged on 29 Jun. by an explosion due to sabotage.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence numerous submarines but no surface forces were at sea. A deciphered radio message revealed that submarines at sea were notified from Sevastopol at 0300 of 29 Jun. of the impending sailing of 4 submarines (probably from Sevastopol).

Own Situation:

During the night of 29 Jun. the 1st PT Boat Flotilla carried out a mine-laying mission in the Sevastopol area. Otherwise nothing to report.

IX. Situation East Asia

Reuter reports an attack on Wake Island by U.S. bombers on 27 Jun. According to a Swedish report from Shanghai, Japanese submarines were sighted in the Arabian Sea and in the Bay of Aden. Radio monitoring intercepted the distress signal of a steamer north-northeast of Mozambique, which was attacked unsuccessfully by a submarine.

30 Jun. 1942

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The assault on Sevastopol succeeded in breaking down the entire Sapun defense position. Our divisions advancing from the south broke through the outer belt of fortifications after overcoming strong enemy resistance; the inner defenses were reached by several units. Forces striking beyond the Sapun heights are approximately 10 km northwest of Balaklava.

In the morning of 30 Jun. the 6th Army attacked on a wide front east and northeast of Kharkov in an easterly direction and broke through the enemy defenses. We gained considerable ground north of Burlyuk on the southern sector and east of Belgorod on the northern sector. The forces advancing in northerly and northeasterly direction east of Belgorod reached Korocha. Forces advancing east of Kursk are fighting for the possession of Gorshechnoie and Kastornaya. The enemy is attempting to exert pressure on our advancing spearheads with newly brought up tank forces.

Central Army Group:

The fight against partisans continued successfully.

Northern Army Group:

Our shock troops advancing toward each other from Kholm and Staraya Russa have made contact so that the entire length of the Staraya Russa-Kholm road is occupied by German forces.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Fighting was on a small scale.

3. North Africa:

During the day the Panzer Army took up positions in preparation for an attack on the Alamein defenses; the German Africa Corps simulated attack preparations against the southern enemy wing. A strong reconnaissance detachment is operating in the direction of the Siwa Oasis.

GLOSSARY

Anton

Code name for the operation to seize unoccupied France in cooperation with Italian forces.

Antonius

Code name for mine-laying operation by the COBRA and the ROLAND. Minefield 15a was laid in quadrant 6300 in the North Sea to strengthen the so-called Westwall barrages.

Attila

Cover name for the occupation of Vichy-controlled France and the attempted seizure of the French fleet.

Bachstelze, Tragschrauber

Lookout kite. Gliderlike device towed by a submarine or ship to widen field of vision.

Blau

Code name for attack on the Caucasus.

Brummbaer

German minefield extending in 3 rows from 59° 59' N, 28° 41.7' E to 60° 3' N, 28° 41.7' E.

Carolus

Code name for plan to land an agent on Long Island by submarine.

Cerberus

Code name for the operation involving the transfer of the SCHARNHORST, GNEISENAU, and PRINZ EUGEN through the Channel in February 1942.

Deschimag

Deutsche Schiff- und Maschinenbau Aktien Gesellschaft (German Shipyard and Machine Building Corporation) one of the leading German shipbuilding firms with shipyards at Bremen and Wesermuende.

EMC

Standard mine, type C; a contact mine against surface vessels.

Erika

Code name for minelaying operation by the OSTMARK and the BRUMMER. It involved minefield 16 of the Westwall barrages: 56° 29.5' N, 4° 7' E to 56° 52.8' N, 4° 7' E.

Ernst

A German reference point located at 24° 35' S, 23° 50' W.

Froschlaich

Code name for a German mining operation in the Kronstadt area beginning 9 June 1942.

Graf

Code name for mining operation carried out by destroyers in the Norwegian area. Minefield 19a of the Westwall extended in 2 rows from 28° 3' N, 3° 27' E to 58° 22.6' N, 3° 27' E.

Grete

Code name for operation landing an agent on the Canadian coast by

means of a submarine.

Grossfuerst

Code name for minelaying operation involving barrage 22a laid between quadrant AN 2819 lower left and AN 2733 upper right (320 EMC).

Herkules

Code name of an operation designed to capture Malta. Hitler thought the best time would be following the capture of Tobruk and a long series of air raids and strong blockade of Malta.

Herzog

Code name for minelaying operation carried out by destroyers in Norwegian waters. Barrage 21a of the Westwall extended in 2 rows from 58° 56' N, 3° 12' E to 59° 15.6' N, 3° 12' E.

Ilona

Code name for initial countermeasures against enemy action against the Iberian peninsula.

Isabella

Cover name for defense measures to be taken in the event of an Allied invasion of Spain.

Julius

Code name for minelaying operation by the COBRA and the ROLAND. Minefield 13a was laid in quadrant 6300 in the North Sea to strengthen the so-called Westwall barrages.

Kuesel Minefield I.

A minefield blocking the western navigation channel of the entrance to the White Sea. The mined area was rectangular and its boundaries were approximately the following: 67° 30' N; 67° 25' N; 41° 32' E; 41° 09' E.

Kunigunde

Code name for minelaying operation involving minefields XIII a and b.

XIII a extended from 57° 53.4' N, 8° 6.6' E to 57° 44.9' N, 8° 11.8' E to 57° 44.4' N, 8° 27' E.

XIII b extended from 57° 43.4' N, 8° 28.1' E to 51° 28' N, 8° 42.5' E.

Maastricht

A German reference point, located at 30° S, 44° W.

Messing

A German reference point in the Indian Ocean; it was located at 23° S, 80° E, in the so-called "Metalle" area which was bounded by 22° S, 30° S, 70° E, and 85° E.

Nashorn

Cover name for a series of German anti-submarine mine barrages designed to keep Russian submarines from breaking out into the Baltic. The barriers extended from Nargen on the Estonian side of the Gulf of Finland to the area of Porkkala on the Finnish side.

Neuland

Code name for information on Russian ship and ice reports intercepted by the Naval Communications Division and transmitted to the

Naval Operations Division and Group North.

News Analysis "Foreign Navies" (Nachrichtenauswertung "Fremde Marinen")
A daily analysis of foreign newspaper reports concerning foreign naval news, compiled by the Naval Staff Intelligence Division (3/Skl).

Political Review (Politische Uebersicht)
A daily review of political developments abroad published by the Naval Staff Intelligence Division (3/Skl).

PQ
Designation of convoys proceeding eastward from the United Kingdom to northern Russia.

QP
Designation of convoys returning to the United Kingdom from northern Russia.

QQQ signal
Distress signal sent by ship when sighting or under attack by armed raider. QQQ was also used when suspicious merchant vessels were sighted.

Roesselsprung
Code name for operation against convoy PQ 17.

Route Anton
A German shipping route. Its geographical borders were: The French coast at 47° 30' N; 47° 30' N, 29° W; 43° N, 40° W; 37° N, 40° W; continued on 37° N; the southern and eastern borders of route "Anton" were defined by the borders of the operations zone of the submarines in the South Atlantic.

Route "Gelb"
Route taken by German vessels to Japan, via Indian Ocean and Sunda Strait. The points touched on this route are given below. The points had different designations for different ships.

- | | | |
|----|-------------|-------------------------|
| 1. | Duesseldorf | - 24° 00' S, 99° 00' E |
| 2. | Dahlem | - Sunda Strait |
| 3. | Danzig | - 09° 15' N, 110° 30' E |
| 4. | Darmstadt | - 20° 50' N, 120° 00' E |
| 5. | Duisburg | - 26° 00' N, 128° 40' E |
| 6. | Doeberitz | - 34° 00' N, 139° 50' E |

Route "Rosa"
German shipping route along the western coast of France.

RRR signal
Distress signal sent by ships when sighting or under attack by enemy warship.

Saale
A German reference point in the Indian Ocean; it was located at 24° S, 99° E.

SC bombs
Thin-shell high explosive bombs.

Seeigel
Code name for German minefield from the islands of Aspoe to 60°

4' N, 27° 9' E; 59° 54' N, 27° 20.5' E, via Vigrund to Cape Kurgalski.

Seeloewe

Cover name for the planned invasion of England.

SSS signal

Distress signal sent when sighting or under attack by a submarine; could also indicate being damaged by a mine.

Standard mines, Type C

See EMC.

Suedsee

Cover name for a planned voyage of German steamers to and from Japan along the northern coast of Russia and Siberia. The German auxiliary cruiser KOMET (ship "45") sailed this route in 1940 with Russian cooperation (operation "Gruen").

Tiger I, II, III.

German minefields extending from 60° 6.4' N, 28° 14.2' E to 60° 9.6' N, 28° 19' E. There were three barrages of 54 EMC mines each, laid for the purpose of interfering with the Russian supply traffic to Lavansaari and Seiskari.

Wagner

A German reference point in the South Atlantic, located at 28° S 19° W in the so-called "Komponisten" area.

Westwall

A system of mine barrages in the North Sea and off the coast of Norway. Geographically it constituted an extension of the Westwall fortifications on land.

Wiesengrund

Code name for operation against Rybachy Peninsula.

