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
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WAR DIARY

German Naval Staff Operations Division



DECLASSIFIED JAN 1972, SUBJ: DECLASSIFICATION OF NAVAL RECORDS

PART A VOLUME 31

DECLASSIFIED JAN 1972, SUBJ: DECLASSIFICATION OF NAVAL RECORDS

MARCH 1942

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Washington, D. C.

Foreword

1. The Office of Naval Intelligence has undertaken to translate important parts of the War Diary of the German Naval Staff. The present volume, entitled War Diary of the German Naval Staff, Operations Division, Part A, Volume 31 is the fifth one of the series to appear. Other volumes will follow shortly.

2. The War Diaries, Part A, are important because they contain a day by day summary of the information available to the German Naval Staff and the decisions reached on the basis thereof. Together with the Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy, 1939-1945, which have been published by this office, the War Diaries should provide valuable material for the study of naval problems arising from total war. The War Diary, Part A, is also a useful index to the German Naval Archives of World War II; references may be found in the micro-film library of Naval Records and Library.

3. Due to the cost of publication, only a limited number of copies could be made; it is therefore desirable that the copies which have been distributed are made available to other offices which may be interested.

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DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

Washington, D. C.
1948

WAR DIARY OF THE GERMAN NAVAL STAFF
(Operations Division)

PART A

March 1942

Chief, Naval Staff:	Grand Admiral Raeder, Dr. h.c.
Chief of Staff, Naval Staff:	Vice Admiral Fricke
Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff:	Captain Wagner

Volume 31

begun:	1 March 1942
closed:	31 March 1942

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Items of Political Importance

Eire:

De Valera spoke on the serious food situation confronting the country, which is due to the fact that shipping space is needed for other and still more vital purposes, the most important of which is the transport of fuel. He said that he hopes it will be possible to manage without resorting to soup kitchens.

U.S.A.:

The U.S. Government informed the De Gaullist Governor of New Caledonia that the United States desires to cooperate with this country directly without recourse to any other French authority.

From a declaration of the Argentine Foreign Minister it can be gathered that the North American armament program is laid out on a four years' schedule covering the following four phases:

1. Rearmament of North America.
2. Military aid to Russia, Britain, and China.
3. Shipment of arms to countries within the American Defense Zone (as far as 18° S).
4. Shipment of arms to other countries.

Japan:

Close attention is being paid to the replacement of the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow, Tatekawa, by Satoh. This move is spoken of as heralding a change in Russo-Japanese relations.

Situation 1 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

No important items are available.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Attache at Tokyo is advised that from the end of March on the Naval Staff intends to have an auxiliary cruiser operating in the southern Indian Ocean south of 10° S and west of 95° E.

In view of the enemy situation the GERMANIA must depart from Santa Cruz no later than 4 Mar.. The Naval Attache at Madrid receives a corresponding directive.

All concerned in foreign waters are advised of the enemy situation by Radiograms 0613 and 1826.

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II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

A joint communique of the British Admiralty and the Air Ministry of 28 Feb. reports that an attack on the German radar equipment at Bruneval was successful and that the station was destroyed. Another announcement, which also includes the War Office, reveals that the parachute troops were supported by infantry.

According to radio monitoring British PT boats and motor gun boats were put into action during the evening against detected German convoys. At 2157 the British vessels executed a torpedo attack.

2. Own Situation:

.Atlantic Coast:

Group West advises the Naval Staff about the opinion of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines concerning the disadvantages in limiting submarines to only two routes for their arrival and departure because of the lack of patrol vessels. Group West also reports that they are investigating whether more forces of the Air Command, Atlantic Coast can be incorporated into the daylight patrol system. (See Telegram 0300.)

Radiogram 1506 advises the OSORNO that long-range reconnaissance will be discontinued beginning 1 Mar.

Channel Coast:

See Telegram 0145 for a report from the Naval Shore Command, Seine-Somme about the air raid on the Air Force building at Cap d'Antifer on 28 Feb.

On the basis of experiences gained from the British airborne landing operation near Cap d'Antifer the Naval Staff directs the Admiral, France to investigate whether the headquarters of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines and the other admirals as well as the submarine pens and living quarters for submarine crews are adequately defended against similar British operations. Group West is informed of the measure. (See Telegram 1601.)

The Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff issues the following directive to the Commander in Chief, Army; Commander in Chief, Air; Commander in Chief, Navy; Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway; Commanding General, Lapland; Commanding General Armed Forces, Netherlands; Commanding General Armed Forces, Southeast; Commanding General, West; Commanding General, South; and the Commanding General, Panzer Army, Africa:

"In a raid on the Channel coast during the night of 27 Feb. British paratroopers (77 men according to a statement from a prisoner) captured or destroyed a radar instrument of the Air Force which was set up in the immediate vicinity of the coast but was inadequately defended. The paratroopers escaped aboard four PT boats.

Because of this incident all defense preparations, especially the protection of installations of this nature when located near the coast,

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but also those in the interior, are to be checked once more immediately with regard to their defensive strength against raids of all kinds and are to be reinforced if necessary.

The branches of the Armed Forces will forward this directive at once to their subordinate headquarters. Further orders will follow."

The directive has been forwarded to Groups West, North, and South, with copies to the Commanding Admirals, France and Norway.

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla conducted a torpedo mission southeast of Orfordness. At 2155 enemy PT boats attacked the tanker MEMELLAND which was hit but remained afloat. She is to be towed to Boulogne.

Between 2119 and 2159 the "Grosser Kurfuerst", "Prinz Heinrich", and "Friedrich August" batteries fired a total of 7 rounds from the 30.5 cm. guns and 14 rounds from the 28 cm. guns at a detected enemy convoy. Effects were not observed.

There seems to be little use in firing on detected enemy forces off the British coast in this manner. It should be examined whether such an expenditure is worth while at all.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The Air Force located a considerable number of shipping targets northwest of Walcheren, but our fighters which were over the location one hour later sighted nothing.

In the afternoon and evening reconnaissance activity over the central part of the North Sea and along the Norwegian coast.

The 4th Mine Sweeper Flotilla is en route from Hook of Holland to Westermunde. This flotilla is to be stationed in Norway.

Group North advises against maneuvers by heavy vessels in the North Sea since mines have been reported in that area and ice conditions make it impossible to sweep and patrol routes adequately.

During the night the 1st Mine Sweeper Flotilla and the 8th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla laid mine fields SW 4 and SW 5.

2. Norway:

According to air reconnaissance the naval vessel and the rather large steamers which were sighted in Murmansk and Kola Bay on 27 Feb. are no longer to be seen there. The convoy has presumably departed.

Own Situation:

Due to a defect in the connection no reports are available from the Admiral, Arctic Ocean.

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On 28 Feb. enemy air raid on Kirkenes. The mess hall and the office building of the Air Force loading officer were damaged.

Transport and escort services according to plan; nothing to report.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

See Telegram 0200 for the report from the Air Force Commander, Central Sector to the Naval Staff concerning transfer of the 1st Air Force Smoke Detachment to Kiel. This unit will temporarily be placed under tactical naval command until the Navy's own smoke detachment is ready for duty.

By Telegram 1600 the Naval Staff directs the Naval Station, Baltic to report at once to the Naval Staff on the bomb hit sustained aboard the MONTE SARMIENTO and to explain the reason why the crew had not been alerted. Group North is informed of the order.

Otherwise nothing to report.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring a plane located about 370 miles west of Brest reported at 1300 that it attacked a submarine with depth bombs and presumably scored two hits. On receipt of the report two more planes were dispatched from Plymouth and advised that the attacked vessel was probably damaged. Towards midnight two other submarines were reported in 4600 N, 0930 W and 4927 N, 1406 W.

Radio station Rugby broadcast a submarine warning for the area approximately 450 miles southeast of Halifax and the sea area within a 20 mile radius off the southern tip of Florida.

On 27 Feb. a submarine warning was issued for the area northeast of Cape Viego Francis (Haiti), where two submarines supposedly sank a British ship.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "135" sighted a southwest bound convoy in AL 6862.

In spite of foul weather which is a great handicap in the use of weapons, U "135" fired a quadruple torpedo spread but missed the target and subsequently continued on her voyage north.

Submarine U "213" sighted an enemy submarine in AM 1970.

For a complementary situation report see War Diary, Part B, Volume IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

In the evening armed reconnaissance damaged a 5,000 GRT merchantman.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

During the afternoon submarine berths at Valetta were repeatedly attacked with bombs of heaviest caliber. Dense clouds caused by the explosions prevented observation of the effect on individual targets, but judging from the locations of hits scored the resulting damage is probably considerable. Defensive fire from heavy anti-aircraft artillery was very well aimed. Dock installations at Valetta were attacked during the night of 1 Mar.. On 2 Mar. the resultant damage will be observed by aerial photography.

3. Eastern Front:

It is reported that the enemy is protecting Sevastopol with a strong fighter screen.

On the eastern front we have approximately three times as many planes as the enemy (on 22 Feb. 1,021 as compared with 371).

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

The only reports concerned submarines which were located northwest of Naples near Leukas and between Pola and Fiume.

2. Situation Italy:

No enemy air raids on Benghazi during the night of 28 Feb.

On 27 Feb. an enemy submarine shelled three Italian coastal steamers northeast of Leukas. The steamer LIDO caught fire as a result and ran ashore during this attack.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

During the afternoon of 27 Feb. an enemy submarine sank the steamer TEMBIEN west of Tripoli.

4. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Air reconnaissance reports that seven steamers, three torpedo boats, and three PT boats left Sevastopol. A medium-sized naval

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vessel was located off Sevastopol. According to radio monitoring the cruisers "E" and "D" were located in the Tuapse area and three destroyers were in the Sevastopol area. Eight submarines were detected at sea south of the Crimea. Radio communications with patrol and coastal defense vessels were normal.

Own Situation:

The High Command, 2nd Army has supplemented the air reconnaissance reports concerning the vessels arriving in Sevastopol by pointing out that a convoy of seven transports is involved. Therefore it may be expected that the enemy forces in the Crimea will soon be reinforced in both materiel and personnel.

As concerns the use of Italian special weapons in the Black Sea, the Naval Attache at Rome has advised Group South that the Italians intend to organize these units in a manner which will require a minimum number of officers and men. The Naval Staff informs Group South that it is very much in accord with this way of planning and that it also fully approves of the various Italian proposals concerning organization of command.

VIII. Situation East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

From the first phase of the engagement between Allied and Japanese naval forces in connection with Japanese landings on Java on 27 Feb. the U.S. Navy Department reports that the Japanese cruiser MOGAMI and three destroyers were put out of action, while the Allied vessels sustained no serious damage.

The official report from the Dutch East Indies on the battle in the Java Sea and the Japanese landing operation in Java speaks of a Japanese transport fleet of forty steamers and a supporting naval force of twenty vessels, among them heavy cruisers with 20 cm. guns. The Japanese sustained the losses reported above on 27 Feb.. Two Dutch cruisers sustained torpedo hits and sank in the course of the ensuing night action. During the landing operation in the night of 28 Feb. a Dutch destroyer engaged two Japanese cruisers near Bantam and was beached while sinking. Off Rembang Allied submarines and planes sank a transport and damaged another one; off Indramayu a naval vessel was blown up by four direct bomb hits and a steamer of 6,000 GRT burned up. Bomb hits damaged a cruiser and six more transports.

The oil fields and refineries near Tjepoe were destroyed.

2. Situation Japan:

An official report from Tokyo states that three enemy cruisers and six destroyers were sunk during the night of 27 Feb. and that two enemy cruisers were sunk during the night of 28 Feb.. Four more cruisers were damaged. Only one Japanese destroyer sustained damages.

Japanese troops were successful in landing at four points in Java.

However obscure the picture of actual losses incurred in the course of the naval battles may be, it is certain

that the Japanese succeeded in achieving their strategic goal.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

In the Crimea the enemy concentrated most of his pressure against the northern sector of the eastern front, where he attacked with two divisions supported by between forty and fifty tanks. Our troops were able to hold Korpetch. Enemy attacks on the Sevastopol front were unsuccessful.

On the sector defended by the Von Kleist Army Group all enemy attacks failed.

On the southwest flank of the 6th Army we launched an attack and some groups crossed the Orel in pursuit of the withdrawing enemy.

At the 2nd Army sector enemy attacks near Livny were repulsed.

Central Army Group:

The 2nd Panzer Army has launched a counterattack against the enemy forces which penetrated our lines in the northern outskirts of Vesniny. All enemy attacks on the 4th Army sector were unsuccessful.

Northern Army Group:

The battles around Kholm and Staraya Russa are continuing.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Brisk artillery activity on the Svir front. The enemy raiding party which had broken through our lines was annihilated.

3. North Africa:

The presence of a South African division in the Ain el Gazala position has been confirmed.

During February the enemy lost twenty six tanks and armored cars, thirty six guns, 117 motor vehicles, and fifty nine planes.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

The United States are trying with all means at their command to obtain a guarantee from Vichy that Madagascar will never become an Axis base and that the island will be defended against any attack.

Great Britain:

Britain's efforts to humor Russia by encouraging Sir Stafford Cripps are bearing the strangest fruit. At a meeting of an Anglo-Russian youth organization he was permitted to express the hope that the British youth will be as brave and steadfast as that of Soviet Russia; the attitude of the Russian youth guarantees that it will play an important part not only in conquering Marxism (obviously an error and should be Nazism, Tr.N.) but also in the construction of the new world and the new civilization after victory is won.

In an editorial the London "Times" advocates a sweeping change in British foreign policy. It states that British supremacy in East Asia can never be restored to its old form but that the defeat could be the basis for a new trend in which Britain would once more become the pioneer and proponent of ideologies.

Spain:

A report issued by the official U.S. news agency alleging that German submarines are being supplied at bases in the Canary Islands, primarily designed to foment anti-Spanish sentiment in the South American press, gave rise to a sharp denial from the Spanish Foreign Office.

Sweden:

The Danish press devotes special attention to intensified military preparations in Sweden and also discusses the possible threat to the northern Atlantic coast in case the British and Americans launch a spring offensive. In the same connection the Associated Press mentions a report by the Norwegian Legation in Montreal concerning the possibility of an Allied invasion of the northern area.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The night fighter defense organization at Kiel was to be ready for duty by the end of January. The Chief, Naval Staff orders an investigation of how far the matter has progressed.

II. On the basis of the brief report forwarded by Group West the Chief of Operations Branch, Naval Staff reports about the enemy attack on the Air Force equipment near Cap d'Antifer. He also reports on security measures taken by the Naval Station, North Sea for the protection of the Frisian Islands and the special attention devoted to the coast of Holland. At this the Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division re-

ports that, according to information received from the Naval Liaison Officer to the Armed Forces High Command, General Jodl has expressed himself as favoring complete unification of all coastal defenses under Army command. Furthermore, the Commanding General, Armed Forces, France requested from the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command that "the Navy no longer be allowed to evade preparations for the reinforcement of coastal defenses". The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command allowed this request to enter the minutes without comment.

The Chief, Naval Staff is going to reject this unjust accusation in a personal letter to the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command; if necessary he will report the matter to the Fuehrer. It will be made clear that naval batteries have not been attacked to date for the obvious reason that the enemy knows how much better these units are prepared to repulse attacks than are those of the other branches of the Armed Forces.

III. On the occasion of the report on the Channel coast situation by the Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff, the Chief, Naval Staff orders that gunfire by coastal batteries with no observation of results cease to be published.

IV. During the report on bomb hits on the GNEISENAU, the Chief, Naval Staff orders an examination of how much ammunition must be taken off a vessel each time she docks, since docks offer a particularly attractive target to enemy planes.

The GNEISENAU is to be transferred to Gdynia as soon as possible.

A decision concerning the repairs and the future of the GNEISENAU will be deferred until the final report has been received from the Naval Construction Division.

V. Because of the changed situation the Naval Staff, in accord with Group North, proposes to postpone the intended transfer of the SCHEER to Narvik until the time when the HIPPER has arrived in the northern area. The Chief, Naval Staff consents to this plan.

VI. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff gives notice of the report concerning troop transports via the North Sea to southern Norway which was forwarded to the Fuehrer (see War Diary 1 Mar.). The Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the report.

VII. The Chief, Naval Staff also endorses the Naval Staff's proposals concerning sanction of Italian plans for using special weapons in the Black Sea and concerning willingness to take a greater risk by allowing the blockade-runners MUENSTER and PORTLAND to proceed to western France, even though they will arrive there later than planned. (See War in Foreign Waters.)

VIII. The Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division reports on the employment of Croatian naval personnel as volunteers in the German Navy. The Foreign Office offers no objections, so long as they do not come in contact with the Italians. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

IX. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff reports on the stand taken by the Foreign Office concerning the Japanese plans with regard to Madagascar. Although these plans are welcome from a military point of view, there are serious political objections with regard to the ef-

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fects on France, on the stability of the Vichy Government, etc. The Naval Staff intends to propose to the Armed Forces High Command that French objections be removed through negotiations. For further details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

Italian authorities object to the repair of the DUNKERQUE. The Foreign Minister requests the Navy to make further action dependent on the Fuehrer's decision.

X. Experiences in connection with recent major events have shown that there is cause for adverse criticism of the time it takes for the Navy to report to the Armed Forces High Command. The bulletins were not forwarded fast enough, and in many instances lagged behind those from the other branches of the Armed Forces. The Chief, Naval Staff orders that a relevant directive be issued.

XI. The Chief, Naval Staff endorses the Naval Staff's memorandum for presentation to the Fuehrer concerning the strategic conclusions to be drawn from the current situation, with special attention to the problem of the Near East.

Situation 2 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

The report of a foreign agent states that a British cruiser of the ORION class docked in Brooklyn on 6 Feb.. The vessel came from South Africa and showed severe damage, which apparently was sustained in the East Asiatic theater of war.

South Atlantic:

The auxiliary cruiser ASTURIAS sailed from Montevideo on 25 Feb. On 1 Mar. a convoy of four steamers and one destroyer was reported near Victoria (Brazil).

According to foreign agent reports the destroyer GREER and the U.S. gun boat LIND arrived damaged in Rio de Janeiro on 24 Feb. Both vessels were damaged. It is said that this damage was sustained during the middle of February in connection with a German submarine attack in the Caribbean Sea, which occurred near the spot where a Norwegian steamer was sunk.

A French agent reports that a battleship of the KING GEORGE V class and two submarines were in Freetown from 15 to 19 Feb. This probably is a case of mistaken identity of the battleship MALAYA.

According to an Italian report convoy WS 15 was located at about 26° S, 10° E on 7 Feb. On 9 Feb. part of a convoy bound for Durban was located at 35° S, 16° E and another part bound for Capetown was located in the area off that city.

Pacific Ocean:

According to radio monitoring the WARSPITE was located in the vicinity of Australia on 2 Mar.

The report of an agent in the United States states that U.S. repair ships and one aircraft repair ship are located in the vicinity of New Zealand or Samoa. A squadron of planes from the LEXINGTON is currently based on Samoa.

2. Own Situation:

At 2221 Norddeich received a position report from the OSORNO. According to this the blockade-runner, concerning whose fate there was already some anxiety, has progressed no farther than 24° N, 36° W and is making 8 knots. This is considerably slower progress than the calculated speed of 12 to 14 knots.

Group West and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines are advised of this fact.

Previously the OSORNO had received the following directive: "From today on during the next four days two northbound and two southbound convoys may be expected on the north-south route between 40° and 50° N" (see Radiogram 1912).

The Naval Staff had taken into account that the blockade-runner will not be able to reach western France until 4 May although according to directive 25 Apr. was supposed to be the latest date for her arrival. And now Etappe Japan has reported that the PORTLAND will be unable to arrive on schedule either, due to delay in departure and to a detour necessitated by the appearance of U.S. naval forces near the Marshall Islands, and that she cannot be expected in western France before 10 May. Nevertheless the Naval Staff considers the rubber shipments so important that the considerably greater risk of running the blockade off the Bay of Biscay in May is justifiable in the case of both the MUESTERLAND and the PORTLAND.

See War Diary, Part C, Vol. I for the changes made in Annex 1 of the operational order for ship "28", concerning the zone of submarine operations, routes to be taken by prizes, and reciprocal exchange of information as per 1/Skl Ik 488/42 Gkdos. Chefs.

II. Situation West Area1. Atlantic Coast:

Group West temporarily defers the rendezvous mission for the OSORNO.

2. Channel Coast:

At 0428 enemy PT boats again attacked the tanker MEMELLAND and her tug but without success. One of the attackers was sunk. The MEMELLAND has been brought into the outer harbor of Dunkirk and beached there. This ship carries a cargo of 7,000 tons of fuel oil and is therefore of great value at this time; she is to be brought

into port with the next tide.

The mission of the 4th PT Boat Flotilla during the night of 2 Mar. was without result. The flotilla turned back at 0005 because of increasingly foul weather without sighting the enemy. For the brief report see Telegram 0745.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Considerable mine sweeping in the Thames and along the south-east coast. Two shipwrecks were reported. Shipping in the Humber has evidently been prohibited.

According to an agent report the newly built vessels BEATTY and JELLICOE are still sailing under the names of HOWE and ANSON which were used while they were under construction.

The transfer of the large British naval vessels from the North Atlantic area was confirmed. One vessel, presumably the RENOWN, is expected in Barrow and another, the RESOLUTION, is expected at a base in Scotland. The information originates from the engineering office of Rear Admiral F.B.C. Turner. Statements from R.A.F. officers further confirm the concentration of heavy naval vessels in Scotland. R.A.F. units are also being transferred to Scotland. From 10 to 12 Feb. the FURIOUS was located near the Faroe Islands.

Own Situation:

The mine fields SW 4 and SW 5 were laid as planned. Nothing to report concerning escort service and sweeping operations in the area under the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North. Aerial mines are suspected in the areas off and north of Hanstholm. During the morning the coastal batteries at Hook of Holland and Scheveningen were alerted because an unidentified object, northbound at a speed of 20 to 25 knots, was located between 10 and 18 km. offshore. Recent observations confirm the suspicion that British convoys which sail along the eastern coast are being protected not only by routine check sweeps but also by an escort of mine sweepers immediately preceding each convoy. Therefore the premise which led to the request for a device to permit the mine to become active only for certain periods of time ("Pausenuhr").

For this reason the Naval Staff requests the Naval Ordnance Division, Underwater Obstacles Branch to shelve the proposal for a "Pausenuhr" for the present in favor of other projects with higher priority, the most important of which is the period delay mechanism for the Fab XI firing device.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

On 1 Mar. air reconnaissance ranged as far as the ice border in the area northeast of Murmansk and north of the North Cape, but ob-

tained no results. Therefore it may be presumed that the expected PQ convoy had not yet reached this area in the course of the day. Since there is an ice border running approximately 200 miles north of the North Cape, the course of the convoy must lie considerably more to the south than was assumed until now.

On 2 Mar. reconnaissance missions flown by two FW 200's over the area between the northern exit of the North Minch and the Faroe Islands obtained no results.

According to statements of prisoners daylight traffic on the railroad to Murmansk has been curtailed. During the night there are numerous trains carrying fuel going from north to south. A considerable quantity of war materiel, including tanks, has been accumulated in Murmansk.

This leads to the conclusion that the supplies which are carried to Murmansk by convoy are very plentiful, but that their transport from there is difficult.

Own Situation:

According to a report from the commanding officer of the VANDALE there is no doubt that the harbor patrol vessel was sunk by a torpedo hit on 27 Feb.

Supply and escort missions proceeding as planned. On 1 Mar. enemy air raid on Haugesund, air raid alarms in Egeroe, Stavanger, and Bergen, but no bombing.

On 2 Mar. an anti-submarine training force of three training vessels and U "17" sailed from Stavanger toward the north.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway designates Svolvær as the main base of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla; part of the flotilla must be there at all times on the alert. It is desirable that anchorages be changed from time to time. The flotilla will be placed under the command of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean.

The Commanding Admiral, Battleships reports to Group North that his conference with the Commander, Anti-Aircraft Defenses revealed a surprising lack of adequate anti-aircraft defenses in the region of the Aasen Fjord. He requests urgently that the anti-aircraft artillery be strengthened, searchlight batteries be erected, barrage balloons and kites be employed, parachute wire rockets be used against strafing planes, and that one of the four ME 109 flights intended for Trondheim be exchanged for one FW 190 flight of Pursuit Wing 26. (See Telegram 1950.)

The Naval Staff is investigating the situation.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

The Armed Forces High Command decides that in view of the special importance of the railroad bridge at Riga the CASTOR is to be employed for the Riga mission when ice conditions permit and that transport op-

erations are to be deferred temporarily. (See Telegram 2130 and War Diary 28 Feb.)

The Fleet reports that the bomb which hit the GNEISENAU could not have been larger than those which landed on the SCHARNHORST in La Pallice, i.e., 864 kg.. The armored deck was only ripped open and not fully penetrated. The detonation occurred above the armored deck.

Via letter 1/Skl IL 495/42 Gkdos. Chefs. the Naval Staff directs the Naval Liaison Officer with the Commander in Chief, Air to impress on the Operations Staff that the planned surprise raid on heavy enemy forces in Kronstadt Bay should also include destroyers and submarines. He is also to take measures which will give Group North the possibility of forming a clear picture of the situation in the northern part of the Baltic Sea on the basis of the reconnaissance observations of the 1st Air Force, in order to eliminate the threat to our supply lines by enemy operations. For a copy of the letter see War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

West of Iceland a plane encountered an SL convoy at 54° N, 12° W. On 5 Mar. convoy SC 71 is supposed to be located in the rendezvous area at approximately 58° N.

2. Own Situation:

U "158" reports that en route to the American coast it sank an 8,000 GRT tanker with two torpedoes followed by gunfire.

From the coast of Florida U "128" reported sinking two petroleum tankers totalling 15,000 GRT.

En route to the west U "162" reported sinking an 8,000 GRT four-masted freighter, probably of the ASTRONOMER class. On 28 Feb. U "129" reported sinking a steamer of 4,000 GRT off the coast of Guayama.

Altogether, these reports represent a total of 35,000 GRT sunk. For a supplementary situation report see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Off Montrose, evening reconnaissance bombed and severely damaged one steamer of 6,000 GRT and another one of 4,000 GRT.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The nuisance raids on Malta and the bombing of military camps and troop columns in the Cyrenaica are continuing.

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During the night of 2 Mar. fourteen Ju 88's based on Candia flew a mission to mine the Suez Canal; a simultaneous raid by thirteen He 111's on the air base at El Kabrid near Alexandria served to divert the enemy's attention.

3. Eastern Front:

During the night of 1 Mar. an aerial torpedo attack near Kerch sank a steamer of 6,000 GRT. Another aerial torpedo attack was launched during the night of 2 Mar.

Missions over the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov were badly handicapped by fog.

Most of the missions flown to support Army operations were over the Barvenkova-Lostovaya area. For reports on further missions and successes see situation report.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

Evaluation of aerial photographs of Valetta shows the following: 3 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 8 submarines, 2 steamers, 1 tanker, and 1 mine layer. Of the 3 cruisers one, of the DIDO class, has undocked and another one, of the AURORA class, is in dock.

Towards noon air reconnaissance sighted a convoy escorted by three or four planes 35 miles east of Marsa Matruh. No further data is available.

2. Situation Italy:

Enemy planes raided Tripoli during the night of 1 Mar.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

During the evening, the steamer PETRARCA is scheduled to leave Taranto en route to Benghazi.

Ten of the seventy German soldiers aboard the steamer TEMBIEN were rescued. Two hundred British prisoners of war were killed by the torpedo hit in the hold.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

On 1 Mar. an enemy submarine was sighted near the southern Cyclades. On 2 Mar. two enemy submarines southeast of Salonika fired on coastal auxiliary sailing vessels.

Because of the submarine situation near Salonika the convoy of tankers ALBARO and PRODOMOS, en route from Trikeri to the Dardanelles, is being rerouted and given additional escort of a second torpedo boat. Three Italian subchasers are conducting a submarine hunt.

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Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

No new observations by air reconnaissance or radio monitoring.

Own Situation:

Enemy air raid on Nikolayev. Bombs fell in the vicinity of the southern dock and the eastern air field but caused no damage.

Concerning Black Sea operations by Italian special weapons, the Naval Staff reports to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff (via the Naval Liaison Officer) that upon the proposal made by the Commander in Chief, Navy the Italian Navy has detailed the following forces:

1. Four subchasers with a crew of 13 men each.
2. Six midget submarines with a crew of 5 men each.
3. Four small PT boats, each with a crew of four Italians.

All boats can be delivered by Mar. 1942. The midget submarines and the PT boats will be transported by land on specially built Italian cars; possibilities for shipping the subchasers are still being examined. It is both desired and appropriate that all the boats be manned by Italians. All forces will be under the tactical command of the Commanding Admiral, Black Sea and under the administrative control of an Italian officer to be detailed to the Commanding Admiral, Black Sea. The Italian organization will be held to a minimum of officers and men. The entire personnel will probably amount to from 150 to 200 men. Constanta is planned as a temporary base for all three groups. As soon as the Army situation permits, it is intended to transfer the base to the Crimea or some point still farther east. This is especially desirable in view of the small operating radius of the boats. The transfer will be effected on the basis of the recent decision of the Fuehrer. A conference with the Italians will take place at Sofia beginning on 5 Mar. and after its conclusion another one will be held with the Rumanians. For a copy of the corresponding telegram as per 1/Sk1 Im 478/42 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

According to a report from the Military Attache in Tokyo, the occupation of Rangoon may be expected by 10 Mar.. All but minor remnants of resisting enemy forces on Sumatra have been overcome. The Japanese are approaching the oil fields of Jambi.

The advance on Java is proceeding according to plan.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

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Enemy attacks on the Feodosiya front are continuing. At the sector of the Von Kleist Army Group the enemy succeeded in penetrating to some extent our front line on the Bakhmut in several places. Further attacks are expected in the Samara River valley.

On the southwestern front of the 6th Army our forces attacked and advanced farther east across the Orel River.

Central Army Group:

House to house fighting in Vesniny. The enemy gained some territory near Lostovaya. All other enemy attacks in the 4th Army sector were repulsed. Our troops are attacking north west of Demidov. Fighting on the highway between Veluki and Suraj. Our forces are again in possession of the railroad from Veluki to Neval.

Northern Army Group:


Enemy attacks near Kholm were repulsed. No reports are available from the area south of Staraya Russa. Other enemy attacks were repulsed.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Artillery fire along the entire northeastern front.

3. North Africa:

Situation unchanged.



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Items of Political Importance

Norway:

All bishops have resigned in connection with the removal of the head of the Norwegian State Church, Bishop Berggrav.

France:

According to comments from neutral sources, the great majority of the French people are supporting Petain and his reconstruction program. It is said that popular opinion is anti-German because of the delay in settling the general Franco-German problem and because of the detention of prisoners of war. Public opinion is by no means pro-British, however.

Great Britain:

General Wavell has been given the post of a commander in chief again, this time in India. He is also responsible for military operations in Burma as well as for Sino-British cooperation. Consequently the Dutch themselves are in command in the Dutch East Indies.

Reuter's commentary on this delicate situation in which the Allies find themselves is ambiguous. It states that Java can no longer serve as the base for the Allied attack, and that the battle for this island is no longer significant in the over-all strategic plan. The Dutch are reacting as might be expected.

The change of Cabinet officials has by no means solved the slowly approaching crisis in Britain's interior affairs, the outcome of which firmly hinges on the vital question of whether the Government will be able to pursue its plan of continuing the war in the face of the disastrous developments since last December, or whether the adherents of the die-hard party will lose more and more of their influence during the coming months and thereby make way for compromise and reason before it is too late. In any case, Churchill's decline and Cripps' rise do not mean the peace party's ascendance. On the contrary, this means merely a shift in emphasis. It is of much greater significance that a personality like Beaverbrook severs his ties with Churchill and resigns from all his offices, and that voices are being heard from arch-conservative circles who are willing to resign themselves to German supremacy over the European continent if such a sacrifice could save the Empire.

Numerous members of Parliament voiced their opposition to air raids on Germany, but Air Minister Sinclair declared on 28 Feb. that an air offensive is an important preliminary to a successful invasion of Europe. Now is the time to get a stranglehold on Germany, not 1943 and 1944. The ones to do this are the RAF and the Red Army.

South Africa:

A report from diplomatic sources states that opposition to Smuts is constantly increasing. It is said that this prompts him to look for success in the field of foreign policy and to consider the idea of

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occupying Lourenco Marques. The thought of defending Madagascar no doubt has something to do with this plan; the occupation of this island seems to preoccupy South African circles of late.

Sweden:

The Swedish Government gave permission for transfer across Swedish territory to Finland of 40 workers belonging to the Todt Organization, since no members of the Armed Forces are involved.

According to a report from the Finnish Foreign Office, the Swedish Foreign Office stated positively that should British forces land in Norway or demand permission to march through Sweden, she will defend herself with all her strength, whatever the consequences might be. It would not be merely token resistance, but would be in dead earnest.

Turkey:

The Turkish press states in an analysis of the problem of relations between Europe and Asia that Japan will fall heir to the Dutch colonies, since neither Germany nor Italy lays claim to them. However, since Europe will have future need for the raw materials she will have lost in Asia, the present war, consciously or not, contains the seed of new global conflicts.

The Turkish press also emphasizes the difficulties of an Anglo-Russian rapprochement. They state that the appearance of Cripps poses the question of whether it pays Britain to substitute Bolshevik tyranny for National Socialist sovereignty.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division reports on the bomb raid on the MONTE SARMIENTO. An investigation revealed that the alarm was sounded about a quarter of an hour before the bomb hit the ship. The evacuation was retarded because the complement of approximately 500 men had had to abandon ship once before during the same night. The bomb hit destroyed both ladders and resulted in 15 killed, 23 missing, and 46 wounded.

The Navy has completed its preparations for night fighter operations at Kiel. On 30 Jan. the Air Force had not yet delivered planes or instruments.

II. The Chief, Naval Construction Division reports on the damage to the GNEISENAU. The foundation of "A" turret must be lifted out. An investigation revealed that the passageway between "A" and "B" turrets was closed in accordance with regulations. The bow above the armored deck was overheated up to "B" turret. It will require approximately 9 months for about 1,000 workers to complete necessary construction and repair of "A" turret in Gdynia. The vessel can be ready for transfer in 5 or 6 days.

The Chief, Naval Staff orders that Group North report whether ice conditions will permit the transfer.

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III. Concerning the PRINZ EUGEN, the Chief, Naval Construction Division reports that it is still too early to state whether a new rudder frame is required. The casting has been ordered as a precaution in any case.

The Chief, Naval Staff orders that a request be made for the projected dock in Trondheim to be assigned SS priority on the basis that the Fuehrer explicitly ordered the execution of this project.

IV. The Naval Staff, Operations Division, Foreign Affairs Section submits the outline of the telegram to be sent to the Armed Forces High Command concerning the opinion of the Naval Staff on the question of repairing the DUNKERQUE. (Compare War Diary 2 Mar.) Text of the telegram is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

V. Concerning naval operations in the northern area, Group North on 25 Feb. communicated to the Naval Staff, also informing the Fleet Command, that assignment of our naval forces to Trondheim is not enough in the long run to discourage or tie up British naval forces in home waters. Thus a transfer of German naval forces is not justified. Therefore Group North suggests a diversionary operation based at Trondheim for around 12 Mar., at which time the GNEISENAU and perhaps also the HIPPER will leave port. The Commanding Admiral, Battleships would direct the TIRPITZ, the SCHEER, and 2 destroyers; their mission would be to locate and destroy enemy supply transports and to divert the enemy's attention from the GNEISENAU.

The operation is planned as follows: Sail to Jan Mayen and from there, in a reconnaissance line approximately 120 miles wide with the left flank skirting the border of the ice region, proceed east up to about 25° E. Refuel the destroyers a second time and return to Trondheim during the fourth night of the operation. The operation must be supported by adequate air reconnaissance. The vessels should be received and escorted in the Trondheim area by submarines, destroyers, torpedo boats, and mine sweeper and motor mine sweeper flotillas.

Group North expects the enemy to interpret this operation as an attempt to break out into the Atlantic. He will therefore shift his naval forces, which are now attempting to check German operations in the Arctic Ocean, so as to prevent our vessels from achieving their apparent goal. Once the enemy fleet knows that the German vessels have returned to Trondheim it will proceed to port; thus alleviated conditions for the GNEISENAU's transfer will be created.

The Naval Staff, Operations Division comments in detail on this proposal. It concludes that the plan can be considered basically sound but must be deferred until the HIPPER has reached the northern area and other prerequisites have been fulfilled. For a copy of the comment see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

The Chief, Naval Staff desires that Group North be requested to refrain from such an operation until the HIPPER is ready for duty, particularly since the GNEISENAU is now out of commission and a diversionary maneuver in support of her departure is no longer necessary. The Chief, Naval Staff's estimate of the situation is to be forwarded to Group North.

Therefore on 3 Mar. Group North receives the following answer to the request of 26 Feb.:

"The Naval Staff basically agrees with Group North's concept concerning the necessity for operations in the northern area. However, the Chief, Naval Staff requests that the planned operation be postponed until the HIPPER is ready for action in the northern area, particularly since the GNEISENAU is out of commission and there is no pressing need for diversionary operations at this time. Within the next few days the Naval Staff will forward Group North its estimate of the situation in the northern area in order to clear up discrepancies."

VI. Concerning air forces: The Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division reports on the proposal from Group North of 17 Jan. 1942 which concerns the creation of a naval air force. As the initial step, the proposal advocates the formation of a naval air force under the tactical authority of the Navy, while the necessary planes, weapons (except for torpedoes) and personnel would be furnished by the Ministry of Aviation. The Commanding Admiral, Group North considers the present time especially opportune for preliminary work, so that as soon as the Russian campaign is at an end and forces are released as a result we can promptly proceed with the proposed reorganization.

In the proposal from Group North the Naval Staff, Operations Division fails to see a working basis desirable for organizing what is later to become a naval air force. Such an air force must be based on a Navy possessing a large fleet, and its personnel must be homogeneous with that of the Navy. Neither prerequisite exists at this time, and neither of them can be created for the duration of the war. Therefore the Naval Staff considers it impossible to reopen the naval air force issue for the duration.

See War Diary, Part C, Vol. V for a copy as per 1/Skl 1640/42 Gkdos. of the proposal from Group North and the views expressed by the Naval Staff, with which the Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

Some time ago the Navy reported to the Fuehrer that it agrees to the temporary solution of the naval air force controversy but reserves the right to report again at some future date in order to acquaint him with the Navy's basic views on the problem. The Chief, Naval Staff desires that it be determined whether the moment for this report is now at hand in order to emphasize that the Navy lays claim to a final solution in the form of its own air force.

VII. Organization of a PT boat command. Conforming to the earlier basic decision from the Commander in Chief, Navy the Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division reports on the creation of a Commander, PT Boats and the elimination of the post of Commander, Torpedo Boats. It will be best to transfer the torpedo boats to the Commander, Destroyers.

The Commander in Chief, Navy approves. The High Command, Navy, Officer Personnel Division is to decide who will be assigned to the new command.

Special Items:

I. According to a report which the Foreign Office received from Stockholm, the Swedish Foreign Minister has evidently learned from the Norwegian Legation in London that the British have no plans for an operation in Norway during 1942. The British Government is said to have

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agreed to refrain from even minor actions against the Norwegian coast as the Norwegian Government in London requested because of German retaliatory measures. The Foreign Minister added that this has no bearing whatsoever on Sweden's military preparedness.

II. In compliance with the directive from the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff of 9 Jan. 1942, a detailed examination has brought about an agreement between the Commander in Chief, Navy and the Commander in Chief, Air on the feasibility of transferring the development and manufacture of aerial torpedoes to the Air Force. On 3 Mar. this agreement is submitted to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff in the form of a joint proposal from both branches of the service, recommending that the field of aerial torpedoes be transferred to the authority of the Commander in Chief, Air. The Commander in Chief, Navy adds the remark that as far as releases of materiel and personnel are concerned, the Navy has gone to the limit beyond which he can no longer be responsible for its present tasks.

As soon as the Fuehrer makes his decision the transfer can be effected without further delay.

III. The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division and the Naval Construction Division have worked out the order in which the 6 PT boats and the 8 large motor mine sweepers are to be transferred to the Black Sea. 4 small motor mine sweepers and 14 fishing smacks are also to be included. The Naval Staff is particularly interested in getting the vessels under way as soon as possible. The 6 PT boats are at Kiel, and can leave when ice conditions permit. 3 weeks after the PT boats have arrived in Dresden, the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West will order the 8 large motor mine sweepers to proceed there. The right to decide on the transfer of naval barges is reserved by the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, which assumes that a simultaneous transfer of the 5 submarines one at a time at three-week intervals will present no difficulties.

IV. Of late it has been the frequent experience of the Naval Staff that it did not receive sufficient information on important developments. Therefore the Chief, Naval Staff has ordered that important developments as well as measures initiated or planned in connection with them are to be reported to the Naval Staff as soon and as thoroughly as possible. A directive to this effect is forwarded to the Group Commands; the Fleet Command; the Commanding Admirals Norway and France; the Naval Stations; the German Admiral, Rome; and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines. (See Telegram 1919.)

V. On 28 Feb. the High Command, Navy, Naval Construction Division (in agreement with the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division) and Group North issued contradictory orders to torpedo boat T "4" (see War Diary 28 Feb.). This incident causes the Naval Staff to observe to the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch that Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Battleships should have been informed of the High Command's order for the vessel to return. The contradictory order from Group North placed torpedo boat T "4" in a most undesirable position. The incorrect issuing of orders moreover caused an unnecessary consumption of fuel and delayed necessary repairs.

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Situation 3 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

The report from a British agent states that the CARNARVON CASTLE is no longer serving as an auxiliary cruiser but as a transport, apparently due to the shortage of transport vessels.

According to Radio London, the U.S. Secretary of the Navy has announced that 140,000 men have volunteered for service with the U.S. Navy, so that it is unnecessary to draft men for naval duty.

South Atlantic:

On 2 Mar. one 10,000 GRT cruiser and 4 submarines of undetermined nationality passed Ifni on a southern course.

A French report states that on 26 Feb. a British auxiliary cruiser was located about 270 miles southwest of Freetown. On 3 Mar. a British steamer sighted a submarine 150 miles southwest of Freetown. (It is improbable that this was a German submarine.)

Indian Ocean:

The U.S. radio station Cavite broadcast submarine warnings for points off the southwest coast of Australia. The U.S. destroyers reported in Valparaiso left on 21 Feb.

2. Own Situation:

The DOGGERBANK received the following order via Radiogram 0913: DOGGERBANK operates as auxiliary cruiser. Mission "Kopenhagen".

Via Radiogram 1211 the OSORNO was advised as follows:

1. The Naval Staff assumes that after reporting her position the vessel made a radical change of course.

2. All former orders are rescinded. The new sailing directive reads as follows: Head for point "Max" via points "Ostsee-krabbe", "Hans", and "Bruno".

3. Location of new points contained in separate radiogram.

4. Keep strict radio silence from now on.

Radiogram 1457 advises the OSORNO about the location of the new points as per Paragraph "3" above.

Letter 1414 informs Etappe Japan that the OSORNO reported her position on 2 Mar.. Etappe Japan is directed to train blockade-runners to zero beat their transmitter and receiver equipment to insure accurate two-way contact on first call, since Norddeich had to broadcast several requests for a position report from the OSORNO until she finally ans-

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were on the frequency used by merchant vessels.

Radiograms 0715, 1507, and 2348 advise all hands in foreign waters of Japanese successes near Java and of the enemy situation.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

From 2120 to 2225 Dover kept a fix on 2 German groups between Cape Gris Nez and Calais. At 2220 a torpedo attack by a PT boat was reported.

The British Admiralty reported of the night of 1 Mar. that a PT boat torpedoed a German tanker from a heavily escorted convoy in the Channel, and that British naval forces fought in several engagements, allegedly sustaining no losses.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Group West and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines are advised that for the time being the Naval Staff, Operations Division will retain command over the OSORNO. The order for escorting the vessel into port remains in effect and 1 submarine is to meet her at point "Ostsee-Krabbe". On 8 Mar. at 0000 German Standard Time Group West will take charge of the OSORNO. Arrangements for a rendezvous point, the time of rendezvous, and recognition signals should be made in cooperation with the Commanding Admiral, Submarines. The message also informs Group West and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines of the directive which the Naval Staff issued to the OSORNO. (See Radiograms 1211 and 1457.)

Channel Coast:

The tanker MEMELLAND was warped into the inland harbor of Boulogne (not Dunkirk as was erroneously reported on 2 Mar.).

The valuable cargo of fuel oil should therefore be safe.

While battery 655 E was shelling ships which had been located, without observing results, a shell exploded prematurely and caused loss of personnel.

At 2223 the convoy of steamer "H 12" was attacked by enemy PT boats north of Cape Gris Nez. Steamer "H 12" sustained a torpedo hit and sank. She is the JEAN JACQUES, and was scheduled for use as a troop transport in the North Sea. At 2300 the 2nd Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla had a brief skirmish with British PT boats, one of which was damaged and withdrew.

This is the second time within 2 days that enemy PT boats have scored successes against our convoys.

Air Situation:

From 2110 to 2340 strong enemy air forces raided factory districts and suburbs of Paris. Our defenses against the low-flying (300 meters) raiders were wholly insufficient and ineffective. Detailed reports have not yet been received.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean1. North Sea:

Nothing to report.

2. Norway:Enemy Situation:

During the morning air reconnaissance spotted a naval vessel, probably a heavy cruiser, 170 miles northeast of Vardoe on a course of 230°.

Own Situation:

On 2 Mar. at 2000 the hydrophone station at Stavoe reported electric motor noises in the Aasen Fjord. A submarine chase in that area was unsuccessful. Transport and escort operations proceeded according to plan; nothing to report. On 2 and 3 Mar. enemy air activity over Stavanger and the Oslo Fjord.

Group North requests that the 4th and 5th Mine Sweeper Flotillas, the 5th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla, and the 11th Subchaser Flotilla be transferred to the administrative command of the Commanding Admiral, Norway, and likewise that the 7th and 22nd Mine Sweeper Flotillas, which are being organized under the Commander, Defenses, North, also be placed under the administrative command of the Commanding Admiral, Norway on being transferred. (See Telegram 1839.)

The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division will take charge of further details.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway reports that he has 2 protective nets available in Bogen Bay for use alongside large ships, but adds that they have only temporary value because the floats are inadequate. (See Telegram 1930.)

The Commanding Admiral, Norway comments in detail on the request from the Commanding Admiral, Battleships of 2 Mar. concerning reinforcement of anti-aircraft defenses in the Aasen Fjord area (see War Diary 2 Mar.). For a copy as per 1/Skl 5074/42 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

Group North endorses as urgent the exchange of a squadron of ME 109 E's in Trondheim for modern FW 190 pursuit planes as proposed by the Commanding Admiral, Battleships. Group North states that the prevention of enemy air reconnaissance is urgently desired not only to protect the vessels but also for operational reasons.

In compliance with the request the Naval Staff will approach the Air

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Force High Command, Operations Staff.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

The 5th Mine Sweeper Flotilla laid mine field VIII in the Skagerrak as planned.

Telegram 1919 advises Group North of the Armed Forces High Command decision that the icebreaker CASTOR is to operate in the Gulf of Riga whenever Group North decides that conditions warrant. Information concerning this decision was also forwarded to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea; the Admiral, Baltic States; the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Baltic States and White Ruthenia; the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division; and the Naval Staff, Hydrographic and Meteorological Division.

Naval Station, Baltic has raised objections concerning the use of Estonian fishing boats in the group commanded by Cellarius (see War Diary 27 Feb.). However, the Naval Staff, Operations Division does not hesitate to endorse such a move and believes that it is more advantageous to requisition the boats on the spot than to initiate action via Naval Station, Baltic and the High Command, Navy. The Naval Staff especially commends the initiative taken by the Admiral, Baltic States.

The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division is informed accordingly.

Nothing to report concerning the naval situation in the Baltic Sea.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Limited air activity. The Brazilian steamer LYDIA M (3,664 GRT) is stranded near Cuba. As a protest against the torpedoing of 2 steamers the Brazilian Government seized 6 Danish ships totalling 22,000 GRT.

Newspaper reports state that submarines sank the U.S. destroyer JACOB JONES, the U.S. freighter MARONE (8,215 GRT), and the British steamer MACGREGOR (2,500 GRT).

2. Own Situation:

Information of the GERMANIA's sailing on the evening of 4 Mar. is relayed to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines with the directive to arrange for a submarine to pick her up on 13 Mar. in quadrant CD 36.

For a supplementary situation report see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Our planes mined the Thames during the night. Attacks on ships met with no success.

Between 10 and 15 planes raided the coastal area of northern Germany. See Situation West Area for reports about the enemy raids on Paris which caused considerable damage and caused heavy casualties among the civilian population.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

During the night of 2 Mar. our planes raided the air bases at El Kabrit and Tanta as planned with good results. Mine-laying missions against the Suez Canal were flown simultaneously and 7 of the 25 mines dropped landed in the fairway as planned. Alexandria was raided during the evening.

The nuisance raids against air bases on Malta and the raids on the submarine base at Valetta were continued.

3. Eastern Front:

The Army received air support.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Situation Italy:

During the night of 2 Mar. the steamer CUMA sustained a bomb hit and caught fire at Palermo. Her cargo was destroyed, including 1,314 tons of German fuel and 1,790 tons of German military supplies. An enemy air raid on Benghazi caused no damage. On 1 Mar. the auxiliary cruiser EGITTO struck a mine in the Taranto roadstead and sank.

3. Own Situation:

The German Naval Command, Italy asks the Naval Staff, Operations Division to transmit all data available on enemy mine fields, including harbor defense barrages, in the eastern Mediterranean.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Three naval barges left Tripoli en route to Benghazi. Two of these are to proceed to Derna if the mine situation permits.

5. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

An enemy submarine sank a third auxiliary sailing vessel in

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the coastal area off Salonika. 11 German soldiers drowned and 3 were badly wounded. All traffic of unescorted auxiliary sailing vessels carrying members of the Armed Forces has been discontinued temporarily. The submarine threat necessitates that escort vessels proceed only in groups while in the northern Aegean Sea.

In view of serious delay in shipments from Italy to Piraeus, Group South proposes that a regular convoy system be established, and requests the Naval Staff's assistance.

Further action will be initiated by the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch (see Telegram 1248).

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

During the night of 2 Mar. Feodosiya was subjected to air raids and a brief naval bombardment. Air reconnaissance reveals that 11 transports left Sevastopol.

Prisoners state that the Black Sea fleet is not equipped with its own magnetic mines, but they confirm the fact that British magnetic mines are in use.

The BOYKIY class destroyers have a maximum speed of 40 to 42 knots and those of the SPOSOBUY class can make up to 44 knots. Contrary to rumors the cruiser KRASNY KAVKAZ was not sunk near Feodosiya but was badly damaged. At the outbreak of war some S class submarines are said to have escaped to the Mediterranean via the Bosphorus. German aerial mines are being removed by towing barges loaded with scrap iron over the location where it was observed that they were dropped.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

5. Situation France:

A French report to the Armistice Commission states that on 1 Mar. the French steamer P.L.M. 20 was sunk near Scusse by 2 submarine torpedoes while sailing in an escorted convoy. The French delegation rightfully points out that due to the orders issued by the Armistice Commission convoys are unable to protect themselves against submarines. They propose that zones be designated in which arms may be used against any submarine attacking a French convoy. As yet the Italians have likewise failed to agree concerning the use of territorial waters. (See Telegram 1855.)

For further details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

VIII. Situation East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

An official report from Batavia states that the motor destroyer ROSALE sank a Japanese flotilla leader during a night attack

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in the eastern part of the Java Sea.

2. Situation Japan:

According to a report from the Naval Attache in Tokyo, the Japanese Admiralty Staff accounts about the naval battle in the Java Sea are vague and hardly vary from newspaper reports.

According to Domei 6 enemy cruisers, 8 destroyers, 7 submarines, 1 gun boat, and 1 mine sweeper were sunk. The cruisers in question were the U.S. cruiser HOUSTON, the British cruiser EXETER, the Australian cruisers PERTH and HOBARTH, and the Dutch cruisers DE RUYTHER and JAVA.

The HOUSTON and the DE RUYTHER were already reported as sunk on 4 Feb.. Now the Japanese Navy corrects that report, stating that those vessels were the AUGUSTA and the TROMP.

According to Domei 1 Japanese mine sweeper was sunk and 1 destroyer slightly damaged.

The Japanese Navy is justly proud of this success resulting from twenty years' training for night fighting.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

No attacks took place in the Crimea.

In the area south of Losovaya an enemy cavalry corps was defeated and thrown back in northerly direction. Enemy attacks near Bakhmut again met with no success.

The combat force which started an advance to the east in the Orel sector gained further territory.

Enemy attacks east of Kursk and west of Livny were repulsed.

Central Army Group:

Enemy attacks on the Yukhnov front were repulsed. Our units advancing from the area south of Vyazma gained territory to the south. An enemy attack on the Dnieper bridge was repulsed.

Our artillery was able to smash most of the strong enemy attacks northwest of Rzhev. Only 1 small enemy penetration remains to be mopped up.

Enemy pressure on the Demidov sector brought our advance to a halt.

Northern Army Group:

The battles around Kholm and in the Staraya Russa area are continuing with undiminished tenacity.

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2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

The situation remains unchanged.

3. North Africa:

For data concerning the rearrangement of the enemy's position at Min el Gazala see today's situation report.

No noteworthy fighting took place.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

The Minister for Supply stated in the House of Commons that supply reserves during the second half of 1941 were 30% higher than at the end of 1940 due to increased shipments from abroad. However, this year it has become necessary to curtail both imports and rations. During the debate black market operations were criticized and a total ration system advocated. The desire was expressed that publication of shipping losses be resumed.

India:

Sumner Welles declared that a North American supply commission will be sent to India in the very near future and that other vital measures for aiding India's defense will also be instituted in Washington.

Egypt:

Because the food situation has deteriorated to a very critical point, shipments of military supplies are being curtailed temporarily and the resultant shipping space devoted to transport of food for the Egyptian population. Certain amounts of the cereal reserves allotted to British troops will be made available to feed the civilian population.

The morale of Allied troops stationed in Egypt is said to be extremely low. The Australians want to go home and the De Gaullist troops feel that they are being neglected.

King Farouk maintains his completely anglophobic attitude for which the new Prime Minister tries to compensate through necessity. Anti-British sentiment among the population is not increasing only because of the still greater antipathy toward Italy.

Portugal:

On 2 Mar. more than 300 persons suspected of revolutionary tendencies were arrested, among them higher officials of the postal and telegraph administration. The fact that the plot called for an attempt to assassinate Salazar and was designed to bring about a British occupation of Portugal is causing a special sensation.

On 28 Feb. the Japanese Government urged the Portuguese Government to withdraw immediately the transport now en route to Timor to west of 90° longitude.

U.S.A.:

The following allotments were made from the \$39,000,000,000 armament appropriation: For the Army \$22,000,000,000, for Lend-Lease \$5,500,000,000, and for the ship construction program \$5,000,000,000.

In a speech on 2 Mar. the Chairman of the War Production Board, Nelson, announced that a control system will be introduced in which labor and management cooperate to increase production. Following the

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example of Soviet Russia, production charts of individual workers are to be posted in every plant and awards introduced such as the honorary title "Soldier of Industry".

According to Reuter a plan is under consideration in Washington whereby the sovereignty of African possessions held by De Gaulle would be recognized on a basis similar to the one just adopted for possessions in the Pacific.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff reports on the request from the Commanding Admiral, Battleships for a reinforcement of anti-aircraft defenses in the Aasen Fjord (see War Diary 3 Mar.). The Chief, Naval Staff orders that the matter be brought to the attention of the Air Force High Command, Operations Staff once more in any case. The Naval Staff, Operations Division will arrange further details.

II. For the first time the blockade-runner TANNENFELS will be able to sail via the Strait of Sunda and thereby shorten the trip from Europe considerably. In due time the new situation in the Indian Ocean will also afford the opportunity to employ the fast Navy tankers for oil imports from the Sunda Islands.

III. Concerning the remark that the Navy should not be allowed to dodge preparations for reinforcing coastal defenses which the Deputy Commanding General, Armed Forces, France made to Field Marshal Keitel, the Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division is ordered to express in a personal letter from the Chief, Naval Staff to the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command that sharp exception is taken to the above statement by General Sperrle. None of the failures mentioned can be ascribed to the Navy, obviously because the Navy's coastal defense installations are better prepared than those of the other branches of the Armed Forces. There is no reason for changing the command organization in coastal defenses. If a unified command is to be organized at all, then the Air Force should also be brought under its authority. In any case the Commander in Chief, Navy desires that the Navy be consulted if plans are drawn up for an organization of this kind.

IV. The Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division reports that a further reduction of raw material allocations has been announced which is supposed to become effective as early as the second quarter of 1942. The cut in the copper quota alone would lower the potential for completing submarines from 18 per month to 9, and would permit construction of only 1 new destroyer and 2 new torpedo boats per year. A survey of the consequences which this new reduction entails will be presented by the middle of next week. It is quite obvious that such a curtailment of surface vessels would make it impossible to carry out even the transport tasks for the entire Armed Forces. Even a temporary reduction of raw material allocations would make it extremely difficult to reach maximum output again once full production is resumed.

V. The Naval Staff, Operations Division, Foreign Affairs Section reports that the German Armistice Commission will attempt to resume

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Franco-German negotiations concerning the so-called "Rommel tonnage" on an economic basis since previous negotiations on a military basis have failed. Negotiations in general had temporarily assumed a more amiable character, but now it is felt that the atmosphere is becoming tense once more. For further details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

VI. The Chief, Naval Staff, Operations Division reports on the conferences between the Army High Command and the Naval Staff concerning employment of the icebreaker CASTOR off Puenamuende as soon as ice conditions permit, and on the permission granted by the Armed Forces High Command to withdraw the CASTOR from transport operations to Norway for this purpose.

An additional report concerns the expectation that the new chairman of the Norwegian Shipowners' Association appointed by Reich Commissioner Terboven will be able to persuade those shipowners who are still pro-British to work in the German interest. The matter is in the hands of the Mercantile and Economic Warfare Division of the Armed Forces High Command. The Chief, Naval Staff desires that the Commanding Admiral, Norway be consulted in decisions pertaining to this problem.

VII. The Chief, Naval Staff endorses the transfer of the railway battery from Boulogne to the Gulf of Finland as proposed by the Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

Special Items:

I. On 20 Feb. 1942 the Naval Staff, Operations Division issued an estimate of the situation analyzing strategic requirements for future operations by the Tripartite Powers which are indicated by the present situation. These requirements are summarized as follows:

Oil procurement is the most important strategic requirement. The strategic key position which is most significant for future war developments is Suez. The Naval Staff is convinced that a successful early offensive against the Suez Canal, which is Britain's main artery, and later the establishment of a direct sea connection with Japan will have a devastating effect on Anglo-American warfare. These steps are therefore of decisive importance to the outcome of the war.

Upon authorization by the Chief, Naval Staff (see War Diary 2 Mar.) a Naval Staff memorandum containing in condensed form the thoughts developed in the estimate of the situation was forwarded on 4 Mar. to the following authorities: The Naval Aide to the Fuehrer for the Fuehrer's information; the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff; the Air Force High Command, Operations Staff; the Army General Staff; the Foreign Office (attention of Ambassador Ritter); as well as the Armed Forces High Command, Foreign Intelligence Section.

For a copy of the memorandum and the estimate of the situation as per 1/Skl Ib 507/42 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. "Fundamental Problems of Warfare".

The estimate of the situation on which the memorandum is based was brought to the attention of the Naval Liaison Officers; the departmental chiefs in the Naval High Command; and the Chiefs of the Naval

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Staff Quartermaster Division, Communications Division, Submarine Division, and Intelligence Division.

II. The Commander in Chief, Navy ordered that explanatory notes and basic guiding principles be appended to the directive regarding armaments for 1942 issued by the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander on 10 Jan. 1942. See War Diary, Part B, Vol. V for a copy of the directive as per Skl Qu A 350/42 Gkdos. of 20 Jan. 1942.

Situation 4 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

According to a French newspaper report 2 Argentinean cruisers and 4 destroyers sailed from Buenos Aires bound for Bahia Blanca, from which base they will patrol the South Atlantic coast.

2. Own Situation:

Reports from forces in foreign waters have not been received.

Via Radiogram 1838 the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN was directed to maintain, or if possible accelerate, a minimum cruising speed of 7 knots in every way feasible. The use of anchor chains is recommended for removing barnacles. She is ordered to maintain radio silence under all circumstances, even if her speed exceeds or falls below the estimate of the Naval Staff.

The GERMANIA received sailing directions via Radiogram 2302.

News of Japanese successes in the Java Sea and enemy reports were transmitted via Radiogram 2129. Submarine positions as broadcast by Caville on 3 Mar. were transmitted via Radiogram 1632.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio London reported correctly that last week the German motor ships HENK and THRIANTHA carried parts of the cargo of the ELSA ESSBERGER from Ferrol to Bayonne.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Group West reports that the Commanding Admiral, Submarines and the Air Commander, Atlantic Coast have entered into an agreement

according to which the latter will provide air cover for arriving and departing submarines whenever there are enough AR 196's and weather conditions permit them to operate. It is impossible to assign this task to HE 115's because there are too few of them. (See Radiogram 1035.)

Channel Coast:

A report from Group West states that during the night of 3 Mar. between 8 and 10 enemy PT boats attacked the steamer JEAN JACQUES. The ship sustained 2 torpedo hits. 8 crew members are missing. The patrol vessels suffered no damage or losses.

Increased activities of British PT boats compel us to supplement our defensive measures.

The enemy has also increased mine-laying operations in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West. 208 mines, 23 of which were ground mines, were swept between 1 and 28 Feb.. The destroyer HEINEMANN, mine exploding vessel "171", mine sweeper "1208", and 2 barges were sunk by enemy mines.

This noticeable increase in our losses is most regrettable. Our comparatively weak mine sweeper and motor mine sweeper forces must exert themselves to the utmost in order to gain control over the situation. It may be assumed, however, that our current mine offensive off the British coasts is resulting in comparable enemy losses.

In the course of February the enemy made 15 plane attacks on vessels belonging to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West, during which 12 enemy planes were certainly shot down and 3 more probably were. 11 of our vessels sustained damages. 16 crew members were killed and 88 wounded.

Civilian casualties from the enemy air raid on Paris on 3 Mar. are estimated at about 800 killed and 1,200 wounded.

During February 1942 convoys in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West comprised 550 vessels totalling 333,000 GRT.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring an unidentified steamer sank near Yarmouth apparently due to a mine hit.

Own Situation:

Convoy and patrol missions proceed according to plan. Nothing to report.

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During the night of 3 Mar. several enemy planes flew over Heligoland Bight. It is suspected that aerial mines were laid in the area north of the East Frisian Islands. (See Telegram 0850.)

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance observed 15 small steamers lying in Murmansk. One submarine was seen entering Kola Bay. A 1,000 GRT steamer and a southbound patrol vessel were located east of the Rybachi Peninsula. 6 mine sweepers were operating east of the Kildin Islands. No vessels were spotted between North Cape and Bear Island. It was observed that the drift ice ends at 54° N, 13° E and the pack ice at 73° 31' N, 17° 20' E.

Own Situation:

On 3 Mar. an enemy submarine failed in a torpedo attack on subchaser "1105" near Nordkyn. The Submarine was pursued and air bubbles and oil spots appeared after the third depth charge had been dropped. Contact with the submarine was lost when the search receiver ceased to function, but the chase continued.

The position of the submarine in the exit of the Porsanger Fjord proves how ineffective it is to declare a mine danger area without actually laying mines. It is desired that the planned mine field be laid at this point as soon as the mines arrive which are now en route aboard the ULM.

Supply operations are proceeding according to plan. Nothing to report.

The 5th Mine Sweeper Flotilla, made up of 7 vessels, sailed from Kristiansand South toward the north.

The report from the Admiral, Arctic Coast concerning a mine field off Kvaloe is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa as per 1/Skl 5195/42 Gkdos.

In answer to the request from the Naval Staff concerning substitution of FW 190 fighters for an M 109 E squadron in Trondheim as proposed by the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, the Air Force High Command, Operations Staff advises that on 3 Mar. Group IV of the 1st Fighter Wing relieved the fighter unit stationed in Trondheim. The new unit is equipped with BF 109 models E and F. In the course of the month all model E planes will be replaced by model F. The BF 109 F's are superior in performance to the FW 190's. Moreover, for technical reasons it is impossible to fly FW 190's in Norway.

Group North, the Commanding Admiral, Norway, and the Commanding Admiral, Battleships are being informed accordingly.

See Telegram 1818 for the agreement concerning the fuel supply for the 5th Air Force as reached by the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch; the Air Force General Staff, Division IV; and the Supply and Transportation Office of the Armed Forces Overseas.

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In order to initiate preparations for the projected attack on the Rybachy Peninsula (see War Diary 25 Feb.) Group North issued the following directive to the Commanding Admiral, Norway, of which the Naval Staff and the Admirals Arctic Coast and North Norwegian Coast were also informed:

1. Prepare berths for 2 heavy vessels, 1 destroyer flotilla, mine sweeper, motor mine sweeper, and PT boat flotillas and naval barges in the Arctic Coast area (Alta Fjord).
2. Clear the supply ships DITMARSCHEN and NORDMARK and transfer them north as soon as possible.
3. The Commanding Admiral, Norway will initiate anti-mine patrols in the projected landing areas.
4. Mine laying by our own forces is to be coordinated with the operation.
5. Initiate procurement of naval barges and assault craft.

Group North states in conclusion that the operation cannot be carried out unless the required quantity of fuel oil is delivered to the northern area in time.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway answered at once on 4 Mar. on the basis of experiences made on the Arctic Coast, emphasizing how necessary it is to take the enemy by surprise. He insists that the enemy's attention must not be invited by measures deviating from daily routine, as for instance by the anti-mine patrol ordered by Group North. Instead of a move so ostentatious as the transfer of the heavy vessels to the Arctic Coast, the Commanding Admiral, Norway recommends a diversionary maneuver in the direction of Iceland in order to tie up the British Home Fleet in the west. He recommends that our attack on the Rybachy Peninsula be protected by air reconnaissance, submarines, light naval forces, and by laying in advance a westerly mine field of the type "Bantos A". Furthermore he advocates that during the landing, in addition to plane attacks, the Army's 210 mm. coastal battery which is now being installed near Luenahamari should shell the enemy land batteries.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway recommends that mine fields of either type "Kajak" or "Kuesel VIII" be laid after the landing as the situation may require.

In the opinion of the Naval Staff such detailed preparations are premature since the project is still in its preliminary planning stage at the Army High Command, Lapland. The matter will be reported to the Chief, Naval Staff.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

The westward voyage of icebreaker SISU and the SCHLESIIEN convoy is proceeding according to plan. Engine trouble has again laid up the icebreaker CASTOR which is in Copenhagen for repairs.

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See Telegram 1246 for the report from Naval Station, Baltic concerning the alarm aboard the MONTE SARMIENTO (see War Diary 3 Mar.).

The Fleet Command estimates that after completion of repairs the SCHARNHORST will require 6 weeks for training and trial runs. The Naval Staff is informed via Telegram 2020.

The Finnish General Staff advises that in view of snow and ice conditions it is imperative to complete the occupation of the islands in the Gulf of Finland by the end of March, and requests German agreement or else information as to the time at which German authorities desire the operation to be executed. (See Telegram 1155.)

Concerning the objections raised by the Naval Station, Baltic to the use of Estonian vessels in Cellarius' group, the Admiral, Baltic States expresses agreement with the opinion which the Naval Staff, Operations Division has already forwarded to the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division. He points to a directive from the Fuehrer which provides that volunteer units are to be formed and administered by the SS exclusively; in any case the Navy would certainly have tactical command. It is planned to use 60 of the vessels for patrol and escort purposes and 40 for transport and assault troop missions. A prompt decision is necessary in view of the limited time available for preparations.

The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division must still investigate the question of SS jurisdiction.

A study of possibilities for establishing a shipping route from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea via the Vistula, Bug, and Dnieper Rivers reveals that such an undertaking is not necessarily impossible during the spring thaws.

However, the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division recommends that this possibility not be utilized in view of the considerable risk entailed in a transfer of PT boats and motor mine sweepers. The Navy is not authorized to decide to what extent the Army should make use of this opportunity to ship supplies.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

A submarine warning signal broadcast by the U.S. passenger steamer YARMOUTH (5,043 GRT) reports that a submarine was sighted in an area approximately 350 miles east of Cape Hatteras.

A newspaper report states that because of danger from submarines 4 Venezuelan tankers are tied up in St. Nicolas on Aruba.

Upon their arrival at a port in eastern Canada, survivors from 4 Allied vessels reported that German submarines sank between 6 and 9 vessels of their convoy in the Middle Atlantic. 7 vessels were torpedoed in the course of one night and 2 on the following morning. 5 submarines were located in the vicinity of the convoy.

Last week 1 Canadian steamer of 3,000 GRT was sunk in the South Atlantic.

2. Own Situation:

U "587" reports strong naval and air patrols in the area between Cape Race and the Bank of Newfoundland. She believes she heard 2 torpedo hits on ships in the inner harbor of St. John's. Anti-submarine defense measures made an accurate determination of success impossible.

On 21 Feb. U "67" sank an armed Norwegian steamer of the BRALANTA class (9,600 GRT) in the Caribbean Sea.

For a supplementary situation report see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Off Yarmouth our planes attacked a southbound convoy comprising 1 tanker, 4 steamers, and 1 destroyer. Strong defense measures prevented observation of effect.

Night raids against ships at sea were unsuccessful.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Air raids on Malta were continued.

The raid on Alexandria took place under poor visibility conditions and in pouring rain. Our planes attacked in two waves. The success is considered only moderate.

3. Eastern Front:

East of Rybachi Peninsula armed reconnaissance planes attacked and badly damaged one 1,000 GRT steamer and one patrol vessel.

An aerial torpedo attack on an 8,000 GRT steamer off Anapa was unsuccessful.

No noteworthy reports are available as to air activities at the various Army sectors.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

Only few supply vessels were observed in the area between Alexandria and Tobruk. At 1339 a British patrol vessel reported attacking a submerged submarine, and half an hour later reported oil rising to the surface.

2. Own Situation:

The 8 vessels comprising the 6th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla will not be available for duty until 14 Mar.; repairs were delayed because the shipyards were filled with submarines and it was difficult to procure the necessary material.

In a letter of 25 Feb. the German Naval Command, Italy described to what extent the development of the situation in the Mediterranean, where conditions are at present considerably improved, is due to the use of German planes and German submarines. It expressed the conviction that prevailing conditions are most favorable for permanently eliminating Malta, and that therefore the imminent all-out attack on Malta must be concluded by an occupation of the island before the situation changes again.

The Naval Staff feels that renewed consideration of this question, which it evaluates exactly like the German Naval Command, Italy, promises to be more successful if introduced by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South; the Naval Staff has already informed the Armed Forces High Command repeatedly of the necessity of final elimination of Malta, which is possible only by occupying the island. The development of the fuel oil situation also indicates the advisability of executing the operation soon.

The Naval Liaison Officer with the Armed Forces High Command is instructed at the same time, with reference to Admiral Riccardi's assertion in Garmisch that the Italians have already made preparations for the occupation of Malta, to ascertain how well the Armed Forces High Command is informed regarding such Italian intentions and plans.

A copy of the related letter and telegram as per 1/Skl Im 472/42 Gkdos. Chfs. is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

3. Situation Italy:

See Telegram 0945 for Italian scruples concerning transport of special combat weapons to the Black Sea over Croatian territory due to danger of sabotage, and for a proposition for a transportation route from Trieste to Vienna or Budapest.

The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division and the Naval Staff, Submarine Division will take over the matter.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

4 naval barges and the steamer PETRARCA are en route to Tripoli and Benghazi respectively.

5. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

Supplies are moving according to schedule. A renewed gun-fire attack by enemy submarine was made on a coastal motor sailing vessel north of Skiatho with heavy casualties among passengers. During the night there was an enemy air attack on the air base Timbakion near Kasteli.

Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

The Turkish steamer ADANA was attacked by submarines near the Bosphorus, but without success.

Nothing to report from radio monitoring or air reconnaissance.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia1. Enemy Situation:

Reuter reports a radio message from Bandung to London concerning renewed operations on Java. According to the message, the Japanese, in spite of a 36 hour sea battle, have succeeded in bringing 50 transports to the coast of Java and have landed at 3 points. 15 transports are said to have been sunk or burnt, and 6 others to have been damaged.

In the course of the sea battle the Japanese, according to this message, lost 1 heavy cruiser; 2 cruisers were badly damaged, and 3 destroyers which were on fire were abandoned. The Allied naval forces far outnumbered the Japanese.

According to our radio monitoring it has been established without a doubt that the Dutch flotilla leader TROMP entered an unknown port on 27 Feb. and that she left the same day, presumably for Sydney.

Considering this fact, the Japanese report on sinking the TROMP should be investigated.

Radio monitoring reports a noteworthy increase in urgent operational radiograms on 4 Mar. in the area of the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies.

According to a report of the U.S. Navy Department, 1 Japanese bomber tried to land on a U.S. aircraft carrier during a recent attack on the carrier near the Gilbert Islands which led to the loss of from 13 to 18 Japanese planes. The bomber was shot down by anti-aircraft fire.

2. Situation Japan:

The Domei report on the naval battle (see War Diary 3 Mar.) is identical with the announcement from Japanese headquarters.

During the landing 1 Japanese transport was sunk and 3 others were beached after they had discharged their troops.

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IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Nothing new to report. Local enemy attacks were unsuccessful. Our attacks on the 6th Army front were ineffective due to enemy pressure.

Central Army Group:

In the area around Yukhnov we withdrew our front sectors. The enemy followed cautiously. South of Vyazma heavy enemy pressure restricted our activity. Northeast of Gzhatsk heavy enemy attacks penetrated our lines, but were sealed off. At our defense position northwest of Rzhev heavy attacks succeeded in penetrating our main line of defense near the point of contact between 2 divisions. Countermeasures are being taken.

Northern Army Group:

Nothing new to report from the 16th and 18th Army sectors.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Nothing new to report.

3. North Africa:

Enemy situation unchanged. For a change in the disposition of our forces see daily report.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

A diplomatic source reports that Admiral Darlan does not feel obliged to retain a neutral position toward the U.S. any longer since the U.S. has recognized De Gaulle's authority in New Caledonia.

Great Britain:

In a radio broadcast on 3 Mar. Cripps repeated the familiar thesis that the war will be decided by the amount of available reserves of manpower and material, and not by land victories; the best equipped nations with the largest populations are united in the alliance of the Anglo-Americans, Russians, and Chinese; the myth of Hitler's invincibility was destroyed before Rostov and Moscow.

Air Minister Sinclair announced in the House of Commons that with the start of the German spring offensive British air attacks are to concentrate on German defense plants. The attacks on Hamburg and Wilhelmshaven have already considerably affected submarine construction. The attacks on Paris have been aimed at armament works producing for Germany, particularly Renault.

A self-sufficient naval air force was demanded during the debate, among other things.

Eden attempted in the House of Commons to establish a common basis with regard to Stalin's declaration, by saying that Great Britain's war aim is to make it impossible for Germany to rearm, but to avoid an economic collapse of Germany. He added that this goal cannot be attained under the present German regime.

The development of the crisis in the British Government will depend on the outcome of our eastern campaign, according to well-informed sources. Until now the gravity of the situation has not been completely realized by the population in general. Should the Germans actually succeed in reaching the western frontiers of India via the Caucasus Mountains, thereby seriously threatening Britain's position as a world power for the first time, it is quite possible that leading British conservative circles would feel that the only way to insure the continued existence of the British Empire would be to make peace by compromise. At that time, but not before, it might under certain circumstances be possible that Britain would be ready to negotiate.

Argentina:

In a report from diplomatic circles there are renewed indications that Great Britain, contrary to the U.S., does not favor a breach in diplomatic relations between Argentina and the Axis powers, since she fears that North America might gain decisive economic influence in South America.

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Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff reports on intentions of Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Norway with regard to the Rybachí Peninsula operation (see War Diary 4 Mar.). The Chief, Naval Staff permits the Naval Staff to inform Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Norway that extensive preparations at this early stage are not necessary.

Related telegram is in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa, "Fischerhalbinsel" (Rybachí Peninsula) files as per 1/Skl I op 523/42 Gkdos. Chefs.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division reports on the intended creation of a Sea Transport Office, Black Sea. The Deputy Commanding Admiral, Group South is against such a step. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees that the existing organization, which has been adequate up to now according to Group South, is to remain unchanged, and also agrees that the Naval Staff's intended temporary assignment of Captain von Baumbach to the Admiral, Black Sea should be carried out.

III. Concerning the reply of the Commander in Chief, Navy to Admiral Darlan with regard to repair of the DUNKERQUE, Ambassador Ritter has written a personal letter to the Commander in Chief, Navy, by direction of the Foreign Minister. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Situation 5 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

The U.S. War Department announces the arrival in northern Ireland of the biggest troop contingent that has been transported so far.

South Atlantic:

The New York Times describes in detail the road that General de Gaulle is supposed to build from West Africa to Egypt (Khartoum) in order to relieve the water routes to the Near East.

According to a French press report the Brazilian steamers BAGE and AMIRANTE JAVENU will leave Rio shortly with 800 Axis nationals, most of them families of diplomatic representatives.

Pacific Ocean:

The waters of New Caledonia have been declared a mine danger area. The U.S. intends to build a naval base in Salinas (Ecuador).

2. Own Situation:

Tanker GERMANIA left Santa Cruz (Tenerife) for Bordeaux on 4 Mar.. A submarine is to pick her up in quadrant CD 36 some time after 13 Mar.

Ship "10" is informed of the DOGGERBANK's special mission "Kapstadt" by Radiogram 1301; Radiogram 0647 informs her of the departure of the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN from Las Palmas, and of the intended departure of ship "28" and the TANNENFELS from western France in mid-March and the missions of the last 2 ships.

The OSORNO is instructed concerning rendezvous with our submarine by Radiogram 1634.

The Naval Staff has the impression that U.S. and British troop and supply transports in convoy pass Cape Town without stopping. Only ships sailing alone enter Cape Town. The Naval Staff assumes that there is heavy ship traffic near Cape Town without special patrols by planes or naval forces, except in the case of convoys. Therefore the Naval Staff feels that the chances for execution of mission "Kapstadt" continue to be good.

Appropriate instructions are sent to the DOGGERBANK by Radiogram 1355.

Radiogram 2352 gives the enemy situation report, including an account of the attack on the German prize crew planned by the prisoners on the prize ship PELAGOS by making use of the harpoon ammunition which had not been secured.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance there was a convoy consisting of 20 steamers with 5 destroyers at noon southeast of the Isle of Wight on an east course.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Group West and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines are informed of instructions to the OSORNO and orders for Group West to take over command of the tanker GERMANIA beginning 13 Mar. at 0000, German standard time. Telegram 1130 informs Group West of the departure on 6 Mar. of steamer DREPANUM from Ferrol to Bilbao to await further instructions.

Channel Coast:

Mine assignment: A dummy barrage is to be laid during the night of 6 Mar. in order to secure the coastal route in the English Channel.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to radio monitoring in the morning a convoy was located east of Moray Firth, and a convoy coming from North Minch entered

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Pentland Firth. Strength of the convoys has not been determined. Air reconnaissance located a convoy, consisting of 16 steamers, 2 destroyers, and 1 cruiser, on a north course east of Newcastle.

Own Situation:

The steamer ROBERT SAUBER was grounded near Heligoland and the pilot boat RUESTRINGEN was grounded at Langeroog while helping in the rescue of the stranded patrol vessel "2001". The crew was lost.

Convoy missions as planned. The first group of troop transports is supposed to leave Heligoland bound for Kristiansand South this evening with northern convoy 820.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

The 5th Air Force concludes from the fact that 15 steamers were in Iokanga harbor at noon on 4 Mar. that convoys put in there and then the ships sail one at a time to Murmansk at night. Other indications of the growing importance of Iokanga are as follows: An airstrip for fighters has been built 8 km. southwest of the town on a frozen lake; a new telephone line has been strung along the coast toward the west.

On 5 Mar. at 1305 air reconnaissance spotted 70 miles south of Jan Mayen a convoy of 15 steamers of between 5,000 and 10,000 GRT with 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, and 2 other escort vessels on a 300 course and with a speed of 6 knots.

At 1238 air reconnaissance further spotted at 11° 30' W, 68° 40' N (approximately 160 miles northeast of Iceland) 3 steamers which when approached seemed to be on a deceptive course.

Own Situation:

The Admiral, Arctic Ocean has sent 4 submarines to quadrants AB 4650, 4930, 5770, and 8150 (west of Bear Island) to attack the convoy south of Jan Mayen, and has asked permission to use U "377" and "403" from Narvik. Permission was granted (see Telegram 2230).

Group North reports that the group of the Commanding Admiral, Battle-ships will be ready for action on three hours' notice beginning 6 Mar. at 0900.

In a long distance conversation between the Commanding Admiral, Group North, and the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, the question of using naval forces to attack the convoy was discussed and the general procedure was decided on.

Because of a broken connection no telegraphic reports have been received up to 1700 from the Admirals, Arctic Ocean and Arctic Coast.

An anti-submarine training group with U "17" and 3 training submarines has arrived at Trondheim. U "405" has passed Grip on her way to Trondheim.

Safety measures for Norway:

1. The Commanding Admiral, Norway is supporting the request

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of the Admiral, Arctic Coast to lay 2 row mine barrages in the Vest Fjord between Skraaven and Flatoey to secure the sea area at Narvik

For a copy of the request with details as per 1/Skl 5287/42 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA.

2. The Naval Staff has received word of the position of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships taken in reference to suggestions of the Commanding Admiral, Norway in the matter of air security for the Aasen Fjord.

For copy see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA, as per 1/Skl 5270/42 Gkdos.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

On 2 Mar. a Finnish patrol tried to land near Lapinlathe on Hogland, but was repulsed by Russian machine gun and machine pistol fire. At Lavansaari all batteries opened anti-aircraft fire on a Finnish plane. Nothing moving on Peninsaari. There was machine gun fire from the eastern edge of the village Tytaersaari. For details see Telegram 1510.

2. Own Situation:

Ice conditions in the Baltic Sea entrances and in the southern Baltic Sea are making transport movements difficult. The SCHLESSEN convoy is en route from Swinemunde to Kiel (Hamburg). The icebreaker EISBAER with the tanker PROCYON is icebound south of Drogden. At least 24 hours are necessary to repair the CASTOR.

On request of the Naval Attache in Stockholm, Group North has been instructed by the Naval Staff to locate the Swedish trawlers MALS IBS and GG 294 which are lost in the ice, and if necessary to help them out. (See Telegram 1919.)

Group North is fully supporting the request of the Admiral, Baltic States concerning Estonian vessels for the group commanded by Cellarius. The formation of the flotillas is deemed necessary (see Telegram 0805).

V. Merchant Shipping:

In repeating its petition of 12 Aug. 1941, which the Navy has satisfied only with regard to improving the personnel situation of the German merchant marine to a small extent, the Ministry of Transportation requests support for merchant shipping in the following points:

1. Return of the merchant ships confiscated by the Naval High Command.

In view of the urgent needs of the Navy, the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division can go no farther than to agree to undertake further confiscations only if necessary to the outcome of the war.

2. Completion of merchant ship construction in German shipyards which has been shut down.

The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division takes the position that new ships particularly adapted to the Navy must be finished in German shipyards and that in exchange for these new ships the confiscated tonnage can be released to the merchant marine.

The Naval Construction Division is asked to pay particular attention to this question, all the more since the Transportation Minister wants to get the Fuehrer to decide on this particular point.

3. Provision of a German shipyard for the purpose of constructing standard merchant ships with mass production techniques.

The Naval Construction Division is asked to state an opinion on this question after renewed examination.

4. Increase of the quotas of raw materials.

This question also must be examined by the Naval Construction Division.

The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division intends to submit to the Commander in Chief, Navy for approval the decision of the Navy with respect to the petition of the Transportation Minister, in order to help the merchant marine as much as possible in their endeavor to eliminate the tonnage shortage.

The Naval Staff, Operations Division is in complete agreement with the Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, a steamer was torpedoed in the Freetown area at 14° 09' W. Name and latitude unknown. A British patrol vessel reported a submerged submarine 70 miles from Cape Mount (south of Freetown). According to a press report the steamer JOHN ERICSSON was sunk in the South Atlantic due to enemy action.

2. Own Situation:

A large transport with destroyers was sighted by U "213" on an east course 60 miles north of Rockall Bank. Contact could not be maintained because of rough sea. Contact with a steamer 200 miles southeast of Great Newfoundland Bank was lost due to fog. U "504" sank a gasoline tanker of 7,000 GRT on 26 Feb. off the coast of Florida. The same boat unsuccessfully fired a torpedo at a steamer of 4,000 GRT, probably a decoy ship. A submarine sighted 4 destroyers proceeding at high speed on a west course in the Mediterranean Sea northeast of Ras Azzaz.

Supplementary situation report is in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Fighter bombers successfully attacked houses and barracks in Selsey Bill. During a night bombing attack a steamer was sunk north of St. David's Head.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Airfields and submarine bases on Malta were again under attack.

3. Eastern Front:

Strong operations by our Air Force in front of the central army front. Bad weather prevented operations in the south. Air reconnaissance over the Black Sea. For results see Enemy Situation, Warfare in the Mediterranean. For results of reconnaissance in the Arctic Ocean and the Norwegian Sea see Enemy Situation, Norway.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

Only a small amount of convoy traffic was reported in the Alexandria-Marsa Matruh area. Submarines were reported near Corfu, Lampedusa, and Cephalonia.

2. Own Situation:

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla plans a reconnaissance operation with 5 vessels in the Straits of Sicily for the night of 5 Mar.. 2 vessels of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla departed at 0400 to reconnoiter Pantelleria.

In accordance with the decision of the Chief, Naval Staff, the Naval Staff released an explicit directive to the German Naval Command, Italy concerning operations of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla in the area of Tobruk, with Suda as a base and rest port and Derna as the port of operations. Copies were sent to Group South and the Commanding Admiral, Aegean Sea. Directive as per 1/Skl I op 4644/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

3. Situation Italy:

During the night of 4 Mar. there were enemy air attacks on Benghazi, causing minor damage. The steamer CUMA which was severely damaged during the night of 2 Mar. sank in port after additional inner explosions. As a result of the explosions on the CUMA, the tanker TRICOLARE, the steamer SECURITAS, and a ferry boat sank, a torpedo boat and a destroyer were severely damaged, and 2 merchant ships were somewhat damaged. Furthermore, numerous civilian buildings and harbor installations were damaged.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The 3rd transport group, including the steamer WACHTFELS, has transported the following quantities to Tripoli, according to an Italian report: 441 men; 768 vehicles (including tanks); 19,946 tons of armed forces supplies; 16,850 tons of fuel; 1,893 tons of coal; and 756 bags of military mail.

The steamer MARINE SANUDO left Trapani for Tripoli the evening of 4 Mar. and is proceeding on the western route.

The 4th transport group is being prepared.

The German Naval Command, Italy reported on 24 Feb. that the volume of supplies reaching Africa is limited not by the amount of shipping space but by the lack of escort forces and fuel, and by the limited capacity of the African ports. The Naval Staff asks the German Naval Command, Italy to confirm the fact that in reality the capacity of the African ports is the only factor which limits the volume of supplies, since with the present favorable situation at sea it is possible to ship the cargo with fewer escort vessels. A report is also requested on the possibility of using for supplies to Africa temporarily unused tonnage provided for moving supplies to Greece or to the Aegean Sea. (See Telegram 1616.)

5. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report of situation at sea.

The German Naval Command, Italy informs Group South concerning a recommendation made by the Italian Navy to transfer the transports for Greece to Bari and Brindisi if possible, and to take better advantage of the railroad route Trieste-Bari-Brindisi, due to the difficulty of safeguarding the Adriatic Sea. (See Telegram 0925.)

Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

A Turkish auxiliary sailing vessel reports on 4 Mar. that a Russian submarine escorted her at a distance, without attacking, from Igneada to the vicinity of the Bosphorus.

Air reconnaissance reports a battleship, 4 destroyers, 17 steamers, 2 tankers, and 35 medium and small vessels in Novorossisk. The port of Kerch is free from ice. 1 large tanker and 6 small vessels were in port.

According to information from a prisoner, the Black Sea submarine flotilla has carried out operations against Varna, Constanta, Burgas, Sulina, and the Bosphorus during the last 6 months. The leader of the flotilla is a British captain, former commander of submarines in the Mediterranean Sea. On each vessel there is a British adviser. 2 vessels are constantly deployed off the Bosphorus. In a line to the north there are about 3 vessels, and north of it there are cruisers and destroyers. Their mission was, next to reconnoitering and destroying Axis shipping, to prevent a break-through of Italian torpedo boats into the Black Sea which is said to have been expected. The prisoner, an

intelligence officer of the Black Sea Fleet, thinks that this deployment is still in force.

Own Situation:

The Deputy Commanding Admiral, Group South has expressed scruples as to the advisability of creating the post of Commanding Officer, Supply and Transports, Black Sea. (Cf. Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.) For copy of corresponding telegram as per 1/Skl 5290/42 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

IX. Situation East Asia:

According to press reports, the capture of Batavia is imminent.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Minor activity on the Crimean peninsula and at the Von Kleist Army Group. At the 6th Army sector north of Losowaya there were more determined but unsuccessful enemy attacks.

Central Army Group:

In the area between Byelev and Lidinovo very vigorous and strong enemy attacks were successfully repulsed by our troops. Renewed powerful attacks were made on our flank position west of Medyn and were repulsed. In repeated attacks with very powerful forces on a wide front, the enemy succeeded in penetrating north of Gzhatsk. This situation is now being corrected. In the Vyazma area there is vigorous partisan activity as well as engagements with regular troops. Our forces reduced further the pocket south of Vyazma. Northwest of Rzhev the enemy succeeded in winning ground in spite of very determined resistance. Heavy enemy pressure is being applied from the area northeast of Byelci with the obvious intention of encircling our forces north of Byelci (XXIII Army Corps), by attacks from the north, south, and west.

Northern Army Group:

In general the situation is unchanged.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

On the Karelian front artillery and patrol activity. At the sector of the Mountain Corps, Norway an enemy landing attempt northeast of Titovka on the Gulf of Motovski with two platoons was repulsed by our artillery.

3. North Africa:

Nothing new to report.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

The government denies emphatically that negotiations are taking place between France and Japan regarding Madagascar.

Vichy's Ambassador to Washington has made a formal protest against the declaration of the U.S. with regard to the Pacific Islands under De Gaulle's authority.

According to a United Press report, the Ministry of the Interior has published for the first time a list of 230 acts of sabotage committed against German occupation troops from June 1941 to February 1942. Only 103 of these were more or less solved.

Great Britain:

The government stated in the House of Commons that its position regarding the prohibition of the communist "Daily Worker" remains unchanged. According to a report from a diplomatic source, the Australian and Netherlands troops on Timor did not resist the Japanese.

India:

According to British press reports, a national Indian government with all the rights of a dominion government is supposed to be formed within a short time. All groups of the population are to be represented. Up to the present time the Mohammedans have not given their approval.

In a proclamation, Nehru assured the Chinese people of India's warmest sympathy for them. He said that the Indian people will not be influenced by Axis propaganda.

Vatican City:

By denying an alleged letter from Stalin to the Pope, the Vatican destroyed the story that Bolshevism has changed its anti-clerical and anti-religious position.

Thailand:

In spite of mutual protestations, Siamese-Japanese relations actually have become somewhat less cordial; the Siamese are disappointed in the fact that the Japanese are abusing the permission to march through the country by permanently occupying important points, and Thailand's independence has been lost in the process.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff.

I. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines wants to keep the sea area Aruba-Trinidad occupied with submarines under all circumstances. Only boats of Type IXC can be considered because of their range. U "154" is scheduled to leave western France very soon. Other submarines are expected to be sent to this area after 20 Mar.

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The Chief, Naval Staff considers constant occupation of the area most important.

II. The Naval High Command, Ordnance Division reports on the effectiveness of the bomb hit on the GNEISENAU, with special reference to the powder of turret A. The powder has satisfied all demands that could possibly be made; fortunately for the ship and her vicinity it did not explode all at once, but burned itself out, with successive explosions of separate cartridges. It is the opinion of the Naval High Command, Ordnance Division that the upper deck was split open by a subsequent flare-up of the remaining powder which had been incompletely burned, and not by a second bomb hit.

It is to be decided whether this opportunity should be used to change the vessel's armament to 38 cm. caliber.

According to a report of the Chief, Ship Construction Division, the GNEISENAU will undock on 13 Mar., and the SCHARNHORST will take her place.

III. The Chief, Operations Division, Naval Staff reports on the intention of Group North to use submarines and possibly forces of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships in operations against the reported PQ convoy.

The Commanding Admiral, Group North has asked for a decision on whether the operation as discussed by telephone with the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff is to be executed, and whether or not the SCHEER and the Commanding Admiral, Battleships are to take part.

The Fuehrer's permission is requested by telephone via Captain von Puttkamer. The Fuehrer is in complete agreement.

Therefore, Group North is advised as follows: Operation is to be carried out without the SCHEER but with the Commanding Admiral, Battleships.

IV. The Naval Staff sends Group North its opinion, as approved by the Chief, Naval Staff; on the question of operations of our naval forces in the northern area, in order to adjust the 2 viewpoints and to provide a stimulus to further plans for operations.

For a copy as per 1/Skl I op 535/42 Gkdos. Chfs. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA.

V. Group West reports that according to a Fuehrer directive forwarded by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, which is based on an increase in reports, an enemy attack on the occupied western area can well be expected in the near future. The Fuehrer has ordered that all commands be on the alert, and that all orders pertaining to such a case be re-examined.

VI. At the next conference with the Chief, Naval Staff the Fuehrer wants the Naval Staff's opinion on probable developments in case a large-scale enemy landing should take place in the northern area.

Special Items:

I. Regarding transfer of the HIPPER to Norway: The Fleet Command re-

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ports that the necessary training requirements for transfer of the ADMIRAL HIPPER to the northern area cannot be fulfilled at this time.

The Naval Staff is of the opinion that the transfer can be made despite the lack of proper training, and the necessary training can be completed in Trondheim.

At the same time Group North reports the intention to transfer the HIPPER to Trondheim after 12 Mar.. An escort is to be supplied by destroyers "26" and "30", and the 2nd and 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotillas. The cover name is "Eisenbahn".

The plan is to have the ship leave from the Jade or the Elbe, escorted by a mine-exploding vessel as far as quadrant AN 9546. Arrive there at 2200, proceed to Hanstholm at 28 knots. The cruiser will spend the day in the Skagerrak, supplying the destroyers with fuel en route. Torpedo boats are to refuel at Kristiansand South. At 2200, proceed at 29 knots to Bredsdal Deep, and from there 2 days after departure at approximately 1200 proceed along the coastal inter-island route to Trondheim. The TIRPITZ and the SCHEER with 2 destroyers and 2 torpedo boats will be transferred to Trondheims Leden to receive her.

The Group asks the Naval Staff to obtain adequate fighter cover as planned from the Operations Staff of the Commander in Chief, Air, if possible under the same command all the way from the home base to Trondheim.

Subsequently Group North asks that it be arranged with the Operations Staff of the Commander in Chief, Air to provide long-range fighters for the sector from 62° N to Kristiansund North, since fighters do not have sufficient range.

In the opinion of the Naval Staff the plan of Group North needs some changes. A conference with the Chief, Naval Staff is planned for 9 Mar.

II. A survey annexed to the War Diary of 16 to 31 Dec. 1941 of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West gives a clear and complete picture of the courageous, important and devoted activity of the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West in escort, mine, and defense duties. The survey covers the whole year of 1941.

III. Group North, the Commanding Admiral, Norway, and the Admiral, Arctic Ocean have objections to the plan as initiated by the Naval Staff for mine laying along the northern route in order to harass the supply lines to Russia. Due to a detailed explanation of the Naval Staff's position which the Chief, Naval Staff telephoned to him, the Commanding Admiral, Group North agreed to have the question re-examined.

For a copy of this explanation as per 1/Skl I E 4962/42 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

IV. The following assertions have been brought to the attention of the Fuehrer's adjutant, Captain von Puttkamer: The Swedish Naval Attache has declared, with reference to a letter of the Swedish King to the Fuehrer, that neither passage of British troops through Swedish territory nor a British occupation will be tolerated. The assistant to the Japanese Naval Attache has declared that as far as he knows the Japanese consider Madagascar only as a submarine base and not as a base for surface forces. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

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Under these circumstances, the question of whether Madagascar might also be used as a base for German submarines should be re-examined, in the opinion of the Naval Staff.

Situation 6 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Reports intercepted up to 4 May 1942 by radio deciphering and radio monitoring are compiled in the radio intelligence reports of the Naval Communications Division, Naval Staff Report No. 9/42.

South Atlantic:

According to an intelligence report, the Scotch troops that landed in Freetown are again at sea. Transports departed for the east on 1 or 2 Mar.

2. Own Situation:

The DOGGERBANK is informed of an enemy convoy in the South Atlantic by Radiogram 1023.

Radiogram 1947 instructs ship "10" that when she meets the REGENSBURG she should obtain the new regulations for exchange of recognition signals between German steamers and the Japanese, in order to be able to equip any prize ships which may be sent to Japan.

Radiograms 0524, 2053, and 1753 informed all ships in foreign waters regarding the political significance of the change in Japanese ambassadors in Moscow, and regarding enemy reports and promotions of flag officers.

II. Situation West Area

Channel Coast:

The dummy barrage mission near the Channel Islands was carried out successfully during the night of 5 Mar.

Nothing else to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

The steamer LAHNECK sank due to a collision. The crew was rescued.

Northern convoy 820, consisting of 2 troop transports, 1 escort vessel

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without cargo, and 2 experimental vessels, is en route from Hamburg to Kristiansand South with 5 patrol vessels.

Attempts to salvage and to rescue the steamer SAUBER and the pilot vessel RUESTRINGEN are being continued. Patrol vessel "2001" has been given up for lost. Patrol vessel "1211" is icebound.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reports having spotted a westbound destroyer at 1600, 270 miles southwest of the Lofoten Islands. The PQ convoy that was reported on 5 Mar. was not located.

Own Situation:

The weather report of 0800 for the sea area around northern Scandinavia reports north to northwest winds of 5 to 6, partly cloudy, snow flurries, 20 miles visibility outside the snow flurries.

Patrol tasks and sweeping of the channels were interrupted because of weather conditions.

The COBRA laid the mine barrage near Harstad on 5 Mar. as planned.

Enemy air activity over Petsamo, Vardoe, and Trondheim on 4 and 5 Mar.. Minor damage and some losses were sustained in Petsamo.

U "405" has arrived at Trondheim.

On 5 Mar. the 5th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla with 8 vessels put out from Bergen for the north. On 6 Mar. the 5th Mine Sweeper Flotilla with 3 vessels and the ULM also left Bergen for the north.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway requests permission to lay an additional anti-submarine barrage off Nordkyn. For copy of request as per 1/Skl 5366/42 Gkdos. see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

Operation of Commanding Admiral, Battleships against enemy PQ convoy. Group North's instructions to the Commanding Admiral, Battleships and the 5th Air Force include among other things an order to seek out, attack, and destroy the enemy convoy. Provision should be made for using torpedoes. A copy of the instructions was sent to the Naval Staff.

The Commanding Admiral, Battleships left Trondheim at 1200 aboard the TIRPITZ with 5 destroyers and 2 torpedo boats. After the area near Fro Havet, where there is danger of submarines, has been passed, 2 of the destroyers and the torpedo boats are to be released.

The vessels will probably contact the convoy on 7 Mar. at 1600 in quadrant AB 5940.

Engagements with superior enemy forces are to be avoided, but if the enemy is of equal strength he is to be engaged if this is necessary to destroy the convoy. Any enemy forces of inferior strength are to be destroyed without regard for the convoy.

After the mission has been fulfilled the vessels are to return to Trondheim.

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5 of our submarines are operating east of 26° E.

Narvik is the alternative port, with limited facilities for refueling. It is recommended that the TIRPITZ refuel the destroyers during the first night.

Communications procedure as in operation "Sportpalast".

The operation has begun as planned. On the suggestion of the Naval Staff, Group North took over command of all submarines in the area of northern Norway at 1531. 3 submarines were deployed in a reconnaissance line east of 27° E, and 2 west of 3° E.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines is of the opinion that on 8 Mar. at 0400 the convoy will already have passed the submarine position which has been ordered, and he recommends that the position be shifted to the east in order to contact the convoy in the daytime.

At 1818 Commanding Admiral, Submarines sent a radiogram to this effect to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean.

The Air Force reports having attacked a submerging submarine which did not return recognition signals at 1529 off the southern point of Moskenaesoe (in the Vest Fjord). It is feared that the submarine might be U "377" which has just left Narvik. The submarine was reported at 1130 by the coast guard station at Mykoerne, having been tentatively identified as a destroyer.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea:

Icebreaker activity with nothing in particular to report.

In order to accelerate the preparation and disposition of the 2 groups of 60 and 40 Estonian vessels which are to be formed according to the suggestions of the Admiral, Baltic States, Naval Station, Baltic now suggests that 40 vessels with Estonian crews (which are to be drafted into the Armed Forces) be provided to reinforce the Coastal Patrol Group, Baltic States, and that 40 vessels be made available for assault troop missions of the group commanded by Lt. Comdr. Cellarius. They are not to be organized into a regular naval unit, however.

The Naval Staff, Quartermaster Division will arrange further details.

According to a directive of the High Command, Air, Operations Staff, the Commanding General, Air Force Group Command, Central Area is to turn over to the Navy 2 anti-aircraft radar instruments ("Wuerzburg T.C. Geraete") on 15 Mar., and 2 more on 1 Apr. for the defense of Kiel against air raids.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an Italian report the British tanker ROSEWOOD (5,989 GRT) left Ponta Delgada on 2 Mar. for Central America. Radio

monitoring intercepted a request for help from an unidentified steamer in 19° 10' N and 21° 15' W (250 miles northeast of the Cape Verdes). A submarine warning was given for the area 75 miles east of the Bahamas. According to radio monitoring the Dutch motor vessel BRASTAGI (9,246 GRT) was unsuccessfully attacked by a submarine 180 miles northwest of Aruba.

2. Own Situation:

Submarines report that they sank the U.S. tanker COLLAMER (5,112 GRT) off Halifax and the steamer O.A. KNUDSEN (11,007 GRT) east of the Bahamas.

A supplementary situation report is to be found in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Although some of the German submarines in the Mediterranean were only out on brief missions it is noticeable that the number of boats which are laid up for repairs at their respective bases has lately been far greater than the number of those in the operations zone. In order to remedy this situation the Naval Staff requests the Commander of Submarines, Italy to submit in detail his opinion as to the factors responsible for delaying submarine repairs. Copies of this request are being forwarded to the German Naval Command, Italy and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

A copy of the above request as per 1/Skl I u 5283/42 Gkdos. may be found in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the night of 5 Mar. Portland was attacked as alternative target. See Situation Norway for details concerning the extent to which the 5th Air Force is to participate in the operation against convoy PQ 12, and for the report about an attack on a submerged submarine in the Vest Fjord.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

16 Ju 88's successfully attacked the submarine base at Valletta. 3 sunk submarines were spotted after the attack; this observation must be confirmed by photographic reconnaissance. In the attacks on Malta it is noticeable that the anti-aircraft defenses have become weaker, possibly because the enemy is trying to save ammunition. In contrast to former observations, the enemy fighters are very aggressive. 2 enemy destroyers were unsuccessfully attacked north of Ras Azzaz. Bombers, dive bombers, and fighters attacked enemy troop concentrations, camps, and motor vehicles in Cyrenaica with good effect.

3. Eastern Front:

The area west of Rzhev was the focal point of attack in the Central Army Group sector. German forces near Kholm and Demyansk and southwest of Pola were supplied by air. Minor raids were flown against Sevastopol and Moscow.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

The Polish steamer SOBIESKI put out from Gibraltar on 5 Mar. with 400 civilians and 800 men on leave aboard. According to a Spanish report task force H, with the MALAYA, the EAGLE, the ARGUS, a cruiser of the DIDO class, and 6 destroyers has left Gibraltar, presumably on an east course. The enemy was not sighted in the central Mediterranean. In the eastern Mediterranean German planes located a westbound force of 4 destroyers off Ras Azzaz. A convoy of 2 merchant ships escorted by 2 light cruisers and 4 destroyers was off Alexandria making for port. A cruiser and 2 auxiliary cruisers were sighted at noon directly off the harbor on a north course.

According to the Italians, the reports that have been coming in for months about the presence in Gibraltar of steamers provided with landing equipment do not necessarily justify the suspicion that a landing operation is pending in the Mediterranean or in West Africa. Rather they suppose that the rafts which have been observed on many steamers are merely life rafts or are meant to be used to facilitate unloading the ships.

2. Own Situation:

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla put in at Porto Empedocle at 1000. The enemy was not sighted. One of the boats is laid up because she scraped bottom south-southeast of Cape Bon.

3. Situation Italy:

Enemy planes attacked Tripoli and Benghazi during the night of 5 Mar.. A considerable number of buildings in Benghazi were damaged.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The steamer PETRARCA did not enter Benghazi and the steamer BOLSENA did not leave that port due to danger of magnetic mines. On 5 Mar. the steamer MARIN SANUDO was sunk by an enemy submarine while sailing to Tripoli on the western route.

5. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

No change.

Own Situation:

A delayed report of 5 Mar. concerns enemy landing attempts at night southwest of Yalta, which were repulsed. 2 gunboats, several transports, and what was evidently a submarine were observed during the action.

VIII. Situation East Asia:

No reports in particular have been received.

A report was received from the Naval Attache in Tokyo concerning inspection of a small Japanese submarine. Copy of report as per l/Skl 5371/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

At Sevastopol the enemy resumed local attacks, but without success. The enemy also launched attacks in some sectors of the Von Kleist Army Group without success. Attacks on the outermost western flank of the 6th Army were repulsed; the enemy suffered heavy losses in some places. Our countermeasures shattered enemy attacks in the Livny area, in part even while they were still in preparation.

Central Army Group:

Encounters near Vesniny and Sukhinichi; the enemy incurred losses. Enemy forces with air support attacked the eastern and southern flanks of the 4th Army. The attacks were without result. Our armored forces cleared the highway between Demyanskoe and Yukhnov of enemy troops. The pocket south of Vyazma was drawn tighter. We were able to close off an enemy penetration northeast of Gzhatsk. Stubborn enemy attacks against the flank farthest left of the division northwest of Rzhev. West of Mostovaya our forces had to be withdrawn. Fierce fighting in Byeloi.

Northern Army Group:

Southwest of Kholm a fierce battle is in progress; the enemy is putting up a stubborn defense. Enemy troop concentrations have been located in the valleys of the Polomyet and the Pola Rivers. All attacks southwest of Staraya Russa between Lake Ilmen and Leningrad were repulsed.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Enemy attacks north of Povyenets were repulsed. The Commanding General, Lapland reports heavy ship traffic along the Murmansk coast.

3. North Africa:

One De Gaulle division moved up to Bir Hakheim. The day was quiet.

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Items of Political Importance

U.S.A.:

According to a report of the French Ambassador in Washington to his government, dated 16 Feb., the economic orientation of the U.S.A. is dominated by three decisions made by Roosevelt:

1. 60,000 planes are to be produced in 1942
 125,000 planes are to be produced in 1943
 45,000 tanks are to be produced in 1942
 75,000 tanks are to be produced in 1943
 20,000 anti-aircraft guns in 1942
 35,000 anti-aircraft guns in 1943
 8,000,000 GRT of shipping in 1942
 10,000,000 GRT of shipping in 1943
2. Roosevelt's budgetary recommendation for \$95,000,000,000 for 1942/43.
3. War production is to be centrally administered under the direction of Donald Nelson.

Almost 41,000,000 persons are now employed, which is an increase of about 2,800,000 over December 1941.

1,100 ships of 6,800,000 GRT were under construction on 1 Jan. 1942. Theoretically it is possible to build the new 10,500 GRT "Liberty" freighters in 105 days.

France:

Boti, the newly appointed Italian Ambassador to Vichy, took over his office on 5 Mar.

Great Britain:

The new Production Minister, Lyttleton, made the following statements on his return from Cairo: The British are now in a much better position to defend Egypt than at the beginning of the Libyan campaign. Shipments of U.S. personnel and materiel have been of great assistance in the defense of the Middle East.

The Russian successes have postponed a threat to the northern sector of the Middle Eastern theater of war for a long time. The capacity of the Iran railroad has tripled. The U.S. air base at Massaua is to be enlarged on an enormous scale.

India:

According to the Transocean News Service, differences of opinion are supposed to have arisen between Churchill and Cripps with regard to the solution of the Indian problem, so that the government declaration concerning India had to be postponed. Churchill refuses to permit full autonomy.

U.S.S.R.:

A report from a neutral diplomatic source states that the food situation

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in Kuibyshev is becoming worse from day to day. A great number of persons who are said to be responsible are being executed after trial by special courts. Since the crops sown in the fall have proved to be utterly insufficient, a real famine and the outbreak of epidemics may be expected.

So far official circles in Moscow have been absolutely silent concerning the appointment of Sato, the new Japanese Ambassador.

Hungary:

Prime Minister Bardossy is about to resign. It is expected that a new cabinet consisting of persons less friendly to Germany will be formed. In addition a law is said to be under consideration which would elevate the regent Horthy to the rank of a Hungarian prince and confer upon his son the right of succession. Officer circles are sharply opposed to this project of founding a Horthy dynasty; but nevertheless it is believed that the population will accept the measure in the usual passive manner.

Japan:

The situation prevailing between Russia and Japan in Manchuria is characterized as armed peace, which will very soon result in armed conflict between the two countries.

Special Items:

I. The situation report by the Naval Staff dated 20 Feb. was sent to the Commanding Admirals of Groups North, West, and South, to the Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy, and to the Fleet Commander for their information.

II. The Armed Forces High Command has felt obliged to reject sharply the opinion expressed by the Commanding Admiral, Battleships to the Commanding Admiral, Norway in connection with his request for reinforcement of the air defenses in the Aasen Fjord, and to insist that proper channels be adhered to.

Situation 7 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

The steamer QUEEN MARY with 5,000 Canadian troops aboard put into Rio on 6 Mar. for a short stop in order to refuel. The naval tanker BROOMDALE left Montevideo on 4 Mar.

Persian Gulf:

According to a press report, construction of an American war town was begun 2 months ago for the purpose of facilitating deliveries to Russia.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 1209 informs the OSORNO when Group West will take over command; Radiogram 1324 informs her about plane recognition signals.

Enemy situation reports are sent by Radiograms 0947 and 1536.

No news has been received from our vessels in foreign waters.

II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance located a convoy of 10 steamers south of the Isle of Wight on a westerly course, and a convoy of 20 steamers south of Start Point. 6 steamers and 1 destroyer were sighted in the Bristol Channel. There were 10 steamers at Milford. West of Cardigan Bay a convoy of 23 steamers escorted by 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, and 2 patrol boats was located on a northwesterly course.

A light cruiser was sighted on a northwesterly course 150 miles northwest of the Hebrides.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Reports from Britain indicate that the enemy has exact information concerning the berths in Ferrol and knows that the ELSA ESSBERGER has unloaded part of her cargo. Therefore he will also know at once when she leaves. As only 750 tons of rubber have been unloaded so far, the Naval Staff hesitates to transfer the ship from Ferrol to Bordeaux immediately. However, the Naval Attache at Madrid thinks it is necessary to transfer the ship soon; since the British are interested in the ship, she is by no means safe in Ferrol. Group West is fully aware of the risk involved in the transfer, but nevertheless agrees with the Naval Attache. The Naval Staff therefore withdraws its objections and authorizes Group West to effect the transfer when the weather permits. Group West is confident that it can master the difficulties involved and believes that this is a less dangerous move than to leave the ship in Ferrol, provided the transfer is ably directed and the ship well escorted.

Channel Coast:

Some time ago the Naval Staff called the attention of Group West to the urgent need of bringing up tankers from the west. Group West reports that every effort is being made to do so. As the result of the enemy's ruthless PT boat operations, his successes are mounting. In view of this situation Group West is wondering whether it might not be allotted the Dutch gunboats, which are particularly suited for operations in the Channel. Reconsideration of this question is requested. In addition it is planned to assign to one of our PT boat groups the task of diverting enemy forces from important convoys. We will have to reconcile ourselves to the fact that there will be fewer PT boat operations against enemy merchant shipping. In order to relieve the situation to an even greater extent the 3rd Air Force has been requested to intensify its offensive against enemy PT boat bases, Dover in particular (see Telegram 1205).

No other reports.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Radio interception located a northbound and a southbound convoy in the Thames River. Aerial reconnaissance had to be discontinued over Scapa Flow because of unfavorable weather conditions. The British 18th Group did little in the way of reconnaissance.

Own Situation:

The steamer ROBERT SAUBER freed itself without assistance. Patrol Boat "1211" is no longer icebound and has been towed to Heligoland.

During the month of February 1942 convoy movements in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North amounted to 44 convoys comprising 192 steamers with an approximate total of 550,000 GRT.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

On 6 March Radio Schenectady broadcast a London report asserting that a large convoy carrying arms and ammunition had arrived at a port in northern Russia.

This convoy appears to be the predecessor of Convoy PQ 12, which we are expecting at the present time.

At 1835 our radio intercept service picked up an OU message (operation urgent) from Cleethorpes to all ships in home waters.

An intelligence report states that an island off Archangel, located at 66° 33' N (64° 33' N (?) Tr.N.), 40° 39' E, has been turned into a fortress. Extremely powerful artillery defenses have been established there. The same report asserts that the British Navy intends to lay a minefield off Kristiansund, at 63° 10' N, 07° 50' E. The vessels of the American fleet which are earmarked for the defense of Great Britain are said to be assembling in the Firth of Clyde.

Own Situation:

Bad weather generally hampered our convoy operations.

There was some enemy air activity in the vicinity of Stavanger and near Lister, but nothing of importance has been reported.

Group North endorses the request of the Commanding Admiral, Norway for another anti-submarine barrage off Harstad; see 1/Skl 5413/42 Gkdos., in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

For report by the Admiral, Arctic Coast concerning reinforcement of minefield no. 1 off Harstad see 1/Skl 5442/42 Gkdos., in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

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Commanding Admiral, Norway reports that the 5th Air Force has rejected a request to strengthen the anti-aircraft defenses of Aasen Fjord claiming that it does not have enough forces available; it was suggested that the Commander in Chief, Air be approached to send additional forces from other command areas. (See Telegram 1600.)

Captain Puttkamer telephoned that the Fuehrer ordered that the East Asia steamers POTSDAM and GNEISENAU be put into operating condition with the greatest dispatch. These ships are to be used for rapid large-scale troop movements to Norway.

Following corresponding measures by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, the Naval Staff forwards the following report to the Armed Forces High Command, Fuehrer Headquarters, attention Navy Liaison Officer:

(1) The engines, personnel, and equipment of the POTSDAM and GNEISENAU will be ready by 21 Mar.

(2) The ships have no degaussing gear. Degaussing equipment cannot be installed until after necessary measurements and loop-trial runs at Brunsbuettel have been completed. This cannot be done until the engines have been put in operating condition, which will require about 2 weeks.

(3) Installation of degaussing gear will require 3 weeks; subsequently another loop-trial run will have to be made at Brunsbuettel.

(4) Thus it will take 5 or 6 weeks to get the POTSDAM and GNEISENAU fully ready. Only two weeks will be required if no degaussing gear is installed.

(5) In the opinion of the Naval Staff degaussing gear is indispensable, however, in view of the mine situation and past experience.

(6) The necessary work on the two ships has already been started.

During the month of February 1942 the following convoy operations were carried out in the area of Commanding Admiral, Norway:

121 ships totalling 279,789 GRT on the arctic coast; 108 ships totalling 272,019 GRT in the area of the Admiral, North Coast; and 120 ships totalling 295,622 GRT in the west coast area. A great many of these were long-distance convoys, which passed through several or even all of the above-named areas.

Operation against PQ convoy:

A Focke-Wulf 200 was sent to reconnoiter the waters east of Jan Mayen, but no results were obtained. Owing to bad weather reconnaissance was very spotty between 69°-75° N and 23° E. No enemy forces were sighted. On 8 Mar. our reconnaissance is intended to cover the area from 10° to 27° E and from 69° N to the pack-ice border, the main emphasis being concentrated on the area between 18° and 27° E, 71° and 74° N. In addition, photographic reconnaissance is intended over Scapa Flow, Moray Firth, and Firth of Forth.

Submarine U "377" has not reported its position in spite of a request to do so. It appears more and more likely that the boat was attacked by our own planes on 6 Mar.

Until further notice Group North is suspending any attacks on submarines and subchase in Norwegian coastal waters or at sea, by planes of the

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5th Air Force. Exceptions may be made only when the planes are flying close escort for German forces or when subchase has specifically been requested. For the text of the directive see Telegram 1602.

Group North reported at 2032 that no news had been received from the Commanding Admiral, Battleships.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

There is nothing to report about the situation at sea.

According to a report from the Navy Liaison Officer at the Armed Forces High Command the shortage of forces at the Northern Army Group is so acute that it may not be possible to capture the Russian islands in the Gulf of Finland. Since the Navy is greatly interested in seeing these islands taken promptly, it should be reconsidered whether naval forces might not be used to bolster the Army's forces during the attack. A query to this effect is sent out to Group North, Naval Station, Baltic, and the Admiral, Baltic States (see Telegram 1619).

In reply to this the Admiral, Baltic States reports that the 531st Naval Artillery Battalion, consisting of 700 men with light and heavy infantry weapons may possibly be used for this purpose. The battalion should either be held in reserve, or its companies inserted among those of the Army. The Admiral, Baltic States proposes an agreement which he has reached with Commanding General, 18th Army on this score (see Telegram 1900).

During the month of February 1942 the following convoy operations took place in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea:

11 troop transports totalling 59,621 GRT
23 supply transports totalling 47,343 GRT.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

At 1600 an airplane reported an unsuccessful depth-charge attack on a submarine 60 miles west of Rockall Bank; another airplane claimed a successful depth-charge attack on a surfaced submarine 130 miles southwest of Brest. Radio Freetown repeated an SSS signal from the Dutch steamer BODEGRAVEN, 190 miles southeast of Freetown.

All ships approaching Chesapeake Bay have been directed to proceed with the utmost caution when entering mined areas and to establish contact with the guard vessel 40 miles east of Cape Henry.

An American radio station gave warning of an abandoned wreck 80 miles east of the Bahama Islands. A submarine fired on the U.S. steamer CARDONIA in the Windward Passage. U.S. tanker CITIES SERVICE MISSOURI reported sighting a submarine east of Georgetown.

According to a newspaper report, the British mail steamer CERAMIC in the Atlantic en route from Liverpool to Rio de Janeiro was damaged in an engagement with a submarine. Two tankers, which had been damaged by

a submarine, were able to reach a Canadian port under their own power. The 5,335-ton tanker OLYMPIC and the 2,577-ton steamer NORVANA are overdue and are considered lost. The British steamers SOTRA and CLAUGHTON were sunk.

2. Own Situation:

In the Mediterranean a submarine reported having temporarily established contact with 3 enemy destroyers east of the Gulf of Sollum. The destroyers were on an easterly course. A supplementary situation report may be found in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

For reconnaissance operations of the 5th Air Force in connection with the operation against PQ 12 see "Situation Norway." Several planes flew armed reconnaissance over St. George's Channel during the night.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The 10th Air Corps flew cover for the 4th transport group. Large-scale reconnaissance was carried out over the western Mediterranean. For reports see "Warfare in the Mediterranean, Enemy Situation". For results of the mission over Cyrenaica on 6 Mar. see the daily situation report.

3. Eastern Front:

Operations in support of the Army centered on the vicinity of Kholm in the northern sector. Strong fighter forces effectively intervened in the ground fighting south of Lyuban.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

Task Force H, which put to sea from Gibraltar on 6 Mar., was sighted by air reconnaissance forces in waters north of Algiers. At first it was located on an easterly course, but during the afternoon on predominantly westerly courses; it was last sighted at 1650 on a 45° course. For details see Telegram 1835. The task force was evidently engaged in transferring airplanes to Malta. A French radio message claims that a British destroyer and a British submarine reached Gibraltar heavily damaged, with dead and wounded aboard.

In the eastern Mediterranean 2 merchant vessels and 2 destroyers were located off Tobruk.

2. Situation Italy:

During the night of 6 Mar. enemy planes attacked Benghazi; no damage was done in the port area. In the afternoon of 5 Mar. an Italian subchaser was sunk by gunfire from an enemy submarine off Cephalonia.

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On the same day the steamer MAGDALENA was torpedoed by an enemy submarine in the Corfu roadstead. The ship was grounded.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The 4th transport group, consisting of 4 motor ships, departed in the morning of 7 Mar. Its close escort consists of 6 destroyers and 3 torpedo boats, surrounded by an outer screen of 3 cruisers and 4 destroyers.

The steamer PETRARCA arrived in Benghazi on 6 Mar.

Landing Barge "154", carrying 84 tons of motor fuel, is the first vessel to have left Benghazi for Derna. Two other landing barges will follow. Two landing barges are en route from Tripoli to Benghazi. The tanker LOMBARDIA reached Tripoli on 6 Mar., the steamer SALOMA on 7 Mar.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

On 2 and 3 Mar. a fifth Greek auxiliary sailing vessel was sunk by an enemy submarine off Salonika.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

A Russian naval lieutenant by the name of Andreyev was captured at Eupatoria and interrogated by Captain von Baumbach. For copy of Von Baumbach's detailed report see 1/Skl Im 9086/42 geh. in War Diary files "Barbarossa".

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

It was reported from London on 4 Mar. that Japanese naval forces of considerable strength, including cruisers and submarines, are on their way to the Gulf of Bengal. The gunboats SANDPIPER, FALCON, GANNET, and TUTUILLA, which were part of the former British and American Yangtze patrol, were turned over to the Nanking (Chungking? Tr.N.) government.

The U.S. War Department has announced that three large troop-carrying transports were sunk in Subic Bay on 4 Mar. According to statements by survivors from the battleships PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE who were taken prisoner when a subchaser was captured by the Japanese, approximately 670 officers and men from the REPULSE and 800 from the PRINCE OF WALES were rescued.

2. Situation Japan:

The sinking of an American aircraft carrier which had been heavily damaged off New Guinea on 21 Feb. is announced by Japanese Headquarters. Another American aircraft carrier, one of special design, was sunk on 27 Feb. off Bali after having been set afire. On 2 Mar. the British destroyer STRONGHOLD was sunk by Japanese naval forces south

of Java. Gunboat ASHEVILLE was sunk on 3 Mar. According to the Domei news agency, Japanese marines have landed on the western shore of the Philippine island of Mindanao. Reuter reports that Japanese landing attempts near Amoy have failed. News Analysis No. 11 of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Navies Branch, contains a report on Japanese landing techniques, which is based on incomplete documentary evidence captured from the British. The same issue also contains information on alternate routes to be used after the loss of the Burma Road.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The enemy attacked along the entire 6th Army Front. In the Orel Valley the extreme right wing of this army slightly gave way towards the west. A counterattack is now in progress. Southwest of Livny the 2nd Army repulsed all enemy attacks.

Central Army Group:

Between Sukhinichi and Lyudinovo the enemy unsuccessfully attacked our positions all along the line. In the 4th Army sector all enemy attacks aimed at the highway in the vicinity of Yukhnov were beaten off. An attack northwest of Rzhev resulted in a penetration of our lines, which, however, was sealed off northeast of Mostovaya. In the 3rd Panzer Army sector our forces carried out successful thrusts southwest of Demidov. A partisan attack was repulsed south of Velikie Luki.

Northern Army Group:

Enemy attacks were repulsed in the vicinity of Kholm, north of Staraya Russa, and on the Volkhov front.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Nothing to report.

3. North Africa:

There was increased enemy patrol activity, particularly in the area west-southwest of Tmimi.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

On the occasion of the funerals of those killed in the British air raids on Paris, Marshal Petain issued a message to the French people. According to a British report, the French Government has protested in London because of this air raid. The position of the U.S. Ambassador in Vichy is said to have suffered. His work has been made more difficult by the British air raids on Paris. It is said that he has recently been treated with pronounced coolness by Admiral Darlan and Marshal Petain.

Great Britain:

The U.S. radio is concerned with the slowly unfolding crisis in Britain. It is said that the British are now demanding offensive action and that they are tired of the everlasting defensive attitude which Churchill advocates. They claim that Churchill always talks about the future and accepts with indifference the defeats of the present. Now the most diversified groups, including the Times and the extreme Conservatives, as well as the radical Communists, are attacking him violently, and it is said that it is by no means impossible that he may resign within three months. However, it is not excluded that he will get another cabinet post or that he will continue to play a role as leader of the opposition.

While discussing an offensive in western Europe, the British press mentions first of all Norway.

This public reference leads to the assumption that nothing will actually be undertaken against Norway.

The former War Minister, Margesson, termed the continuous changes in the Cabinet an indication of impending disaster, pointing to the experience of France. He maintained that a systematic war policy is impossible, if Churchill yields again and again to public opinion.

A reference to Germany in 1917-1918 would also have been apropos.

The British food situation has become noticeably worse during the last two months. Indignation about the extent of the black market has prompted the Government to carry out numerous raids which have led to not less than 42,000 arrests.

During a debate in the Lower House on 5 Mar. concerning allocation of workers, Bevin accused the employers of not trying to get along with the workers available, but continually requesting new ones. Discontent was expressed also about the employment of women, because no special consideration is given to women with children. Bevin explained that labor quotas were calculated on the basis that the climax of the war would be reached at the end of 1942. Due to mismanagement with regard to manpower these calculations, however, have been upset. Now, at the crucial moment, he said, production is beginning to break down.

Lord of the Admiralty, Alexander compared the present situation in Britain to that after Dunkirk, when 73 destroyers were being repaired, 11 had been sunk, and when hardly half a dozen corvettes were available. Now, however, the number of available vessels is considerably higher.

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He considers the present stage of the war a very critical one and deplores the fact that already there are signs of war weariness in Britain.

Hungary:

Bardossy's cabinet has resigned.

Portugal:

It was learned from Mozambique that action by the South African Union against this colony is to be expected during the next three weeks.

Yugoslavia:

According to information from a diplomatic source, increased guerilla and Communistic propaganda activity is noticeable since the arrival of warmer weather. Many refugees have gathered in Belgrad; together with the Communistic mob which is helped and led by former Yugoslav officers these constitute a danger to the city.

Turkey:

Because of the attempt to assassinate the German Ambassador, the Russian Consulate in Istanbul was searched on 6 Mar. Two members of the Soviet Russian Trade Commission in Ankara were taken into custody. A considerable number of foreigners of various nationalities is to be forced to leave Ankara. 250 arrests were made. The Soviet Russian Ambassador has gone to Moscow to report.

Japan:

An agreement has been reached regarding the continuation of the Fishing Agreement with the Soviet Union for one more year. Negotiations concerning better exploitation of the oil concessions of Sakhalin are resting at the present time.

A military government has been established for the occupied area in the Netherland Indies. The commander of the Japanese forces is acting in the capacity of governor general. The local governing bodies remain in office wherever possible.

Special Items:

I. Commanding Officer, Supply and Transports, Italy reported on 27 Feb. to the Shipping and Transport Branch, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division on the achievements and the fitness of Italian submarines for purposes of transportation.

14 submarines in 27 trips transported altogether 2,361 tons of fuel, munition and food supplies during November and December 1941. Two submarines were lost during these operations.

Not counting the 10 Italian submarines which are being used in the Atlantic, 14 more medium-sized submarines can be spared for transporting supplies, so that the monthly capacity can be brought up to 2,000 GRT.

For copy of the report see Skl Qu A VI sa 1696/42 Gkdos., in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII.

II. In addition to the directive of the Armed Forces High Command of 14 Dec. 1941 concerning the reinforcement of the heaviest coastal batteries with anti-aircraft artillery, the Fuehrer has ordered that these

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be strengthened further through the addition of anti-tank weapons, flame throwers and mortars, obstacles, possibly mine fields and, if necessary, infantry units.

On 2 Mar. the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Coastal Defense issued instructions covering the Navy's tasks in connection with the above order.

For copy of the orders of the Army High Command and the Navy High Command, see Skl Qu A I k 3692/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

III. Concerning operation "Sportpalast"

On 24 Feb. Naval Group North submitted a brief report about this operation, analyzing the events and the measures taken. In viewing the operation involving the two cruisers, Group North observes that it is as much a matter of luck to transfer ships via the North Sea and Norwegian Strait undetected as to transfer them undamaged through the German Bight and along the Norwegian coast to a Norwegian base. As usual, the shortage of suitable escort forces proves to be a great handicap. We must realize that in any undertaking of similar scope originating in a Norwegian port and ending in Norwegian coastal waters there will be danger from mines, torpedoes, aerial torpedoes, and bombs. Another unavoidable difficulty which must be taken into consideration from the beginning is the fact that in all western and northern Norway there is no base which has sufficient dock and repair facilities for modern ships.

Opinion of Naval Staff Operations Division:

The manner in which Group North directed the operation deserves recognition. It proved to be absolutely correct. The tactics employed by the Commanding Admiral, Battleships were correct in view of the situation. They are not in any way responsible for the torpedo hit on the PRINZ EUGEN. The shortage of escort forces proved a very great disadvantage. 2 destroyers are an entirely insufficient escort in the area off Trondheim, endangered as it is by submarines. The fact that the weather kept 3 other destroyers from participating was a serious handicap. Although it is not intended to criticize the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, it is justifiable to ask whether it might not have been better to delay approaching the coast at Griphoelen Fjord until daylight so that the anti-submarine patrol (guard boats and subchasers) as well as air cover could become fully effective.

The feat of bringing the damaged PRINZ EUGEN through the difficult approaches of the fjords deserves special recognition.

IV. Operation "Fischerhalbinsel" (Rybachy Peninsula)

On 6 Mar. Group North made known supplementary preparations for the operation and took a stand on the opinions expressed by the Commanding Admiral, Norway; at the same time the group informed the Commanding Admiral, Norway of its wishes regarding the Bantos and Kuesel mine fields. Group North intends to have the new destroyers Z "24", "25", "26", and "30", and also minesweepers, bombard the coast during the landing. The Group does not intend a diversionary operation of TIRPITZ and HIPPER to Iceland, since the enemy is so strong that he can operate in two groups. It is most important that our heavy forces provide cover for the landing.

In this connection the Commanding Admiral, Norway reported on 7 Mar. that with the mines available only part of the minefields requested by Group North can be laid by the beginning of April. The Admiral, Arctic

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Ocean is instructed to lay either the "Bantos A" and the southern half of the "Bantos B" minefields or one extended "Bantos A" minefield with two minelayers during the next new moon period. The Commanding Admiral, Norway suggests awaiting further developments before laying the remaining minefields.

Commander Busch will take over the post of Liaison Officer to the Mountain Army, Norway on 9 Mar.

V. Transfer of HIPPER to Trondheim

The Naval Staff informs the Air Force Operations Staff about naval operations being planned, so that the fighter escorts requested by Group North can be provided. The Air Force Operations Staff replies that the Air Force Group Command, Central Area and the 5th Air Force will provide fighter cover and escort insofar as possible in direct cooperation with each other and with Group North. It is not planned to have unified command, as in operation "Sportpalast", and night fighters will not be used. No additional forces will be supplied.

Group North will be informed accordingly by the Naval Staff.

Situation 8 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

According to an intelligence report from Spain a convoy, coming from the west, has entered the harbor of Gibraltar.

South Atlantic:

3 U.S. cruisers are in Rio, among them the CINCINNATI and the MEMPHIS; also 5 destroyers. According to an intelligence report from Spain, the QUEEN MARY has arrived in Rio from the Dutch East Indies and will depart the night of 7 Mar. It seems that contradictory rumors are being spread intentionally about the destination and load of the ship. An Italian agent report confirms from a reliable source that the WARSPITE was sighted in Australian waters, after undergoing repair in Norfolk.

2. Own Situation:

No reports from our vessels in foreign waters. Tanker GERMANIA is advised that a German submarine will meet her at point "Pfanne" after 0800 on 12 Mar., and is given further sailing orders. For copy of radiogram see 1/Skl 545/42 Gkdos. Chefs., in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

Information on enemy situation was sent by Radiogram 1034.

II. Situation West Area

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1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported sighting 10 to 15 steamers between the Isle of Wight and Portsmouth and in the harbor of Portsmouth in the afternoon.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Group West gave orders for the ELSA ESSBERGER to leave Ferrol on 9 Mar. The ship will be met that day at about 0800 in quadrant BF 8581 by 3 or 4 minesweepers. She is to head for Bordeaux. Air Command, Atlantic Coast has been asked for reconnaissance and escort planes.

Motorship TANNENFELS left Bordeaux for Japan on 8 Mar.

Group West and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines are informed about instructions given to tanker GERMANIA.

On 4 Mar. Group West issued the order for departure of ship "28" for the Atlantic. The code words to be used after leaving the Gironde are "Tuenmler" or "Schwertfisch". Ship "28" is to enter the area of Group West on 11 Mar. The Commanding Admiral, Defenses West will be in command until the ship leaves the French coast; then Group West will take over as far as 30° W, and then the Naval Staff. The Commanding Admiral, Defenses West will order departure from Flushing by code word "Glueckstadt".

Channel Coast:

Nothing to report.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

The first troop transport from Hamburg arrived in Kristiansand South. No further reports.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

On 7 Mar. air reconnaissance sighted 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer at anchor south of Cape Teriberski. On 8 Mar. no results from air reconnaissance in the Arctic Ocean.

At 1140 radio intelligence intercepted an OU message (operation urgent), consisting of 173 groups, directed to all vessels in home waters. Although the British are known to be very careful and capable in handling their radio messages, avoiding anything that attracts attention, so that it has been absolutely impossible lately to draw any conclusions from them regarding operations; it is wrong to assume in this case, as does Group North, that this lengthy message does not concern operations. Outside of that, only a message to radio station Murmansk was intercepted, inquiring whether a radiogram sent from an unidentified vessel and picked up at 1538 had been understood.

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Own Situation:

The investigation ordered on 6 Mar. to determine whether submarine U "377" was damaged or sunk at Moskenes by our own airplanes could not be carried out on that day, because of the weather, and was unsuccessful on 7 and 8 Mar. It is possible that a submarine sighted diving in quadrant AB 6686 on 8 Mar. by our air reconnaissance was submarine U "377", since the position corresponds to her operational orders. The fact that she has not answered the various requests to state her position may be due to a breakdown of her radio. For detailed reports by Group North concerning possible attack on submarine U "377" see Telegrams 0113, 0201, 1113, and 2356. For inquiry sent by Naval Staff to Group North and Commanding Admiral, Norway to determine whether the order prohibiting submarine chase was known by the Air Force in time, and for information sent to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff and the Air Force Operations Staff, see Telegrams 1619 and 1616.

The 12th Subchaser Flotilla left Bodoe for the south; the 4th Mine Sweeper Flotilla arrived in Kristiansand South from Germany.

In the morning of 7 Mar. there was enemy air activity over Trondheim and Bergen (reconnaissance) and on 8 Mar. from 0520 to 0600 over the coastal island area off Bergen.

Transports to northern Norway were delayed because of blizzards and storms.

In order to save fuel oil and to speed up repair of ships, in view of the frequent damage suffered by destroyers and torpedo boats, Group North requests that the Trondheim shipyard be equipped at once to handle important repairs (see Telegram 2303).

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division and the Naval Ship Construction Division will attend to the matter. Concerning the request of the Commanding Admiral, Norway for additional anti-submarine barrages off Nordkyn, the Naval Staff suggests laying the barrage in the shape of a cross in order to be able to intercept submarines proceeding immediately north of Nordkyn, parallel to our own shipping route (see Telegram 1815).

Operation against Convoy PQ 12

The operation did not achieve the desired result on 8 Mar.

If the search of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, geared to an enemy speed of 6 to 8 knots, should remain without result, Group North considers it possible that the convoy stopped or turned back, since they noticed that they had been sighted by our planes on 5 Mar. For message from the Group, see Telegram 1948.

At 1145 Group North had radioed the Commanding Admiral, Battleships that the enemy was expected to be in quadrant AB 5970, 5510, 6210, and 6590 on 8 Mar. at 0800, and in quadrants AB 6590, 6210, AC 1760, and 4560 on 9 Mar. at 0800. The Group suggested that the search be abandoned at sunset on 9 Mar., and that the task force return to Trondheim. (See Telegram 1145.)

Group North reported at 2321 that on 7 Mar. at 1813 the 5th Destroyer Flotilla sank the Russian steamer IMORA in quadrant AB 5697. Destroyer Z "25", the IHN, the SCHOEMANN were released for Narvik and Tromsøe from the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships at 2100 on 7 Mar. and at 0740 on 8 Mar. for refuelling, since the weather made it impossible to refuel at sea. The Commanding Admiral, Battleships is operating

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against the convoy south of Bear Island, and is planning to assemble the TIRPITZ, destroyer Z "25" and the SCHOEMANN in quadrant AC 4755 at 0800 on 9 Mar. in order to continue the operation. It is planned to return to Trondheim in the morning of 10 Mar. Our air reconnaissance reported sighting the TIRPITZ at 1210 in quadrant AB 6631 and at 1235 in AB 6533. (See Telegram 2321.)

Submarines U "134" and "589" were ordered to new attack positions south-east of Jan Mayen to patrol that area for naval forces and the convoy.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Icebreaker CASTOR was damaged again while clearing a path, but it was possible to repair her within 7 hours with the ship's own repair facilities. Icebreaker SISU, together with the LEIPZIG, the KMDEN, and 2 Finnish steamers, coming from the east, passed Rixhoeft en route to Swineuende.

The Naval Staff accepts the suggestion of the Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries (see War Diary 7 Mar.) concerning use of the 531st Naval Coastal Artillery Battalion. Group North, Naval Station, Baltic, and the Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries are instructed that the Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries is to make arrangements directly with the 28th Army and should point out at that time that the same forces are later to take over the occupation of the island, and that no other naval troops will be available.

The results of the investigation are forwarded to the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff; and the Army General Staff via the Naval Liaison Officer; a copy is sent to Group North.

For copy of the telegram see 1/Skl 5489/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

A surfaced submarine was reported west-northwest of the Faroe Islands by a Scapa Flow patrol vessel. Fleet Commander, North Atlantic reported on 6 Mar. that 4 French submarines passed Gibraltar in easterly direction, accompanied by a surface vessel. According to agent report these were 4 British submarines of the SHARE class. An airplane reported attacking a submarine at Halifax.

U.S. radio stations repeated submarine warning regarding definite sighting of a submarine in the Windward Passage. At the same time, all merchant ships in the Atlantic received coded radio messages, presumably new sailing orders.

The submarines in question are probably Italian.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "587" reports sinking the HAWSEGEDA from Greenland southwest of Cape Race; presumably the ship was a camouflaged

escort vessel. Submarine U "129" reports sinking the U.S. steamers MARY and STEEL AGE on the coast of Guiana. Supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Telegram 1914 informs the Commanding Admiral, Submarines concerning arrival of the Swedish vessels PERU and REMMAREN at the western border of the operations area at 0800 on 9 Mar.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

107 planes of the 3rd Air Force attacked Hull during the night. 5 FW 200's of the Air Commander, Atlantic Coast provided escort for the TANNENFELS and the ELSA ESSBERGER without any special events. Enemy planes raided Westphalia and the Ruhr area, with some damage in Oberhausen, Essen, and Dortmund. Rail communications between Oberhausen - Hanborn has been interrupted. Other enemy incursions took place over Belgium, northern France, and western France. Damage to the Ford factory at Poissy near Paris is reported. From Holland comes a report of 4 enemy incursions; bombs were dropped at two places.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Besides escorting the 4th transport group, our planes are continuing to attack Malta, especially the airfields. Moreover, on 7 Mar. attacks were made with obvious success on the harbor of Tobruk and railroads in the Marsa Matruh area. The raids on airfields of Cyrenaica and Malta were continued also during the nights of 7 and 8 Mar.

3. Eastern Front:

Fires were observed as a result of our night raids on the harbors of Novorossisk and Kerch. In the Arctic Ocean an attack on a steamer and a destroyer in the harbor of Yokanga was attempted twice but was unsuccessful because of strong enemy defense. Reconnaissance in the Arctic Ocean remained without results.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

In the afternoon Task Force H returned to Gibraltar; the MALAYA docked. A convoy consisting of 13 freighters with an auxiliary cruiser, a destroyer, 2 corvettes, and 2 gunboats arrived in Gibraltar from the west. In the night of 7 Mar. Italian submarines sighted 5 destroyers about 50 miles north-northwest of Ferrat, heading west. The number of ships in Valletta harbor (3 cruisers and 3 destroyers) remained unchanged all day. Malta forces therefore did not attack the 4th transport group. The radio intercept service reported that at 1325 an enemy plane was maintaining contact with this group. In the eastern Mediterranean German air reconnaissance sighted 3 merchant ships with 2 destroyers at Marsa Matruh, heading southeast. In the harbor of Tobruk a burning vessel was observed (see Aerial Warfare).

2. Own Situation:

Concerning the decision of the Naval Staff with regard to the operation of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla, the German Naval Command, Italy reports the plan to transfer 4 boats of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla to Suda under the flotilla commander. Thus for the time being 3 boats are available for mine operations against Malta. Because of the number of hours they have been in operation, however, they cannot participate in the Cyrenaica mission. For copy of report see 1/Skl 5494/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

3. Situation Italy:

Enemy planes attacked Benghazi during the night of 7 Mar. No damage was done in the harbor. During a day attack on Benghazi on 7 Mar. an Italian minesweeper was slightly damaged. According to an Italian report, the British submarine which sank the steamer MARIN SANUDO was destroyed by an Italian submarine. A report of the shelling of Derna by British submarines on 7 Mar. was found to be erroneous by the German Africa Corps. (See Telegram 1330.)

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The 4th transport group to Tripoli is proceeding according to plan. Motor ship MANARE will go from Trapani to Tripoli by the western route, escorted by 2 destroyers. Coastal traffic as scheduled, without particular events.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Strong enemy attacks at the south wing of the Von Kleist group at the Mius front were repulsed. An attempted breakthrough at the center of the front, supported by 30 tanks and 25 batteries, was repulsed by counterattack with heavy enemy losses. The attacks directed against the south wing of the 6th Army led to small penetrations temporarily. However, the enemy succeeded in enveloping one of our units west of Balakleya. The strong pressure on our lines at Volchansk as well as south of Trokhorovka makes it evident that the enemy is planning to attack Kharkov. A counteroperation has been initiated.

Central Army Group:

Lively combat activity is going on in the area of Sukhinichi as well as west and southwest of Yukhnov. Our forces are continuing to encircle the enemy south of Vyazma. At Gzhatsk and at Rzhev the enemy employed strong forces to break through our lines. Counterattacks are

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in progress. The enemy troops which had penetrated into Byeloi were thrown back to the north. At Usvyat strong enemy pressure is being exerted on our column.

Northern Army Group:

Kholm is being attacked by the enemy from the east with strong forces. In the Polovei and the Pola valleys enemy attacks were repulsed. Pressure in the Pola valley continues to be strong. In the area of Staraya Russa and at the Volkhov front the situation remains unchanged.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Lively combat activity south of Rogozero. The supply road to the northeastern front is blocked by snowdrifts.

3. North Africa:

Normal scouting and artillery activity on both sides. A German reconnaissance patrol which pushed forward as far as the area 100 km. northeast of Gialo did not make any contact with the enemy. 88 km. northeast of Benghazi a German patrol was shot at by 70 to 80 Arabs in ambush.

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Items of Political Importance

Australia:

General Gordon Bennett pointed out that the time left to Australia is too precious to be wasted on lengthy discussions as to who is to be blamed for the fall of Singapore. He maintained that Australia is in great danger and that Japan, in her accustomed manner, would attack the country at the weakest spot and try to conquer suitable airbases in the north in order to proceed subsequently from base to base into the center of the country. For that reason one should try, by all means, to prevent the Japanese from getting a foothold in Australia. The strength of the Japanese lies in the offensive, whereas they are not very efficient in the defensive. The most important thing, according to General Bennett, is to build up the strongest possible air force.

Sweden:

According to a report from a military source, Sweden's neutrality will be defended at all cost. Sweden refuses to accept any outside help for the time being. In case of an Anglo-American attack on Finland, Sweden would side with that country. In this connection operations against Norway as far as the Swedish border or an advance by way of northern Norway or Petsamo will not as such be considered as directed against Finland. Attractive as the idea may seem of getting an exit to the sea because of British capture of Narvik and the ore railroad, Sweden would, in all probability, refrain from participating in a British operation of that sort, in view of German retaliation.

Iran:

Differences between Russia and Britain are growing steadily. Russia is trying to separate the northern provinces from Teheran. In the capital a communist paper is published which is openly agitating against Great Britain. The Anglophile president of the cabinet failed in his attempt to form a new cabinet. For that reason he left Teheran and resigned. The Shah was placed in protective custody in his palace in Teheran after a vain attempt to flee.

Great Britain:

The article in the Times concerning the relations between Great Britain and Russia was much quoted in the world press. Swedish papers assume that the Russians have always been of the opinion that British recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union was a basic prerequisite for the agreement with Great Britain. It is said that the majority of the Americans in Great Britain believe that the U.S. should not be in a hurry to mix into political discussions about the future order in Europe.

U.S.A.:

According to press reports, it is anticipated that there will be a break in the relations between the U.S. and Vichy very soon.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. In his report on the progress of the operation of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships against convoy PQ 12, the Chief, Naval Staff emphasized particularly the great risk involved in operations of that nature, due to the lack of German aircraft carriers and insufficient control over the air forces. A careful investigation is therefore necessary to determine whether such an operation with all its contingencies is justifiable, considering the main task of the heavy vessels, which is to ward off a large-scale enemy landing. At any rate, much more extensive long-range reconnaissance is necessary than was possible in the current operation. In the opinion of the Naval Staff, the submarine operation planned by Group North is out of proportion to the small number of 19 available boats, so that these forces have been scattered too widely. It is particularly noteworthy that enemy radio messages intercepted did not give the slightest clue to the enemy's activities.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Branch reports on the security forces in the western area and on the request of Group West concerning allocation of the Dutch gunboats. (See War Diary 7 Mar.)

III. The final report of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West concerning the enemy operation against the Air Force radar equipment at Cape d'Antifer was discussed. The report emphasizes the excellent cooperation between all the branches of the Armed Forces.

IV. The Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Branch reported concerning submarine U "377" that the Naval Staff ordered clarification of the following points by Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Norway:

1. Was the order prohibiting submarine chase actually known to Air Force commands?
2. Could there be a misunderstanding with regard to the zone in which submarine chase is prohibited?
3. To what branch of the Armed Forces did the coastal patrol post of Mykoerne belong?
4. Did the planes act independently or upon naval request? If so, from what command?

(See War Diary 8 Mar., Situation Norway.)

V. Group North reports about the conference between Field Marshal List and the Commanding Admiral, Battleships on the TIRPITZ on 4 Mar. in the presence of the Chief of the 5th Air Force. List is investigating the situation in Norway by order of the Fuehrer.

The Chief of Staff of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships presented his opinion on the naval situation and possibilities for operations. Main idea: It is very difficult to ward off strong enemy forces with our present inadequate Trondheim group; furthermore it is altogether possible that our forces would arrive on the scene too late even if the attacking enemy force, which probably would utilize weather not suitable for flying, were small. He emphasized especially the need for the best possible air reconnaissance and participation of adequate bomber forces in all naval operations of offensive and defensive character. The Chief of the 5th Air Force agreed that the air forces are at present very weak, and that berths have inadequate antiaircraft protection.

VI. The Chief, Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Branch reports on the plans to use the 531st Naval Artillery Detachment for the occupation of Russian islands in the Gulf of Finland (see War Diary 6 and 7 Mar.). According to a message from the Naval Liaison Officer to the Armed Forces High Command, the Armed Forces High Command is planning to drop this plan and occupy the Shepel-Oranienbaum area instead.

The Naval Staff would regret it very much if these islands would not be occupied, even though the Shepel area would be very helpful for controlling the inner Kronstadt Bay.

VII. The Naval Adjutant to the Fuehrer reported that the Fuehrer is anxious to have steamers POTSDAM and GNEISENAU ready for operations, and believes that degaussing gear is necessary.

Group North doubts the value of the degaussing gear. The Chief, Naval Staff will ask the Fuehrer to make a decision at the conference on 12 Mar.

VIII. The Naval Staff has investigated a proposal sent to the Fuehrer by a Dr. Dyes concerning cutting off the American bauxite supply. The Naval Staff was quite aware of the bauxite in Dutch and British Guiana. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines had already been informed on this score in connection with submarine operations. Dr. Dyes ideas to destroy the areas by means of planes, sleeping sickness germs, or with the aid of the convicts from French Guiana are impractical because of geographic conditions. Destruction of the surface mines would not be effective for any length of time. U.S. industry would be able to convert to local alum earth in a short time. The Naval Staff has pointed this out to the Fuehrer's Adjutant, Captain von Puttkamer, telling him that the Naval Staff had already some time ago ordered submarine operations in the area of the Surinam and Demerara estuaries. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

IX. The Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division reports about difficulties in radio communications during the current operation of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships. It will be necessary to simplify the system by decreasing the number of circuits.

The Japanese Admiralty has termed about a third of the information supplied by Germany as valuable. It is unfortunate that as yet no Japanese naval officer has been appointed for training in German communications, as planned, since the officer in Europe who was originally designated has been given another assignment.

X. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports on the effects of additional cuts in raw material allotments for the second quarter of 1942; on changes in organization in the West Area which are to be discussed with the Armed Forces High Command; on the desires of the Transportation Minister regarding naval assistance to the merchant marine; and on the attitude of the Navy about plans to appoint a special commissioner for maritime shipping (Gauleiter Kaufmann in cooperation with the Reichsmarschall).

XI. The Naval Staff Operations Division, Foreign Affairs Branch reports that trade has been stopped between North America and French West Africa.

XII. The Naval Liaison Officer at the Armed Forces High Command reported that the Fuehrer agrees in principle with the memorandum of the Naval Staff of 4 Mar. However, at the present time the forces for carrying

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out the Suez operation are not available. The Fuehrer would like to know whether the Navy believes it could provide the necessary transport facilities. The Navy believes that this is possible if a large number of naval barges are used and if Italian plans to occupy Malta are carried out.

XIII. According to a Fuehrer directive, the coming German Army operations in the East will be known as operation "Siegfried". Italian, Rumanian, and Hungarian operations will be known as operations "Mars" I, II, and III.

XIV. The Chief, Naval Staff Operations Division, Operations Branch reports on the plans of Group North on the transfer of the HIPPER to Trondheim. (See War Diary 6 Mar.)

For a transcript of the report, which has the approval of the Naval Staff, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

Group North reports that it is not planned to launch operation "Eisenbahn" prior to 14 Mar.

Special Items:

I. On 4 Mar. Group North reported that according to a number of prisoner statements the fall of Leningrad was expected in that city in the late summer of 1941, and opposition would have been slight at that time. The fact that the city was not occupied saved a large part of the Russian fleet, and particularly the shipyards and armament factories for the enemy.

Group North believes it of the greatest importance for naval warfare not to pass up another opportunity to occupy the city. Even a temporary occupation of Leningrad would make it possible to destroy the remainder of the fleet and the armament factories. This would release considerable German naval forces for other tasks. If Kronstadt were taken, considerable amounts of raw materials and scrap iron would fall into German hands.

The Naval Staff fully agrees with these observations. It does not seem advisable to bring this matter to the attention of the Armed Forces High Command at the present time, but it will be kept in mind.

II. Antonescu sent his thanks to the Fuehrer and the Commander in Chief, Navy, after the Admiral, Black Sea informed him about the transfer of special Italian weapons to the Black Sea.

Situation 9 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

See News Analysis No. 12 of the Naval Staff Intelligence Division, Foreign Navies Branch for information concerning organization

of command, command areas, number of ships available and under construction, manpower, bases, and naval air fields of the U.S. Navy in the beginning of 1942.

South Atlantic:

According to an intelligence report from Portugal, a convoy heading north passed the Cape of Good Hope at noon on 8 Mar.

According to the radio intercept service it is assumed that the chief of the South American Division is assumed to be on the BIRMINGHAM en route from America to Freetown.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "28" left Brunsbuettel for Flushing.

Information on the enemy situation is sent by Radiogram 1911.

II. Situation West Area

1. Atlantic Coast:

Enemy air attacks on Lorient and St. Nazaire on 8 Mar. were belatedly reported. Slight damage and some casualties in St. Nazaire.

According to the radio intercept service, the TANNENFELS was located by a Sunderland plane at 0633 at 47° 10' N, 11° 20' W, and was attacked, according to the ship's report, at 0638. Group West instructed her by Radiogram 0853 to head for Spanish territorial waters if the enemy plane continues to maintain contact and if the weather permits. At the same time the weather report for the area northwest of Finisterre was sent to the TANNENFELS.

Since no further reports were received, it can be assumed that the TANNENFELS shook off the plane and is proceeding on her way. She has been notified to this effect by Radiogram 1850.

Group West has instructed the OSORNO and the TANNENFELS via Radiogram 2114 to be particularly on the alert for convoys when passing through the area between 20° and 28° W on 10 Mar., since it is possible that the dates of departure have been changed.

Radiogram 1920 contains sailing instructions for the OSORNO. The transfer of the ELSA ESSBERGER has so far proceeded according to plan.

2. Channel Coast:

There are no reports in particular about the situation at sea.

Since shelling ships located at sea is usually very ineffective, it does not justify the wear and tear on the gun barrels, which is not inconsiderable in the long run. The Commander in Chief, Navy therefore desires that the coastal batteries shoot only at valuable ships in the future, and then only if there seem to be some chances of success. Otherwise the batteries are to shoot only when it is necessary for keeping the personnel in training and ready for action.

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A directive to this effect is sent to Group West and the Admiral, France. The Admiral, France is to issue the necessary orders in agreement with Group West.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, one northbound and one southbound convoy was in the Thames. Air reconnaissance located a convoy of 24 steamers with 2 destroyers and 2 escort vessels off Flam-borough Head on a southerly course.

Own Situation:

Enemy air activity over Wilhelmshaven and Borkum in the night of 8 Mar. The Commanding Admiral, Defenses North requests permission from Group North to have the KAISER lay minefield IV a with 170 mines, and to have the 1st Minesweeper Flotilla lay minefield IV b with 70 mines.

The convoy and escort service proceeded according to plan without special incidents.

38 ground mines were swept in February 1942 in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses North. During 19 air attacks on forces of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses North 8 planes were shot down. One vessel was sunk and 2 were damaged. 13 men were killed. One steamer was sunk by a mine.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

At 0900 a British carrier plane reported one German battleship and 3 destroyers on southerly course in quadrant AF 2626. At 0955, 1031, and 1200 new position reports by planes about a German force were intercepted. At 1030 a ship, presumably a submarine, reported an unsuccessful torpedo attack on a ship of the BISMARCK class. At 1044 Scapa issued code word "Falcon" to the Scapa forces.

According to air reconnaissance, a British force consisting of 1 aircraft carrier, 3 heavy and 1 light cruiser were located at 1115 about 100 miles west of the Vest Fjord on northerly course proceeding at 30 knots. Contact was maintained until 1258, when the force turned west in quadrant AF 2283. At 1415, 4 destroyers on course 110° were reported in quadrant AF 1863. Two destroyers reported in quadrant AC 3785 without indication of the time were probably German forces.

Own Situation:

Group North reported that the Commanding Admiral, Battleships broke off the operation on 8 Mar. at 2200 and turned back. He is to meet the destroyers at 0800 on 9 Mar. in quadrant 3185.

At 0900 enemy planes established contact with the TIRPITZ, which was escorted by only one destroyer. The battleship was attacked at 1020 by

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20 to 35 Swordfish carrier planes simultaneously. At 1100 she was able to report, however, that so far heavy attacks by torpedo carrying planes had been repulsed. At 1219 Group North reported that the TIRPITZ was heading for the Vest Fjord, that the destroyers were joining her, and that the torpedo boats and minesweepers were being brought up from Trondheim. At noon her location was reported in quadrant AE 3549. Ju 88's have been requested to help out. At 1301 the TIRPITZ reported shooting down 3 Swordfish planes. At 1315 Group North informed the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, the 5th Air Force, and the Naval Staff that judging from reports from the radio intercept service and the presence of torpedo planes, there are probably 1 or 2 aircraft carriers within 150 miles radius of quadrant AF 3545. At 1356 the Commanding Admiral, Battleships urgently requested evening reconnaissance, since he was considering proceeding to Trondheim by night, and at 1413 he reported that he would start for Trondheim soon, either by way of the inter-island route or outside of the islands, depending on the situation.

At 1417 the TIRPITZ located a submarine west of Moskenstraumen, and evaded a torpedo. Furthermore in the afternoon torpedo boat T "5" reported a Sunderland plane in the vicinity of the Vest Fjord.

Evidently unaware of this report, Group North agreed at 1635 that the ship should try to break through to Trondheim at once.

On the basis of the noon air reconnaissance reports, evidently received in the meantime (see Enemy Situation), the Group ordered the Commanding Admiral, Battleships at 1749 to proceed to Narvik. Purpose: to leave the TIRPITZ there until the route to Trondheim was free from enemy forces. Until then, subchase should be carried on in the Vest Fjord, and the Air Force should operate against naval forces, particularly against aircraft carriers.

The Group requests the 5th Air Force to attempt to locate the reported enemy force on 10 Mar., and if possible attack it.

Submarines U "589", "403", and "377" were assigned new attack positions in quadrants AF 28, 25, and 22. The Admiral, Arctic Ocean will have command of submarines U "456", "436", and "454" beginning 9 Mar. at 2400. The submarines are operating east of 28° E.

Submarines U "405" and "592" are in waiting position in quadrants AF 5820 and 5880.

The Group ordered the Commanding Admiral, Norway to prepare the harbor defenses in Narvik during the TIRPITZ' stay for enemy planes, submarines, mines, PT boats, and destroyers, supported by cruisers and battleships.

No additional reports were received by the Commanding Admiral, Battleships until the end of the day.

The search for survivors of U "377" was discontinued without having been successful.

The convoy situation is strained. In Tromsø 4 steamers, and in Bille Fjord 3 steamers are waiting for escort forces.

In Kirkenes and Petsamo a total of 7 steamers were torn loose during a heavy storm on 7 Mar.

The Fleet Command supports the request of Group North regarding the development of shipyard facilities at Trondheim. (See War Diary 8 Mar.)

For copy see 1/Skl 5603/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

The Naval Staff fully agrees with the instructions of Group North to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea that convoy operations should have priority over blockade measures designed to prevent Norwegian ships from escaping from Sweden, since it is doubtful that such an attempt will be made (see Telegram 1653). According to instructions from the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff, the operation for capturing the islands in the Gulf of Finland is to be carried out in time to make it possible to set up the coastal batteries on the islands and to provide supplies for at least 6 weeks before the ice thaws.

For copy of the instructions sent to the Army High Command, the Naval High Command, and the Commander in Chief, Air, see 1/Skl 5588/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

V. Merchant Shipping

1. See Brief Report No. 7 of the news series issued by the Naval Staff Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Shipping Branch for information about traffic of Portuguese and Spanish ships to America, and other news about foreign merchant shipping.

2. The Naval Staff Intelligence Division, Foreign Navies Branch estimates that by the end of 1943 the U.S. will have at its disposal 13,100,000 GRT of cargo space, inclusive of Panamanian and Latin American ships, minus any losses. In view of the above estimate, and taking into consideration ships built in 1942 with the exception of tankers, the following cargo space will be available to the Allies for military purposes and to cover losses which British shipbuilding is unable to replace:

1st quarter 1942:	1,200,000 GRT
2nd quarter 1942:	3,200,000 GRT
3rd quarter 1942:	4,200,000 GRT
4th quarter 1942:	5,500,000 GRT
1st quarter 1943:	7,100,000 GRT

Taking into consideration the possible number of round trips (e.g., 8 per year to northern Europe, 6 per year to Africa, 3 per year to the southwestern Pacific) and the shipping space needed to transport infantry and tank divisions, as well as the space needed for supply, one can deduce the possibilities for operations in the various theaters of war.

For detailed figures see News Analysis No. 12 of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Navies Branch.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

A plane northwest of the Hebrides was ordered to attack a sub-

marine reported at 1730. A submarine sighting report from a steamer northeast of Cape Hatteras was intercepted. The Norwegian steamer CHARLES RACINE (9,957 GRT) was torpedoed twice 450 miles northeast of Puerto Rico, evidently by an Italian submarine.

2. Own Situation:

The 2 submarines operating south of Freetown reported sinking steamer BENMOHR (5,920 GRT), tanker BRITISH CONFIDENCE (8,000 GRT), steamer BLUE FUNNEL (6,000 GRT), and steamer BALUCHISTAN (6,992 GRT), a total of 26,912 GRT.

Supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Because of the numerous submarine operations in the northern area, the Commander in Chief, Navy wants a submarine staff officer assigned at once to Group North, who would be capable of assuming the duties of a Commander, Submarines, Norway when the time comes.

See Telegram 1717 for the corresponding directive to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, with copies to Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Norway.

The Naval Staff has come to the following conclusions after considering submarine operations in the northern area:

a. One of the principal tasks of the Navy is to disrupt enemy supplies to Murmansk and Archangel in order to safeguard northern Norway and support Army operations against the Soviet Union. This task is not being fulfilled at the present time. Supplies are being shipped to Russia almost undisturbed.

b. According to available reports, British convoys to Russia leave northern or western Scotland and sail west of the Faroes, east of Iceland, south of Jan Mayen, in the vicinity of the ice border, south of Bear Island until approximately 40° E, and from there to the Russian coast. This traffic is of great importance for enemy warfare.

c. So far very few submarines (3 or 4 at the most) have been committed in the Arctic area. Experience shows that possibilities for successful submarine operations definitely exist. British convoys to Murmansk and Archangel are forced to sail through an area which the ice border limits to from 180 to 200 miles at the most. (The distance between the southern tip of Bear Island and the latitude of the North Cape is 190 miles; the distance between the North Cape itself and Bear Island is 228 miles.) Assuming that the enemy will approach the Norwegian coast closer than 100 miles because of German forces, only a strip about 100 miles wide remains to be watched. It is impossible to patrol this area and attack enemy convoys with 2 or 3 submarines. However operations by 6 submarines would be very promising. In cooperation with air reconnaissance it must be possible effectively to hamper, if not entirely disrupt, enemy shipping in the Arctic area. The depth of the water is favorable for submarine warfare. The area itself as well as visibility and light conditions make submarine operations in accord- and with our accepted tactics possible for the time being. The enemy defense is limited to escort vessels, of which there will not be very many. Compared to other areas the conditions for submarine operations against important convoys must be considered very favorable.

d. The submarines stationed in the area west and northwest of the Hebrides are improperly placed for intercepting convoys to Russia, since these do not pass through this area. Possibilities for

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operations by these submarines grow less as the season progresses. So far they have had very little success. Therefore it seems necessary to shift their operations area.

e. Most of the convoys to Russia sail in all probability east of Iceland. Therefore it would be correct to station the submarines in this area. However the 1 or 2 submarines stationed there heretofore are insufficient. Submarines in this area should be increased to 3 or 4.

f. Until May there is danger that the enemy might launch an attack against northern Norway. Our measures must take this into consideration. Therefore it is not possible to withdraw the submarines from Iceland or the Arctic Ocean, for example for promising operations off the U.S. coast; on the contrary, convoys to Russia should be considered a particularly valuable target for our submarines. To intercept them it is much better to station several submarines in the Arctic area (Bear Island - North Cape) than in the Iceland - Hebrides area.

The Naval Staff therefore makes the following suggestions to the Chief, Naval Staff:

a. The Arctic Ocean submarines of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean should be increased to at least 10 or 12 (including those in Narvik).

b. Submarines east of Iceland should be increased to 3 or 4.

c. Submarines stationed northwest of the Hebrides should be withdrawn.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

In the night of 8 Mar. 63 planes attacked Hull, 14 attacked Sunderland, 7 Grimsby and Great Yarmouth during operations against the east coast of England. 19 planes did not complete the mission. Only very heavy bombs were dropped, among them numerous "LMB weiss" bombs. Because of low visibility only the explosions were heard; but no effects were observed. 5 planes are missing.

9 enemy planes were shot down by fighters in the west area during the day.

During the night of 9 Mar. 28 planes laid mines in the Thames. Enemy planes attacked the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area beginning at 2212, and inflicted some damage. Enemy planes were also active over Belgium, northern France, western France, and Holland. At 0615 they sank a tug at Le Havre, and damaged 1 pontoon and 7 railroad cars.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Attacks on airfields on Malta, in Cyrenaica, and in the Alexandria area were continued. Planes of the 506th Group chased off 6 or 7 Blenheims, which attempted to attack the 4th transport group at 1650.

3. Eastern Front:

Lively air activity on all Army fronts on 7 and 8 Mar.

For reports of reconnaissance in the Black Sea and over Murmansk see daily situation reports.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, British air reconnaissance on the morning of 8 Mar. located the 4th transport group en route to Tripoli, as well as the returning 3rd transport group which had left Tripoli on 7 Mar., in the area north of Cape Misurata.

No action by British naval forces was detected, and there evidently was none. Also there was no particular air activity.

No sighting or radio intercept reports were received for the central and eastern Mediterranean.

According to photographic reconnaissance on 8 Mar., 17 steamers, 3 tankers, and 4 passenger vessels, together approximately 180,000 GRT, and 1 monitor, as well as 1 small naval vessel, were in Suez. 15 steamers, 4 tankers, and 2 passenger ships, a total of approximately 80,000 GRT were in Port Taufiq. 25 steamers, 3 tankers, and 3 passenger ships totalling approximately 160,000 GRT were in Port Said. 3 steamers, 6 barges, and 4 tugs with barges in tow were southbound in the Canal, and 3 tugs with a few barges in tow were northbound. At point Km 154.1 there is one sunken steamer.

According to an unconfirmed Italian report, 2 large British vessels coming from U.S. shipyards are expected to arrive in Egypt the first part of April. British military circles are expecting the Axis to attack Malta in the near future. The defense installations of the island are being reinforced feverishly. According to a supposedly reliable source, there were 11 submarines of the U class in the Malta submarine flotilla on 3 Feb.

2. Situation Italy:

Enemy planes attacked Tripoli between 0055 and 0201 on 8 Mar. without causing damage of military importance.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The 4th transport group arrived undamaged in Tripoli at 1800.

Steamer MANARE was damaged by an aerial torpedo in the vicinity of Pantellaria, and put into Pantellaria. She will return to Trapani. 6 torpedo planes unsuccessfully attacked empty steamers of the 3rd transport group at 1700. The 4 vessels were proceeding on the east route to Italy under escort of forces of the 4th transport group.

Steamers WACHTFELS and MONVISO left Tripoli to return on the west route, each escorted by 1 destroyer and 1 torpedo boat with search gear; steamer MENANDO departed to return along the coast. The ships are heading for Naples and Palermo.

Naval barges, 1 torpedo boat, and 1 ferry proceeded along the coast without special incidents.

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4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

During the night of 8 Mar. a few enemy planes unsuccessfully attacked the airfields at Tatoi and Kalamaki. It is being investigated whether mines were dropped.

The mine operation of the BARLETTA from Candia had to be postponed because of damage to the ship.

Transports proceeded according to plan without special incidents.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The 11th Army High Command reported that 1 Russian submarine fired on the coast south of Sudak on 8 Mar. and that one submarine torpedo was fired in the harbor of Yalta on the same day, but did not explode. In the night of 7 Mar. enemy planes again attacked Saki.

On 9 Mar. air reconnaissance sighted many ships leaving Sevastopol, as well as renewed supply shipments to Sevastopol and Kerch.

No naval forces were sighted.

Own Situation:

One of our planes attacked and supposedly destroyed a Russian submarine south of the Crimea on 8 Mar.

IX. Situation East Asia

The Japanese occupied Rangoon on 8 Mar.

The 98,000 enemy troops on Java surrendered unconditionally at 1500 on 9 Mar.

According to British reports, a considerable number of Japanese troops landed in New Guinea (Salamaua and Leigh).

The surprisingly swift success against the considerable number of enemy forces in Java indicates that the will to resist of the Empire troops and their allies is already greatly weakened. The only place where the Japanese have encountered serious resistance is Luzon.

On 5 Mar. the Japanese Headquarters released the first detailed report about the use of the special submarines at Pearl Harbor. Since the flotilla did not return from this mission, either as the result of enemy defenses or because the vessels destroyed themselves, its part in the successes cannot be determined in detail. It is certain, however, that these submarines achieved notable success, and caused great confusion in the enemy harbor.

X. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

The penetration points north of Taganrog were mopped up in a counterattack. Enemy attacks west of Slavyansk and north of Losovaya were unsuccessful.

The enemy forces which had broken through west of Balakleya were attacked by dive bombers. Reserves are being brought up. Strong enemy pressure is continuing east of Kharkov. The battle west of Volchansk has not yet been concluded.

Central Army Group:

Heavy fighting is going on near Vesnini and in the Sukhinichi area. It was possible to repulse enemy attacks in some sectors of the 4th and 9th Armies and the 3rd Panzer Army. Our forces advancing from Byeloi threw the enemy back to the north.

Northern Army Group:

Fighting continues unabated in the vicinity of Kholm, at Molvotitsy, and west of the Polovei valley and in the Pola valley. Northwest of Soltsy several tanks were able to penetrate our lines.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Forces of the Maselskaya group are being regrouped south of Seg Lake.

3. North Africa:

Stronger enemy scouting activity in the areas west-southwest of Tmimi and south of Mechili.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

The Riom trial is satisfying neither the Vichy government nor the French people nor the Axis powers. The Axis is interested only in a discussion of the war guilt, while the French only lament the unfortunate reaction caused within the country as well as abroad by the causes of the military defeat disclosed in the military investigation. It is not at all impossible that the trial will gradually peter out unless it is officially quashed.

Great Britain:

The conferences designed to clarify British-Russian relations still do not seem to have brought about a final agreement; Great Britain declares that she is unable at this time already to recognize Russia's territorial demands and is furthermore incapable of doing so without Washington's consent.

South Africa:

Malan, the leader of the Boer nationalists, demanded in Parliament on 3 Mar. that the South African Union withdraw from the war. He stated that the Allies cannot win, and that South Africa is threatened by the Japanese only as long as it remains on the side of the Allies.

Australia:

According to a report from the Transocean News Agency, the Australians have founded a separatist movement in Shanghai for the purpose of declaring Australia's independence at once, withdrawing from the war, and entering into separate peace negotiations with Japan.

Portugal:

Concern about the domestic situation of the country continues to exist. Salazar's influence with the armed forces has declined as the result of sending strong and the very best army units for the protection of the islands and colonies; British propaganda, however, is sparing neither effort nor money.

Turkey:

Oshima, the Japanese ambassador to Berlin, is expected to arrive in the near future in Ankara, together with the Turkish ambassador to Berlin. In this connection there is talk about a diplomatic offensive of the Axis simultaneous with the military spring offensive.

Among those arrested in the attempt on the life of Von Papen is an attache of the Russian Embassy.

U.S.A.:

The government is planning to relax the law of 1912 which excludes Asiatics, evidently as a gesture toward those people of Asia who are enemies of Japan.

Brazil:

Vargas' influence is said to be on the decline, and leadership is being taken over more and more by the pro-American foreign minister, Aranha.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Naval Communications Division reports that according to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, the Italians are familiar with radar decoy balloons (Nebelbold), since some of them have been installed in Italian shipyards. Therefore the Italian navy will have to be informed officially thereof at once. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees, but desires that the necessity of keeping it a secret should be stressed; he further agrees that the Japanese also should no longer be kept in ignorance of the device.

II. The Chief, Naval Construction Division reports on the repairs of the GNEISENAU. There are 5 alternatives:

a. Doing only structural repairs in Kiel, and not replacing turret A. This would take 9 months.

b. Doing the same thing in Gdynia. This would take 12 months.

c. Replacing turret A by a 38 cm. turret. This would take until 1 Aug. 1943.

d. Replacing turret A by a 28 cm. turret, and simultaneously lengthening the bow by 12 meters. (The draft would thereby be decreased by 1/2 meter, and the speed increased by 1/2 knot.) This would take until 15 Nov. 1943.

e. Replacing all turrets by 38 cm. turrets, and simultaneously lengthening the bow. This would take until 1 Feb. 1944.

Transfer of 300 to 500 shipyard workers from Kiel to Gdynia would mean discontinuing construction of 3 new submarines; however this has to be done anyhow because of raw material shortage.

The Naval Staff Operations Division is naturally interested in the quickest possible repair, and would prefer suggestion b., unless the time required for suggestion d. could be shortened.

The Chief, Naval Staff will ask the Fuehrer to make a decision at the conference on 12 Mar. He will make use of this opportunity to urge that construction of the aircraft carrier and the necessary planes be continued.

Preparations for transferring the ship to Gdynia should be begun, unless they are already under way.

Special Items

I. With regard to the Garmisch conference, the Chief, Naval Staff advises Admiral Riccardi that it is unfortunately impossible to transfer additional motor mine sweepers to the Mediterranean, since only

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small and medium vessels can be considered for this purpose, but these are available only in limited numbers, and are either in the Mediterranean already, or are being transferred to the Black Sea.

Admiral Riccardi is also informed that due to the transfer of the Brest ships a certain amount of fuel oil has become available, and therefore it will be possible to make one more delivery of 20,000 tons of fuel oil to the Italian navy in March 1942.

II. The brief report of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships to Group North (copies to Naval Staff, Fleet, Commanding Admiral, Norway) about the operation of 6 to 9 Mar. has been received:

Some of the escorts during departure were late because of delayed orders.

Because of the time element the destroyers did not refuel during the night, and it was planned to do so either in Tromsøe or during the night of 7 Mar.

Beginning at 1930 on 7 Mar. until dark a reconnaissance sweep was made to the north-northwest. Because of the weather no ship planes participated. At 1730 the RRR signal of the Russian steamer IMORA, which was sunk by the IHN, was intercepted. The OU message (operation urgent) from Cleethorpes which was intercepted by ship's radio was believed to be connected with the RRR signal of the IMORA.

An attempt to refuel the destroyers at sea involved too much time because of the weather and ice formation. Since it was planned to continue operating south of Bear Island on 8 Mar., the IHN was sent to Harstad to refuel. It was planned to refuel the SCHOEMANN and the Z "25" at dawn.

The lack of air reconnaissance is being felt very strongly. Nevertheless it was decided to continue the operation under the assumption that Group North would interfere in time if the enemy situation should prove doubtful. Three code signals were sent but their receipt was not confirmed.

On 8 Mar. because of the weather the destroyers were no longer able to reconnoiter, and were therefore ordered to Tromsøe. They took along a message to Group North that it was planned to break off the search on the evening of 8 Mar., and return to Trondheim. The reasons given were inadequate air reconnaissance, uncertain enemy situation, and unfavorable snow and fog situation, which would make it possible to attack the ship by surprise.

The ship searched the convoy route at a speed of 6 to 8 knots until evening. Visibility changed constantly. Search in the area south and southwest of the island proved futile. A report received from Group North about the assumed location of the convoy on 9 Mar. was interpreted as meaning that the search should be continued on 9 Mar. Misgivings on account of the unclear enemy situation and the entirely inadequate air reconnaissance were therefore put aside, since it was hoped that Group North had a better view of the situation and that visibility was improved. Group North was informed by code signal that the operation was being continued, and the destroyers were recalled.

At 1930 a message was received from Group North that it was assumed that the ship was turning back; at 2000 another message was received stating that the operation might be continued on 9 Mar. at the discretion of the commanding officer. Since the decision thus rested exclusively with the

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Commanding Admiral, Battleships, it was decided to break off the operation for the following reasons:

a. Entirely unclear enemy situation, since the enemy is probably aware that the TIRPITZ is at sea; the RRR signal of the Russian steamer; the OU message from Cleethorpes; and the lack of information about Scapa.

b. Absence of adequate air reconnaissance in the operations or the possible approach area of an enemy force.

c. Continuing bad weather.

d. Insufficient escort.

The code signal to turn back was received too late by the Tromsøe destroyers. During the night the ship proceeded to the rendezvous point designated for 1800 on 9 Mar. Beginning at 0800 on 9 Mar., enemy planes were sighted astern. They were expertly handled wheeled planes, indicating that a carrier and presumably heavy enemy forces were in the vicinity. It was decided to withdraw into the Vest Fjord. The IHN joined the TIRPITZ via the Straumen.

An aerial torpedo attack at 1020 is reported. Purely by good luck the TIRPITZ, escorted by only one destroyer, was able to outmaneuver all torpedoes, some of which missed her by a few meters or passed under the ship. 3 planes were shot down by light antiaircraft guns. The lack of quadruple gun mounts was evident. Volume of fire inadequate to ward off a mass attack.

West of the Straumen a submarine was located, and 2 torpedoes were evaded. Previously an urgent enemy radiogram to a submarine was intercepted. The ship entered the Vest Fjord. It was planned to proceed to Trondheim very soon, since Narvik is a still less adequate base than Trondheim, and there is greater danger from aircraft carriers because of the absence of fighter cover.

The overall impression created is that it is unprofitable and risky for one ship to operate without adequate air reconnaissance in waters frequented by the enemy. Furthermore, continuous information on the enemy situation, including reports on Scapa Flow and the Kola Bases, as well as sufficient bomber and fighter forces, are necessary prerequisites for operations in the northern area, where the enemy is at present superior.

An examination has been requested of Group North's order with regard to engaging an enemy of equal strength in order to carry out the main mission. Engagement with an enemy of equal strength, as for example a ship of the KING GEORGE V class, means an all-out battle, and would probably result in damages which would endanger the return voyage and might end in disaster, since the enemy can quickly bring up additional forces. Therefore the possibility of any extended operations in the northern area is questionable.

The Commanding Admiral, Battleships reports subsequently that a fourth plane was probably destroyed by one of the planes of the TIRPITZ.

The Naval Staff expects Group North to comment on this report, in which a certain amount of criticism of Group North's orders can be sensed; therefore the Naval Staff withholds its opinion for the time being. It wishes to point out already, however, that there is no doubt that

the operation in itself was justified and necessary. The heavy forces were transferred to the north area for the purpose of preventing an enemy landing and of disrupting enemy supply shipments to Russia. An operation against a convoy consisting of 15 steamers is within the scope of this task. If the heavy ships remain in the harbors entirely, they will very soon cease to be a threat to the enemy; in such a case the transfer of the ships to Norway, which was accomplished at considerable risk, would not have been worth while.

It remains to be seen whether all conditions necessary to justify the given operation prevailed. Only from this point of view can an investigation into this first and unsuccessful operation against PQ convoys be permitted.

Situation 10 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

According to Reuter Admiral Stark has been appointed commander of the U.S. naval forces in European waters. He will replace Vice Admiral Ghormley in London. The Commander in Chief of the U.S. Fleet, Admiral King, will take over Stark's duties as Chief of Fleet Operations, in addition to his present assignment.

No other reports have been received.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our ships in foreign waters.

Radiogram 1044 contains sailing orders for the OSORNO. Radiogram 1505 contains changes in the radio regulations for the TANNENFELS. Information on the enemy situation (general) was sent by Radiograms 1543 and 2012.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence intercepted reports by British motor gunboats and unidentified vessels east of Cromer about sighting 4 German PT boats between 0136 and 0330.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

On 9 Mar. about 20 British planes circled over the coast 70 miles south of Brest. No bombs were dropped. On 10 Mar. one Sunderland plane attacked a group of vessels including minesweeper M "1601" on

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route "Uhunest" between 0200 and 0400. The plane used floating flares which burned for 18 to 20 minutes. No damage was caused.

The ELSA ESSBERGER arrived at Bordeaux at 1700. Since the two last steamers carrying part of her cargo have arrived in the Gironde, the total cargo can be considered safe. Thus the following items have arrived: 30,000 bales of rubber, 200 cases of tea, 8,000 automobile tires, 800 tons of peanuts, 1,000 bales of hemp, 800 barrels of tallow, 3,000 barrels of oil, coconuts, soya, walnut, and wood oil. 200 cases of leather shoes, 1,000 bales of shoe sole leather, 400 sacks of coffee, 100 tons of ores and 800 (tons? Tr.N.) egg products. The ship and her engine are in good condition.

Channel Coast:

During an enemy air attack on Le Havre the night of 8 Mar., one salvaged and dismantled floating crane was sunk in addition to the tug PROTOS. Other damage was slight.

The following flotillas carried out operations during the night of 9 Mar.: the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla operated against convoys off Lowestoft. The 4th PT Boat Flotilla operated on the Dungeness convoy route and escorted German convoys. The 2nd PT Boat Flotilla sighted nothing and had nothing special to report. For brief report see Telegram 1910. The 4th PT Boat Flotilla was fired on by German patrol vessels off Gris Nez without having been asked to give a recognition signal. PT Boat S "48" received 4 hits, but no one was injured. While acting as remote escort for our convoys, the flotilla was twice fired upon unsuccessfully by heavy British coastal artillery. For brief report see Telegram 1300.

While escorting a large German convoy the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla had an encounter at 0345 with enemy gunboats which were lying half a mile off the coast of Gris Nez. German coastal batteries greatly endangered our vessels and definitely scored 3.7 and 2 cm. hits on motor minesweepers R "164" and "165". No one was injured. For brief report see Telegram 1920.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Nothing special to report.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

At 1430 air reconnaissance located an enemy force consisting of 13 vessels under heavy fighter cover on a 90° course in quadrant AE 9661 (40 miles east of the Faroes). The ships were identified as 1 battleship, 3 heavy cruisers, probably 1 aircraft carrier, and destroyers, but no transports.

The radio intercept service did not detect these forces.

According to an intelligence report, an Anglo-American landing is to be expected on 26 Mar. simultaneously at 2 points in Norway: in the

Trondheim area; and in northern Norway in the area through which the 3 Finnish highways to Petsamo, Kirkenes, and Karasjok pass. (See Telegram 1415.)

Own Situation:

On the evening of 9 Mar. the Commanding Admiral, Battleships arrived in Narvik on the TIRPITZ, together with 3 destroyers and 2 torpedo boats. For brief report of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, see Special Items, II.

Due to failure of a forced-draught fan the speed of the TIRPITZ is reduced for 4 days to 28 knots continuous speed. (See Telegram 0524.)

See Telegram 0518 for the request of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships that four 2 cm. 4-barreled guns be installed at once at turrets B and C and at the two forward 15 cm. turrets, in view of the experiences during the air attack on 9 Mar.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division will handle the matter. Group North will call the attention of the 5th Air Force to the long time it took for the air reconnaissance reports of 9 Mar. and 0453 on 10 Mar. The Group will send a staff officer to the 5th Air Force on 20 Mar. to clarify the matter and to see what steps can be taken to rectify the situation. For copy of telegram see 1/Skl 5694/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA, in files "PQ 12".

Without a doubt the long time required for air reconnaissance reports to get through is the main reason why neither Group North nor the Commanding Admiral, Battleships had a clear picture of the enemy situation in time. The Group did not receive the decisive report that an enemy carrier with 3 heavy and 1 light cruisers was sighted at 1115 until 1839, in other words after more than 7 hours.

It is of vital importance for all naval operations that this problem of communications between air and naval forces be solved. The Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division will have to give his full attention to this task.

In view of the enemy situation, the Commanding Admiral, Battleships has ordered 3-hour readiness for the naval forces at Narvik, beginning at 2117.

In accordance with the directive of the Chief, Naval Staff, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines has appointed Lt. Herbert Schultze Submarine Staff Officer to Group North; until now he was commander of the 3rd Submarine Flotilla.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

According to a report from the consulate, captains and crews have been on the Norwegian ships in Goeteborg since 1 Mar.

2. Own Situation:

Icebreaker and transport service without particular incidents.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence intercepted an SSS report from the British radio station at Santa Lucia about a submarine attack at the harbor entrance of Port Castries on the ships lying there; also a message from the British motor ship ORARI concerning sighting a submarine 250 miles east of Martinique.

There was livelier reconnaissance in the rendezvous area. A submarine sighting report by a plane was intercepted from along the east coast of Iceland (65° 28' N, 13° 10' W).

On 8 Mar. Spanish fishing steamers reported a convoy of loaded steamers on westerly course between Cape San Vincent and Cape Santa Maria. A group of 4 steamers, one of them 10,000 GRT, passed Santa Isabel on 7 Mar., evidently en route from Duala to Lagos.

The U.S. Navy Department confirms the torpedoing of the Brazilian steamer ARABUTAN (7,874 GRT). According to press reports, the TAURUS was sunk in the Atlantic.

2. Own Situation:

Since it may be assumed that the enemy forces reported in the northern North Sea will return to Scotch harbors as soon as it becomes known that the force of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships has put into a Norwegian port, Group North believes it advisable to station the Iceland submarines preferably in the area of the Orkneys, Faroes, and Shetlands. For the corresponding advice of the Group to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, see Telegram 1658 (in files "PQ 12").

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines therefore orders the submarines stationed west of northern Scotland to take up positions as follows: submarine U "569" in quadrant AE 99; U "553" in quadrant AF 77 and 78; U "135" in quadrant AE 93 is also instructed to be on the lookout for the enemy.

Numerous sinkings have been reported by the submarines operating along the American coast. Submarine U "161" (Lt. Achilles) reports on an attack on the inner harbor of Port Castries (Santa Lucia). The 2 steamers of 8,000 and 5,000 GRT which were lying at the pier and were hit probably sank. The submarine also sank a munitions steamer of 6,000 GRT off Santa Lucia on 7 Mar.

Submarine U "126" reports on conditions in the Windward Passage.

For details and additional information see supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The submarines in the north Norwegian area are disposed as follows:

Kirkenes:	U "436", "456", "585", "454", "589", "435"
Narvik:	U "377", "403"
Trondheim:	U "405", "586"
Bergen:	U "591", "592"

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8 submarines are stationed in the area of northern Scotland and Iceland. These are U "87", "553", "753", "135", "569", "213", "701", and "593". This makes a total of 20 submarines.

For present positions and operations areas see supplementary situation report.

In reply to the Naval Staff's inquiry (see War Diary 6 Mar.) the Commander, Submarines, Italy states that there are no particular reasons applying only to the Mediterranean area which are responsible for the unfortunate ratio between submarines at sea and those in repair, aside from the tempo of the Italian shipyards, which is 10 to 15% slower than that of German shipyards. A relatively large number of submarines with considerable damage have had to undergo lengthy repairs or have been in need of overhaul. Certain delays have been caused by supply difficulties. For details see Telegram 1620.

Since the Commander, Submarines, Italy is doing everything possible to improve the situation, the Naval Staff does not need to take any steps.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

For reconnaissance activity of the 5th Air Force in the northern North Sea, see Enemy Situation, Norway.

A 2,000 GRT steamer was sunk north of the Shetlands.

7 Ju 88's, 6 He 111's, and 4 He 115's unsuccessfully attacked enemy forces.

Very heavy bombs were dropped on the Sumburgh airfield with good results.

Enemy planes during the night of 10 Mar. inflicted some damage in the Rhenish-Westphalian industrial area. Enemy planes flew over northern France and Belgium.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Our planes continued to attack Malta, as well as airfields in the Cyrenaica and in the Alexandria area.

The attack on Alexandria on 4 Mar. is said to have caused considerable damage and to have been the most effective attack in the Suez area so far.

3. Eastern Front:

The 4th Air Force reports from the Black Sea unsuccessful aerial attacks on Sevastopol and Novorossisk. Reconnaissance operations were carried out.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

There was no change in the naval situation or in the ships in the harbors of Gibraltar, Malta, and Alexandria.

According to a reliable French source (20 Feb.) the QUEEN ELIZABETH was seriously damaged; the VALIANT will be repaired within 4 weeks to such an extent that she will be transferred to another harbor.

2. Own Situation:

The Naval Staff confirms the telephone message from the German Naval Command, Italy that the most essential preparations for PT boat operations can be made in Suda within a few days, but in North African harbors cannot be finished in less than 2 or 3 weeks; the Naval Staff agrees with the German Naval Command, Italy that PT boats are to be transferred to Suda only after preparations in North Africa have progressed to such an extent that PT boats can provisionally operate there. It is expected that preparations will continue to be made with greatest dispatch. (See Telegram 1818.)

3. Situation Italy:

Enemy planes attacked Benghazi without inflicting damage. Presumably they dropped mines.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The Italian cruiser force is returning together with the 3rd transport group according to plan.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Nothing special to report.

6. Situation France:

The Naval Staff has informed the German Armistice Commission, France that it is out of the question that a German submarine sank the French steamer P.L.M.20 at Sousse on 1 Mar. The Naval Staff believes that there is no sense in permitting French convoys unless the escort forces are permitted to defend themselves against submarine attacks. The German Naval Command, Italy has been asked to persuade the Italians to take a similar stand. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

VIII. Situation East Asia1. Enemy Situation:

News analysis no. 13/42 of the Naval Staff Intelligence Division, Foreign Navies Branch contains information on the Australian naval and air base at Port Darwin.

According to the U.S. Navy Department, in the week of 6 Mar. U.S. submarines operating in East Asiatic waters sank 1 Japanese destroyer leader and 1 naval tanker, and scored 1 or 2 torpedo hits on 1 air-craft carrier and 3 cruisers, in addition to successes earlier reported.

2. Situation Japan:

Headquarters announced a surprise attack of the naval air force on Pearl Harbor during the night of 4 Mar. Between 1 and 9 Mar. Japanese fleet forces sank 52 ships totalling 210,000 GRT.

IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

Enemy attacks north of Taganrog were smashed. In the Slavyansk area heavy fighting is raging around Cherkeskaya.

At the 6th Army 1 panzer division annihilated the enemy forces which had advanced across the Donets toward Liman. Fierce fighting is in progress at the point of penetration at Volchansk.

Central Army Group:

Enemy forces have penetrated our lines south of Sukhinichi; a counterattack is in progress. West of this area several attacks were repulsed.

Blizzards and snowdrifts badly hampered operations in the sector of the 4th Army.

Northern Army Group:

German armored forces advanced in the Lovat valley to the south. The enemy is exerting strong pressure on our withdrawn positions in the Pola and the Polomyet River valleys. South of Lyuban enemy forces were mopped up. 5 enemy tanks succeeded in breaking through our lines southeast of Maluksa.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Some local combat activity.

3. North Africa:

No reports have come in.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

According to Reuter the French government consented to keep the U.S. government informed about the movements of French warships under the condition that the U.S. continue shipping food and other supplies to North Africa. Since these shipments were discontinued, France does not consider herself bound to the agreement. In this connection Reuter is of the opinion that the reason the French warships were sent from Dakar to Madagascar is because Vichy is determined that Madagascar should not become a Japanese base.

This statement by Reuter may be intended to prepare the way for a British or American operation against Madagascar.

Welles has stated that the U.S. stopped deliveries to North Africa because Vichy's replies to the U.S. requests for information were unsatisfactory.

Great Britain:

Foreign Minister Eden spoke in the House of Commons about alleged inhuman treatment of prisoners of war and internees by the Japanese. He said that Japan has refused the services of the Red Cross.

A survey by the Chancellor of the Exchequer shows that Great Britain spent 5,000,000 pounds sterling per day in 1940 for war purposes, 10,500,000 pounds per day in 1941, and 12,500,000 pounds per day in 1942. Collections of money to build new ships and the national savings drive are progressing satisfactorily. A member of the Labour Party stated during the discussion that it does not make sense to spend millions to build warships when no satisfactory explanation has as yet been given about the sinking of the British battleships at Malaya.

According to a report from a diplomatic source, the British have set up a new army in Iran and Iraq against unexpected German attacks via the Caucasus. A British General Staff commission sent to Tiflis and a Russian commission sent to Bagdad have been withdrawn because of differences of opinion. The difficulties about the division of spheres of influence in Iran continue. The British would like to establish themselves in Baku and set up a front there for the defense of Iran and Iraq, but the Russians do not want to permit this.

In a U.S. magazine Cripps demands an offensive to relieve the Russians, since it is not sufficient to help them only with war materiel. Russia would probably like to establish the frontier of June 1941, while the present territories which Russia believes necessary for her security are to be incorporated as autonomous republics. Stalin plans to defeat Germany completely and to take Berlin. Otherwise Cripps repeats Stalin's assurances that the Russians do not intend to interfere with the domestic affairs of other countries, and that also in Germany they are striving only to annihilate the Nazi regime.

India:

The main difficulty in the Indian problem seems to be that the Mohammedans refuse categorically to accept any arrangement which would put the

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government of India in the hands of the Hindus. They demand therefore that the northwestern provinces, which are predominantly Mohammedan, should be excepted from the general plan and treated separately. They have made it known in London that they would prefer delaying a decision in the Indian question rather than getting an unsatisfactory decision at once. Consequently the position of the Indian Minister Amery has been strengthened, and even leaders of the Labour Party are tending to delay a decision until after the war. However, Cripps and Attlee supposedly have threatened to resign if this should be the case.

Switzerland:

The progress of the war in the East has caused a noteworthy change in opinion among many of the Swiss people in favor of Germany's mission to save Europe from Bolshevism. This is borne out by the Swiss participation in the wool collection drive, which has to be done anonymously considering the circumstances. Many people have even voiced the opinion that Switzerland should enter the war as a defense against Bolshevism. British prestige has suffered greatly in Switzerland.

Portugal:

The transport sent to Timor has been ordered to proceed to Goa. Salazar refused London's offer to supply the transport in Australia.

Hungary:

Bardossy's resignation can be explained by his negative attitude concerning the selection of the deputy of the regent. Kallay has been asked to form a new government, and will also fill the post of foreign minister for the time being. The other ministers are the same as before. The fact that the Honved minister is unchanged proves that there will be no change in the military policy of the country.

Liberia:

The Firestone airfield and a base for hydroplanes at Cape Mount are to be completed within 2 months. The Pan-American Airways has received permission to cede its rights to the United States, but not to other nations.

Japan:

On the occasion of the anniversary of the battle of Mukden, General Sato stated that now is the time to finish off Great Britain in cooperation with Germany and Italy, who will occupy Suez and Gibraltar in the near future. Japan is prepared for every eventuality in the north. Great Britain and the U.S. will have no opportunity to recover from their losses in the southwest Pacific, because Germany and Italy are already threatening to advance to Suez and further to the southeast, in order to establish a junction with Japan via the Indian Ocean.

U.S.A.:

According to a press report, the decision to start the offensive against the Axis powers was reached during a conference at the White House on 9 Mar., and the date was set. Litvinov, who is said to have participated in the conference, repeated the urgent request of the Russian government that a second front be opened before spring. A first step is the organization of a large U.S. fleet in European waters. The appointment of Admiral Stark is interpreted in London as indicating that there will be greater activity in the northern Atlantic, and that combined naval and

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land operations against Germany are being prepared. The U.S. War Department has taken steps to put younger officers on the General Staff, and to give the air forces greater representation. Reuter states that the U.S. chartered the Italian steamer MONTE GRANDE and the German steamer WINDHUK from Brazil.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports in connection with the Naval Staff's suggestion about submarine operations in the Iceland-Hebrides area and in the Arctic Ocean (see War Diary 9 Mar., Submarine Warfare).

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

II. The possibility of operations by the TIRPITZ is discussed in view of the outcome of the operation against convoy PQ 12. The Chief of Staff, Naval Staff repeats the basic principles laid down in War Diary, 10 Mar., Special Items II. The Chief, Naval Staff points out the limitations of operations by heavy ships in the Arctic Ocean as a result of inadequate air support. The lack of an aircraft carrier is a real handicap. The Chief, Naval Staff further believes that the TIRPITZ should not remain in Narvik any length of time because of the great danger from planes and because she might be blocked in. The Naval Staff is ordered to arrange for an early transfer to Trondheim, and to order as many submarines as possible to operate against British forces in the area off the northern coast of Norway. It is pointed out to the Air Force that it is very important to combat enemy aircraft carriers in that area. The Chief, Naval Staff will also inform the Commanding Admiral, Group North of his views by telephone.

III. The final date when the GNEISENAU will be ready for transfer to Gdynia cannot be set until 18 Mar. Provisional caulking of the bow will probably be completed by 24 Mar.

IV. Group North reports that cruiser HIPPER cannot be transferred prior to 16 Mar.

Situation 11 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

According to the radio intercept service for the first time it is evident that convoys are being assembled on the coast of Brazil. Convoys seem to proceed from Trinidad as far as the latitude of Pernambuco, from which point the ships proceed separately.

The steamer QUEEN MARY had orders to leave Rio on 8 Mar., and was to proceed to Capetown along approximately 34° S via the Gough Islands. The fact that she was ordered to make a wide detour to the south is noteworthy. Escort is provided by planes, 4 destroyers, and 4 auxiliary cruisers. Cruising speed: 21 knots.

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Auxiliary cruiser CILICIA arrived in Montevideo on 9 Mar. Auxiliary cruiser BULOLO was again located in her last patrol area between 20° and 30° S, 30° and 40° W, where she seems to be taking turns with the BIRMINGHAM. Ships located in the South Atlantic show that traffic in that area is widely scattered.

14 transports with British troops arrived in Capetown between 9 and 15 Feb. U.S. cruiser INDIANAPOLIS arrived in Simonstown on 13 Feb. The Italians report that a large number of ships are being assembled in South African harbors and they assume that these indicate preparations for an attack on Madagascar. This assumption is not necessarily correct, since these ships may belong to convoys to the Middle East. However, the Italian assumption may be correct.

Indian Ocean:

According to press reports, the first large shipment of Americans has arrived in Eritrea for the purpose of expanding the harbor as a U.S. base.

2. Own Situation:

At 0000 on 12 Mar. the Naval Staff will take over the command of the TANNENFELS. Radiogram 1725 informs the ship to this effect.

Radiogram 1902 contains sailing orders for the TANNENFELS beginning at 30° W.

The following information is sent to the Naval Attache, Tokyo in reply to the Japanese inquiry concerning operation "Suedsee" (northeast passage): The Naval Staff is planning to go through with the operation, but for technical reasons the operation will have to be postponed until summer 1943. Preparations are continuing. At the proper time the opinion of the Japanese will be welcome.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

A submarine reported sighting smoke at 1715 in quadrant BE 7818 and destroyers in quadrant BE 7841, probably part of convoy OS 22, on course 200°, speed 8 knots.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

Channel Coast:

During the night of 10 Mar. the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla operated against a southbound convoy. One steamer of 3,000 and one steamer of 2,000 GRT were sunk by torpedo. Numerous motor gun boats and 2 destroyers of the HUNT class participated in the defense. For brief report see Telegram 1400.

See Telegram 1656 for the agreement between the General of the Air

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Force attached to the Commander in Chief, Navy, Group West, and the 3rd Air Force concerning air cover during the transfer of catapult ship SCHWABENLAND to Bremerhaven.

Air Situation:

The Naval Staff is permitting the use of moored aerial mines off the coast of Cornwall as requested by the Air Force; this area is considered particularly promising.

For copy of the communication to the Commander in Chief, Air, Group West, and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines see 1/Skl 4849/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. V.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Ship "10" and her escort arrived in Flushing from Heligoland according to plan.

Enemy planes were active over Rotterdam and caused some damage.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, 25 steamers totalling approximately 100,000 GRT were in Archangel, and 25 steamers totalling approximately 60,000 GRT were in Molotovsk. There was some air activity in the Bergen and Faroes area.

Own Situation:

At 1320 submarine U "377" reported her position in quadrant AB 6991. Fortunately the submarine is undamaged.

The reply to the Naval Staff's inquiry concerning submarine U "377" (see War Diary 8 Mar.) indicates that the Navy is not at fault, and the Chief of Staff of the 5th Air Force personally assured the Chief of Staff of the Commanding Admiral, Norway that the fault lay with the Air Force, which neglected to pass on information about the blocked area to the Air Force commanders. (See Telegram 1150.)

In connection with plans for mine operations near the Rybachi Peninsula, the Commanding Admiral, Norway reports the intention of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean to lengthen the "Bantos A" minefield. See 1/Skl 5764/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

The Naval Staff agrees with the Admiral, Arctic Ocean.

In support of the request of the 5th Air Force that the air forces in the Norwegian area be reinforced, Group North asks that the few torpedo planes available to the Commander in Chief, Air be concentrated in that area.

The Naval Staff considers it inadvisable to withdraw the few torpedo planes from the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and has asked the Naval

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Liaison Officer to inform the Commander in Chief, Air to this effect; the Commander in Chief, Air has been asked for his plans regarding the use of torpedo planes in Norway.

According to the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, the capacity of the naval shipyard at Trondheim depends very much on the use of the repair ship HUASCATAN. A torpedo shop, periscope shop, and communications equipment maintenance shop are available only on the HUASCATAN. 12 submarines and two high-pressure superheated steamships can be repaired simultaneously without the help of the repair ship only after the shipyard is fully completed. The machinery necessary for expanding the shipyard is supposed to be brought from the Kiel shipyard, but has not arrived as yet.

This justifies fully the request made by Group North (see War Diary, 8 Mar.).

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Ship "23" will transfer to Swinemuende as soon as she leaves the shipyard.

The SCHLESSEN and her convoy is making very slow progress, and is at present in the Gjedser Strait. The ice situation is causing great difficulties. This is causing considerable delay in bringing ships to the North Sea for transporting troops.

According to the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Antiaircraft Section, the enemy air attacks on Kiel the nights of 25 and 26 Feb. were no different from earlier attacks, either as regards the number of planes participating, or the method of attack. If anything, there were fewer planes. Only part of the attacking planes reached the city proper during both nights. Attack conditions, as always during the months of January and February, were especially favorable because of the strong contrast provided by the snow and the clear visibility. Conditions for defense were also not unfavorable.

The captains of the SCHARNHORST and the GNEISENAU are wrong in assuming that the antiaircraft defenses of Kiel are far less adequate than those of Brest. While Brest has a larger number of batteries (38 as compared to 33), the area to be defended is smaller at Kiel, and the guns are heavier. However there is a shortage of radar equipment in Kiel, as is the case in all bases defended by the Navy. A renewed request has been made for allocation of such equipment. The assertion of the Air Force that the Navy is to blame for the fact that the organization of the combined night fighter area has not been set up is incorrect. On the contrary, the delays have occurred in the tasks which are the responsibility of the Air Force. The Naval Shore Commander, West requested on 23 Feb. that combined night fighter training be instituted; however this could not be done since the night fighters in question had been sent to Norway until 27 Feb. in connection with the transfer of the PRINZ EUGEN and the SCHEER. Training was scheduled to begin on 1 Mar.

No smoke equipment was used at Kiel on purpose, because of the uncertain consequences in case the enemy should use large numbers of incendiary bombs in attacks on German cities. The available smoke screen detachments have been stationed at Aasen Fjord. In the meantime the motorized smoke screen detachment of the Air Force has been transferred to Kiel from Brest. It will take at least 3 weeks to set up the necessary equip-

ment. The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Antiaircraft Section is skeptical about the use of smoke screens in Kiel. It remains to be seen how it will work out. Whenever ships have to spend some time in the shipyard, the ammunition will have to be removed.

V. Merchant Shipping

Enemy shipping space (tonnage available as of 1 Jan. 1942; shipping requirements): for maritime shipping and purposes of warfare the enemy has 26,000,000 GRT at his disposal. At the present time he is using about 6,700,000 of these for naval and military operations. This is not sufficient for further operations, however, and the enemy will temporarily have to draw upon supply ships or use the approximately 3,200,000 GRT which will probably become available as the result of the disruption of imports to the U.S. from the Pacific and the Dutch East Indies.

Britain and the U.S. are building 7,300,000 GRT of new ships during 1942, and these will further ease the situation. It is planned to build approximately 8,800,000 GRT in 1943.

For details see report no. 5/42 of the foreign merchant shipping series of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Shipping Branch.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service the ILLUSTRIOUS was at sea in the Greenock area. A submarine warning was issued for the area approximately 110 miles west of the Hebrides.

According to an intelligence report from Portugal, a convoy consisting of 34 ships, among them 4 large passenger steamers and 3 tankers, accompanied by 3 destroyers, were sighted on 6 Mar. approximately 200 miles southeast of Sao Miguel (Azores) on northwesterly course, speed 10 knots. According to an Italian report, 3 British mine sweepers were in Ponta Delgada on 8 and 9 Mar. One large British ship is supposedly en route from the British Isles to Gibraltar.

An SSS signal was intercepted from the U.S. steamer PARISMINA (4,732 GRT) 180 miles north of Cape Hatteras. Another ship approximately 100 miles southeast of this cape also sent an SSS signal.

According to the radio intercept service, U.S. steamer TEXAN (7,005 GRT) and the British steamer DESTRO (3,335 GRT) were torpedoed southwest of the Windward Passage.

According to press reports, tanker GULF TRADE (6,776 GRT) and the Brazilian steamer CAYRU (5,252 GRT) were torpedoed off the Atlantic coast. The Brazilian steamer ARABUTAN sunk off Newport was formerly the CALRERA and the SWORDFISH.

2. Own Situation:

By order of the Chief, Naval Staff, the 8 submarines stationed

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in the Scotland-Iceland area were put under the operational command of Group North, effective at once, to operate against the enemy forces reported in the Arctic Ocean and to safeguard the movements of the TIRPITZ.

Submarine U "593" established contact with a convoy of 14 steamers and 5 destroyers in quadrant AM 2734 (west of the Hebrides). The submarine was located and forced off.

Submarine U "432" sighted smoke and 1 destroyer on a 2000 course in quadrant BE 7818, evidently a convoy with remote escort. She was unable to maintain contact, since she was on her return voyage because of lack of fuel.

Submarine U "162" did not find the OSORNO in quadrant CE 54, and she turned back as ordered.

Submarine U "94" reported sinking a 6,000 GRT steamer off the U.S. coast in quadrant CD 4498 on 7 Mar., and a 5,000 GRT steamer in quadrant CA 5489 on 11 Mar.

6 submarines are stationed in the Mediterranean off the Cyrenaica coast.

For details see supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

Available submarines on 1 Mar. 1942 (previous month's figures in parentheses)

a. Operational submarines:

Type VII B:	7		
VII C:	74		
VII D:	1		
IX B:	8		
IX C:	19		
and foreign submarines		Total:	111 (101)

b. Submarine Acceptance Command:

Type VII C:	34		
VII D:	3		
IX D:	2		
IX C:	12		
X B:	1		
XIV :	3	Total	54 (40)

c. In preparation and training for operations:

Type VII C:	36		
VII D:	2		
IX C:	10		
X B:	2	Total	50 (60)

d. Training submarines:

Type II :	40		
VII :	4		
VII B:	4		
VII C:	7		
IX :	2	Total	57 (57)

Grand Total	272	(258)
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e. The following submarines became ready for operations in February:

Type VII C:	6		
IX C:	6	Total:	12 (15)

f. The following submarines were commissioned in February:

Type VII C:	13		
IXD2:	1		
IX C:	2	Total:	16 (15)

g. Reported missing in February:

Type VII C: 2 (U "82" and U "581")

h. In March the following submarines will probably be commissioned:

Type VII C:	14		
IXD2:	2		
IX E:	4	Total:	20 (16)

Submarine mines:

With the introduction of the new rack mine type A the depths at which submarines cannot lay mines have been confined to from 30 to 35 meters. (Heretofore it was 30 to 50 meters.)

VII. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The attempt of the 5th Air Force to find the enemy force in the northern part of the North Sea was unsuccessful. East of Dundee a 3,000 GRT steamer was badly damaged by a bomb.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports that there are Spitfires at Malta again, evidently brought there from Gibraltar by task force H. Attacks on the Malta airfields continue.

Contact was made at 0850 off Derna with an enemy force of 4 cruisers, 6 destroyers, and 4 escort vessels, and was maintained the rest of the day. After 2 futile attacks, a third attack by 25 Ju 88's scored a direct hit on 1 cruiser according to reports available so far.

On 3 Mar. 3 enemy submarines were attacked from the air (off Veggio, off Taranto, and off Piraeus).

The Commander in Chief, Air sends the following communication to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South; although it is very important to attack the airfields on Malta, the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South is requested not to neglect attacking the harbor installations at Valletta, since this harbor is vital for the supply of all ships and the entire island.

3. Eastern Front:

No special reports have been received.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

According to Italian reports, the EAGLE and the ARGUS are scheduled to depart for the Mediterranean very soon with 70 planes.

Air reconnaissance over Malta at 0915 showed that 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer have left the harbor.

German air reconnaissance also located at 0850 a force consisting of 3 cruisers, 5 destroyers, 4 escort vessels, and 2 unidentified ships about 100 miles north of Varna on a 1100 course. Contact was maintained during the day until 1800. According to photo reconnaissance at 1800 the force consisted at that time of 4 cruisers, 6 destroyers, and 3 escort vessels. Since a force consisting of 3 cruisers and several destroyers had been sighted on 10 Mar. north of Tobruk on westerly course, it may be assumed that the small cruiser which left Malta met this force for transfer to the eastern Mediterranean. For air attacks on this force see Air Situation, Mediterranean Theater. Submarines were sighted east of Tripoli and southwest of Taranto. Radio intelligence intercepted a report from British planes about a freighter on northerly course south of Cape Bon (evidently a ship returning from Tripoli). Furthermore it was established that a British vessel off the North African coast evidently encountered an enemy plane or submarine at 2053.

2. Situation Italy:

The escort forces of the 4th transport group arrived in Taranto the evening of 10 Mar. The afternoon of 10 Mar. an enemy submarine was pursued by 2 Italian PT Boats off Cape Spartivento; they were supposedly successful.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The 4 empty steamers of the 3rd transport group arrived in their ports of destination the morning of 11 Mar. Steamer MANARA, which was torpedoed in 10 Mar. likewise reached the port of Palermo. According to an Italian report, steamer MONTVISO was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy submarines the morning of 10 Mar.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Transports proceeded according to plan without interference.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, there was lively ship traffic in Sevastopol. 5 or 6 steamers or transport vessels were seen entering and leaving. A cruiser which was outside the harbor with some merchant ships laid a protective smoke screen.

Own Situation:

On 12 Mar. Rumanian destroyers are supposed to meet tankers

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ALBARO and PRODOMOS, which are coming from the Bosphorus. Otherwise nothing to report.

IX. Situation East Asia

According to an official Japanese statement, U.S. cruiser MARBLEHEAD was sunk. The Military Attache at Bangkok reported that there are supply difficulties in the combat zone north of Rangoon because of bad roads.

Japanese losses published so far amount to 3,200 dead and 6,000 wounded. The Japanese army air force has lost 40% of its planes so far.

Mopping up operations on Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes are practically completed. The Japanese were able to advance so rapidly on Java because the enemy air forces were smashed so quickly and completely.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The enemy is resuming the offensive on the Sevastopol front. Attacks on the center of our front were repulsed. Heavy enemy concentrations on the northern part of the Feodosiya front were combatted.

Enemy attacks against the Von Kleist Army Group were repulsed north of Taganrog, west of Slavyansk, and east of Barvenkovo. Enemy pressure is continuing on the southern flank of the 6th Army at Orel. Enemy pressure was particularly noticeable at Volchansk, where 5 enemy divisions were brought up. A tank attack is in progress.

Central Army Group:

Unsuccessful enemy tank attacks took place south of Sukhinichi. Other enemy attacks on the highway northeast of Demenskoye and northwest of Yukhnov were repulsed. The supply route south of Byeloi has been blocked by the enemy. Blizzards and snow drifts are greatly interfering with the fighting.

Northern Army Group:

An enemy attack was repulsed southwest of Kholm and east of Molvotitsy. The attacks in the Pola and the Polomyet valleys are continuing. Also at Staraya Russa and at the positions along the railroad south of Maluksa enemy attacks were brought to a standstill.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

No special incidents.

3. North Africa:

Situation unchanged.

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Items of Political Importance:

France:

For a report from a diplomatic source about Franco-American relations see Political Review No. 60, paragraph 1.

According to the official German news agency (DNB) Vichy has denied all reports that negotiations are in progress between Japan and France about a possible combined defense of Madagascar.

Great Britain:

According to Churchill's talk on India (see Political Review No. 60, paragraph 2a), the British government has made decisions which go beyond that reached in August 1940 (dominion status for India depending on Indian internal harmony). These decisions will not be made known and Indian self-government will not be proclaimed until a member of the government has investigated on the spot whether a just and practical solution would be accepted. For this purpose Cripps is being sent to India. In the meantime the problem is not to be discussed publicly in Britain or in India.

The Food Minister announced new severe cuts.

Finland:

The legation reports that the U.S. has made new attempts to intimidate Finland, threatening to land U.S. troops in the north and to engage in armed conflict. While some importance is attached by the Finnish Foreign Ministry to the possibility of a landing in northern Europe, it is doubted that it will actually take place in view of the difficulties involved in transporting and supplying an army of 200,000 men. The whole thing may be a bluff to cause Germany to take far-reaching defense measures which would benefit other theaters and might lead to a German-Swedish conflict. This would be disastrous for Finland, since Marshal Mannerheim would then turn away from Germany and Finland would collapse.

U.S.A.:

In Roosevelt's message to Congress about the first year of Lend-Lease, the transport situation is pointed out as the most difficult problem. For details see Political Review No. 60, paragraph 4.

Brazil:

The government has ordered that all Brazilian ships en route to the U.S. turn back, and that no further ships be permitted to leave for that country.

It is expected that German property will be confiscated in the near future.

According to press reports, war with the Axis powers will be declared soon. All ships at sea have received orders to put into the nearest ports, and a state of siege has already been declared.

Liberia:

The U.S. has asked permission to land troops and war materiel to protect

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U.S. air bases in Liberia.

Japan:

According to Domei a spokesman of the information office stated that the fate of the Dutch East Indies is in store for Australia unless she changes her attitude. Australia's conduct will determine whether she will be treated like the Philippines and Malaya if and when a separate peace is negotiated with the approval of the Axis powers.

General Sato, spokesman for the Army, states that Japan is prepared for a long war of attrition. After the U.S. has completed rearming in about 2 or 3 years the Allies will take more decisive action, and it is not known whether the attack will be launched from the north or the south. After the war of attrition has gone on for some time, heavy fighting which will decide the war will ensue. Believing the present war unavoidable, Japan never used more than 40% of her forces and 20% of her industrial capacity for the war with China.

Special Items

I. Survey of the Situation in Norway by the Naval Staff:

The TIRPITZ set out on the operation in the Arctic Ocean when planes reported sighting a convoy near Jan Mayen (15 ships en route to Russia). The Naval Staff believes that in such cases it is absolutely necessary to have a task force available which can be sent out, so that the task of cutting off enemy supplies to Russia can be fulfilled, and enemy landings prevented.

The TIRPITZ did not intercept the convoy; the enemy force evidently changed course when the German planes were detected. In anticipation of an operation by the TIRPITZ, the enemy had sent out a heavy carrier task force. In spite of daring torpedo plane attacks, the enemy was unsuccessful, due to pure luck as well as to skillful maneuvering.

Conclusions: The operation shows our weakness in the northern area. The enemy reacts to every German thrust by sending out strong task forces, particularly aircraft carriers, which must be considered the most dangerous opponents of our heavy ships. It is indicative of our extremely weak defenses that the enemy dares to approach the coastal waters in the northern area, without being annihilated by the German Air Force. Our escort forces are so few (destroyers and torpedo boats) that our ships are always hard pressed during air attacks and other encounters.

Other observations about the conduct of the enemy: The enemy is very skillful: enemy radio traffic gives no indication of operations; enemy planes are expert at maintaining contact; ruthless, daring attacks by torpedo planes; enemy submarine tactics are correct; absolute control over the commitment of enemy forces, as well as flexible guidance of convoys (they change course as soon as sighted); excellent co-operation between enemy naval and air forces during operations.

The following conclusions may therefore be drawn:

a. Support by strong air forces from the Norway area is essential for successful operations in the Arctic Ocean, in the absence of aircraft carriers (reconnaissance, bomber, and torpedo planes).

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b. Every operation in the Arctic Ocean will mean an all-out effort for our ships, in view of the enemy's determined reaction; this holds true particularly when enemy carriers are involved.

c. Therefore our naval forces should be kept back for the present so that they will be ready to ward off enemy landing operations. They should be sent out only when definite information is available about enemy ships, and the Air Force can provide sufficient support.

d. We must demand categorically that the Air Force attack enemy aircraft carriers whenever they are within reach. It must be the prime aim of the Air Force in connection with naval warfare in the northern area to annihilate enemy aircraft carriers at sea and in their bases. If enemy aircraft carriers were eliminated, German operational possibilities would be fundamentally improved.

e. We must demand that construction of our aircraft carrier be accelerated. This includes providing sufficient carrier planes. Every effort must be made to organize a German task force consisting of the TIRPITZ, the SCHARNHORST, an aircraft carrier, 2 heavy cruisers, and 12 to 14 destroyers. Such a force would be a grave threat to the enemy in the northern area, and could engage in very effective operations.

The above considerations were laid down on 11 Mar., and were briefly presented to the Chief, Naval Staff during the conference on the situation.

The Chief, Naval Staff will make use of them during his conference with the Fuehrer today.

II. For the opinion of the Naval Staff concerning naval operations for defense against enemy landing operations in Norway see 1/Skl I b 588/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

In accordance with the Fuehrer's request, this opinion will also be presented to the Fuehrer during today's conference.

III. For a collection of detailed maps for the Rybachí Peninsula area in connection with landing plans, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa, files "Fischerhalbinsel".

IV. After the report by the German Admiral, Rome, the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, Field Marshal Kesselring asked the Commander in Chief, Navy on 10 Mar. to postpone withdrawing the PT boats from Malta operations until the end of air operations against Malta, which are to begin the middle of March, since the lasting effect of the overall offensive would be jeopardized if mine operations of the PT boats were discontinued, and the Italian Navy cannot be relied upon to carry out their part of the mine operations. Kesselring requested 3 to 4 weeks delay.

In reply the Chief, Naval Staff states that he believes temporary surprise attacks by PT boats on supply traffic along the North African coast would be very profitable, and he points out that these supplies also affect Malta. In any case Kesselring's request will be complied with due to the fact that the necessary preparations will take 2 to 3 weeks. The date of the transfer of the PT boats will then be set in agreement with Kesselring.

For copy of the corresponding telegram see 1/Skl I a 567/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

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V. The General of the Fighter Planes reported about the operations of the fighters and long-range fighters covering the battleships during the break through the Channel on 12 Feb. He pointed out the advantages in having the 3rd Air Force in charge during the entire operation regardless of the territory involved.

Forces which took part:

7 fighter groups
1 fighter squadron
2 long-range fighter groups less one squadron
1 bomber group in case the weather should not permit operations by fighters and long-range fighters.

Forces were concentrated in 2 areas:

1. The area of Dunkirk, St. Omer, and Abbeville
2. The area of Katwijk, Shiphol, Woensdrecht, and Maldegem

Communications worked well. The fact that the Commander, Fighters was aboard the flag ship proved of great importance to the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, as regards information on the air situation.

Total forces committed:

260 planes for close escort
140 planes for remote escort

The remote escort, which were on the offensive and therefore less restricted in their action, shot down more planes than the close escort.

Successes and losses:

26 enemy planes were shot down for certain, 14 probably.
1 Me 109 and 3 FW 190's were lost.

The experiences gained have been incorporated by the General of the Fighter Planes in a uniform directive for the escort of convoys and naval vessels in the entire area of the west coasts, including Norway. The directive has been submitted to the Naval Staff.

The Naval Staff fully agrees with the favorable opinion of the General of the Fighter Planes concerning cooperation with the Navy in this operation.

VI. Referring to the Naval Staff memorandum of 4 Mar., the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command points out that some time ago the Fuehrer forbade sending situation analyses, even by the Armed Forces High Command, to the Foreign Office, except for a definite naval or military purpose, in which case it must be approved by the Fuehrer. The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command states that this applies particularly to the Naval High Command, which is in a position to evaluate the overall situation purely from the standpoint of naval warfare. The Fuehrer is of the opinion that it is not the business of the Foreign Office to draw military conclusions from the various opinions of the branches of the Armed Forces; that is up to the Armed Forces High Command. The Foreign Office is supposed simply to draw political conclusions from the Fuehrer's decisions on military and naval matters.

The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command asks that this be kept in mind when memoranda are distributed in the future.

The Naval Staff makes no claim to judging matters not pertaining to naval warfare. In the present case, however, the overall problem is made up of so many questions which are entirely the responsibility of the Navy that the Naval Staff does not believe the reproach of being unable to evaluate the situation accurately is in any way applicable.

It is quite another question whether it might help the Fuehrer, who is not only the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but also the political leader, to make his military decisions if the Foreign Office is aware beforehand of matters which are of as great political as of military consequence. The Naval Staff does not believe that the above ruling of the Fuehrer was meant to be as basic as it has been interpreted by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command.

Furthermore the Naval Staff was of the opinion that the Foreign Minister, who is the chairman of the permanent committee of the Tri-Partite Commission, should participate in the present matter, which affects Japan and Italy as much as Germany.

VII. The report of Group North about the operation of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships of 6 to 9 Mar. describes the progress of the operation, which the Naval Staff had approved on 6 Mar. at the suggestion of the Group. The Group had believed the situation favorable for an attack by the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, even though it assumed that convoy PQ 12 was escorted by heavy forces, possibly including an aircraft carrier. The 5th Air Force had readily agreed to carry out far-reaching reconnaissance and escort operations.

The OU (operation urgent) radio messages intercepted on 7 and 8 Mar. were judged normal, considering the source. On the evening of 8 Mar. the Group was still under the impression that the enemy was not fully aware of the operation. Furthermore, the Group did not believe that the TIRPITZ task force would be endangered even if it encountered fast, strong enemy forces relatively close to the coast. Therefore it was left to the discretion of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships to continue the operation on 9 Mar. until dark as originally planned, under the assumption that the destroyers which had been released for refueling would rejoin the force on 9 Mar. The Group assumes that the message permitting the Commanding Admiral, Battleships to continue the operation at his discretion crossed the latter's message concerning plans for 9 Mar. When at 2300 the decision of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships arrived, stating that he was planning to break off the operation on the evening of 8 Mar., the Group made the necessary arrangements. On 9 Mar. the Group approved his decision to proceed to the Vest Fjord, and likewise in the afternoon approved his plan to proceed to Trondheim during the night. The reasons are given in the War Diary. On the basis of further developments in the enemy situation, which was still unclear, the Group gave orders in the afternoon for the TIRPITZ to remain in Narvik for the time being.

The Group did not receive the reports that heavy enemy forces were sighted at 1115 in quadrant AF 2656 until 1815. The 5th Air Force, which used all available bombers against the enemy, had only 6 planes at its disposal, 2 of which unsuccessfully attacked. No torpedo planes were available.

In commenting on the report of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, the

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Group expresses regret that the destroyers did not refuel at night as had been intended in the operations order in order to provide better escort and greater range for the task force. The Group believes that the fact that the destroyers proceeded to Norwegian harbors jeopardized the secrecy of the whereabouts of the battleship. The Group approves the decision of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships on 8 Mar. about the further progress of the operation, and stresses his statement concerning inadequate air reconnaissance and escort. The 5th Air Force, to be sure, complied most willingly with all requests of the Group; actually, however, only very few planes participated in the operation at any one time, partly because of the weather, and partly because of plane shortage. The Group states quite correctly that this situation can be remedied only by reinforcing the Air Force in Norway and expanding the ground organization. The reporting methods of the operational Air Force and the complicated radio communications, with numerous reconnaissance wavelengths, are unsuitable for an operation of this type. In spite of the best intentions by the 5th Air Force Command, it was obvious that at no time during the operation was the Air Force anywhere nearly equal to the requirements for reconnaissance and attack, nor was it at all comparable to the enemy air force. The grotesque situation arose that the enemy was able to chase us out of our own coastal waters, and to operate there himself unhampered. An aircraft carrier would have been most helpful both in searching for the convoy and in preventing surprise attacks.

With reference to the request of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships that the stipulations of the operational order pertaining to an encounter with an enemy force of equal strength be changed, the Group points out that the usual enemy task force is superior, but that the usual old battleship escorting convoys provides a good target for the TIRPITZ, even though the guns of both ships are of the same caliber. The decision to proceed to the Vest Fjord is approved. The Group expresses warm appreciation of the skill in evading aerial and submarine torpedoes, as well as of the operations by the ship planes and the 3 or 4 enemy planes shot down.

In summary the Group concludes as follows:

1. The operation did not have the desired success presumably for these reasons:

a. It was impossible to locate the convoy; it is likely that the convoy turned back on 5 Mar. immediately after it was sighted by the plane or after the Russian steamer sent the RRR signal, or that it was delayed.

b. The time spent in searching was very short, and the number of ships engaged in the search was very small, particularly the second day.

c. Air reconnaissance did not supply the necessary accurate information.

2. This experience does not change the basic fact that it is correct for the Norway forces to attack profitable targets reported en route to Murmansk. It has become evident, however, that the air forces in the area will have to be reinforced for this purpose, and the Air Force personnel will have to have a better understanding of the tasks of naval warfare.

3. The risk involved in any operation in the arctic area is great.

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Therefore only profitable targets should be attacked, and for this purpose the stipulations set forth under 2. must be complied with. Otherwise the risk is out of proportion to the chances for success.

The Naval Staff is basically in full agreement with Group North, and welcomes especially the statement made under 2. concerning the idea which prompted this operation. The Naval Staff will subsequently state its opinion as well as the conclusions to be drawn from this operation. (See also Special Items, I.)

VIII. The Naval Staff sent a report to the Chief, Naval Staff at Fuehrer Headquarters containing an extract of the reports of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships (see War Diary 10 Mar.) and Group North, with special emphasis on the problem of inadequate air support. The concluding statement of Group North was transmitted in full. The Chief, Naval Staff unfortunately did not receive these materials before his conference with the Fuehrer. The Naval Adjutant of the Fuehrer has been instructed, however, to give the Fuehrer this information in connection with the report of the Chief, Naval Staff.

The Chief, Naval Staff is at Headquarters for a conference with the Fuehrer.

For minutes of the conference see 1/Skl I b 588/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.

Special attention should be given to the Fuehrer's decisions regarding the repair and rearmament of the GNEISENAU, continued construction of the aircraft carrier GRAF ZEPPELIN, as well as preparation of the necessary carrier planes.

Situation 12 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

According to Reuter a British contingent landed in Nassau in the Bahamas.

South Atlantic:

The cruiser DELHI left Freetown on 9 Feb. with a northbound convoy of about 20 steamers. It is said that a number of ships coming from South America generally join the northbound convoys in the latitude of Bathurst. The cruiser KENYA entered Freetown on 11 Feb.

A U.S. force evidently arrived in the Cape area on 12 Mar.

Pacific Ocean:

According to an agent report from the end of February, a

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considerable number of grain transports sail unescorted from Australia. The route to the South African harbors is secured by the patrol service.

2 U.S. destroyers, 3 submarines, and 5 ore steamers entered Coquimbo (Chile) on 5 Mar.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from German ships in foreign waters.

Radiogram 1752 contains sailing orders for the OSORNO, including information about the ship's rendezvous with German minesweepers; port of destination Bordeaux.

All ships in foreign waters are informed about political events and enemy reports by Radiograms 1543, 0648, 1110, 1427, 1626, and 2029.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

5 British vessels were located during the afternoon near Portsmouth.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Radiogram 1752 informs Group West about the orders to the OSORNO.

Ship "28" is ordered to transfer from Flushing to Bordeaux.

Air reconnaissance failed to locate the OSORNO.

Channel Coast:

Numerous enemy planes flew over the Dunkirk and Le Havre areas during the day. Several harbor patrol vessels were slightly damaged and suffered casualties.

Ship "28" departed from Flushing. In accordance with the request of the Naval Staff, the Commander in Chief, Air has ordered the 3rd Air Force to locate and then launch massed surprise attacks on the enemy's PT boat bases. (See Telegram 1205.)

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

The 5th Coast Patrol Force was organized in Cuxhaven. Two British officers, who landed in rowboats near Katwijk, were captured. They were evidently planning to commit acts of sabotage.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Submarine U "454" reported a convoy consisting of 10 steamers, 4 destroyers, and 2 escort vessels on a 1700 course in quadrant AC 8557 at 1000. According to air reconnaissance, 6 northbound destroyers with fighter escort were in quadrant AF 7286 at 1150; 4 destroyers and 4 escort vessels on easterly course in quadrant AF 2785 at 1520; and unidentified ships which put up a heavy anti-aircraft barrage in quadrant AF 8413 at 1830.

According to a report of the British Admiralty, British naval forces were unable to establish contact with the TIRPITZ which had been seen by reconnaissance planes proceeding north. Nothing has been ascertained as to the effects of the aerial torpedo attack of the morning of 9 Mar. Two British planes failed to return from this mission.

In evaluating the enemy situation, Group North believes that an enemy carrier force might attack Narvik the morning of 13 Mar. The enemy force located in quadrant AF 5115 indicates that a mining operation is in progress, aimed at the Vest Fjord or the approaches to Trondheim. It may be assumed that a heavy enemy task force is at sea, possibly the unidentified ships reported, as flanking protection for the mine-laying forces.

Own Situation:

In view of the enemy situation, Group North requests the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to inform the submarines in the Shetland and Iceland area that the Group believes there are enemy carrier and cruiser forces in the vicinity of quadrant AF 7297 and that they should take up the following positions: in quadrants AE 99; AF 78 and 79; AE 93; and in the area between AF 7450, 7180, 7270, and 7540.

Convoy and supply operations are proceeding according to plan.

At 1525 submarine U "454" lost contact with the enemy convoy.

In view of the difference in the number of ships reported it is not clear whether this convoy was PQ 12, which we are looking for. However, this would seem to be the case. Otherwise the convoy would have had to cross the operations area of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships undetected, unless, contrary to our assumption, there is an ice-free route north of Bear Island.

In view of recurring reports, the Commanding General, Armed Forces, Norway and the 5th Air Force expect an enemy operation in force against the Banak airfield south of the Porsanger Fjord and request that the coastal artillery positions in the Porsanger Fjord be reinforced by a minefield. The Commanding Admiral, Norway suggests that a 2-row shallow minefield be laid between Hovnholm Island and the east shore of the fjord, within the range of the naval guns. This would not interfere with the movements of our naval and merchant vessels, since there is an easily navigable passage west of Hovnholm. See 1/Skl 5870/42 Gkdos, in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway will spend the period 12 to 23 Mar. in northern Norway.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea1. Enemy Situation:

According to an agent report from Stockholm, the Russians have asked for British anti-aircraft guns to be sent at once in order to protect the important Kyem railroad bridge at 65° N, 34° 38' E. According to the same report, which originates in the British Legation in Stockholm, British air attacks are shortly to be extended from Paris to all of France, Belgium and Holland, in order to simulate a British landing in this area and cause German troops to be diverted from other fronts.

2. Own Situation:

The SCHLESIEEN and her convoy are still frozen fast in the Gjedser Strait. Other icebreaker movements without incidents. Enemy planes attacked Kiel during the night of 12 Mar. No detailed reports have as yet been received.

V. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

The radio intercept service reports that a plane attacked a submarine north of Rockall Bank at noon, supposedly successfully. British vessels were located 150 miles southwest of Lisbon and 210 miles southwest of Porcupine Bank.

U.S. steamer MARJORY reported sighting a submarine off Cape Hatteras.

U.S. steamer HELEN (3,129 GRT) was torpedoed in the vicinity of the Bahamas. The radio intercept service further reports that tanker EULIMA (6,207 GRT) was torpedoed on 21 Feb. approximately 300 miles south of Cape Race, Norwegian steamer HAVOERN (1,527 GRT) on 19 Jan. southwest of Cape Race, Greek steamer MEROPI (4,181 GRT) on 15 Feb. southeast of Halifax, and Norwegian steamer EGDA (10,000 GRT) on 21 Feb. approximately 320 miles south of Cape Race.

According to figures compiled by the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Marine Branch, the following enemy ships were sunk by German submarines during January and February 1942 off the U.S. East Coast:

In the Atlantic	37 steamers and 14 tankers totalling	318,931 GRT
In coastal traffic	16 steamers and 14 tankers totalling	208,150 GRT
In the Caribbean	4 steamers and 13 tankers totalling	99,633 GRT
Total	98 vessels totalling	626,714 GRT

2. Own Situation:

The attempt by submarine U "454" to lead other submarines to the convoy sighted in quadrant AC 8557 by means of direction finder signals was unsuccessful. Submarines U "701", "135", "569", and "553" in the area east of Northern Scotland and Iceland have been organized into the York group in order to carry out the directive of Group North.

Submarine U "593" in the North Atlantic reported that a red searchlight

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was successfully used as a location device while she was maintaining contact with a convoy in quadrant AM 27.

Submarine U "155" reported sinking a 6,000 GRT steamer off the U.S. coast on 7 Mar. This submarine as well as U "578" reported encountering a submarine trap. There is no definite proof, however. Lt. Lehmann-Willenbrock of submarine U "96" reported sinking steamer TYR, thus raising his total to 29,101 GRT. On 9 Mar. submarine U "94" sank a Brazilian steamer which was proceeding on zigzag course, without lights, en route to New York. This was probably the CAYRU (5,123 GRT). No special reports have been received from the submarines stationed in the West Indies or the South Atlantic.

In the Mediterranean submarine U "565" (Lt. j.g. Jøbsen) fired a four-fan at a cruiser of the LEANDER class east of Sollum Bay, probably scoring 2 hits. 30 to 40 minutes after the fan was fired noises like those from a sinking ship were heard (breaking bulkheads, etc.). The sinking could not be confirmed because the submarine was pursued with depth bombs for 4 hours. Submarine U "371" established contact with the enemy force northeast of Ras Azzaz (see War Diary 11 Mar.) but lost it 5 hours later. For supplementary report on the situation see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The Naval Staff has examined the planned submarine positions in the area west of Scotland and Iceland. Positions in the immediate vicinity of the coast are not very promising as regards ships approaching the British Isles from the Atlantic. Experience has shown that submarines are most successful if used in sufficient numbers against enemy shipping to Murmansk and Archangel. A directive is sent to Group North; the Commanding Admiral, Submarines; the Commanding Admiral, Norway; and the Admiral, Arctic Ocean to place 4 of the 8 submarines stationed in the area of Northern Scotland and Iceland under the operational command of Group North (the Commanding Admiral, Norway) for operations against enemy shipping on the PQ convoy routes and at the ports of destination; and to station the other 4 submarines approximately in the area of Jan Mayen and east of Iceland and Northern Scotland for operations against enemy shipping outside the enemy's harbors. Bases for the first 4 boats are to be northern Norway, Trondheim or Bergen, possibly Germany; for the other 4, ports in western France. See l/Skl I u 575/42 Gkdos Chefs. For a copy of this telegram as well as the instructions to the Naval Staff Submarine Division and the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division concerning preparation of repair and supply facilities for the present total of 16 submarines now in northern Norway, including Trondheim and Bergen, see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

For reconnaissance activity over the North Sea area see Enemy Situation, Norway.

A FW 200 carried out a bomb attack on the British steamer LEADGATE in the Bay of Cadiz; the steamer was probably damaged.

30 to 40 enemy planes were active during the night of 12 Mar. Attacks concentrated on Kiel, involving 28 to 30 planes.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The Italian Air Force reports attacking an enemy force of 14 vessels northeast of Tobruk on 11 Mar.; it is certain that a direct hit on a medium-sized cruiser by aerial torpedo was scored. When the attack was repeated 2 more cruisers are reported to have been hit, one of which listed heavily. The 29 German bombers and dive bombers which attacked the same force scored only one SC 250 hit on a light cruiser. This is the force which had made a thrust to the west from Alexandria in order to meet the Malta cruiser.

Attacks on the Malta airfields were continued. 15 Spitfires were observed over the island.

The number of planes on the enemy airfields in eastern Cyrenaica and in Libya has increased. 225 planes were counted on 13 airfields.

3. Eastern Front:

Aerial torpedoes failed to hit the target during attacks on a floating dock at Novorossisk and on a naval vessel.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

An additional 3 submarines were located in Valletta. German and Italian reconnaissance planes spotted a few light naval vessels between Alexandria and Tobruk, among them 6 undefined vessels on easterly course east-northeast of Tobruk.

According to an intelligence report, 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 torpedo boats, 5 submarines, and 6 tankers arrived at Haifa from North Africa on 10 Mar. in order to refuel.

The German Naval Command, Italy transmitted a list of the names of British naval vessels which were sunk in the Mediterranean by Italian naval forces up to 1 Jan. 1942. The list includes 6 cruisers, among them the NEPTUNE which hit a German mine, and the FIJI which according to a British statement was sunk by a German plane; 1 fast minelayer; 10 flotilla leaders and destroyers, one of which, the DAINTY, was sunk by a Ju 88 according to prisoner statements; 22 submarines; 5 auxiliary vessels; and a total of 24 merchant ships, including 7 tankers.

2. Situation Italy:

German and Italian planes, as well as 1 German submarine, attacked the naval force sighted south of Crete on 11 Mar. (see Aerial Warfare and Submarine Warfare). If the reports are true, one cruiser was sunk by the German submarine, Italian planes scored hits on 3 cruisers, and German planes on 1 cruiser. This would mean that all 4 cruisers, including the one coming from Malta, were at least damaged.

According to a compilation by the Naval Staff Intelligence Division, the Italian Navy lost the following ships between 10 Jun. 1940 and 15 Mar. 1942: 1 battleship, 4 heavy cruisers, 4 light cruisers, 22 destroyers, 18 torpedo boats, 45 submarines; a total of 94 vessels.

Among these are the battleship CAVOUR, heavy cruisers SAN GIORGIO, ZARA,

FIUME, and POLA, light cruisers DIAZ, COLLEONI, GIUSSANO, and DA BARBIANO.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

No particular incidents.

The Naval Staff requested information concerning the inadequacy of the African harbors and the possibility of transferring tonnage for the purpose of carrying supplies to Greece (see War Diary 5 Mar.); the German Naval Command, Italy replies that the unfavorable report as to the capacity of the unloading harbors was not meant for Africa in general, but only for Cyrenaica. In the meantime the capacity of these harbors, particularly of Benghazi, has been improved, so that this bottleneck will become less and less serious in the near future. The German Naval Command, Italy does not consider it advisable to transfer ships to the Aegean Sea, so long as we must count on attacks by Malta cruisers and destroyers and by submarines and planes on our Africa convoys. Our steamer tonnage was reduced by the loss of the steamers CUMA and MARINE SANUDO on 24 Feb. Up to now the Italians have definitely refused to contribute Italian steamers for the Aegean, since their tonnage is fully occupied in supply traffic to Tripoli and Cyrenaica.

With this information we can consider this question settled.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Submarines were located off Piraeus and in the Gulf of Salonika, as well as west of Euboea.

Own Situation:

PT boats are combatting the enemy submarines off Piraeus. West of Euboea an enemy submarine which attacked a sailboat with gunfire was forced to submerge by a German seaplane. 2 planes and a harbor vessel set out after the submarine.

The auxiliary cruiser BARLETTA is en route to Salonika, where she is to be loaded for a mine operation.

Increased escort protection was provided by 2 torpedo boats, 2 PT boats, and 2 subchasers. The naval barges TARABYA and CAVALLA which left Varna on 10 Mar. passed Constantinople on 11 Mar. in the direction of the Dardanelles. The naval barges were camouflaged as far as possible.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance there was a floating dock in tow between Anapa and Novorossisk on a southeasterly course, escorted by destroyers, torpedo boats, and fighter planes. For an unsuccessful aerial torpedo attack see Air Situation.

Own Situation:

No particular incidents.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is requested to investigate, in agreement with Naval Group South, whether Group South could take over the tasks which up to the present time have kept the Admiral, Black Sea in Bucharest; the Admiral, Black Sea could then be transferred farther east, at first to Constanta, in order to devote himself exclusively to naval tasks in the Black Sea.

This measure is the result of a memorandum by the Naval Staff about naval tasks in the Black Sea, in which the Chief, Naval Staff agrees that every effort must be made to seize the initiative from the Russians, who have been almost unhampered so far. In order to do this full use must be made of the few means at our disposal, and we will have to resort to makeshift methods. Bucharest is too far from the front to permit our taking such energetic measures.

VIII. Situation East Asia

According to press reports the Japanese attacked Port Moresby in southern New Guinea from Salamaua with bombs. The Naval Attache at Tokyo reports that operations of the naval forces are under command of the chief of the fleet. This commander sends only such reports to Tokyo concerning the progress of the operations as are suitable for the press. Therefore the Admiralty Staff seldom has more information than the press.

According to Reuter, 8 heavy U.S. bombers attacked Japanese ships and the airport at Salamaua on 10 Mar. 9 ships, among them evidently one light cruiser or destroyer, are said to have been damaged.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Newly brought up German forces pushed superior enemy forces in the Von Kleist Army sector back to the north at Varvarovka, and took several villages. The advance of an armored group made from the bridgehead of the 6th Army west of Balakleya pushed far to the south across the Donets. At the points of penetration west of Kharkov our counter-attack forced the enemy to abandon further breakthrough operations.

2. Central Army Group:

Our troops were able to hold Vesniny against strong enemy attacks. Attacks were also repulsed south of Sukhinichi. The 17th Infantry Regiment achieved a great local victory at Demenskoye by attacking troop concentrations of a large part of 3 enemy divisions. The enemy was kept from breaking out of the pocket southeast of Vyazma. There were many enemy deserters. Enemy forces which had penetrated southeast of Gzhatsk were annihilated in a counterattack. We repulsed heavy tank attacks on our positions northwest of Rzhev. The enemy made repeated attempts to penetrate the left flank of the Corps west of Rzhev, bringing up strong reserves. Our troops successfully advanced northwest of Vyazma toward the Dniepr and east of Demidov. Enemy forces entered the northern outskirts of Velizh after a strong attack.

Northern Army Group:

Lively combat activity near Kholm and Staraya Russa. The captured commander of the 191st Rifle Division confirms the fact that the supply situation of the 2nd Red Assault Army is difficult. In the 191st Division the flesh of dead soldiers was used as food. The enemy penetrated our positions along the railroad southeast of Maluksa.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

It is interesting to observe from Churchill's comments in the House of Commons on the appointment of Lyttleton as Production Minister that Lyttleton will be in charge of all production except that which is directly under the Admiralty, i.e., construction and equipment of warships, and the Fleet program. The Admiralty will remain in charge of this production if the Defense Minister and the War Cabinet approve. The Admiralty will also be responsible for construction and armament of merchant ships in cooperation with the Transportation Ministry.

According to a report from a Spanish diplomatic source, Churchill stated that the number of ships sunk has increased to an alarming degree. It is said in London that the present time is the most critical since the beginning of the war.

U.S.A.:

The attitude of the U.S. population toward Soviet Russia is still very much divided. According to press reports, the Japanese successes have made a great impression on the Negroes in the U.S., who show a remarkable lack of interest in this "war of the whites".

Japan:

The Minister of the Navy gave a detailed account in the Diet of the naval war, in which Japan has lost no ship of cruiser size or larger, but only 4 destroyers, 4 submarines, 5 special-purpose submarines, 1 special-purpose vessel, 5 minesweepers, and 27 transports. The enemy has lost 130 naval vessels. The War Minister announced that 210,000 prisoners of war have been taken so far.

According to a diplomatic report, Japanese propaganda in China is focused on the theme of Greater East Asia. It lays down a program of a new prosperity with the motto of Asia for the Asiatics and elimination of foreign influences, improvement of the standard of living, independence and freedom of the peoples under Japanese leadership against which opposition is useless. The Axis alliance is hardly mentioned any more. The propaganda utilizes primarily the successes of the Army and the Navy.

According to a report from the German Embassy, Tatekawa himself requested to be recalled from Moscow, so that in the event of a Russo-Japanese war a professional diplomat and not a general would be in Moscow.

Brazil:

By a decree of President Vargas, 10 to 30% of the possessions of German firms and private persons have been confiscated for the benefit of the government. These funds are to serve as a guarantee and compensation for acts of aggression against Brazilian property. It has been forbidden to make property over to foreigners.

Chile:

According to a report from the German Legation, the sinking of South American ships has complicated the relations between Chile and the Axis Powers. Foreign Minister Rossetti will soon be replaced by Barros Jarpa,

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whose sympathies are on the side of the U.S.A.

Sweden:

According to a report from the Armed Forces Intelligence Division sent for the information of the Commander in Chief, Navy, the Swedish envoy in Berlin told the German Foreign Minister personally on 13 Mar. that the King of Sweden solemnly declares and gives his word as king to the Fuehrer that Sweden will never acquiesce to any Anglo-American plans regarding Northern Scandinavia which would involve marching through Sweden. He is firmly determined to use armed force to prevent Anglo-American forces from setting foot on Swedish soil.

France:

According to press reports, Vichy Ambassador Haye assured Sumner Welles that the French fleet will not be handed over to the Axis Powers.

Admiral Muschier has tendered his resignation to General de Gaulle, evidently in connection with the question of the occupation of Miquelon and St. Pierre which he raised.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. In reply to the Fuehrer's question about radar equipment in Norway for location of ships, the Chief, Naval Communications Division replies through the Naval Adjutant of the Fuehrer that the 4 sets intended for that area were sent some time ago.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports about the ships to be used for troop transports from Hamburg to southern Norway. The request of the Armed Forces High Command can be met as regards shipping space. It remains to be seen whether the ice situation will permit carrying out the operation by the end of March as planned.

III. The Chief, Naval Staff desires that after the Fuehrer has decided the matter of the Commissioner for Maritime Shipping the wishes of the Transportation Minister be complied with as much as possible, insofar as this can be done considering the Navy's increased responsibility for the merchant fleet. The position of the Undersecretary, Vice Admiral Wuelfing should be strengthened by the Navy as much as possible.

IV. The Chief, Naval Staff gives orders pertaining to the repair and re-armament of the GNEISENAU in accordance with the Fuehrer's decision. The Fuehrer wants to be informed about the possibility of using the 28 cm. guns of the GNEISENAU for coastal defenses. The Chief, Naval Staff orders that the ship should not be dismantled in a routine way, but with a view to conservation for the purpose of using her again at a later date.

V. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports about the conference with Minister Speer concerning a further 30% reduction in construction projects, and appointment of another deputy for construction in the occupied territories, especially Norway.

He also reports on the effect of the induction of 450,000 armament workers, which are supposed to be the last to be drafted from this industry.

VI. The Chief, Naval Staff Submarine Division reports that the shortage

of torpedo practice heads will have been overcome by 1 Apr.

VII. The Fuehrer wants the special naval communiques to be expressed in more vivid terms, since they are too sober and brief as compared with those of the other branches of the Armed Forces.

VIII. Since the Fuehrer refuses to interfere in the armament industry (allocation of scarce raw materials to carry out the tasks ordered by him), pointing out that the branches of the Armed Forces have to help themselves, particularly since they were told as early as 1936 to take into account in their armament programs raw materials which it would be difficult or impossible to obtain in case of war, the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is ordered to contact the Chief of the War Economy and Armaments Division, Armed Forces High Command. (See also the minutes of the conference of 12 Mar. of the Commander in Chief, Navy with the Fuehrer in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VII.)

IX. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports about the enemy situation in the northern North Sea, the distribution of submarines, and the transfer of the TIRPITZ back to Trondheim. The Chief, Naval Staff states that the Fuehrer has agreed to the plan for using only submarines and light naval forces for the time being to combat PQ convoys.

The Chief, Naval Staff approves the Naval Staff directive concerning operations of submarines in the northern area (see War Diary 12 Mar.); however, he orders that the 4 submarines operating east of the Shetland Islands also be under the operational command of Group North and not of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

The Armed Forces High Command has approved the request of the Naval Staff that the preparatory period for operation "Felix" should be lengthened from 3 to 6 months.

X. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the directive of the Armed Forces High Command that the Russian islands in the Gulf of Finland be taken in time. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports on the plans for setting up German batteries on these islands.

XI. The letter which the Chief, Naval Staff ordered written to the Fuehrer concerning the basic necessity for a naval air force as shown by past experience is to be written only after the Commander in Chief, Air has replied to the letter sent him by the Commander in Chief, Navy about the setup of the Commander, Naval Air. The Naval Staff will then submit a draft.

XII. The telegram from the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South concerning PT boat operations from Malta and Tobruk is read. The Chief, Naval Staff approves the answer suggested by the Naval Staff (see War Diary, 12 Mar.). It remains to be seen what the Fuehrer's final decision will be concerning the operations against Suez and Malta. This will primarily determine also where PT boat operations will be concentrated.

XIII. The Chief, Naval Staff reports on the conference with the Fuehrer on 12 Mar., as recorded in War Diary of 12 Mar., Part C, Vol. VII. The Fuehrer is planning a conference with the Duce in the near future, and at that time will also take up the question of Suez, Malta, and Italian transport submarines.

The Chief, Naval Staff believes it advisable to urge the Japanese to

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launch operations in the Persian Gulf very soon, if possible as a preparation for the German fall offensive against Suez.

The Chief, Naval Staff will receive Admiral Nomura for this purpose within the next few days. At the same time it will be advisable for the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff to have a conference with Nomura also.

Special Items

I. The Naval Liaison Officer at the Armed Forces High Command reported that the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff called the attention of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West to the contradiction between the request telephoned by Field Marshal Sperrle to the Armed Forces High Command and the report of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West. Field Marshal Sperrle asked that "the Navy be ordered not to neglect its share of preparations in defense against enemy landings". The Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, on the other hand, reported that "cooperation between all branches of the Armed Forces and between the various units was excellent during the enemy attack on Cape d' Antifer." The Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff has asked the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West to furnish details that might throw light on the objection raised by Field Marshal Sperrle.

At the same time, the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West has been asked to suggest what changes in command might be made on the basis of past experience for the defenses against enemy landings on the coasts of the occupied western areas.

II. According to a report from the Naval Attache, Tokyo, Captain Hiraide, spokesman for the Japanese Navy, in a public address compared the achievements of the Japanese and German Armed Forces in a way so derogatory for the Germans that the Naval Attache registered a very sharp protest at the request of the Ambassador. The matter was settled when Admiral Oka visited the Naval Attache in order to apologize, and the Navy Minister sent a letter in which he expressed deepest regret and announced that Hiraide would be punished.

Situation 13 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

In the Naval Communications Division's compilation of intercepted and decoded enemy reports up to 8 Mar. 1942 (Radio Intelligence Report 10/42) there is no information of particular interest, except for confirmation of the fact that enemy movements in the northern part of the North Sea from 6 to 9 Mar. absolutely could not be detected by radio intelligence.

In the British press a new type of warship, the so-called "NL boat", has been pictured; the size of this vessel is halfway between a destroyer and a motor torpedo boat. She has supposedly already been used successfully in the escort service.

North Atlantic:

According to an agent's report from the U.S., the cruiser NASHVILLE left Corpus Christi for the Panama Canal and the Pacific on 17 Feb. with 3 destroyers, several auxiliary ships with catapults for fighter and torpedo planes, and 2 tankers. Transshipment for the Middle East and India is mainly done in Baltimore. Voyages by single unescorted ships have been stopped. Materiel transports leave the Chesapeake Bay in convoys; 26 to 30 ships are to leave there between 13 and 19 Mar. with war materiel and also, for the first time, with mines. At Pensacola 2 or 3 ships are to join this convoy. Between 12 and 16 Mar., several large tankers with deck cargo are to leave Gulf ports via the Panama Canal. In the Chesapeake Bay the escorts are to be the cruisers VINCENNES and SALT LAKE CITY, besides destroyers.

South Atlantic:

According to radio reconnaissance there are not only U.S. warships in the Cape area, but also British ships. Additional U.S. ships are thought to be in the Falklands area. The report about the voyage of the QUEEN MARY to the Cape seems to be false, made to mislead us. The ship was sighted in the latitude of Pernambuco on 11 Mar.

It is not known how reliable this sighting report is.

Pacific Ocean:

According to an agent's report there is still regular, also commercial, air traffic between the U.S. and Hawaii. The new line Hawaii-Canton Island-Samoa-Auckland is restricted to Armed Forces traffic.

Numerous old destroyers are being reequipped for escort service at Mare Island, Corpus Christi, and San Diego. They will be ready in March. Aircraft carrier WASP, cruisers ASTORIA, HELENA, HONOLULU, and destroyers of the MAHAM class will be used as escorts on the Panama-Australia route.

2. Own Situation:

No news has been received from our ships. The enemy situation reports were sent via Radiograms 0613, 1600, and 1827.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance sighted convoys south of the Isle of Wight and south of Milford.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Air reconnaissance failed to sight the OSORNO.

Channel Coast:

16 ground mines were swept on route "Rosa", between points 33 E and 33 X nine new Mark XVI mines. Enemy planes were active in the evening over Boulogne, Calais, and Paris, but dropped no bombs.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean1. North Sea:Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

The BEITZEN and torpedo boat T "4" arrived in Wesermuende from Bergen.

Ship "28" left Flushing in westerly direction.

The steamer KELLERWALD was damaged by a mine 6 miles east of point A, and is to be towed in.

Enemy planes were active over the East Frisia-Wilhelmshaven area during the night of 12 Mar. For details see Telegrams 0710 and 0735.

2. Norway:Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance sighted a force consisting of 7 vessels, evidently destroyers, at 0925 in quadrant AF 2759 (120 miles west of Utsire). Radio intelligence located 1 enemy vessel, presumably a submarine, in the Bergen area at 1015, and 1 at 1313 between the Nord and the Sogne Fjord.

On the basis of enemy reports Group North assumes that a mining operation may be in progress against the Vest Fjord and the deep channel near Bergen.

According to an intelligence report from Sweden dated 12 Mar. based on a British underground radio communication from Sweden to Norway, the British are planning to attack with naval forces at a point called B 26 K 4 (not identified) in the night of 14 Mar., supposedly near Trondheim.

The Naval Shore Command Kirkenes reported that on 12 Mar. a submarine was sighted surfacing briefly in the Koi Fjord.

Own Situation:

The group of the Commanding Admiral, Battleship left Bogen Bay at 2220 on 12 Mar. It reached Trondheim on schedule without special incidents. At 1530 it was in quadrant AF 6458. Naval Signal Station Trondheim was passed at 2020.

Submarine U "585" reports much ice east of 39° E moving west. Submarines cannot operate in the area.

Submarine U "456" operated against an enemy convoy off Kola Bay, which was reported by U "454" (see War Diary 12 Mar.), but had no chance to attack. Group North issued the following order to the Commanding Admiral, Norway and the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, with copies to the Naval Staff, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, and the 2nd Admiral, Submarines:

a. The submarines of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean will be in-

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creased to 12. Attacks on enemy supply ships should be concentrated off the enemy Murman coast and at the entrance to the White Sea.

b. Group North will soon order the Bluecher group to be released to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean. The submarines intended for the north area will return by the convoy route.

c. An additional 4 submarines will also arrive via the convoy route within the next few days in order to raise the number to 12. 3 of these will leave Heligoland on 14 Mar., and the fourth on 15 Mar.

d. The 12 submarines include those stationed at Narvik. It will not be possible to increase the number of submarines ready for operations to 12 until the ice situation improves.

e. The above figures do not include 2 submarines stationed at Bergen and 2 at Trondheim, which remain at the disposition of Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines. An additional 4 submarines will also remain under the Commanding Admiral, Submarines for the time being. (See Telegram 1924.)

Convoy operations and submarine chase proceeded without special incident.

For a report by the Admiral, North Norwegian Coast about the barrage in the Froi Fjord see 1/Skl 5879/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA.

After another investigation, the Commanding Admiral, Norway asked Group North on 11 Mar. for permission to extend the fishing area between 62° and 68° N by 45 to 60 miles. Group North requests that the Naval Staff make a new decision in the matter.

The Naval Staff informs the Group of its approval on 13 Mar.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

During an enemy air attack on Kiel in the night of 12 Mar. several bombs were dropped on the Deutsche Werft, Deutsche Werke, and the Germania Werft. A number of bombs fell in the direct vicinity of the SCHARNHORST between the floating dock and the starboard side; one bomb exploded on the pier about 15 meters from the port side near compartments XI and XII, causing slight splinter damage to the superstructure and the ship's side above the water, as well as starting some fires on the upper deck at compartment IX in the passageway and the officers' quarters, in the picket boat on the superstructure deck, and at compartments XI and XII on the battery deck in the technical petty officers' quarters. The fires were put out in short order. Casualties on the SCHARNHORST amounted to 3 dead and 18 wounded. (See Telegram 0300.)

An alarm was sounded in Kiel due to an erroneous report that parachute troops had landed. For details about the air situation see Telegrams 0737, 0743, 1200, and 1345.

Coastal Defense Commander, West reported that the enemy is using considerably more flares than heretofore, and that enemy planes approach with the motors shut off so that they hardly make any sound while circling.

The Fleet has ordered the SCHARNHORST to be transferred at once from her especially dangerous location, since she cannot be docked until

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measures to improve the defenses, which are now in progress, have been carried out. (See Telegram 1545.)

The Naval Staff agrees with this measure. Group North is informed, with copy to the Admiral, Baltic States, that the troops intended for the attack on the islands in the Gulf of Finland will arrive between 21 and 24 Mar. in the Narva area. The Finnish Army has promised to provide officers familiar with the ice conditions and several Finnish pilots. (See Telegram 1816.)

V. Merchant Shipping

2 new cases have become known in which Portuguese ships carried food supplies from Portuguese harbors to Gibraltar.

In Spain a new undersecretariat has been created for the merchant marine, which in peacetime will be under the Ministry of Commerce, and in wartime under the Ministry of the Navy. For additional reports about foreign merchant shipping see Brief Report No. 8/42 of the Foreign Merchant Shipping Branch of the Naval Staff Intelligence Division.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance located submarines 90 miles north of Rockall Bank and 80 miles southeast of Porcupine Bank. According to an agent's report based on conversations between Americans which were overheard, the cruiser OMAHA and 7 torpedo boats are to be sent to Gibraltar soon.

U.S. tanker MERCURY SUN (8,893 GRT) exploded 140 miles southeast of Cape Hatteras as the result of a submarine attack. Submarine sighting reports sent by 3 steamers in the West Indies were intercepted. All U.S. merchant ships were warned to avoid the northern coast of Cuba, since submarines are very active there. U.S. tanker ESSO BAYONNE (7,998 GRT) reported being fired upon by a submarine off the west coast of Haiti.

According to press reports a British tanker and a small Swedish freighter were torpedoed in the Caribbean Sea. 83 survivors of these vessels arrived in a Caribbean harbor.

The U.S. Navy Department has announced that hereafter the names of sunk and torpedoed ships will no longer be published. The loss of steamer MALAMA in the Pacific Ocean is the last to be announced.

2. Own Situation:

3 large and 6 medium-sized submarines are stationed off the American coast; 7 large and 5 medium-sized submarines are en route to and 9 large and 6 medium-sized submarines are en route from the area.

15 submarines are in the operations area in the Arctic Ocean and Norwegian waters; 4 are returning from there; 2 are in Trondheim and 2 in Bergen. 2 submarines are stationed in the South Atlantic, and one is detailed for special tasks. In the Mediterranean there are 4 submarines

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in the operations area and 1 is returning from there; 9 submarines are in La Spezia, 9 in Pola, and 3 in Salamis.

For instructions of Group North about the distribution of submarines in the North Area see Situation Norway.

In accordance with the wish of the Commander in Chief, Navy, the Naval Staff gives orders that Group North, as the command responsible for warfare in the Arctic Ocean and defense of the Norwegian area, should direct the operations of the 4 submarines stationed outside of the ports of departure in the Jan Mayen area, east of Iceland and northern Scotland, for the purpose of disrupting enemy transport movements. Details about tactical command are to be arranged between Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines; Group North is to keep the Naval Staff informed about its plans. For copy of directive see 1/Skl I a 593/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

Submarine U "126" (Lt. Ernst Bauer) reports from the West Indies that she sank 8 ships totalling 46,794 GRT.

Submarine U "67" sank tanker PENELOPE (8,436 GRT) in the same area. In the Mediterranean submarine U "83" torpedoed 1 steamer north of Sollum Bay. It could not be observed whether she sank due to strong defense action.

For Supplement to the Submarine Situation see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 7 enemy destroyers reported west of Utsire were attacked twice by planes of the 5th Air Force, but without success. At night 32 planes dropped mines in the Humber.

Enemy air activity over Germany in the night of 13 Mar. concentrated on Cologne. In addition there were 32 incursions into Belgium, 4 into western France, and 1 into Norway. For damage caused in Cologne see daily situation report.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Attacks on Malta are continuing. During a dive bomber attack on Tobruk 1 steamer of 3,000 GRT received 3 direct hits.

3. Eastern Front:

The 1st Squadron of the 100th Bomber Group reported sinking a submarine south of Feodosiya. A plane which attacked an enemy steamer stuck in the ice north of Iokanga did not return. No reports were received from the Army fronts.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

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Air reconnaissance sighted a small eastbound convoy with fighter cover north of Marsa Matruh in the morning.

According to an Italian report the enemy force consisting of 3 cruisers and destroyers which was attacked by a German submarine on 11 Mar. north-east of Sidi Barrani arrived in Alexandria on 12 Mar. The force probably had another encounter with a submarine east of Marsa Matruh. According to radio intelligence, the Swedish steamer RADMANSOE left Haifa. According to an unconfirmed intelligence report, a heavy cruiser, 2 training ships, 1 aircraft tender with 50 planes, 4 submarines, and 5 transports arrived in Famagusta on 11 Mar. 30 seaplanes are said to be in the harbor.

2. Own Situation:

Mine operations of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla against Malta were cancelled because of the weather.

3. Situation Italy:

The Italian Navy assumes that the enemy submarines chased on 12 Mar. off Taranto and on 13 Mar. southeast of Piraeus were sunk. The sinking off Taranto was due to a search receiver.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Nothing to report.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

A convoy consisting of 7 Italian steamers arrived in Patras from Bari on 12 Mar. There was a submarine chase in the Gulf of Salonika, mainly on the approach route of the BARLETTA. According to a Greek report, an additional auxiliary sailing vessel was sunk by an enemy submarine northeast of Porto Rafti. The BARLETTA and 2 torpedo boats, a subchaser, and 2 Italian subchasers arrived in Salonika on 12 Mar. and will depart again on 14 Mar. for special assignment. The SIENA transport group is operating according to plan.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance gathered no new information. The floating dock which was towed from the Kerch Strait in a southeasterly direction was probably used previously for bringing up railroad equipment and supplies for Russian troops on the Kerch Peninsula.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

IX. Situation East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

According to press reports a U.S. submarine sank another 3

enemy freighters and a passenger vessel in Japanese waters.

On 12 Mar. planes raided the Japanese landing area on New Guinea again.

2. Situation Japan:

According to press reports the Japanese occupied the northeast coast of Sumatra and the towns of Medan and Sabang, almost without a fight. According to the Military Attache in Bangkok the procedure of the Japanese Air Force was as follows: Attacks on battleships are made first with bombs, then aerial torpedoes. During the fight for the South Sea Islands every single army was given an airborne division with flexible organization. The Army Air Force was put in charge of close targets and ground support, the Naval Air Force of escort duty and remote targets. When the same targets were assigned, the Army and Navy Air Forces attacked at different times. At the start of the operations the Army Air Force was assigned Hong Kong and Malaya, the Naval Air Force with long-range bombers the Philippines, and with aircraft carriers Hawaii, Wake, and Guam.

The Japanese submarine arm is used primarily defensively for reconnaissance purposes, and cooperates directly with aircraft carriers operating independently. The British had made preparations for destroying airfields by means of a sort of drainage pipe filled with explosives equipped with remote-control fuze. The enemy destroyed all repair shops. Therefore the Japanese were forced to bring all spare parts from Japan by air. The Messerschmitt fighters proved to be superior, and the best means of combatting the Boeing B 17 bomber.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The enemy launched another attack on the northern wing of the Feodosiya front, but was repulsed except for one breakthrough by numerous tanks east of Kiyat. Renewed attacks are expected.

After heavy preparatory bombardment the enemy attacked with 2 divisions west of Slavyansk at the Von Kleist Army Group. The attack collapsed. Heavy fighting is going on at the southern wing of the 6th Army. Several enemy tanks broke through in the Babka sector. An attack was repulsed southwest of Volchansk.

Central Army Group:

The 2nd Panzer Army repulsed all attacks. North of Yukhnov the enemy broke through the lines of the 4th Army. The breach was sealed off. A tank-supported attack northeast of Gzhatsk during a blizzard collapsed directly in front of our lines, and the enemy suffered severe losses. Northwest of Rzhev enemy tanks broke through during a heavy storm from the north. A counterattack is in progress. At Losovaya a very severe blizzard has been hampering operations for the past 36 hours.

Northern Army Group:

All enemy attacks were repulsed.

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2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

East of Baranova Gora the enemy attacked after preliminary artillery fire, but without success. Livey scouting activity in the Ukhta sector.

3. North Africa:

Situation unchanged.

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Items of Political ImportanceFrance:

An article in the U.S. press which has caused much comment demands a sharper attitude toward France. According to this article, if this should lead to a break with France nothing can be done about it, for it is better to weaken France now before she is completely ready to cooperate with Germany. Only fear of an Allied attack keeps France from cooperating with Germany. Therefore France must become the next goal of the Allied offensive, particularly since air attacks from England on French territory are easier than on German territory.

According to General Juin, Commander in Chief in French North Africa, the long occupation and the prisoner of war question has a demoralizing effect on the French people, many of whom are ready for cooperation with Germany. Also in Africa people are beginning to understand the role of Marshal Petain. The North Africans are not followers of De Gaulle, and the Arabs have been won over to France. Unfortunately, however, the Italians still seem to have designs on Tunis.

Great Britain:

General Wavell declared that the loss of Rangoon and a great part of southern Burma is more serious than the loss of Singapore, since India is now threatened directly. All possible defense measures for India have been taken. Above all a powerful air force will be stationed in the northeast. Pointing out the difficulties confronting Japan because of the Russian threat, he declared that the fight for the Dutch East Indies was like a race in which British reinforcements unfortunately arrived 4 to 5 weeks too late. Britain was not prepared for the war in East Asia, and her forces were tied down in the homeland and the Middle East, and as the result of shipments to Russia. The loss of the Indian troops in Malaya was due to lack of experience in jungle warfare.

According to reports from London Cripps has authority to negotiate only the details of the compromise proposal which he helped to work out; in all fundamental questions he has to consult the War Cabinet. The plan itself is still a secret, but is said to offer the Indians greater responsibility in their government and far-reaching changes in their constitution within a certain time after the end of the war. The Indians themselves have different opinions about Cripps' mission. The Mohammedans hope to achieve a partition of India into a Hindu and an Islam state, while the All-India Congress is greatly disappointed that Britain did not make greater concessions. Cripps' mission is termed a delaying action, and the Moslems are accused of sabotaging the struggle for independence. The U.S. government shows great reserve so as to avoid anything that might interfere with the very difficult discussions.

Realization of either Moslem or Hindu desires would be equally unsatisfactory for the British. Their present Indian policy will have to have two main goals: the defense of India against Japan, and maintenance of Indian lack of unity.

Australia:

Prime Minister Curtin stated in a radio talk to the American people that the Australian Foreign Minister will go to Washington in order to es-

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establish the closest possible contact with the U.S. government. Britain is fully occupied with the Battle of the Atlantic and aid to Russia, so that the U.S. alone is the determining factor in the Pacific, even though Australia's relation to the British mother country will remain the same as before. Australia is the last remaining bastion in the Pacific. If she is saved the American west coast is safe.

Australia so far has not answered the message of the Japanese Prime Minister; however she is expected to do so. Japan is said to have demanded that Australia no longer permit Britain and the U.S. to use Australian territory as a military base.

Portugal:

The opinion obtains in the U.S. Legation at Lisbon that the U.S. will seize bases in the Atlantic in the spring, and may attempt a landing on the Iberian Peninsula. Thus a new front would be created in the Pyrenees, which would afford the Russians the necessary relief. Salazar is said to have made the comment that since positive proof is lacking nothing definite is known.

Sweden:

The government confiscated 14 newspapers which carried news about the arrest of the Norwegian bishops and the church quarrel in Norway.

Iran:

According to foreign reports Great Britain and Russia have come to an agreement about the spheres of influence in Iran; the British have given up many of their earlier demands. It is said that they will withdraw their troops from Teheran and the central part of the country and will retain only the defense zone for the protection of the oil fields in the south. The Russians are continuing their terror tactics.

Brazil:

According to the United Press, the measures against German property in Rio have become more serious.

Special Items

"Most reports concerning British and American plans agree that the enemy is trying to maintain Russia's power of resistance by means of great quantities of supplies and to open a second front in Europe in order to divert German forces from Russia. The regular heavy convoy traffic from Scotland to Murmansk or Archangel can serve both purposes. Therefore we must consider the possibility of enemy landings on the arctic coast, in which case the nickel mines in northern Finland which are indispensable to us are most likely to be attacked."

This remark introduces the Fuehrer directive, which stipulates that all available means should be used to disrupt sea communications between the Anglo-American powers and Russia in the Arctic Ocean, which are practically intact so far, and to overcome the enemy's supremacy at sea which extends into our own coastal waters. See Ob.d.M. 605/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA for copy of the directive which resulted primarily from the conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy and the Fuehrer on 12 Mar., and contains the special orders of the Fuehrer for

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the Navy, Air Force, and Army.

Situation 14 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

The auxiliary cruiser CILICIA left Montevideo on 11 Mar.

The Brazilian government is planning to order that all merchant ships be armed.

According to an agent report the QUEEN MARY was sighted on 12 Mar. in the latitude of Ceara heading for Belem. The ship is equipped with 3 splinterproof turrets at the bow, each with an antiaircraft gun. Between the first and the second smokestack there is an armored cupola for radio equipment. In addition to antiaircraft guns and machine guns the ship is equipped with naval guns, supposedly of 34 cm. caliber, although this seems most unlikely.

Pacific Ocean:

Between 11 and 16 Feb. 2 U.S. destroyers entered Callao. 1 U.S. destroyer coaled in Talara on 12 Feb. 2 Peruvian cruisers and 2 submarines are stationed at Tarara, the harbor of which is protected with light antiaircraft guns. There are 6 Peruvian and 4 U.S. planes on the Tarara airfield at the present time.

According to an agent report from the U.S., fuel for Australia and the South Pacific will be supplied by the U.S. after the loss of the Sunda Islands.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our ships in foreign waters.

The Japanese Liaison Officer reported that the Japanese Navy cannot carry out the operation through the Northeast Passage in the summer of 1942, since no naval forces are available to escort the ships through the Bering Strait and the Bering Sea.

Radiogram 2111 informs ship "10" that the TANNENFELS left western France on 7 Mar., and that it is planned to have her meet the REGENSBURG.

Radiogram 1843 informs all naval forces in foreign waters that the new code is going into effect. Information on the enemy situation is sent by Radiograms 1032 and 1919.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service a German force was

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located by Dover at 0330 eight miles north of Calais on southwest course, and motor gunboats were ordered to attack it. At 0445 the report of motor torpedo boat "34" about an engagement was intercepted. At 2346 a British vessel reported 3 German PT boats southeast of Lowestoft near the ATTEMPT convoy. Air reconnaissance reported lively convoy traffic on the southwest coast and in the Bristol Channel.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing to report.

Channel Coast:

While en route from Flushing-Le Havre under escort of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, the 2nd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, and vessels of the 2nd Minesweeper Flotilla, ship "28" was attacked by light enemy naval forces between 0330 and 0710. At first our vessels had an encounter with enemy PT boats, one of which burst into flames, and 2 others were damaged with certainty. At about 0645 4 enemy destroyers of the KH class entered into the engagement, attacking from the dark horizon in the west. They were located by means of flares, and were attacked by the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla and the Minesweepers. Simultaneously the PT boats attacked astern in a pincer action. 1 destroyer was seriously damaged and probably sunk. 1 PT boat was destroyed. Later our force was attacked by 3 enemy torpedo planes, one of which was shot down by a German fighter. Strong fighter cover prevented further attacks by enemy planes, which maintained contact until our ships entered Le Havre. We suffered no losses or damage during the entire operation. At 2100 the force proceeded from Le Havre to the west. See Telegram 2230 for a preliminary brief report.

The successful defense against this enemy attack is very commendable.

In the evening the 2nd and 4th PT Boat Flotillas went on a torpedo mission off Cromer. No successes have been reported so far.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported normal convoy activity on the east coast.

Own Situation:

The 2nd Hamburg-Oslo transport group has gotten under way with 1,881 men aboard. Steamer KELLERWALD sank after salvage efforts failed.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance reported an icebreaker and 9 steamers in Iokanga Bay. On 13 Mar. radio intelligence intercepted a message from

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the leader of the destroyers to all ships in home waters that 2 planes were maintaining contact with his force. The 5th Air Force assumes that the force is either between the Shetland and Lofoten Islands in a patrol line, or farther west as advanced patrol.

According to an intelligence report, Canadian icebreakers are operating in the Arctic Ocean. This report bears investigation.

Own Situation:

The Admiral, Arctic Ocean reports that 3 submarines are in the operations area off the Murman coast, and a fourth is in Kirkenes ready for operations. Minesweeper M "1504" reported an unsuccessful torpedo attack in quadrant AF 7368, evidently by an enemy submarine.

According to the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, his entire force will have replenished supplies by 15 Mar. at about 0800. The TIRPITZ, destroyers IHN and Z "25", and torpedo boat T "5" will be ready for action only to a limited degree for 2 to 4 days because of necessary repairs. For details see Telegram 1850.

Group North agrees with the proposal of the Commanding Admiral, Norway that a minefield be laid in the Porsanger Fjord (see War Diary 12 Mar.).

The Commander in Chief, Air has issued instructions to the 5th Air Force for the continuation of operations. In accordance with these, attacks on PQ convoys are given prime importance. These attacks will be made in cooperation with the Navy as well as independently by the 5th Air Force. The orders contain special provisions for cooperation with the Navy. For copy see 1/Skl 6032/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

The Admiral, Arctic Ocean pointed out in his war diary of 9 Feb. on the basis of exploration of the ice situation at Bear Island that it is possible to pass north of the island with or without the aid of icebreakers. He states that the following facts tend to bear out this assumption:

a. All submarine operations south of Bear Island have been unsuccessful, except for the sinking of 1 steamer on 2 Jan.

b. According to Russian reports there exists a convoy route to the Murman coast which is safe from German submarines.

The Naval Staff Hydrographic and Meteorological Division is asked to investigate the matter. The attention of the Commander in Chief, Air is also called to this problem.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

As the result of the experiences gained during the last enemy air attacks on Kiel, Naval Station, Baltic Sea requests that 3 Air Force antiaircraft detachments, each with 3 or 4 heavy and 2 light batteries and 1 searchlight battery, be provided at once, since the air defenses of the center of Kiel are no longer in any way adequate to cope with the heavy air attacks, in which the enemy has lately used very skillful attack techniques. (See Telegram 1308.)

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division will attend to the matter.

According to the Naval Liaison Staff, Finland, the Finns believe that

there are altogether 11 Russian torpedo or gunboats, 32 minesweepers, 20 subchasers, 9 transports, 17 tugs, and 7 school or survey vessels on Lake Ladoga. Group North believes that there is 1 minesweeper tender with about 30 minesweepers, 1 torpedo boat, 4 gunboats, 3 armored barges, and 7 transports. The Finns welcome our plan to transfer naval vessels to Lake Ladoga, and they promise support in every way. It is possible to transport the ships through Finland. They cannot go into action until the end of May. Therefore the Naval Liaison Staff asks that the question, which had been deferred, be investigated once more.

V. Merchant Shipping

1. Since it is necessary to import about 150,000 tons of scarce materials from East Asia to western France during the next shipping period in winter 1942-43, and the German shipping space available is not sufficient, the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is instructed to take steps now to provide additional suitable shipping space. The efforts to obtain use of Japanese ships, which another office is making, are a step in this direction. It is desirable that the Italian motor freighters HIMALAYA, CORTELLAZZO, PIETRO ORSEOLO, and FUSIJAMA continue to participate. Negotiations to charter these ships are to be taken up at once. If these negotiations prove unsuccessful, an attempt is to be made to charter at least one of these freighters for camouflage purposes.

2. The Maritime Shipping Office in the Transportation Ministry reported to the Armed Forces High Command (copy to the Naval High Command) that German ships in Norway increased from 57 ships totalling 344,000 tons on 1 Dec. 1941 to 133 ships totalling 613,000 tons on 5 Mar. 1942. Thus two thirds of the shipping space available for transporting supplies directly connected with the war effort is in the Norwegian area. The Maritime Shipping Office believes that since unloading facilities in Norway are inadequate and have not been improved during the past year and a half, the increase in the number of ships has resulted in many of the ships' being used for storage; if shipping space had been used more wisely, approximately 300,000 tons could have been put to other use. The increased demand for shipping space for supplies to Norway, and the fact that it takes these ships 3 to 5 times longer for the voyage than it used to, as well as the increased difficulties in repairing damaged ships, are mainly responsible for the fact that the ships at the disposal of the Transportation Ministry transported only a total of 15,500,000 tons in 1941 as over against 21,000,000 tons in 1940. This is bound to have an effect on the war effort. The Maritime Shipping Office therefore demands that by the middle of April at least 300,000 tons of shipping space be returned to Germany, and makes suggestions as to how shipping space could be used more advantageously.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence intercepted a report from a plane about a supposed hit on a submarine north of Rockall Bank. According to an intelligence report from Spain a convoy consisting of 14 ships with an auxiliary cruiser, 2 destroyers, 2 gunboats, and 7 corvettes (?) left Gibraltar in the afternoon. Radio intelligence intercepted part of an SSS message from the area 500 miles northwest of the Cape Verdes.

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A U.S. merchant vessel was informed that 2 submarines were sighted near the Nantucket lightship in the night of 13 Mar. An SSS signal of the British tanker BRITISH RESOURCE (7,209 GRT) was intercepted from 240 miles north of Bermuda. According to a report from the British Admiralty, 106 crew members from submarines U "131", "434", and "574" were captured when these submarines were sunk in the Atlantic in 1941, while 29 crew members are missing. One of these submarines sank the U.S. destroyer STANLEY, and was in turn rammed and sunk by destroyer STORK. U "574" was sunk on 18 Dec., U "434" on 17 Dec.

According to a German News Agency (DNB) report, the Brazilian vessel CAMPANI (3,000 GRT) is 6 days overdue.

2. Own Situation:

In accordance with the directive from the Naval Staff (see War Diary 12 Mar.), the Commanding Admiral, Submarines reports that submarines U "209", "378", "376", and "655" have been put under the command of Group North. The last 2 of these submarines left Heligoland on 14 and 15 Mar. No change has been made for the time being in the Shetlands and Jan Mayen area, where submarines U "701", "135", "569", and "553" are stationed.

Successes reported:

On 13 Mar. submarine U "404" sank a 6,000 GRT steamer proceeding without lights south of Long Island. After the steamer was hit she lighted up and displayed Chilean colors.

On 14 Mar. U "161" sank a 5,000 GRT tanker with her last torpedo southwest of Santa Lucia.

In the Mediterranean submarine U "133" sank off Cape Turlos immediately after departure from Salamis as the result of a mine hit. It is possible that this is a case of faulty navigation while passing the gap in the minefield. Additional information must be awaited.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Armed reconnaissance attacked a convoy on the southwest coast unsuccessfully, and another in the Bristol Channel without observing results. 23 planes dropped mines in the Thames the night of 14 Mar. As an alternate target 4 planes attacked Falmouth by dead reckoning. Air reconnaissance failed to sight the OSORNO in the Atlantic.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Nuisance raids on the airfields on Malta continue.

3. Eastern Front:

No results were observed during attacks on the steamers located by air reconnaissance off Iokanga. No other reports were received.

VIII. Mediterranean Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

A cruiser of the DELHI class arrived in Gibraltar from an unknown direction. According to an Italian agent report the MALAYA has left dock. For departure of the convoy to the west see Enemy Situation, Submarine Warfare.

Only 4 submarines were still in Valletta in the morning. 2 submarines were sighted off Crete, and another one off Punta Stilo.

According to air reconnaissance there was little ship traffic in the Alexandria and Tobruk areas. There were many ships in Alexandria.

2. Situation Italy:

Enemy planes attacked Benghazi in the night of 13 Mar. No damage has been reported. An enemy submarine sank an auxiliary sailing vessel en route from Trapani to Tripoli off the east coast of Tunisia.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Steamer TRAPANI, returning empty from Tripoli on the western route, noticed a British plane maintaining contact. Otherwise nothing to report.

4. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

Enemy planes were active over Athens the night of 12 Mar., but dropped no bombs. Auxiliary ship BARLETTA left Salonika with an escort for a special assignment.

Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

The radio intercept service located cruiser E in the Sevastopol area. 3 destroyers and 2 submarines were in the same area. Messages between cruiser A, in the area off the southern part of the east coast, and Batum were intercepted. 8 more submarines were located at sea, at least 3 of them in the southwestern part of the Black Sea, and 3 off the southern part of the east coast. The submarines are maintaining radio silence, and only messages addressed to them were intercepted.

The German Legation at Bucharest forwarded a memorandum of the Rumanian Foreign Ministry which states that "it seems the Russians are preparing a landing between Varna and Burgas for the coming spring". It is assumed that the main objective is not so much to create a new Balkan front as to incite a communistic revolution in Bulgaria, to be followed by revolutions in Yugoslavia and Greece. The Rumanian government does not believe a communistic revolution in Bulgaria at all unlikely, since the Bulgarian people are decidedly pro-Russian, and the lower classes have pronounced Bolshevistic leanings. The army is not communistic, but it is pro-Russian. The German Minister believes that these views may go too far, but that they are worthy of note, particularly since other reports concerning agents operating under the direction of the Soviet Legation in Sofia are available.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report about the naval situation.

The Air Force Operations Staff has issued orders to the 4th Air Force for operations against enemy ship movements in the Black Sea. These attacks are to be concentrated in the Sevastopol, Kerch, and Kamish Burun areas, particularly Sevastopol, and they are to take precedence over operations in other areas of the Black Sea. Air reconnaissance for the purpose of locating ships is also to concentrate on coastal areas. For copy of the directive see I a 6283/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

IX. Situation East Asia1. Enemy Situation:

According to Reuter the Australian Prime Minister has announced that cruiser PERTH and PT boat YARA must be considered lost.

2. Situation Japan:

According to a report from the Military Attache in Tokyo, the Japanese General Staff does not yet know whether the capitulation on Java includes the Sumatra forces. The Military Attache at Bangkok reports that the British forcibly recruited 50,000 Indians in Burma, so as to keep them from being used by the Japanese. The advance along the railroad Rangoon-Prome to the north is continuing. The Japanese have occupied the Andaman Islands, as well as Akyaban harbor northwest of Rangoon. Operations will be hampered by the rainy season which begins at the end of March. Heavy air attacks by the Australians on the Japanese beachhead at Huon Gulf (New Guinea) have been reported. The Japanese Navy bombarded the Christmas Islands.

X. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

Continuing strong attacks in the Crimea, the enemy succeeded in penetrating the northern part of Korpech. Counterattacks are in progress. At the Von Kleist Army Group a night attack by about 450 naval troops and 150 engineers coming from Shabelskoye was repulsed at the Mius estuary, with severe enemy losses. All attacks launched by the enemy north of Taganrog were unsuccessful. At Slavyansk fierce street fights took place during a heavy snowstorm. In the sector of the 6th Army the enemy pushed back our lines west of Balakleya. Enemy pressure on Kharkov continues undiminished.

Central Army Group:

Enemy attacks south of Sukhinichi were unsuccessful. All enemy attacks on the highway at Yukhnov were repulsed. South of Vyazma broadcasts to enemy troops resulted in 310 deserters. Northeast of Gzhatsk troops which had penetrated our lines were thrown back. Further

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enemy attacks northwest of Rzhev and north of Byeloi were also unsuccessful.

Northern Army Group:

In general the situation is unchanged, with some local combat activity. The deep snow is interfering with operations. Heavy fighting continues at Maluksa.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

2 enemy attacks along the street from Syargozero to Kirasozero were repulsed with heavy enemy losses.

3. North Africa:

Lively enemy scouting activity. Enemy planes attacked the area of the XX Army Corps during the night of 13 Mar.

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Sunday

Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

The Undersecretary of State for War declared that the Allied defenses in the Pacific collapsed when naval supremacy was suddenly wrested from them. It is unjustifiable to reproach the troops for giving up Singapore after only 7 days, since they already had 10 weeks of heavy fighting on the Malay peninsula behind them.

Australia:

The War Minister claims that rumors about the possibility of a Japanese-Australian peace are enemy propaganda. Australia is an integrate part of the Empire.

South Africa:

During heated debates in Parliament, Smuts rejected attacks on the U.S. because of insufficient support of her allies, and stated that relations between the South African Union and Mozambique could not be better. He claims there are no plans for attacking Madagascar.

U.S.A.:

A reliable agent claims that public pressure in favor of taking the offensive refers particularly to Iceland and Central Africa. The plan to attack northern Norway from Iceland is said to be primarily of British origin, and the plan to launch an offensive via the Congo to the south and from there to North Africa, the Near East, and the Caucasus of American origin. It is considered that landings in Italy or Spain would be too costly. Small-scale operations against France are merely intended to be of nuisance value.

Japan:

Diplomatic circles term the report from a British source stating that the Japanese commander on Bataan committed harakiri a malicious invention.

Situation 15 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

According to an agent report from Brazil, a large gray ship with 4 escort vessels was sighted east of the mouth of the Amazon River on 13 Mar.; it is believed that this might be the QUEEN MARY.

Various reports indicate that a large U.S. convoy is being assembled

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which will head for the Far East via Capetown. In Lisbon it is rumored that the troops of this convoy will occupy Madagascar.

Pacific Ocean:

According to a decoded radio message, a U.S. steamer received orders from radio station Summit on 13 Mar. to proceed directly to Antofagasta. This indicates that there is controlled routing of ships in the South Pacific.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 1931 contains information about the enemy situation.

II. Situation West Area

1. Atlantic Coast:

Radiograms 1218 and 1323 instruct the OSORNO and the GERMANIA to be on the lookout along their approach route for a northbound convoy on 16 Mar. between 230 and 180 W, and for a southbound convoy on 17 Mar.

Group West reports that the assignment given by the Naval Staff on 4 Mar. 1941 (to cut the cable between Vigo and the British Isles) had to be postponed again because ships "13" and "24" were transferred to Norway.

2. Channel Coast:

Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence intercepted reports of British vessels about sighting a German PT boat 93 miles east of Lowestoft at 0725, and 4 German PT boats 75 miles east of Lowestoft at 1105.

Own Situation:

According to the brief report of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla about the engagement during the night of 13 Mar., the encounter with the destroyers took place inside a British minefield in quadrant BF 3358. 2 mines exploded 300 meters ahead of the SEEADLER, after 8 explosions had been heard previously. It is therefore not at all unlikely that the enemy forces laid mines shortly before the encounter. During the engagement the FALKE probably scored a torpedo hit on 1 destroyer. The ILTIS noticed 1 enemy destroyer listing. The JAGUAR definitely observed one 10.5 cm. hit on the leading enemy destroyer. On the JAGUAR one man was badly and one slightly wounded.

For copy of the brief report see Telegram 0750.

At 1715 twenty to thirty Spitfires attacked the 1st and 2nd Minesweeper Flotillas on operations between Le Havre and Cherbourg. At 1730 ship "28" continued her voyage from St. Malo westward.

Operations of the 4th PT Boat Flotilla against the northbound convoy during the night of 14 Mar. at buoy 54 E were unsuccessful. The flotilla was surrounded by 7 enemy destroyers at 2340. There were several 4 cm. hits on PT boat S "51", severely wounding 5 members of the crew; several men were slightly wounded on PT boat S "110". Unusually low visibility primarily accounted for the fact that the enemy did not score more hits,

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although he had located our vessels accurately. For copy of the brief report see Telegram 1553.

The simultaneous operation of the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla against the southbound convoy at buoy 57 E was very eventful. Because of the very low visibility 2 of the vessels ran into the end of the convoy, and PT boat S "104" sank 1 two-stack enemy destroyer with 2 single shots.

At 0400 the flotilla was located and chased by destroyers. The bridge on the S "104" received a 12.7 cm. hit. By 0900 all vessels except the S "111" had entered Ostend. After being notified by the Commander, Torpedo Boats that an engagement between an enemy motor gunboat and a German PT boat had been reported at 0730 in quadrant 8528, the flotilla commander departed once more with 3 vessels, and met the S "111" in quadrant 8524 engaged with 3 enemy motor gunboats which were chased off to the northeast. One of the enemy vessels was damaged severely; further pursuit had to be abandoned because of engine failure. The S "111" was found sinking and completely stripped. She sank at 1409. While attempting to bring her in our force which had no fighter escort was attacked intermittently by 11 enemy planes. There were 7 dead on the S "111", among them the captain, Lt. Popp, and a midshipman. 16 men were missing, and it is assumed that they were taken prisoner by the enemy. All our other vessels received hits during the Spitfire attacks and are out of commission. There were 5 severely and 8 slightly wounded men.

For brief report see Telegram 2120.

The sinking of the enemy destroyer more than makes up for the loss of PT boat S "111". In view of our inadequate forces it is particularly important that the enemy be made to feel that the convoys, which he is taking more care to guard lately, mainly by means of PT boats and destroyers, are not without risk.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

The 6th Flotilla postponed its departure from Heligoland to Norway because of the weather.

In the afternoon enemy planes were active over the Dutch coastal area. 1 plane was probably shot down by antiaircraft artillery.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

According to photographic reconnaissance, there were 1 light cruiser, several destroyers, and 16 steamers totalling 60,000 to 70,000 GRT in Murmansk. The 5th Air Force is probably correct in assuming that convoy PQ 12 has arrived. Air reconnaissance reported 9 steamers in the Iokanga area.

Own Situation:

The 8th PT Boat Flotilla is scheduled to carry out an operation off the arctic coast during the night of 15 Mar. Convoy and escort operations are proceeding according to plan. Steamer NICOLE SCHIAFFINO

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sank near Tromsø after scraping bottom.

As the result of the Fuehrer's directive about closer cooperation between the Navy and the Air Force along the Finnish-Norwegian coast by combining the staffs, or at least by exchanging liaison officers (see War Diary 14 Mar., Special Items), the Naval Staff plans to attach a liaison officer to the 5th Air Force, and to suggest that the Air Force Operations Staff attach an Air Force liaison officer to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean.

Group North is ordered (copy to the Commanding Admiral, Norway) to express an opinion immediately about other measures necessary in this connection, and to take other steps to eliminate shortcomings in communications between the Navy and the Air Force. See 1/Skl I a 6143/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

Group North informs the Fleet; Commanding Admiral, Battleships; Commander, Destroyers; the Commanding Admiral, Norway (with copy to the Naval Staff) about the experiences gained in the TIRPITZ operation against the northern convoys.

For copy see 1/Skl 6077/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

The SCHLESIEEN convoy is still in the Gjedser Strait. Icebreaker CASTOR has left Swinemunde to come to its aid.

Group North asks and receives the approval of the Naval Staff for carrying out pending urgent tasks in the following order:

1. The SCHLESIEEN convoy is to be assisted and brought to Kiel, so that the troop transport can proceed to Hamburg.
2. Subsequently the CASTOR is to bring the troop transports from Swinemunde in order to transport troops from Copenhagen to Oslo.
3. The CASTOR is not to leave for Riga until the Oslo transports can proceed without her aid, and until the ice situation permits the voyage to Riga.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, the ILLUSTRIOUS was at sea in the Greenock area, 1 ship northwest of Rockall Bank, and 1 ship 250 miles southwest of Porcupine Bank. The British steamer PERELLE, the Dutch steamer ALHENA, and the American steamer PULLER were probably damaged by collision.

According to an Italian report convoy SL 99-102 was located on 1 Mar. at approximately 23° N, 21° W on northerly course, speed 7 knots. One of the ships in the convoy was sent to Gibraltar the same day.

According to the radio intercept service, steamer AREAN and U.S. tanker ARI0 (6,952 GRT) were torpedoed south of Cape Lookout. 2 steamers

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reported sighting submarines, one of them the U.S. steamer BERWINDGLEN (4,411 GRT) south of Long Island.

The Naval Attache at Buenos Aires reports that a rumor is current in naval circles there that the QUEEN MARY has been torpedoed; the rumor is most probably incorrect.

According to the official German news agency (DNB), a German submarine sank the British steamer BRADFORD CITY off the coast of South Africa.

2. Own Situation:

Successes:

Submarine U "158" (Lt. Rostin) reports also sinking a coast guard vessel on 11 Mar., a tanker of at least 12,000 GRT and a ship which was presumably the MERCURY SUN (8,893 GRT) on 13 Mar. Steamer OLEAN (7,018 GRT) was left sinking, and with the last torpedo a hit was scored on steamer ARIO (6,952 GRT), which was subsequently set aflame by gunfire. All these ships were in the vicinity of Cape Hatteras.

Submarine U "101" (Lt. Achilles), which is out of torpedoes, reports sinking the U.S. steamer ACADIA (6,185 GRT) by gunfire.

For supplementary situation report see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

26 planes dropped mines in the Thames during the night of 15 Mar.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports that the reinforced air forces attacks on Malta have begun according to plan. A concentrated attack on the antiaircraft positions in the Valletta area with good effect initiated these operations.

3. Eastern Front:

7 planes made a surprise attack on the harbor of Murmansk during the night of 14 Mar. 8 explosions other than bomb explosions were heard.

For the directive of the Commander in Chief, Air to the 5th Air Force, see War Diary, 14 Mar., Situation Norway. The Air Force Operations Staff has ordered the 5th Air Force to report by 17 Mar. agreements reached with naval commands.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

A cruiser of the DELHI class left Gibraltar in an unknown

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direction during the night of 14 Mar.

2 PT boats were sighted on easterly course at 1630 northeast of Cape Serat. (This is the first time enemy PT boats have been sighted in this area.) According to Italian air reconnaissance 8 destroyers were seen at 0740 at 35° 33' N, 30° 45' E on 150° course. The Italian Navy believes that these were British destroyers returning from a mine operation between Scarpanto and Rhodes. The radio intercept service bears out this assumption, reporting that there are light forces in the Cypress area.

Submarines were sighted near Lampedusa, Cape Matapan, and Cape Spartivento.

The radio intercept service intercepted a message from a Malta reconnaissance plane that a submarine attacked an Italian merchant ship escorted by a destroyer 38 miles southeast of Lampione.

According to an Italian agent report 2 submarines with personnel and supplies left Egypt for Malta on 1 or 2 Mar., in other words British transport submarines!

2. Own Situation:

The mine operation of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla off Malta was carried out according to plan in the night of 14 Mar. Another mine operation is being carried out in the night of 15 Mar.

The 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla is ready for operations. It will leave La Spezia on 18 Mar. after adjustments.

3. Situation Italy:

According to a report from the German Consul General in Tirana concerning the unfavorable situation of the Italians in Montenegro, 2 or 4 British submarines are operating along the coast of Montenegro, supplying the insurgents with war materiel, and in return they receive food and fuel, which the Italians are forced to deliver to the rebels. The same report mentions secret Italian connections with the insurgents, and delivery of weapons.

According to the report of the Naval Attache, Rome about Italy's economic situation in February 1942, it is interesting to note that of 250 tons of cellulose delivered by Germany per month, only 65 tons per month were used for powder, while 85 were used for rayon, 50 for films, and 50 for celluloid. Under these circumstances it is understandable that the German war economy officer in Italy is to be refused any insight into the general economic situation, including the armament industry.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Ship movements are proceeding according to plan without special incidents.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The search for survivors of submarine U "133" was unsuccessful. The BARLETTA has started out on her assignment.

Black Sea:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia1. Enemy Situation:

From the continuation of the Admiralty report about the naval battle in the Java Sea on 27 Feb. and the following days it is evident that the following ships were lost: EXETER, the Dutch cruiser DE RUYTER, JAVA, the Australian cruiser PERTH, British and U.S. destroyers JUPITER, ELECTRA, ENCOUNTER, STRONGHOLD, and POPE, the Dutch destroyers KORTENAER and EVERTSEN, and the Australian corvette YARRA. For translation of the complete report see the appendix of No. 63 of the Foreign Press Reports, Naval Intelligence Division.

The report confirms the overwhelming victory of the Japanese in this battle, and mentions the loss of several more destroyers than the Japanese. However, it does not mention the fate of the U.S. cruiser HOUSTON, which the Japanese claim was lost.

2. Situation Japan:

The Military Attache at Bangkok reported on 13 Mar. as follows:

a. Indochina: a newly organized mountain division has arrived in Saigon for the Burma front.

b. Burma: unified warfare is impossible for the enemy in the Irrawaddy delta; he is retreating in the direction of Bassein.

c. Australia: an air raid lasting half an hour was carried out against Melbourne.

d. New Guinea: the Japanese are advancing north from Huon Gulf. The Australians are launching heavy air attacks on this area. Enemy planes attacked Rabaul.

IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

Repeated and often strong enemy attacks were repulsed in the Crimea. The enemy is expected to launch a large-scale attack north of Taganrog. Enemy attacks near Slavyansk were unsuccessful.

North of Bishkin Russian forces which had broken through on 14 Mar. pushed the Hungarian hussars to the west. Fierce fighting is in progress west of Balakleya. Tank divisions coming from the west repulsed enemy units advancing between Saltov and Volchansk.

Central Army Group:

Fighting in the Sukhinichi area continues. The 4th Army re-

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pulsed attacks west of Yukhnov. Enemy forces penetrated our lines north-east of Gzhatsk. Likewise enemy troops gained ground at the former penetration point west of Rzhev. We have thrown in all available forces. The supply routes are blocked by snow drifts.

Northern Army Group:

The enemy has increased his activity in the rear area north of Demyansk. He is bringing up parachute troops. Our troops are exerting pressure on Staraya Russa and the Volkhov pocket.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

Normal scouting activity on both sides.

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Items of Political Importance

U.S.A. and Great Britain:

According to Reuter the British Isles are to get four fifths of all American exports of milk, eggs, pork, and lard in 1942. More than 2,000,000 tons of food are expected to be exported to all allies.

Brazil:

Anti-Axis demonstrations are still being made. The police have had to use guns to break up the demonstrators.

According to the Associated Press the Brazilian government has confiscated 12 Italian and 4 German ships totalling 113,000 GRT in retaliation for the 4 Brazilian ships sunk.

Spain and Argentina:

According to the press, the Spanish Foreign Ministry has announced a far-reaching financial and economic agreement with Argentina, which provides for the exchange of goods valued at 500,000,000 pesetas.

Near East:

According to the Transocean News Service reporting from Ankara, Russian troops are advancing on the oil region of Mosul. British troops are continuing to withdraw from the western provinces of Iran.

Turkey:

According to the German News Agency, another Turkish ship was sunk by a Russian submarine inside territorial waters in the Black Sea.

Japan:

The British and American press are discussing future Japanese plans. In Washington the impression is growing that Japan will attack Vladivostok and the Russian Pacific coast in the spring or summer. London, on the other hand, tends to believe that Japan will be so occupied in the Pacific and India that she will be unable to attack Siberia. In any event, Russia is making all preparations for the defense of Vladivostok.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports that the SS has requested that sufficient shipyard facilities be allocated to construct 100 motor ships of 300 tons each and 50 monitors for use in the Black Sea.

The Chief, Naval Staff orders that this request be rejected, pointing out that such projects are exclusively the responsibility of the Navy.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports about the Croatian volunteers in the Navy. The original plan to organize separate Croatian units has been abandoned due to the objection raised by the

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Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division about providing these units with secret code material and similar equipment. Instead, these troops could be trained and then used individually on German ships.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

III. The Chief, Naval Staff orders that no valuable ships should enter Narvik until the antiaircraft batteries in Bogen Bay have been reinforced as planned.

IV. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, West has pointed out that the Army must reinforce the defenses of submarine bases to such an extent that the enemy will be unable to occupy them even temporarily, as in raids. The Chief, Naval Staff orders that a request to this effect be directed to the Army High Command.

V. The Naval Staff Operations Division, Foreign Affairs Section reports about French counterdemands in return for permitting 4 additional PT boats to pass through French territory into the Mediterranean. (Release of 3,500 prisoners of war on leave in occupied France.) The Armed Forces High Command has agreed, and the prisoners are to be released as soon as the PT boats have been transferred through France.

The Italian Armistice Commission has now dropped its objections against repairing the DUNKERQUE. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

According to a report of the Naval Liaison Officer at the Armed Forces High Command, the Fuehrer has approved the suggestion of the Foreign Office that Turkey be offered war materiel, possibly even submarines, in return for permitting German warships (submarines) to cross the Dardanelles.

VI. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports about the Fuehrer directive (see War Diary 14 Mar.), and the Naval Staff's request that Group North submit suggestions about appointing liaison officers in accordance with this directive. (See War Diary 15 Mar.)

VII. According to reports from the Commanding Admiral, Norway and Group North, the attack on the Rybachi Peninsula will probably have to be postponed until fall, since supplies and troops cannot be brought up by 15 Apr., which is the deadline if the operation is to be carried out in the spring. The matter will have to be decided by the Armed Forces High Command.

If the attack should be postponed, it would be well to recall Commander Busch temporarily to Germany, so that he can acquaint himself with landing experiences at the Naval High Command and the Admiral, Amphibious Forces and then return to Petsamo.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

VIII. See 1/Skl I op 562/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary file "Felix" for the order to Group West, the Commanding Admiral, France, and the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division extending the preliminary warning period for operation "Felix".

IX. The Armed Forces High Command transmits the following order of the Fuehrer:

1. Since an aircraft carrier is indispensable for naval operations, the GRAF ZEPPELIN is to be completed as quickly as possible.

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2. The ship planes are to consist of fighter, reconnaissance, and torpedo planes.

3. The Commander in Chief, Air will be responsible for providing suitable planes and crews at the appropriate time.

4. Details are to be worked out between the Commander in Chief, Navy and Commander in Chief, Air, beginning at once.

The Commander in Chief, Navy is asked to inform the Fuehrer through the Armed Forces High Command when the ship can be expected to be commissioned and ready for operations.

The War Economy and Armaments Division of the Armed Forces High Command requests the same information as well as data on the materials and manpower needed.

The Chief, Naval Staff would like to see the data before it is sent on to the War Economy and Armaments Division of the Armed Forces High Command.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division will take care of the matter. See 1/Skl I a 612/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. V.

Situation 16 Mar.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 1826 contains sailing instructions for tanker GERMANIA.

According to information from the Japanese Liaison Officer, the latest report from Tokyo indicates that the area south of 10° S and west of 80° E is the only one in which German auxiliary cruisers can be permitted to operate. In an emergency this line can be crossed by agreement. This limitation is necessary because Japanese operations in this area will get under way in the near future.

Radiograms 1418, 1544, and 2119 contain information on the enemy situation.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

The Admiralty reports about the engagement in the Channel between the convoy of ship "28" and naval forces the night of 13 Mar. According to this report, 1 German PT boat was blown up, and another one was sunk, while the British suffered only slight damage and no losses.

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As a matter of fact there were no German losses.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Radiogram 1826 informs Group West about the sailing instructions to tanker GERMANIA.

Channel Coast:

Harbor patrol boat "97" sank near Dunkirk as the result of a mine hit. 6 are dead or missing. It is possible that the ship, which has a considerable draft, hit an old mine that had been sunk by gunfire.

Ship "28" proceeded according to plan. The 4th PT Boat Flotilla laid mines according to plan northeast of Orfordness the night of 16 Mar.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

4 vessels of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla left Heligoland for Stavanger.

Convoys proceeded according to plan without special incidents.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Radio Rugby issued a warning about mined areas near Kristiansund and the Trondheim Fjord, based on reports in the Norwegian press. Air reconnaissance located 1 cruiser, probably of the KIROV class, and 1 destroyer in Kola Bay. There were 2 submarines in Polyarnoye.

Own Situation:

The northern mine ship group (COBRA and BRUMMER) entered Kirkenes on 15 Mar.

On 16 Mar. steamer UTLANDSHOERN sank off Petsamo as the result of an explosion, the cause of which has not been determined as yet. It may have been a mine.

Mine ship ULM has left for the first part of the mine operation near the Helnes lighthouse.

Convoy and escort service according to plan.

Group North is instructed as follows (copies to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines and the Admiral, Arctic Ocean) concerning the assignment of the 20 submarines provided for the defense of Norway:

a. They are to disrupt enemy supply lines in the Arctic Ocean and outside the ports of destination.

b. They are to disrupt enemy transport movements outside of the ports of departure.

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c. They are to detect and hamper enemy landing plans in the Norway area.

The main task at the moment is that described under point a. Once more it is pointed out that Group North should direct the operations of the 20 submarines in accordance with its responsibility for naval warfare in the North Sea and the Arctic Ocean and the protection of Norway.

For copy see 1/Skl I u 613/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

A plane reported a submerged submarine at 1050 in quadrant AO 4454 (west of Skagen), evidently in connection with the departure of the Norwegian ships from Swedish harbors.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "7" and 1 patrol boat went out after the submarine in quadrant AO 4454. The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea informed all ships at sea about the submarine sighted near Skagen.

The SCHLESSEN group is still in the same place in the Gjedser Strait.

See Telegram 1717 for steps taken by Naval Station, Baltic Sea to reinforce the air defenses of Gdynia in view of the impending transfer of the GNEISENAU.

For copy of the report of the Coastal Defense Commander, West, transmitted by Naval Station, Baltic Sea, concerning the smoke screen defenses and experiences during the last air attacks on Kiel see 1/Skl 6187/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

See Telegram 1152 for requests of Naval Station, Baltic Sea that a railroad antiaircraft battery of the Air Force be stationed in Kiel temporarily; Telegram 1716 contains a request for 6 additional "Wuerzburg" radar sets. The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is taking care of the matter.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

In the South Atlantic a submarine warning was issued for the area 40 miles west of Capetown. Since no German submarines are in that area it is possible that the minefield laid by the DOGGERBANK in that area has scored another success.

Numerous SSS signals were intercepted from ships along the North American East Coast. Among these were U.S. steamer BEATRICE (3,451 GRT), British steamer BRIGITTE (1,595 GRT), British tanker SAN DEMETREO (8,073 GRT), which was torpedoed, all of them from the area east of the Chesapeake Bay; U.S. tanker AUSTRALIA (11,628 GRT) was torpedoed off Cape Hatteras

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and abandoned by her crew; British tanker BRITISH RESOLUTION (8,408 GRT) also sent an SSS signal from the vicinity of Cape Hatteras.

According to a radio message 3 rafts and ship debris were sighted west of Trinidad.

2. Own Situation:

The Irish steamer IRISH WILLOW (1,000 GRT) was released by radio order of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines after being searched by submarine U "753" northwest of Porcupine Bank.

Tanker SAN DEMETREO was probably sunk by U "404". U "504" sank an armed 7,000 GRT steamer northeast of the Bahamas. She was evidently carrying ammunition, motor vehicles, and plane parts. The ship could not be identified, since she blew up.

No reports have been received from the submarines in the South Atlantic.

In the Mediterranean submarine operations were concentrated off Tobruk in the night of 17 Mar.

For supplementary situation report see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV. See Situation Norway for orders concerning vessels in the northern area.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Air reconnaissance along the English coasts resulted in no information of importance.

On 15 Mar. a FW 200 of the Air Commander, Atlantic Coast sank the British steamer DAGO (1,750 GRT) off Lisbon.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The weather hampered air operations against Malta.

For photo reconnaissance of Alexandria see Enemy Situation, Mediterranean Warfare.

3. Eastern Front:

Reconnaissance planes were active in the Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The Air Force Operations Staff ordered the III Group of the 1st Tactical Experimental Wing transferred at once to the Black Sea for the purpose of attacking ships in that area.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

4 destroyers and 2 gunboats were observed leaving Gibraltar.

A German submarine sighted a periscope 50 miles south of Ostia. Between

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Benghazi and Alexandria air reconnaissance sighted only 1 convoy in the afternoon consisting of 2 steamers and 5 escort vessels proceeding on northwesterly course 45 miles west of Alexandria. The Italian Navy reported that 1 submarine was sighted northeast of Cape Spartivento.

Photographic reconnaissance of Alexandria showed that there were 2 destroyers and 3 small cruisers more than on 10 Mar.

2. Own Situation:

The mine operation of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla off Malta was carried out according to plan during the night of 15 Mar. The flotilla will carry out a similar operation during the night of 16 Mar.

3. Situation Italy:

Enemy planes attacked Benghazi during the night of 15 Mar. 2 of them were shot down.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

According to an Italian report the 4th transport group carried 688 vehicles, 8,640 tons of Armed Forces supplies, and 4,571 tons of fuel, in addition to 145 men.

The 5th transport group, with steamers REICHENFELS and PISANI, departed according to plan on 16 Mar. Steamer GREGORI has departed for Tripoli by the western route. Steamer BOSFORO left Taranto for Benghazi on 15 Mar. Steamer TRAPANI was towed into Trapani on the return voyage from Tripoli on 16 Mar. because of engine failure.

Coastal traffic by naval barges without special incidents.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

The Italian Navy reported that a submarine was sighted east of Cape Stavros (Crete).

Own Situation:

Auxiliary cruiser BARLETTA has carried out her mining operation according to plan. The special assignment of the Italian subchasers was broken off prematurely because of the weather. The operation is to be repeated on 21 Mar.

Convoy operations proceeded without special incidents.

According to a report from Naval Group South, it is definite that submarine U "133" probably due to faulty navigation, passed through the minefield itself instead of the gap near Cape Turlos. No survivors or debris have been found as yet.

Because of the shortage of anti-submarine forces, Group South has ordered submarine traps to be used in the Aegean as well as in the Black Sea. In the Aegean Sea 5 auxiliary sailing vessels will be used as an emergency measure to begin with; in the Black Sea motor ship RILA (185 GRT) and 1 naval barge will be used.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division will handle the matter. (See

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Telegram 1800.)

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

At 0330 on 15 Mar. Feodosiya was bombarded from the sea. In the night of 15 Mar. a landing attempt at Klaronka was repulsed by an Army coastal battery.

Air reconnaissance reported lively shipping traffic to and from Sevastopol and Kerch. For details see Air Situation.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Situation Japan:

According to a report from the Military Attache at Bangkok, parts of the Army Air Force which become available in the Southwest Pacific are being transferred to Manchukuo. In this connection the report from the German Embassy at Nanking is noteworthy, in which it is said that the Japanese High Command believes it possible that the Russo-Japanese conflict might break out this month.

All enemy resistance has stopped on Sumatra and Java.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Fighting continues on sectors of the Crimean front without any decisive change in the situation.

Enemy troops are concentrating in front of the Von Kleist Army Group. A number of local attacks were unsuccessful.

The 6th Army repulsed all enemy attacks.

Central Army Group:

Vesnini was held in the face of strong attacks. Lively combat activity continued at the main points of earlier enemy attacks (Demenskoye, Yukhnov, Vyazma, Rzhev, and Velizh). The railroad from Rzhev to Vyazma is again in our hands.

Northern Army Group:

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Also in this sector local enemy attacks at Kholm, in the Pola valley, near Staraya Russa, west of Yamno, and near Maluksa were unable to change the situation.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

Enemy situation unchanged.

The German Africa Corps successfully carried out armed reconnaissance against El Mogaresh for the purpose of diverting the enemy's attention from operations to relieve our troops.

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Items of Political Importance

Norway:

See Political Review No. 64, paragraph 1, for a report on the unchanged dissatisfied state of public opinion in this country.

Great Britain:

A British computation of war potentials estimates that of Germany at 100, of America at 200, Great Britain 80, Russia 60, the Dominions and India 30, Japan only 40, Italy 20, and the other countries occupied by the Axis 25; thus the Axis have a potential of 185 as against 370 of the Allies. At the moment, however, the U.S. produces only as much as Germany.

Because of paper shortage further restrictions have had to be imposed on the press. The Food Minister has declared that it will be difficult to maintain the meat rations at the present level.

Halifax declared in New York on 16 Mar. that the Allies will certainly not leave the initiative in the hands of the enemy. The enemy has now reached the capacity of his industrial and military power, and can increase either in the future only at the expense of the other. Calling attention to the unused American reserves, he appeals to faith in the Allied cause, which is the only thing that enabled England to survive the past fall and winter.

Indo China:

So far Japan has not made any final decision about the fate of this country. However it may be assumed that the French administration will not continue indefinitely.

Japan:

The Japanese press stresses particularly that it might be wise to use diplomatic rather than military tactics against India, Australia, China, and Russia. With regard to India it is said that Nehru and other circles, in contrast to Ghandi, are ready for negotiations with Cripps. Japan has no designs on India herself, but only wishes to free this country from the British yoke, so that she may become an active participant in the reorganization of East Asia. (This would mean "under Japanese leadership".)

The new ambassador to Moscow, Sato, stated that he believes it might be possible that Japan will celebrate her victory in London and the Japanese fleet will parade in victory at New York. (!)

U.S.A.:

Sumner Welles announced that the Swedish steamer DROTTNINGHOLM (11,055 GRT) has been chartered to take German and Italian diplomats from America to Lisbon, and U.S. personnel from Europe to the U.S. Thereafter the ship will take Japanese diplomats from America to Lourenco Marques, where they will be exchanged for British officials from the Far East.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the results of the investigation ordered by the Chief, Naval Staff on 27 Feb. concerning protection of the Trondheim approaches, i.e., Frohavet, Ramsøe Fjord, and Griphoelen, and elimination of the gap in the minefield in Trondheimsleden (see War Diary 27 Feb.) Group North reports the mining operations planned by the Commanding Admiral, Norway in this connection and the number of mines needed, and states that it approves these plans provided the Ramsøe Fjord barrage is laid last. For copy of report see 1/Skl 6177/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIIa.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway has not yet finished the investigation concerning elimination of the gap in the minefield in the Trondheimsleden.

The Chief, Naval Staff approves, and calls attention to the fact that the large number of mines needed for this task should have been shipped at once to Norway, in spite of the difficult transport and storage conditions.

II. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the cargo of the TANNENFELS, which is en route to Japan. It consists of 3,390 tons of machines and machine parts, 240 tons of iron and steel, 330 tons of boilers and related equipment, 180 tons of agricultural machinery, 75 tons of scientific equipment, electrical equipment, 5 tons of cameras, films, and related equipment, 700 tons of chemical and pharmaceutical products, 870 tons of fertilizer, 435 tons of dyes, etc.; a total of 7,250 tons.

III. A report is also made on Japanese landing tactics and a chart is demonstrated which was drawn up by the Naval Intelligence Division, showing U.S. bases. The consistent geopolitical principle underlying the U.S. policy of expansion is clearly evident in this chart. The Chief, Naval Staff will present this chart to the Fuehrer during the next conference.

IV. The Chief, Naval Communications Division reports that the TANNENFELS did not take along any radar set for the Japanese Navy, since no Japanese officer was sent to be instructed as to its use.

V. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports that another battleship berth has been completed in the Lo Fjord near Trondheim. He also reports about the contradictory orders issued to torpedo boat T "4" by the Naval Staff Construction Division and Group North. The Chief, Naval Staff will discuss the matter personally with the Commanding Admiral, Group North after receiving Group North's report, since it is not justifiable as things stand to blame Group North alone.

VI. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports on the importance of the coal problem, on the British wire rockets, new U.S. antiaircraft cruisers, and serious damage to the torpedo dump at Kiel during the enemy air attack on the night of 12 Mar., which has upset torpedo deliveries for about a month and a half.

A further report is made in connection with the Fuehrer's reproach that the branches of the Armed Forces did not pay sufficient attention to the problem of scarce raw materials. It is pointed out that as early as September 1934, in other words 5 years prior to the Fuehrer directive dealing with this question, the Navy had begun to take energetic steps to introduce substitute materials. For example, steel cartridge cases,

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steel rotating bands for missiles, nickel in armor plating replaced by molybdenum, etc. As ordered, the Armed Forces High Command has been kept constantly informed about the progress of these very considerable developments since 1939.

The Chief, Naval Staff is prepared to report the essential points of this program to the Fuehrer.

VII. The Chief, Naval Construction Division reports about the stage reached in the construction of the GRAF ZEPPELIN.

VIII. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports that permission has been given to drop aerial mines in the harbors of the English west coast, and that the legal arrest on the Norwegian ships in Goeteborg has just been lifted.

A report is also made about the change in the orders issued by Group North for the transfer of the HIPPER to Trondheim; the waiting period in the Skagerrak has been cancelled. The operation is to start on 18 Mar. The Trondheim forces have been ordered on 3 hour readiness at the berth.

A report is made about the submarine situation. The Chief, Naval Staff believes that it is regrettable that submarine operations in the Caribbean Sea are temporarily coming to a standstill, and he directs that the Commanding Admiral, Submarines be informed to this effect.

Investigations of possibilities for operating in the Panama area have shown the inadvisability of such plans, in view of very strong land fortifications and the fact that the water is generally too shallow in the Canal approaches.

A report is made on the instructions given to Group North concerning operations of surface forces in the north area on the basis of the experiences gained by the Commanding Admiral, Battleships during the operation against convoy PQ 12. See 1/Skl I a 608/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

The Chief, Naval Staff likewise approves of the directive to Group North (copy to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines) concerning authority over and tasks of the submarines in the north area, whose main task at the present time consists in disrupting enemy supplies in the Arctic Ocean and outside of the ports of destination, Murmansk and Archangel. See 1/Skl I u 613/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, 16 Mar.

The Chief, Naval Staff approves the plan of the Naval Staff to transfer the available destroyers from Trondheim to the north in the near future; torpedo boats remaining in Trondheim will insure that the heavy forces there can continue to operate.

Special Items

An intelligence agent reported on 10 Mar. about the enemy's spring offensive as follows:

Approximately at the end of May the operations indicated below are to begin simultaneously. The exact date will be set about 2 weeks prior

to the start of the operations.

1. A large-scale Russian attack will be launched against Finland, and 500 British planes with British crews will participate.

An attack will also be launched against northern Finland from Murmansk, where 2 rifle divisions are ready for this purpose.

2. The British will launch an attack against Norway (probably Narvik), and Russian air forces will participate.

3. Air raids will be carried out against occupied France, Belgium, and Holland, as well as against Germany.

4. Air raids will be launched against the Balkan states, particularly concentrating on Bucharest, Constanta, Ploesti, Harsova, and Braila.

5. Air raids against Hungary, especially Koloszvar.

6. Pressure on Turkey will be increased by deploying 8 Russian rifle divisions and 8 British divisions in Iran in the vicinity of Lake Urmia. The U.S. is to supply all the equipment for these units.

7. Heavy attacks will be made against Italy, especially Sicily and Calabria.

8. Additional attacks will be made against Libya. General de Gaulle is to have command of the forces involved. This is the suggestion made by General Weygand.

Situation 17 Mar.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

Cruiser DIOMEDE was expected in Montevideo on 16 Mar.

Indian Ocean:

According to a report from the French Military Attache in Athens, the blockade of French Somaliland has been lifted for all practical purposes. The colony has been supplied with food for about a year from Madagascar.

According to a report from the Italian Air Force, 2 light U.S. cruisers and 2 destroyers were sighted within territorial waters near Lourenco Marques. 2 additional destroyers were in the harbor.

According to the radio deciphering service, on 15 Mar. the Chief, East India Station ordered the U.S. auxiliary cruiser WEST POINT (which an agent had reported in Pernambuco on 2 Mar.), en route to the Indian Ocean, to tune in on a certain wavelength. To judge from her radio messages, the ship is already in the East Indies. On 14 Mar. U.S. submarine S "38" and Dutch submarine K "9" were in the Australian radio area.

2. Own Situation:

No report has been received from ship "10" since her departure. The Naval Staff assumes that the ship is still in the operations area or withdrawing from there, and believes that she will take on 1,600 cubic meters of fuel oil from the REGENSBURG between 25 and 31 Mar.

Ship "10" is informed of this assumption and ordered to report after refueling from the REGENSBURG by code the date on which the supply ship was released. She is also to report her successes and changes if any, in the amount of fuel she has taken on.

The Naval Staff expects that the REGENSBURG will supply the TANNENFELS at the latest 5 days after she has been released by ship "10"; if there is any change, ship "10" is to report when the TANNENFELS can be expected to release the REGENSBURG.

Since experiences with sending messages outside of the zero beat have been good, ship "10" is permitted to use this method if necessary.

If it should be necessary for ship "10" to remain longer in the operations area, the Naval Staff agrees, and will leave supply ships as long as necessary in waiting position. In this case ship "10" is to send a code signal when withdrawing from the operations area as to when she expects to meet the REGENSBURG.

Since it is intended to send the TANNENFELS through the Indian Ocean to the Sunda Strait after she has taken on supplies, it is important to know the date of departure. Ship "10" will be informed of the route to be taken by the TANNENFELS and the waiting area for the second supply operation.

Radiogram 0642 informs ship "10" accordingly. Radiogram 1597 contains information about the enemy situation.

II. Situation West Area

1. Atlantic Coast:

Ship "28" has entered the Gironde, and will be ready to depart on 20 Mar. The 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla has entered La Pallice.

Air reconnaissance failed to sight the OSORNO or the GERMANIA.

Radiogram 0922 contains plane recognition signals for the OSORNO.

2. Channel Coast:

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla laid mines according to plan. For brief report see Telegram 0740.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

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Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service there were 3 convoys in the Thames estuary, and another one was east of The Wash. Air reconnaissance reported 1 large warship and several escort vessels northeast of Cromer at 1350, and a total of 12 barrage balloons. Photographic reconnaissance to confirm these facts was unsuccessful because of fog. 1 convoy consisting of 11 steamers and 2 minesweepers was located east of Flamborough Head on northerly course.

Own Situation:

2 vessels of the Rhine Flotilla off Schouwen ran aground in the fog and are being towed away.

Interrogation by the Intelligence Center, Wilhelmshaven of the 2 Dutchmen disguised as British officers who were captured at Katwijk confirms the suspicion that they were attempting sabotage. See Telegram 2350 for copy of the intelligence report.

Convoy and escort service is proceeding without special incident.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, 1 British vessel was in quadrant AN 3717 (100 miles east of Firth of Forth), and convoy PQ 13 was in British home waters on 13 Mar. British planes reported 2 southbound destroyers 32 miles northwest of Bergen at 1745.

Air reconnaissance in the Arctic Ocean reported 7 steamers north of Murmansk in the morning, and 3 steamers in the Kola bend, evidently stuck in the ice. It was not possible to reconnoiter Iokanga.

Own Situation:

The 6th PT Boat Flotilla entered Stavanger. According to the Naval Shore Commander at Kirkenes it is possible that steamer UHLANDSHOERN was sunk by a PT boat torpedo, since engine noises were heard. However, the search for mines continues.

The ULM executed the mining mission near Helnes lighthouse according to plan on 16 Mar., and will continue the operation in the Bille Fjord during the night of 16 Mar., after taking on more mines.

Convoy and transport movements without special incidents.

See Telegram 1710 for the report of the Admiral, Arctic Coast to Group North about the operations and operations areas of 7 submarines.

For report by the Commanding Admiral, Norway about mines in the Porsanger Fjord see 1/Skl 10438 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA.

See 1/Skl 6322/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA for plans of the Commanding Admiral, Norway about an alarm minefield in the Trondheimsleden as a protection against an attack by heavy enemy surface forces, and his request for approval and allocation of 74 standard mines type C and 500 torpedo mines type A.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea1. Enemy Situation:

On 17 Mar. a court decision lifted the arrest placed by the Swedish government on Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. There are 12 loaded ships totalling 60,443 GRT in Goeteborg. In addition there are 10 completed new ships in Goeteborg and Malmoe totalling 88,240 GRT and probably 3 more totalling 30,500 GRT in Goeteborg and Landskrona. The loaded ships in Goeteborg can be expected to attempt a breakthrough, especially since the ice situation in the Skagerrak permits passage.

2. Own Situation:

Group North is instructed that it is most desirable to prevent the ships from breaking through or to destroy them. The patrols for the minefield gaps at Hanstholm and Kristiansand South provided by the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea for 17 Mar. should be taken over by the Commanding Admiral, Norway on 18 Mar. Group North plans to commit the naval forces if the steamers are seen leaving port. The 5th Air Force is requested to attack likewise under these circumstances, and to reconnoiter the area of the Skagerrak and southwestern Norway, since British covering forces must be expected. (See Telegram 1615.)

Submarine chase in the vicinity of Skagen was discontinued because of the weather.

The SCHLESIIEN convoy is still in the Gjedser Strait.

See Telegram 1600 for the report of the Fleet Command to the Naval Staff about changes in the gun cables on the SCHARNHORST.

V. Merchant Warfare

1. It may be assumed that the Russian merchant fleet (government property) consisted of about 2,000,000 GRT at the beginning of the war. Between 22 Jun. 1941 and 28 Feb. 1942, 268 of these ships totalling 560, 137 GRT are estimated to have been lost, among them 21 tankers totalling 88,220 GRT. For details see report no. 7/42 "Foreign Merchant Shipping" of the Naval Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Shipping Branch.

2. According to the Transocean News Agency, the Brazilian government has approved purchase of the 5 Danish ships in Brazilian harbors.

VI. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

For position of convoy PQ 13 see Enemy Situation, Norway. Radio intelligence intercepted messages concerning a submarine sighted 60 miles off Long Island, and concerning the torpedoing of the U.S. tanker ACME (6,978 GRT) off Cape Hatteras.

According to an American radio message, a plane sank an Axis submarine off the U.S. East Coast. According to Chilean government circles,

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the Vichy Telegraphic Service reported that the Chilean freighter TOLTEN (3,000 GRT) was sunk off the U.S. coast.

Radio Cuba picked up an SOS from a U.S. coast guard vessel from the vicinity of Guadeloupe. The Swedish steamer SKANE was lost in the Caribbean Sea.

2. Own Situation:

The submarine assigned to meet the tanker GERMANIA was unfortunately unable to locate her. For supplementary situation report see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

See 1/Sk1 6311/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV for the opinion of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines and suggested changes in the draft of Group West of a "directive for cooperation between merchant vessels and escort submarines".

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines tends to believe that expertly used and brief radio bearings involve little risk, and recommends that the Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division give his opinion.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

For results of air reconnaissance see Enemy Situation, North Sea.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Planes provided escort for the 5th transport group. During the operation they attacked a surfaced submarine northwest of Benghazi, but no effects were observed.

During the day bomber and fighter planes made renewed attacks on Malta; some good effects on airfields were achieved. For the first time planes were observed on the Krendi airfield.

Reconnaissance missions were flown in the central and eastern Mediterranean.

3. Eastern Front:

Nothing special to report.

For reconnaissance reports see Enemy Situation, Norway.

VIII. Mediterranean Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

The ARGUS, 1 DIDO class cruiser, and several destroyers were at sea during the day, evidently for maneuvers, and returned to Gibraltar in the evening. According to an intelligence report from Spain, 1 warship, evidently a cruiser, and 4 destroyers were sighted off Malaga

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on a southwest course on 16 Mar.

According to an Italian report, 2 Greek destroyers entered Malta in the morning.

German and Italian air reconnaissance reported sighting submarines south-east of Kuriat (Tunis) and south of Messina. There was little shipping traffic between Alexandria and Tobruk in the morning.

According to an Italian agent report 1 7,000 GRT cruiser was sunk and 2 others damaged during the air attack on the naval force on 11 Mar. There were many casualties on all of the cruisers.

2. Own Situation:

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla returned from its mining mission. 6 mines exploded about 1 or 2 hours after they were laid. The cause is being investigated.

3. Situation Italy:

Nothing to report.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The voyages of the 5th transport group and of steamers GREGORI and BOSFORO proceeded according to plan. The transport group was sighted by British reconnaissance planes between 1045 and 1200, and reported as consisting of 1 cruiser, 3 destroyers, and 2 steamers.

Libyan coastal traffic is proceeding according to plan without special incident.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

No reports available because of interrupted communications.

The report of the Admiral, Aegean Sea about the results of the conference between the Italian Transport Minister, envoy Clodius, and the Chief of Staff of the Admiral, Aegean Sea concerning commercial traffic in Piraeus and the construction of 24 wooden fishing cutters for the Navy is transmitted to the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division for further consideration. For copy see 1/Skl 6299/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, cruiser E was west of Tuapse, cruiser A and 1 destroyer somewhere along the central or southern part of the east coast. 10 to 12 submarines were located at sea.

Air reconnaissance located lively shipping traffic in the direction of Kerch. The number of merchant vessels in Novorossisk had diminished accordingly. In this harbor 1 cruiser and 2 submarines were sighted burning.

Own Situation:

During the night of 16 Mar., 3 Russian vessels bombarded

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Feodosiya, Sarigol, and positions northwest of Feodosiya for half an hour.

Nothing to report about our own naval situation.

Situation France:

According to a report from the German Armistice Commission, the French steamer ST. MARCELLE (1,518 GRT) was torpedoed between Marseilles and Turin near Cape Carbon by an unknown submarine on 14 Mar. at 2000 Central Greenwich Time.

IX. Situation East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

According to a report from New York, large U.S. submarines are supposed to have arrived in Australia after a 30-day voyage. Several Japanese aircraft carriers were sighted near the Solomon Islands and in Australian waters.

The U.S. War Department reports that Flying Fortresses attacked the Rabaul airfield.

2. Situation Japan:

Headquarters reports that a Japanese submarine sank a 10,000 GRT tanker on 1 Mar. and a 7,000 GRT steamer on 2 Mar. off the California coast.

According to a report of the Military Attache at Bangkok, American troops on Corregidor are estimated at 5,000.

Japanese naval forces are operating in the Torres Strait. Japanese planes attacked the Thursday Islands. U.S. planes made another large attack on Huon Gulf (New Guinea). Port Moresby was attacked for the 12th time by Japanese planes.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Fighting in the Crimea is continuing without any change in the situation. At the Von Kleist Army Group and the 6th Army several rather strong enemy attacks were repulsed, partly by counterattacks.

Central Army Group:

Enemy attacks on our lines south of Sukhinichi, which had been withdrawn, were unsuccessful.

Fighting is in progress west and northwest of Yukhnov, northeast of Gzhatsk, northwest of Rzhev, near Byeloi, and south of Velizh.

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Northern Army Group:

The enemy brought up additional forces at the Maluksa penetration point. We are forming a defensive front. The enemy has thrown in 9 rifle divisions, 2 tank divisions, 2 ski regiments, and 2 ski battalions at this point. Enemy divisions have evidently been withdrawn between Soltsy and north of Yamno.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Nothing special to report.

3. North Africa:

Enemy situation unchanged.

The Infantry Division is relieving our Motorized Corps according to plan.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

In Morocco all British citizens 18 to 55 years of age have forcibly been evacuated to the interior of the country in order to prevent danger of sabotage and espionage along the coast.

Great Britain:

According to the discussion in the House of Commons, the supply situation in the British Isles is becoming more critical. Cuts in coal, gas, and electricity consumption are under consideration, and men may be released from the army in order to increase coal production. According to an official announcement the clothing rations will be reduced by 25% beginning on 1 Jun. Rations of white bread and gasoline will also be cut.

According to a report from Afghanistan, the quarrels between the Indian leaders are so serious that the Indian freedom movement can hardly be consolidated. The only consequence of the present confusion will be that the Indian divisions will no longer wish to fight for England. If the German spring offensive crosses the Caucasus, opposition in Iran will collapse like a house built of cards.

Australia:

General MacArthur, the defender of Bataan, has taken over the high command in Australia. This transfer, which was ordered by Roosevelt as early as 22 Feb. was delayed, on MacArthur's request, in order to facilitate transferring his command to his successor. The fact that MacArthur was transferred does not indicate that the Philippines have been abandoned.

Sweden:

Crown Prince Gustav Adolf is going to Finland with a military commission in order to award Marshal Mannerheim the highest Swedish military decoration. Much attention has been aroused by the special Swedish gestures on the occasion of Field Marshal List's visit to the Commander in Chief of the Swedish Army, General Thoernell; also on the other hand by the significant decision of the highest Swedish court in favor of the British Government, to release the Norwegian ships.

The two gestures made for the benefit of the Axis powers hardly compensate for the real advantage accorded the Allies.

U.S.S.R.:

In a talk on 17 Mar. Litvinov again demanded that the Allies show greater activity against Germany, since inactive waiting does no good, and time is a fickle ally which is apt to fight on both sides. For details see Political Review, No. 65, paragraph 6.

Iran:

Turkish General Staff circles term incorrect reports that the Russians are already assembling at the Turkish and Iranian frontiers, and that

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the border has already been crossed in a number of places. The Iranian Telegraphic Agency denies that the Russians delivered an ultimatum, made territorial demands, or annexed Azerbaijan.

Chile:

The sinking of the Chilean steamer TOLTEN has aroused great excitement. The government has asked Washington to investigate the matter further.

Uruguay:

The government confiscated the German steamer TAKOMA in retaliation for the sinking of the steamer MONTEVIDEO.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports that the Italians have agreed to the complete repair of the DUNKERQUE. The German Armistice Commission has refused the Italian request that in return for this concession Italy be allowed to establish observation posts on the coasts of Tunisia and German officers participate in the control commissions.

II. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the question whether the Fleet Command should take part in planning mining operations. The Chief, Naval Staff shares the opinion of the Naval Staff that it is advisable for the Fleet Command to participate, especially when areas are concerned in which fleet forces will operate in the future. For copies of the telegram between the Naval Staff and Group North which brought about this decision of the Chief, Naval Staff see 1/Skl 5680, 5703, and 5975/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

III. Group North has postponed the transfer of the HIPPER to Trondheim until 19 Mar. because of fog. In accordance with the operational orders of Group North, 2 vessels of the 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla will leave for Bergen 24 hours before the Hipper in order to be available there after refuelling. 2 or 3 destroyers and 2 torpedo boats will escort the HIPPER from Heligoland; after entering Skudesnaes Fjord the torpedo boats are to be sent ahead to Bergen for refuelling and will subsequently proceed to Trondheim together with the HIPPER or alone.

Situation 18 Mar.

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

According to a French report the RODNEY, DEVONSHIRE, DORSETSHIRE, BELFAST, DRAGON, and 4 destroyers are between Freetown and Capetown.

Pacific:

A light U.S. cruiser and a transport entered Antofagasta on

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Indian Ocean:

According to a French report, the REVENGE, ROYAL SOVEREIGN, RAMILLIES, HERMES, INDOMITABLE, and 14 or 15 cruisers are in the Indian Ocean, and the AUSTRALIA, ADELAIDE, COLOMBO, ARETHUSA, DAUNTLESS, and 5 destroyers in Australian waters.

2. Own Situation:

Letter 1717 informs the Naval Attache, Tokyo about the report of the Japanese Liaison Officer in Berlin that the operation via the northern passage will not be carried out in 1942.

Radiogram 1354 informs the DOGGERBANK that after completing her mission she should withdraw to her waiting area, the western border of which has been moved 20 further east; she is also informed that the Naval Staff assumes that the submarine warning issued on 16 Mar. by the Admiral at Simonstown for the position 33° 53' S, 17° 43' E may have some connection with the mission of the DOGGERBANK.

Radiogram 2041 contains sailing orders for the CHARLOTTE SCHLIEMANN and informs her that she is to meet an auxiliary cruiser at the end of April at a point which will be designated later.

Radiogram 0215 informs all ships in foreign waters about the positions of the returning blockade runners RIO GRANDE and FUSIJAMA.

Reports on the enemy situation are sent by Radiograms 0653, 1201, and 2049.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

In the report of the British Admiralty about the engagement in the Channel on 14 and 15 Mar., it is announced that the destroyer VORTIGERN was sunk by 2 PT boat torpedoes. The Admiralty supposes that British naval forces sank 5 German PT boats in the Channel over the weekend and damaged 2 others.

For the text of the Admiralty report see appendix to Foreign Press Reports No. 65.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Blockade runner OSORNO was taken under close escort at the Spanish border at 0715 and at 2225 she anchored in the Royan roadstead. Thus the ship reached her port of destination approximately 3 weeks behind schedule.

Thus 3,133 tons of rubber, 10 tons of copper, 7 tons of copper wire, 163 tons of tin in sheets, 7 tons of tungsten ore, 50 tons of molybdenum, 63 tons of tin ore, 26 tons of resin, 52 tons of lacquer, 1,199 tons of coconut oil, etc. have been added to Germany's economy.

Channel Coast:

According to the radio intercept service, on 17 Mar. a patrol vessel was ordered to meet an unidentified ship at buoy 52; however it was impossible to maintain contact with the ship. 2 hours later a mine sweeper reported that a steamer evidently sank. An unidentified vessel reported a shipwreck. In the Hartlepool area there seems to have been a shipwreck. A patrol vessel was asked about salvage possibilities and about the number of corpses.

According to the Liaison Officer at Boulogne, the DUNKERQUE entered dock in Toulon 2 weeks ago. The ship will be ready for operation in 3 months at the earliest.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean1. North Sea:Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance there was lively convoy activity along the east coast of England.

Own Situation:

No special incidents.

See Telegram 0045 for the report of the Armed Forces Intelligence Center, Wilhelmshaven about further interrogations of the prisoners captured at Katwijk.

2. Norway:Enemy Situation:

Planes of the 5th Air Force reconnoitering the convoy route from the British Isles to Murmansk sighted nothing. The area north of Jan Mayen was reported free of ice, and an ice barrier was located southeast of the island.

Own Situation:

The second part of the Helnes lighthouse minefield I and the first part of minefield II were laid according to plan by mine ship ULM on 17 Mar. The Bantos mine operation is to be executed on 19 Mar.

See 1/Skl 6432/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a for the report from the Admiral, Arctic Coast concerning the barrages laid in Bugoe Fjord on 28 Jan., in Joey Fjord on 30 Jan., and in Jar Fjord on 29 Jan. 1942.

With regard to the mining of the approaches to the Sogne Fjord, permitted as one of the alternate projects, the Commanding Admiral, Norway asks approval of the plan suggested by the Admiral, Norwegian West Coast, and for permission to declare a danger zone. For copy see 1/Skl 6424/42 in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

In accordance with the order of the Commander in Chief, Navy issued on 27 Feb. about protecting the Trondheim approaches by deep minefields

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and closing the gap in the minefield in Trondheimleden with deep mines, Group North submitted corresponding plans of the Commanding Admiral, Norway on 16 Mar. The Naval Staff approves these plans as well as the request for the necessary mines, and designates the submarine barrages for Trondheim as the most urgent task. For copy of telegram see 1/Skl I E 6172/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

Group North agrees to the plan of the Commanding Admiral, Norway for an alarm minefield of two rows in the Trondheimleden (see War Diary 17 Mar.). However Group North wishes assurance that the minefield will be laid only in a real emergency, and can be removed quickly. For copy of telegram see 1/Skl 6403/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

Nothing to report about the naval and air situation.

Telegram 1818 instructs the Commanding Admiral, Norway, with copies to Group North and the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, for security reasons not to report the daily positions of submarines in the regular report, but to send this information separately as "secret" to the Naval Staff.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

The SCHLESSEN convoy has passed Fehmarn. Because of bad weather the patrol line in the Skagerrak was withdrawn. In accordance with the instructions from Group North concerning prevention of an attempt of the Norwegian ships in Goeteborg to break through, the Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic Sea takes over control of the gap in the Kristiansand South minefield, and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses North of the gap in the Hanstholm minefield. As soon as the ice situation permits, the Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic Sea will closely patrol the Swedish coastal islands waters. The Commander, Naval Air sends out daily patrol planes at dawn for three hours, and in the afternoon again for three hours just before dark, between quadrants AN 3949 and 3528 and along the Swedish territorial waters between 57° 30' N and 59° N. Ships breaking through west of the eastern border of the Skagerrak declared area are to be attacked and forced to enter port. The 5th Air Force is requested to inspect daily in the late afternoon quadrants AN 4300, 2800, 4200, and the eastern half of 2700.

It is reported that the structural repairs on the bow of the GNEISENAU will be completed on 22 Mar. so as to permit her transfer. The Fleet has given up the idea of repairing her degaussing gear for the transfer.

According to a report from the Fleet, the SCHARNHORST can enter dock because of the improved air defense situation, and will probably do so on 20 Mar. (See Telegram 1801.)

According to a report from the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command, on the day of the Finnish attack on Surasaari island, German air forces will be ready to keep Lavansaari under control and to prevent any enemy action from there to counter the Finnish attack. (See Telegram 1920.)

V. Merchant Shipping

Repair Facilities for German Blockade Runners:

The plan worked out by the Special Staff for Mercantile and Economic Warfare, Armed Forces High Command for exchange of goods between Japan and Western France by means of blockade runners provides for the fullest utilization of the available shipping space. Nevertheless the shipping space available is not sufficient to assure shipment of sufficient amounts of important scarce raw materials. There is little chance of securing additional shipping space. Therefore it is very important, if not decisive, for the war effort that there be no change in the ships sailing schedule.

This means that the ships must be made ready to sail in time. With reference to the above, the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is instructed to find out from the Naval Construction Division whether it will be possible to finish repairs and conversion of the German blockade runners, and possible repairs on three Italian ships within the intended time.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio messages between the ILLUSTRIOUS and Greenock were intercepted in the evening. Other British vessels were located in the Rockall Bank area. A radio station in West Africa issued a submarine warning for an area 10 miles south of Cape Palmas.

The British Admiralty extended the declared area in the Bay of Biscay as far as about 12° W. SSS signals were sent by U.S. tanker MOBILE OIL (9,925 GRT) south of Long Island and U.S. tanker CATATUMBO (3,163 GRT) 8 miles east of Cape Hatteras.

According to a report from the Uruguayan Foreign Minister, steamer MONTEVIDEO (5,785 GRT) was torpedoed off Haiti while flying the Uruguayan flag.

2. Enemy Situation:

Our submarines established contact with a convoy consisting of 20 to 30 ships escorted by 4 destroyers proceeding on a 2000 course 120 miles south of Rockall Bank. 2 submarines are operating against the convoy.

Submarine U "404" reported sinking a 6,000 ton ore steamer on 12 Mar. and torpedoing tanker SAN DEMETRIO (8,000 GRT) on 17 Mar. south of Long Island.

Submarine U "68" reports sinking 4 steamers totalling 20,653 GRT off the Liberian coast. In the Mediterranean a submarine established contact with a convoy departing from Tobruk, and 3 submarines are operating against it.

According to a report of the Commander, Submarines, Italy, the loss of submarine U "133" as a result of running into the minefield is confirmed.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During the night 13 to 19 planes mined the Thames according to plan. Also reconnaissance activity. For reports see Enemy Situation, North Sea and Norway.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

237 fighter planes, 84 bombers, 2 fighter bombers, and 15 reconnaissance planes operated in support of the 5th transport group. Successful attacks were made on the airfields on Malta. 8 enemy planes were shot down in dogfights. In the night of 18 Mar. planes attacked antiaircraft and searchlight batteries on Malta.

3. Eastern Front:

Very lively air activity was reported on the Eastern Front on 17 Mar. Operations centered in the south near Kharkov, in the central area near Rzhev, and in the north in the area north and south of Lake Ilmen.

Successful attacks were made on the harbor installations of Sevastopol, Novorossisk, **Kerch**, and Kamish Burun. The 100th Bomber Wing repeatedly attacked a convoy reported in the southern part of the Black Sea on a northerly course between 0850 and 1832; the attacks were unsuccessful, however, because of strong fighter cover and well-placed antiaircraft fire.

4. Special Item:

In order to insure a sufficient number of carrier planes if the GRAF ZEPPELIN is to be completed quickly, using available types, the Technical Division of the Air Force believes that structural changes will have to be made on the ship in order to permit using Ju 87 D's and BF 109 F's. For copy of the memorandum to the Shipyard Branch of the Naval Construction Division see 1/Skl I L 6173/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. V.

VIII. Mediterranean Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

Undoubtedly it was a British submarine which sank the French steamer SAINT MARCELLE, which was carrying concealed supplies for the Axis powers. On 17 Mar. submarines were reported sighted off Spalato, 180 miles east-southeast of Malta, 54 miles west of Lampione, 18 miles northwest of Pantelleria, and 44 miles north-northeast of Benghazi.

German reconnaissance planes sighted a burning merchant vessel of approximately 3,000 GRT on the morning of 18 Mar. lying in the area where a German submarine sank a tanker out of a convoy on 17 Mar. On 18 Mar. Italian air reconnaissance sighted a submarine 18 miles northwest of Misurata. German air reconnaissance sighted 2 medium-sized freighters, one tanker, and 2 large warships of undefined type leaving **Tobruk** at about noon. Italian air reconnaissance spotted a medium-sized freighter and 2 destroyers northwest of Alexandria on southwesterly course. According to the radio intercept service, a Sunderland plane crashed northeast of Ras Azzaz and a British plane reported a surfaced submarine near

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the same spot.

2. Own Situation:

6 vessels of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla laid mines in the night of 18 Mar.

3. Situation Italy:

During the night of 17 Mar. enemy planes were active over Tripoli but dropped no bombs. The Italians have established that submarine GUGLIELMOTTI was torpedoed east of Sicily by an enemy submarine.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The 5th transport group arrived in Tripoli according to schedule. The cruiser group left on 17 Mar. at 2000 to return to Taranto. Therefore the empty ships ALEGRI and GUILIANA will return from Tripoli to Palermo via the western route and not via the eastern route under cruiser escort as planned. The two steamers left in the evening of 17 Mar. escorted by 2 destroyers.

Naval barges engaged in coastal shipping operated according to plan without special incidents.

Steamers ACHAIA and SALONA left Tripoli for Benghazi the evening of 17 Mar. The same day the ACHAIA ran into a German minefield at 2345 off Taigule and sank after hitting a mine with 2,243 tons of German cargo aboard. A very regrettable as well as unnecessary loss!

Steamer BROOK left Naples for Benghazi.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Swedish steamer RADMANSOE arrived at Piraeus from Haifa on 17 Mar. carrying food supplies for Greece.

Otherwise nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance sighted lively steamer traffic to and from Sevastopol. In the southern Black Sea 1 convoy consisting of 2 tankers escorted by 1 heavy cruiser and 1 destroyer under fighter cover were sighted. For reports on unsuccessful attacks by our planes see Aerial Warfare. 1 uncompleted cruiser, 3 destroyers, 10 submarines, 3 mine-sweepers, and 12 steamers were located in Tuapse. 3 steamers on 330° course were observed east-southeast of Feodosiya in the afternoon.

Own Situation:

No change.

IX. Situation East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

According to the Vichy Telegraphic Service, the U.S. Navy Department reported as follows:

During the landing on New Guinea 23 Japanese ships were sunk or damaged by U.S. planes. The Japanese losses during the battles in the islands of the South Pacific consisted of 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 5 transports, 1 gunboat, 1 destroyer, and 1 minelayer. 2 destroyers were probably also sunk. 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer, 5 transports, 1 supply ship, 1 gunboat, and 1 submarine tender were damaged. U.S. losses: submarine SHARK; the SEALION was damaged off Cavite to such an extent that she had to be destroyed; the destroyer STEWARD was destroyed near Soerabaja to prevent her falling into enemy hands.

The Military Attache at Bangkok reported on 16 Mar. renewed Australian air attacks on Rabaul and on Gasmata in New Britain. One quarter of the population of Calcutta has already been evacuated, and is being routed to Delhi via Bombay.

2. Situation Japan:

Domei reports that Japanese submarines had sunk 11 ships totalling 81,500 GRT by 16 Mar. Almost all Blenheim bombers have been shot down in Burma, so that only Spitfire and Curtiss fighters are still being used.

The Japanese admit that 1 cruiser was lost and 2 damaged during the battles in the South Sea Islands. They also report that the Allied forces had no unified command and that both morale and training were inadequate.

Japanese submarines sank a 10,000 ton tanker off San Francisco and a 10,000 ton freighter off the coast of Mexico.

On New Guinea the Japanese are advancing in the direction of Port Moresby (jungle fighting). Japanese planes attacked Port Darwin and Australian islands in the Torres Strait. Japanese operations are now concentrating on the Burma front, and no information is being released.

X. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

On the Kerch Peninsula 4 enemy tank brigades and 3 independent tank battalions totalling 462 tanks were established; of these 256 were annihilated between 27 Feb. and 16 Mar.

All enemy attacks were repulsed at the penetration point east of Kharkov.

Central Army Group:

At Dyankovka north of Bryansk a partisan assembly center was discovered. The partisans proceed from there via Kirov to the enemy front.

Northwest of Yukhnov the enemy temporarily penetrated our lines. Southeast of Vyazma we are continuing to surround the enemy forces. Enemy

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supplies are being brought up by air. Fighting is in progress near Rzhev and Byeloi as well as south of Velizh. North of Surash enemy scouting troops recruited reinforcements behind our lines.

Northern Army Group:

In the Demyansk area there were lively enemy attacks, mostly unsuccessful. The enemy is digging in at the Staraya Russa front. The German attacks north of Lake Ilmen were unable to gain terrain. The enemy is trying tenaciously to keep from being encircled, using bomber planes. Enemy attacks near Maluksa continued.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

German and Finnish troops repulsed continuous enemy attacks made across the ice of the river and lake with motor sleds in the Ladoga-Svir triangle.

3. North Africa:

Normal scouting activity on both sides.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

Beaverbrook will continue in the U.S. to strive to combine all Allied resources and carry out special assignments of the War Cabinet. In these tasks he will hold the position of a representative of the War Cabinet.

The Deputy Prime Minister informed the House of Commons that a report on the Channel breakthrough by the German battleships is now available. The investigations of the committee appointed by the House of Commons disclosed no serious shortcomings in the defense preparations and in the cooperation of the various branches of the armed forces. This statement was criticized to some extent in view of the unsuccessful defense put up by our forces.

Halifax announced that during the past months no less than 80% of all war production has been sent abroad. Likewise as many soldiers as could be transported with the ships available have been shipped. Tank production in Britain is twice what it was in August 1941 and 5 times what it was in August 1940. By the end of the current year light tank production will be 7 times as high as at the end of 1940. These figures should prove to the U.S. the extent of Britain's total war effort. The Middle East will play an important role in the coming summer. The number of troops and amount of materiel sent abroad are limited only by the shipping space available and by the necessity of guarding the British Isles, the only base against Hitler in Western Europe.

According to a report from a diplomatic source, public opinion in Britain has become much less optimistic. Definite doubts concerning the strength of the Empire are being voiced as the result of the Japanese victories. Although there is great faith in U.S. aid, there exists great suspicion concerning the reliability of the Russian ally.

Informed circles in England term the Indian situation as extremely serious. It is feared especially that British defeats will have grave repercussions as regards the Indian troops.

Turkey:

President Inonu stated in an address that Turkey intends to abide by all agreements entered into with other powers. Turkey is determined to stay out of the war. To do this, she must be ready to defend herself at all times.

U.S.A.:

Secretary of the Navy Knox announced that the patrol forces along the U.S. East Coast will be reinforced considerably during the next two months. He stated that only 5 out of the 1,000 ships leaving New York for the south were sunk en route. The government will make use of the right to confiscate ships necessary to maintain the necessary patrols.

Japan:

In a statement of policy the Japanese administration of Malaya declared that its main aim is to produce necessary war materials. No attempt will be made to bring in Japanese settlers. In view of the great racial

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mixture of the population, Malaya cannot be granted selfgovernment.

According to foreign press reports the Japanese government is planning to make a final peace offer to Chungking. For the terms of this offer see Political Review No. 66, paragraph 7b.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports on a conference with the Chief, War Economy and Armaments Division, Armed Forces High Command. The naval copper quota for the second quarter will be increased from 1,600 to 2,300 tons, instead of 2,650 tons. This amount includes the copper needed to repair the GNEISENAU. Another increase will be requested in order to be able to continue construction of the GRAF ZEPPELIN.

The fog installations and night fighter organization at Kiel have been ready for operations since 14 Mar.

The Fleet believes that it will be necessary to leave approximately 500 men aboard the GNEISENAU while she is undergoing repairs; 240 of these will be needed to man the antiaircraft guns.

The three guns of turret A will be ready for use in coastal batteries in 2 to 3 months.

Turrets B and C are to be installed complete in suitable terrain (where no concrete construction will be necessary). Thus only rocky coastal areas can be considered.

The six-week periods spent by Finnish naval officers aboard various German vessels are over. They had the desired effect in every respect, especially as regards the PT boats.

No other reports or decisions were made.

Situation 19 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

According to an agent report from Canada, a considerable troop transport with 14,000 to 16,000 men was to leave Halifax about the middle of March, presumably headed for the British Isles.

South Atlantic:

According to press reports all Uruguayan merchant ships are being armed. The ships have been told not to sail.

It has become known that the QUEEN MARY left Sydney on 18 Feb. for Rio via the Cape of Good Hope, carrying 10,000 men aboard.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 1547 informs the DOGGERBANK that the northern and southern limits of her waiting area have been shifted 40 further south.

Radiogram 1208 contains information to all blockade runners that the Naval Attache, Tokyo will take over command between 90° E, 160° W, and 30° S.

Report on the enemy situation was sent via Radiogram 2236.

II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

The British Admiralty announced that the danger area declared on 11 Nov. 1940 has been extended. The new limits of the area are as follows: In the north a line connecting points 49° 52' N, 06° 27' W; 49° 52' N, 07° 00' W; 49° 00' N, 07° 00' W; 49° 00' N, 12° 00' W; in the south a line connecting points 54° 05' N, 12° 00' W; 54° 00' N, 08° 00' W; from there the line runs at a distance of 20 miles from the Spanish coast to 43° 39' N, 02° 07' W. In the east the line runs from Bishop Rock west to 48° 03.4' N, 05° 05' W and from there along the coast of France to Lesocoea Light.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

An investigation of the defense installations of the submarine bases along the Atlantic coast, carried on jointly by the local Army and Navy commands concerned, has shown that at present there is not sufficient protection against enemy surprise attacks.

In view of the importance of these bases for submarine warfare, we cannot afford to have the enemy seize them even temporarily or destroy them. Above all the bases at Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire, and La Pallice must be protected in such a way as to make it impossible for the enemy to seize them by a surprise attack. It is felt that Bordeaux is less endangered.

In view of the withdrawal of troops for transfer to the Eastern Front, the Naval Staff asks the Army General Staff to leave sufficient forces of Army Group D in the West Area to ensure adequate protection of the bases. For copy of the telegram see 1/Skl I West 6818/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIb.

Group West reports that after removal of the 1st Squadron of the 40th Bomber Wing the Air Commander, Atlantic will have on the average for reconnaissance work for Group West 5 He 111's and 4 He 115's until further notice, and that with these forces it is no longer possible to provide adequate reconnaissance for the Group's operations even of a small area for a few hours before the operations are launched. See Telegram 2100.

The Naval Staff will take up this question with the Air Force Operations Staff.

Channel Coast:

Mine exploding vessel "162" swept 11 mines, some of them close together, on route "Rosa" in the night of 18 Mar. The vessel was damaged during this mission. An escorted ore steamer was also damaged. The mine situation on route "Rosa" in the Ostend-Boulogne area is at the moment no longer under control.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean1. North Sea:Enemy Situation:

Very little air activity in the central and northern parts of the North Sea.

According to air reconnaissance there was normal convoy activity along the eastern coast of England.

Own Situation:

A submarine was somewhat damaged by ice in the Elbe.

Convoy service as planned without special incident.

The operation to transfer the cruiser HIPPER to Norway was started as planned. Because a submarine was sighted in quadrant 3161 Group North ordered the route shifted farther to the west. Otherwise no special incidents.

2. Norway:Enemy Situation:

A submarine was sighted in the afternoon in quadrant AN 3161.

Air reconnaissance sighted a convoy of 6 steamers on southeast course east of the Rybach Peninsula, and 2 steamers on east course north of the Kildin Islands.

Own Situation:

Mine ship ULM laid the Porsanger Fjord minefields on 18 Mar. as planned. Transports and ship movements according to plan. A Norwegian coastal steamer en route from Flekke Fjord to the west is overdue.

At the Palace Bridge in Oslo 2 motor boats were destroyed by an explosion. 4 people were killed.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway reports measures planned for laying the anti-submarine minefields for protecting the approaches to Trondheims Leden. Mine ship OSTMARK, mine ship ULM, and mine ship KAISER (this ship twice) will be used for bringing up the mines from Cuxhaven. The Commanding Admiral, Norway calculates that all of the anti-submarine minefields at Trondheims Leden can be laid by the end of April or the beginning of May. If another steamer for transporting 600 to 800 mines in Germany could be provided the project could be speeded up considerably.

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In reporting on the defenses of Trondheim Fjord the Commanding Admiral, Norway states that the effectiveness of the defenses would be considerably heightened if submarines could be forced under water in approaching Trondheims Leden by having planes and subchaser constantly on the lookout; he considers that it is necessary and practicable to keep a sub-chaser flotilla under the Admiral, North Norwegian Coast for Trondheim, and to have the Air Force carry out constant submarine chase at the 3 approaches to Trondheims Leden in the vicinity of the minefields. A second coastal listening station is being set up between Agdenes and Breittingnes. 4 depth charge mortars are being installed on the shore south of there.

It is still being investigated whether it is possible to close the gap in the anti-submarine minefield in Trondheims Leden at Garten.

Extensive experience up to now indicates that it is not possible to close Trondheims Leden by a submarine net. For copy of telegram see 1/Skl 6497/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway requests a naval barge for the Admiral, North Norwegian Coast in order to cope with the transports for the net operations. See Telegram 1120.

Group North requests, in view of the numerous mining tasks in Norway, the eastern campaign which will start soon, and the strengthening of the Westwall which still has to be done, that all mine ships be used as mine carriers; it requests therefore that mine ship ROLAND be left with Group North. (See Telegram 1246.)

Group North instructs the Commanding Admiral, Norway concerning mine transports, and requests the Commanding Admiral, Norway to investigate what further measures might be undertaken for the protection of Trondheim. For copy see 1/Skl 6483/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

Group North agrees to the suggestion of the Commanding Admiral, Norway concerning mining of the approach to Sogne Fjord. The Commanding Admiral, Norway is asked to investigate whether Stroem Fjord is suitable for sending through German ships of all sizes by day and night. (See Telegram 1208.)

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

The ice situation has become worse. The SCHLESSEN convoy was about 10 miles off the Boek lightship in the evening.

The minefield gap at Kristiansand South is being checked once more. The 3rd transport group, with 4 steamers, will leave Hamburg for Kristiansand on 20 Mar.

Since capture of the islands in the Gulf of Finland is to be undertaken across the ice, it will not be necessary to use the Siebel ferry group, which will have important tasks with the Army after the gear has been repaired. For information to this effect sent to the Army General Staff see Telegram 1245.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service the convoy SC 75 probably left on 18 Mar. as planned. Reports were intercepted from the American coast according to which the U.S. steamer IPSWICH, the steamer CHESTER SUN, and the tanker GULF OF MEXICO sighted submarines near Cape Hatteras. The last-named ship was shot at, and the U.S. steamer LIBERATOR (7,720 GRT) was torpedoed in the same area.

The British passenger steamer CITY OF EXETER (9,954 GRT) sighted a submarine off the coast of Liberia.

2. Own Situation:

No further reports have come in from the submarines operating against the convoy south of Rockall Bank.

Group North's instructions concerning use of the submarines in the Arctic Ocean are as follows:

For the present the Admiral, Arctic Ocean is to keep 10 submarines for operations east of 20° E. The main tasks are to combat supply shipments for the Russian front and for any enemy landings which might be attempted. The 10 submarines allocated to Narvik, Trondheim, and Bergen remain directly under the Group. Main tasks: to stand by in the harbors in case of enemy action against the Norwegian coast; to take up patrol lines for protection and reconnaissance during operations by surface forces; and to patrol constantly the probable convoy route in the Arctic Ocean. For copy of the corresponding telegram see 1/Skl 6519/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

In the Mediterranean German submarines gained contact temporarily with a convoy on southwest course north of Sollum Bay, and with a convoy on northeast course north of Marsa Matruh.

For supplementary situation report see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Group 106 sank a steamer of 6,000 GRT out of a convoy southwest of Portland. 2 steamers of 3,000 GRT each were badly damaged, so that they probably sank.

2. Mediterranean Area:

Intensified attacks were continued against anti-aircraft positions and airfields on Malta with good effect. According to the listening service of the Air Force, we have evidently succeeded in preventing the planes sent from Gibraltar from landing.

3. Eastern Front:

See daily situation report for information from the Air Force Operations Staff about the remaining strength of the Russian Air Force.

An aerial torpedo hit was scored on a 7,000 GRT tanker proceeding in

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convoy south of Sevastopol in the Black Sea on 17 Mar.

In order to assure closer cooperation with naval commands, the Air Force Operations Staff ordered the command staff of the Commander, Air transferred to Trondheim.

In order to reinforce the air forces in northern Norway, it is planned to transfer Coastal Air Group 506 to the Commander, Air, Lofoten. The 5th Air Force is also to prepare the transfer of another torpedo plane squadron from Stavanger to Trondheim. 2 more additional torpedo plane squadrons are to be brought up.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

No special reports have been received.

For contact established by German submarines with the convoy which left Tobruk on 18 Mar. see Submarine Warfare.

2. Own Situation:

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla carried out the mine operation according to plan during the night of 18 Mar., and left the evening of 19 Mar. with 6 vessels on another assignment.

3. Situation Italy:

Cruiser AOSTA and 2 destroyers entered Taranto the evening of 18 Mar. after completing their escort mission. During the day and night of 18 Mar. subchase was carried out in the Gulf of Taranto, off Naples, along the coastal routes of Sicily and Calabria, in the southern part of the Adriatic, and off the Dalmatian coast.

The Italian submarine TRICHECO was torpedoed while returning to Brindisi, evidently by an enemy submarine. During the night of 18 Mar. enemy planes attacked Benghazi without inflicting damage.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Steamer GREGORI arrived in Tripoli in the morning. Steamer BOSFORO is expected to arrive in Benghazi on 21 Mar. Motor ship MONREALE and the BIXIO, each escorted by 2 destroyers, left Tripoli for Naples the evening of 18 Mar.

2 enemy planes strafed 2 naval barges returning from Derna to Benghazi on 17 Mar. Otherwise coastal traffic proceeded according to plan.

According to the German Naval Command, Italy, the Italian Navy has approved use of Spanish vessels in North African coastal traffic. See Telegram 1940 for suggestion to the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch that additional Spanish vessels be purchased as soon as possible for this purpose.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia

According to press reports, the Japanese have captured Bassein west of Rangoon. Japanese troops reached Padang on 18 Mar.

IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

At 0500 the enemy launched attacks on the Feodosiya front supported by 50 tanks after a very heavy preparatory artillery barrage. The attacks were repulsed by counterattacks and the use of artillery and dive bombers.

At the Von Kleist Army Group German forces made a successful advance west of Slavyansk. Enemy attacks with strong forces and tanks between Kuibyshev and the Ternova valley and west of Losovaya were repulsed by evening.

In the 6th Army sector the enemy made another attack on the front east of Kharkov. Fighting is still in progress at Salto. At all other points the attacks were repulsed.

Central Army Group:

A German advanced frontal sector near Sukhinichi is to be withdrawn to the Zhizdra position. A number of enemy tanks succeeded in breaking through north of Yukhnov. The situation is unsettled. Renewed enemy attacks were launched near Gzhatsk, and our lines were pushed back slightly. Further attacks are expected in this area. Also at Mostovaya several enemy tanks penetrated our positions. All other enemy attacks at the front of the Central Army Group were unsuccessful.

Northern Army Group:

Our troops launched a successful advance south of Kholm. In spite of stubborn resistance, our pincers, advancing from the south and the north, succeeded in establishing contact north of Lake Ilmen. Attacks from the east on this junction were thrown back with heavy enemy losses. The enemy is trying to break out of this new pocket in all directions. North of Maluksa an enemy forest camp was taken in a German advance. Kolgompia Peninsula was shelled from Seiskari.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

Normal scouting activity.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

A comprehensive plan for rationing coal, gas, and electricity is being prepared, since coal production is inadequate and consumption has risen enormously.

The appointment of Casey, who was up to now the Australian Minister in Washington, as Lyttleton's successor in the office of minister for the Far East, undertaken without previously consulting the Australian Cabinet, has evidently created considerable dissatisfaction manifested by critical remarks in Australia.

Italy:

According to the Foreign Ministry, an agreement has been reached with Great Britain about the return of Italian citizens from Southeast Africa. 4 Italian steamers are to be sent for this purpose via the Atlantic around the Cape to Jibuti in the beginning of April.

Rumania:

Foreign Minister Antonescu sharply attacked Hungary in his speech of 19 Mar. For details see Political Review No. 67, Paragraph 6.

U.S.A.:

According to British press reports, dissatisfaction is growing fast in the U.S. as a result of the defeats in the Pacific. Former isolationist ideas are being revived. The Hearst press asserts that the Americans will have to attend to their own interests and can no longer afford to bother about those of the British. Warnings continue against the danger from communism. Attacks are being made on Cripps, in line with the general attempt to find a scapegoat for the defeats.

Brazil:

According to a report from a diplomatic source, it is impossible for Brazil to stay out of the war if Brazilian ships continue to be sunk. In that event Argentina will confine herself to declaring Brazil non-belligerent.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

No special reports or decisions were made.

Special Items

I. The Japanese Liaison Officer at the Naval Staff was giving the following information on 14 Mar. after his repeated requests:

1. The German Naval Staff considers that a German attack on the

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Near East (Suez, Iran, Irak) might have decisive importance for the outcome of the war. The German Armed Forces High Command has been informed of this opinion, and shares it.

2. Whether, when, and where Germany will launch such an attack depends on the development of the situation in Russia, which is not entirely clear at the present time. The Naval Staff is not informed about any plans of the Armed Forces High Command in this respect.

3. Thus it is true that the opinions of Japan and Germany about the further course of the war coincide.

4. The Japanese Liaison Officer was told explicitly that this information should be regarded as only semi-official, and that Japan can be informed officially only when Germany feels capable of translating these plans into action.

Another question by the Japanese Liaison Officer concerning the stand taken by the Army High Command in this question was answered by pointing out that the matter has not yet reached the stage of definite discussions between the Army and the Navy.

II. Regarding the decision of the Commander in Chief, Navy that cruisers NUERNBERG and KOELN should be made ready for operations, the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division points out that reinstallation of the plane facilities and the missing torpedo tubes are to be dispensed with. On the other hand, anti-aircraft armament is to be reinforced as much as possible. A radar set is to be installed on the NUERNBERG. No other additional equipment should be installed at the expense of fuel space.

III. A report from the German Legation at Lisbon stemming from the British Embassy there contains information concerning the noteworthy work being done by the British Intelligence Service to incite revolutions in the Iberian republics which could be used as an excuse and possibility for Allied landings for the purpose of establishing a continental western front in the Pyrenees. Supply shipments to North Africa would be endangered by control of the western Mediterranean thus established; this combined with simultaneous pressure exerted on France would lay a foundation for the 1943 offensive. For copy of the report see 1/Skl 6501/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIb.

The Naval Staff believes that this report is probably correct, and that such procedure must be expected in view of its strategic effects and since it is altogether possible that it would be successful if sufficient forces are used. However, the Allies will probably not attempt such an operation as long as we are able to keep down Allied tonnage as the result of the Battle of the Atlantic and operations in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Situation 20 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

For enemy radio reports intercepted and deciphered up to 15 Mar. see radio intelligence report no. 11/42 issued by the Naval

Staff Communications Division, Radio Intelligence Branch.

North Atlantic:

According to an agent report of 2 Mar., the following U.S. ships were in northern Ireland at the end of February; cruisers CHICAGO, LOUISVILLE, SAVANNAH, CONCORD, RICHMOND; destroyers PERKINS, MANLEY, WORDEN, CASTOR, PORTER; 1 auxiliary cruiser, 1 escort vessel. The destroyers SOMERS and GLEAVES were on patrol near Iceland.

South Atlantic:

Freetown relayed a QQQ-signal on 20 Mar. from 20 N, 200 W; it was cancelled later.

Indian Ocean:

A convoy with about 10,000 troops left Durban for Egypt on 7 Mar. A submarine warning from a steamer west of Colombo was intercepted.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 1926 instructs the REGENSBURG to withdraw to the south after supplying ship "10".

Radiogram 1107 informs ship "10" that the OSORNO entered the Gironde and contains instructions for the DOGGERBANK.

Radiograms 1235, 1200, 1755, and 1924 inform all ships in foreign waters about the arrival of the OSORNO and about the positions of the Swedish ships in the American traffic as permitted.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

A report concerning location of a German PT boat was intercepted from the vicinity of Dungeness.

In the morning a Sunderland flying boat attacked a German customs patrol boat north of Biarritz, landed on the water next to her, and took off again, evidently taking along 3 customs officials and 2 Frenchmen, who are missing.

Reconnaissance planes sighted a transport of approximately 10,000 GRT entering Plymouth in the morning, escorted by 6 PT boats and 2 patrol boats. A convoy consisting of 20 to 25 steamers was sighted on north-easterly course off Land's End.

According to an intelligence report from France of 20 Mar. (from a French major), the Anglo-American forces (Navy, Army, Air Force) are planning to attack simultaneously the French coast between St. Malo and St. Michel and between St. Nazaire and Vannes in the first week in April, and are hoping to establish contact between these two beachheads at Rennes. If the operation is successful, a similar operation is to be carried out from Cherbourg, thus establishing a western front approximately 200 km. long. Preparations for sabotage, etc. are being made by the De Gaullists. Brest will be the main port of disembarkation for

the American troops.

All interested commands have been informed.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Ship "28" departed according to plan.

Channel Coast:

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla went on a torpedo mission along the southeast coast.

In order to reinforce the troops in the west area, the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division has ordered the 1st Naval Signal Battalion to transfer from Ruegen to the west area. Operational command of the battalion is under the Naval High Command, administrative command under the Commanding Admiral, France. The battalion must at all times be ready for operation "Isabella". It is also planned to transfer the 3rd Naval Signal Battalion to the west area (the Netherlands).

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

An especially trustworthy agent in the enemy intelligence service was notified by the enemy on 20 Mar. that beginning 20 Mar. a large-scale British attack may be expected in the area of Antwerp, to be announced by Radio London by means of code word "Les Becassines Travaillent". The code word will also set off acts of sabotage. For details see Telegram 1820.

The fact that there are repeated reports of imminent enemy landing operations in western and northern Europe, which seem most unlikely in view of the strained transport situation, seems to indicate that by purposely disseminating such rumors the enemy hopes at least to create unrest and trouble on the German side, even though enemy forces are not sufficient to carry out these tempting plans.

See Telegram 0430 about additional information obtained by the Intelligence Center, Wilhelmshaven from the prisoners captured at Katwijk. It is noteworthy that motor gun boats type 340 are equipped with so-called "silent motors".

According to air reconnaissance there was lively minesweeping activity on 20 Mar. between Cromer and Orfordness. At Flamborough Head a south-bound convoy was sighted, consisting of 40 steamers, escorted at some distance by one small cruiser.

Own Situation:

The 3rd transport group, consisting of 4 steamers, left Hamburg carrying 3,735 men, 908 horses, and 506 vehicles.

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The transfer of the HIPPER is proceeding according to plan. At 2000 she was in quadrant AF 8871 (Sognesjoen).

Minesweeping and escort service in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North proceeded according to plan without special incident.

Increased mine activity of the enemy in the Channel seems to indicate, in view of results achieved, that he has extended his mining operations to the areas of the Commanding Admirals, North and Baltic Sea. Until improved minesweeping gear has been provided, we must count on losing an increased number of mine detonating vessels and remote sweeping gear. Group North therefore requests that mine detonating vessels and remote sweeping gear be provided at the latest by the end of the ice period, and that the Air Force be asked to continue developing minesweeping planes. (See Telegram 2114.)

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance located 7 steamers in the harbor of Murmansk totalling about 15,000 GRT, and 2 icebreakers with 2 steamers near Lavna. On 19 Mar. a Russian PT boat was in Litsa Bay, and another in Motovski Bay. Air activity from the entrance to Petsamo Bay to the vicinity of Liinahmari. Aerial mines were probably dropped. On 20 Mar. air activity in the area of Trondheim was observed at noon.

According to statements of the only survivors of the Russian steamer IMORA at the Intelligence Center, Tromsø, the ship was sunk on her second voyage. On the first voyage she transported guns and sugar from the British Isles to Murmansk. There were supposedly 14 ships en route at the time, which were escorted by 5 torpedo boats during the first 3 days.

Thus it is not impossible that the IMORA belonged to convoy PQ 12 and that the forces of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships were therefore in the direct vicinity of the convoy on 7 Mar.

Own Situation:

The second part of the mining operation at Helnes lighthouse, barrage II, was carried out as planned by the ULM. The northern mine ship group laid the "Bantos A" minefield as planned, with the BRUMMER, the COBRA, 4 escort vessels, and 4 PT boats.

After making port submarine U "377" confirms the report that a flight of Ju 87's attacked her on 6 Mar. near Moskenstraumen, fortunately without success. The boat is undamaged.

Copies of the Commanding Admiral, Norway's opinion on the directive of Group North concerning bringing up the mines and net barrages to Trondheims Leden (see War Diary 19 Mar.) are sent to the Naval Staff, the Fleet, the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, and the Admiral, North Norwegian Coast. See 1/Skl 6550/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Naval and ice situation unchanged.

The orders of Group North concerning measures to prevent Norwegian steamers from leaving Goeteborg stipulate that 2 vessels of the 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla (beginning 21 Mar. 3 vessels), and 6 vessels of the 6th PT Boat Flotilla are to observe 3 hour readiness in Stavanger until the ice situation permits transferring them to Kristiansand South and to the Kattegat. Group North will be in command.

For copy of instructions see 1/Skl 6599/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

V. Merchant Shipping

According to press reports, the chairman of the U.S. War Production Board will suggest to the President that the shipbuilding program announced in January 1942 be further increased from 8,000,000 to 9,000,000 tons in 1942, and from 10,000,000 to 15,000,000 tons in 1943. The Naval Staff Intelligence Division is at present investigating whether these figures are correct and particularly whether this program can be carried out.

U.S. and British offices handling wartime shipping have announced that a joint agency with headquarters in New York has been created to control cargo and import duties.

See Brief Report No. 9/42 "Foreign Merchant Shipping" issued by the Naval Staff Intelligence Division, Foreign Merchant Shipping Branch for figures on shipping traffic between South America and the U.S., and about French ships in Indo China, among other things.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

The 19th Group carried out lively air reconnaissance activity in the rendezvous area.

The radio intercept service reflected lively German submarine activity from the American East Coast. Steamers and tankers reported submarines off the Chesapeake Bay, Cape Hatteras, Sable Island, and Cape Lookout.

According to these reports steamer MONICA and tanker DAVILA (8,053 GRT) were torpedoed. Tanker ARGON (6,952 GRT) was pursued, and U.S. tanker MERCURY SUN was fired upon. The latter had already been reported torpedoed and blown up on 13 Mar.

All merchant ships in the Atlantic were given exact sailing orders for the area east of Diamond Shoals, so that there is probably a minefield there.

All warships in West Indian waters were notified that a periscope was sighted about 480 miles northeast of Cayenne. This may have been an Italian submarine.

See Telegram 1000 for a detailed report from the Naval Attache at Buenos Aires about press reports concerning the torpedoing of the Uruguayan steamer MONTEVIDEO and the treatment of the crew of the German steamer TACERNA.

2. Own Situation:

Contact was not reestablished with the convoy in the vicinity of Rockall Bank. One submarine reported that of 6 torpedoes fired, 4 probably hit the target.

In the Mediterranean a German plane observed a German submarine attacking an escort force and scoring a hit on a destroyer of the JERVIS class. The submarine herself reported a 6 hour pursuit by depth bombs, during which 79 explosions were heard, but no damage was done.

For supplementary situation report see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

In the late evening Group 106 sank one 4,000 GRT steamer and damaged another one of 3,000 to 4,000 GRT belonging to the convoy near Land's End (see Enemy Situation, West Area). Falmouth was attacked as alternate target.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Attacks on Malta are continuing.

3. Eastern Front:

On 18 and 19 Mar. large numbers of our planes attacked tank concentrations, columns, and trains with good results on all Army fronts.

Air Commander, South reported that during an attack on Sevastopol one steamer of 7,000 GRT and one passenger vessel of 10,000 GRT were set afire.

For results of photo reconnaissance in the harbors of the Black Sea, see Enemy Situation, Black Sea.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

At 1200 on 19 Mar. the Algerian subcommission of the Italian Armistice Commission reported to the Italian Naval Staff that a plane sighted 5 warships, one of them a large one, on easterly course between Melilla and Oran. According to another report by the Italian Navy, at 0300 on 20 Mar. the MALAYA, ARGUS, EAGLE, and HERMIONE left Gibraltar, evidently eastbound. An Italian submarine sighted this force with several destroyers at 0533 forty miles east-southeast of Cape de Gata on a 400 course, speed 22 knots.

No change in the ships in the harbor of Valletta in the morning as compared to 19 Mar.

Reconnaissance planes and 1 submarine reported a slight increase in convoy traffic in the Alexandria-Tobruk area.

3 merchant ships and 4 destroyers were north of Sidi Barrani at 0850 on westerly course. Evidently the same force was located by the radio intercept service north of Sollum Bay, and was attacked by planes at 1420 approximately 50 miles north-northwest of Sidi Barrani.

2. Own Situation:

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla did not carry out its mining operation because of high swells and heavy seas (6), but was forced to drop the mines in an inactive condition.

The 6th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla left La Spezia on 18 Mar. for transfer to North Africa.

3. Situation Italy:

In view of the enemy forces reported sighted on 19 Mar. in the area of Melilla and Oran, all PT boats in Trapani and Pantelleria have been alerted, reconnaissance has been ordered south of 39° N as far as 40° W, and the torpedo planes on Sardinia have been ordered to be in readiness.

On 19 Mar. one auxiliary minesweeper was sunk by enemy submarine gunfire off Brindisi.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

No special incidents.

The 6th transport group will consist of 6 motor ships.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Auxiliary cruiser BARLETTA was sent to Italy for shipyard repairs.

Subchase and escort service proceeded without special incidents. See Telegram 1616 for approval of the Naval Staff Submarine Division of plans to use submarine traps.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to photo reconnaissance on 19 Mar. there were: 1 light cruiser, 1 torpedo boat, 1 tanker, and 19 steamers in Sevastopol; 1 battleship, 2 destroyers, 1 torpedo boat, 1 tanker, 17 steamers, and 2 floating docks in Novorossisk; 1 tanker, 7 steamers, and 3 motor mine sweepers in Kerch; 12 small steamers in Tamenskaya; 10 steamers and 4 motor minesweepers in Kamish Burun.

According to the radio intercept service on 19 Mar: cruiser A and destroyers entered a base on the southwest or west coast of the Crimea; cruiser E was at sea west-southwest of Sevastopol; cruisers D and F were at sea at an unknown position; there were 3 destroyers and 3 submarines west of the Crimea, and 3 destroyers and 1 submarine east of the Crimea.

According to air reconnaissance on 20 Mar., concentrations of small vessels were sighted near Kerch.

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Own Situation:

Nothing special to report about the naval situation.

Special Item:

In following up the questions raised by the memorandum of Group South concerning naval tasks in the Black Sea beginning Spring 1942, as well as by the directive of the Naval Staff concerning operations in the Black Sea (see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV: 1/Sk1 442/42 and 275/42 Gkdos. Chefs.; the memorandum and the directive came out at the same time), the Deputy Commander of Group South reported on 5 Mar. as follows: the basic preparations have been begun; the details for the supply shipments which the Naval Staff has ordered initiated to the southern Ukrainian harbors, the harbors on the west coast of the Crimea, and those on the Sea of Azov, as soon as the ice situation permits, have been discussed with the Admiral, Black Sea and the Naval Training Division, Rumania.

As regards the protection of this supply traffic, Group South states that the necessary equipment has been delayed in the course of the winter through traffic and material difficulties, and that also the PT boats and motor minesweepers expected from Germany will not be available until the beginning of the supply operations.

Also all equipment needed to support the Army in the conquest of Sevastopol and of Kerch, as well as in the continued occupation of the Crimea will not be available until the middle of April, with the exception of that needed to prevent Russian landings behind the Army front. Beginning with the middle of April submarines and PT boats will be available to attack Russian supply traffic to Sevastopol and the Kerch peninsula.

Group South reports on a number of defensive measures, some of them completed and others in progress, which have been taken to prevent Russian landings (use of Army coastal artillery, commitment of Naval Coastal Artillery Battalion 601, emergency blocking of the harbor entrances by hawser boom barrages, destruction of landing facilities, etc.).

Other measures to be taken for this purpose include laying harbor barrages by means of river mines, using 10 warrant mine officers as barrage specialists, bringing up equipment for detecting mines for the harbors on the Sea of Azov, commissioning 100 motor fishing vessels with Croatian crews as defense flotillas in the Crimean and Azov area.

Further mining operations are being planned for supplementing the defenses of the Crimean coast and for disrupting Russian traffic to the Kerch peninsula. In view of the fact that there is little Russian activity, these operations can be carried out if the German Air Force will provide the forces necessary for close and remote escort (this seems doubtful for the next few weeks according to discussions carried on so far with the 4th Air Force).

6 mining operations are planned, 5 of which will be carried out by minelayer MURGESCU escorted by destroyer REGELE FERDINAND off Eupatoria, Ak Mechet, Yalta, Feodosiya, and in the southern Kerch Strait. The 6th operation consists in mining the approach point off Cape Kherson, and is now being prepared.

Group South expects that Rumanian political leaders and the Rumanian Navy will cause difficulties, since they believe that it is too dangerous to use Rumanian ships. These difficulties will have to be overcome, however.

Unfortunately the 5 mining operations mentioned above and urgently requested by the 11th Army High Command cannot be carried out for the time being, since according to the report of Group South on 17 Mar., the Commander, Naval Air, Black Sea (4th Air Force) has at the present time only one airplane which is ready for operations, and the Commander, Air, South of the 4th Air Force has no planes available for escort and reconnaissance at sea.

Group South believes, however, that the 6th operation (minefield off Cape Kherson) can be carried out even with limited air reconnaissance. The Admiral, Black Sea has therefore been ordered to ask Rumanian political leaders and the Rumanian Navy to carry out this operation.

IX. Situation East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

According to British reports the Japanese did not land on the Andaman Islands after all. At the moment the British population is being evacuated.

According to French reports, since the morning of 19 Mar. a major engagement has developed out of an attack by American-Australian naval forces on a large convoy in the Coral Sea northeast of Australia. The German News Agency (DNB) states that Allied planes sank a Japanese cruiser near Rabaul.

2. Situation Japan:

According to press reports the Japanese have carried out further landings on the northeast coast of New Guinea. It is said that there are numerous cruisers and several aircraft carriers in the landing fleet.

Reuter reports Japanese air attacks on Port Darwin and Port Moresby.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

In the morning Korpech was retaken by our troops; in the afternoon we lost the southern part of the city once more, however. It was not possible for the Air Force to support the operation due to the weather.

At the Von Kleist Army Group enemy attacks were repulsed. At the 6th Army sector a concentric attack by German and Hungarian forces in the Bishkin area came to a stop against enemy resistance. East of Kharkov the enemy succeeded in pushing into 2 villages. Other attacks were repulsed.

Central Army Group:

In the area of the 2nd Panzer Army all enemy attacks were

repulsed. In the 4th Army sector our attack near Demenskoye was halted after some success at first. The enemy succeeded in pushing in our front at several places northeast of Gzhatsk. Our troops took over at the point of penetration northwest of Rzhev. Attacks by the enemy at other sectors of the Army Group were unsuccessful.

Northern Army Group:

The project of the Air Force to wear down the enemy south of Lake Ilmen was carried out at first in isolated operations. Enemy attacks southwest of Lyubnitsa, west of Yamno, and south of Maluksa were repulsed. Enemy tank attacks on the front south of Oranienbaum were also unsuccessful.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Lively enemy reconnaissance, artillery, and plane activity at the Murman front. Several enemy gunboats were driven off at the Eina Guba point.

3. North Africa:

Normal scouting activity on both sides.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

In an article in the Times Sir William Beveridge states that changes in the government up to now are not sufficient to ensure a successful prosecution of the war. The attitude and policy of the British government must be changed. The state should take over the industries important to the war; instead of a coalition of the parties a national government must be created, and a real leader is necessary who instead of making unfortunate compromises would take the risk of responsibility himself. This demand shakes the very foundations of the British state!

For details see Political Review No. 68, paragraph 1 c.

Australia:

British-Australian disagreement has led to the issuance of an Australian white book on the events leading up to Casey's appointment to the post of British minister in Cairo. In any event Churchill was very much mistaken if he hoped to flatter the Australians by appointing an Australian as British minister.

Sweden:

The Russian Legation protested to the Foreign Office because the Swedish decoration was awarded to Field Marshal Mannerheim.

U.S.S.R.:

The Russian Japanese fishing agreement was extended for another year at Kuibyshev. For the contents of the agreement see Political Review No. 68, paragraph 4.

Hungary:

The sharp statements of the Rumanian Foreign Minister Antonescu against Hungary have had very lively repercussions in that country.

Turkey:

According to a report from the Embassy, Turkish government circles particularly appreciate the success of the German defensives on the Crimea, since Stalin's plan to roll up the southern front starting at the Crimea is thus foiled.

The police confiscated Russian and British propaganda material in Ankara.

U.S.A.:

The State Department announced that the French have given assurance that no Axis ship will refuel in French colonies in the western hemisphere. The U.S. government registered a sharp protest because the German entered Martinique on 21 Feb., but declared themselves satisfied with the French explanation.

Argentina:

The government has rejected the U.S. request that Argentine ships join inter-American convoys.

Chile:

As the result of the sinking of steamer TOLTEN, all Chilean ships have been ordered to observe strictly measures recommended by the Axis for identification purposes, and under no circumstances to sail without lights. The Chilean government will inform Washington to this effect.

Special Items

A survey of the officers in the Navy made by the Officer Personnel Division on 4 Feb. is very interesting as regards the ratio of officers aboard ship to those on land. Of a total of 15,997 officers, of which 5,962 are active, 6,450 on unemployed pay, and 3,585 for special duties, there are in fleet service only 2,003 active officers, and together with the other categories 2,972 in all, that is not even a fifth; 2,346 others, of these 1,245 reserve officers, are in the coastal service at sea; 4,083 are in the coastal service on land; 1,081 are in replacement units; other commands and offices account for 4,917.

Situation 21 Mar. 1942I. War in Foreign Waters1. Enemy Situation:

No special reports have come in.

2. Own Situation:

The most recent information concerning enemy traffic in the South Atlantic makes it necessary to change the point planned for the rendezvous of the TANNENFELS and the REGENSBURG (see War Diary 17 Mar., Radiogram 0642 to ship "10"). The TANNENFELS is therefore instructed in Radiogram 1134 to proceed to the Indian Ocean according to sailing orders and is informed that the Naval Staff intends to have her meet the REGENSBURG there for delivery of supplies.

Ship "10" is advised accordingly in Radiogram 0616. Radiogram 1407 contains information on the enemy situation.

II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

The Armed Forces High Command transmits an intercepted radio report sent by enemy agents in Holland about our camouflaged PT boat base at IJmuiden, giving location of the torpedo dump and the command post. (See Telegram 1205.)

Interested commands are being informed.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The tanker GERMANIA was met at 1350 at the Spanish-French border. Early morning reconnaissance up to 15° W made for the departing ship "28" was without result.

Channel Coast:

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla broke off its mission in the night of 20 Mar. because of fog.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean1. North Sea:

Battery "Vineta" fired at ships located off the Dutch coast between Hook of Holland and Scheveningen from a distance of 15 kilometers. After 3 salvos it was observed that the ships turned off to the north. The Admiral, Netherlands has ordered increased readiness.

2. Norway:Enemy Situation:

In the morning air reconnaissance observed 20 steamers (each of 4,000 to 6,000 GRT), most of them under steam, and 10 1,000 GRT steamers between Lavna and Kola.

Own Situation:

Transport and escort tasks were executed according to plan with no special incidents.

The transfer of the cruiser HIPPER to Trondheim was carried out according to plan.

A copy of Group North's order that the 3 destroyers with the best engines and best-trained crews be transferred to the arctic coast under a flotilla commander so as to be at the disposal of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, is sent to the Naval Staff. The order also contains directives for the operations of these destroyers from arctic ports against convoys located by plane and submarine in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Norway. See 1/Skl 6696/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA.

This is in accordance with the Naval Staff's opinion that a destroyer flotilla should be transferred to the arctic area soon.

See Telegram 1824 for Group North's directive that the 4 submarines stationed east of the Faroe Islands be withdrawn to harbors in western France and that as long as these 4 submarines are stationed east of the Faroes, the 6 submarines stationed in Narvik, Trondheim, and Bergen at the disposal of Group North should operate only against coastal convoys and enemy naval forces in the northern North Sea when reconnaissance information is available.

According to the Commanding Admiral, Battleships work to make the stern of the PRINZ EUGEN watertight will not be completed before 31 Mar. It will require 2 to 3 weeks to install the jury-rudder as ordered by the

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Naval Staff after it arrives from Germany. If, therefore, the ship awaits arrival of the jury-rudder from Germany, she cannot be transferred prior to the end of April. She will have a trial run without jury-rudder and undergo degaussing tests sometime early in April. (See Telegram 1850.)

Group North suggests that steamers POTSDAM and GNEISENAU carry troops together under fighter cover only as far as Oslo or Kristiansand South. The Group does not believe it advisable to proceed to northern Norway. On the other hand Group North suggests that the troop transports leaving Hamburg at the present time proceed to northern Norway (see Telegram 1845).

The Commanding Admiral, Norway reports on measures agreed upon between the Commissioner, Norway and the SS in order to influence Norwegian ship-owners and captains whose ships are in enemy areas to put their ships at the disposal of the Axis powers. For copy see 1/Skl 11035 geh. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XI. For further discussion of the question see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report of 0955, the Norwegian ships have left Goetsborg. Details are not known.

2. Own Situation:

Group North reports that all possible measures have been taken to prevent these ships from breaking through. He recommends, however that Sweden be reminded that her steamers which are permitted passage observe exactly the stop signals of German naval and air forces, so that incidents can be avoided. Our forces have orders to prevent with all means the steamers from breaking through. The Foreign Office reports that the departing steamers will be accompanied by Swedish warships in order to be sure that Swedish territorial waters are not used as a hiding place and that territorial borders are not crossed.

Telegram 1811 contains information to this effect to Group North, with copies to the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic, the 5th Air Force, and the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North.

No change in the ice and sea situation.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to the report of a very reliable agent, the convoy previously announced has arrived in Ulster. It is composed of 21 steamers, including 7 transports. The escort included the cruisers CHICAGO, LOUISVILLE, CONCORD, and RICHMOND. The next transport is expected between 24 and 30 Mar.

According to radio monitoring an HX convoy will leave the assembly point at 43° 15' N, 60° 40' W (south of Sable Island) on 21 Mar. An unidentified ship was torpedoed at midnight about 400 miles south of the large Newfoundland Bank. The U.S. tanker ATLANTIC SUN (11,615 GRT) was torpedoed south of Cape Lookout. On the Florida coast U.S. steamer SAHALE reported being attacked by two torpedoes which missed.

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According to a report from the Naval Attache at Buenos Aires steamer MONTEVIDEO sank at 29° 30' N, 69° 13' W.

The Admiralty has announced the loss of the corvette ARBUTUS.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "161" en route home, fired on the armed steamer EMPIRE GOLD 1,000 miles southwest of the Azores, but without success, since her torpedoes had been exhausted.

See Telegram 1103 for the report of the Commander, Submarines, Italy about the attack by submarine U "652" on the convoy off Sollum Bay (see War Diary of 20 Mar.).

See Telegram 2015 for the report of the Commander, Submarines, Italy concerning danger to secret material resulting from forced opening of the safe of submarine U "561" at Pola. So far there are no specific indications that material was stolen.

Submarine Distribution in the North Area:

1. The "York" group, with U "135", "553", "569", and "701", is at sea east of the Faroes.
2. The "Wrangel" group, with U "405", "586", and "592" is at sea approximately in quadrants AF 58 and 82.
3. U "377" and "403" are in Narvik.
4. U "591" is in Bergen.

The distribution of the submarines in the Arctic Ocean reported by Group North on 18 Mar. (see War Diary 18 Mar.) provides that only the 10 submarines stationed in Kirkenes be placed under the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, with their operations area extending to 26° E; the two vessels stationed in Narvik will remain under Group North and are to operate in the Jan Mayen area.

The Naval Staff considers this arrangement unsuitable. Since for tactical reasons the most favorable spot for contacting the PQ convoys in time lies between Bear Island and North Cape, and there are greater prospects of success in this strait formed by our coastal waters and the ice border than near the ports of arrival, it will be necessary to extend the operations area to the west, especially when an icefree route north of Bear Island enters the picture; and then in the interest of unified direction of operations it will be advisable to place also the vessels in the Jan Mayen area under the Admiral, Arctic Ocean. If the submarines are used during an operation of the surface forces they come automatically under the command of Group North once more. The Naval Staff is further of the opinion that Group North can count on submarine replacements in the north area in case extended shipyard repairs should be necessary.

A directive to this effect is sent to Group North and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, with the approval of the Chief, Naval Staff.

For copy of the telegram see 1/Skl I u 622/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

Upon inquiry of the Japanese Liaison Officer at the Naval Staff, whether German submarines have received special orders as regards Chilean and Argentine ships, the Naval Staff replied that the order to the submarines

reads as follows: "These ships are to be treated as ships of all other neutral countries, but particular care should be taken that no incidents occur involving the above named countries."

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Nothing special to report.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The naval force which left Gibraltar for the Mediterranean at 0300 on 20 Mar. was first sighted by air reconnaissance at 0935 on 21 Mar., and contact was maintained until 1730. Since Italian reconnaissance sighted wheeled planes on an easterly course, it may be expected that planes were ferried to Malta, and according to radio direction finding, it is assumed that these planes flew over French territory. German planes were ordered to operate against the convoy located by an Italian submarine on 21 Mar. at 1630 northwest of Tobruk on northwesterly course.

The II Air Corps continued to pound the Venias airfield on Malta with good results with 2 massed attacks. Strong German fighter forces patrolling the Strait of Sicily did not contact the enemy. Reconnaissance planes of the X Air Corps sighted nothing between 25° and 30°. The Air Commander, Africa launched nuisance raids against airfields in the Tobruk area. The Italian Air Force reported sinking an enemy warship 40 miles north of Bardia on 20 Mar.

3. Eastern Front:

Lively air activity on all Army fronts on 20 Mar. Correction of the report of successes during the German air raid on Sevastopol on 20 Mar.: 1 4,000 GRT steamer sunk, 1 7,000 GRT tanker probably sunk. Shipyards and power station damaged. According to Army reports there were numerous explosions and fires in the harbor and fuel dump. West of the southern bay there was a 1,300 m. high column of smoke. Furthermore a 9,000 GRT steamer was sunk outside of the harbor.

On 21 Mar. 8 BM 1,000 mines were laid in Sevastopol harbor.

For reconnaissance in the Arctic Ocean see Enemy Situation, Norway.

VII. Mediterranean Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

On 21 Mar. German air reconnaissance located task force H at sea on varying courses near Mallorca between 0935 and 1730. The force reported by the French on 19 Mar., consisting of 5 ships, was not located again. It is possible that an error was made in the date, so that this report also concerned task force H.

The Air Force established that the mission of task force H was to ferry planes to Malta.

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In view of enemy movements east of Malta, it may be assumed that the eastward advance of the Gibraltar task force is meant to facilitate convoys from Alexandria to Malta.

There were 3 more submarines in Valletta than on 20 Mar. Otherwise there was no change by 1625 on 21 Mar.

The convoy approaching Malta from the east was reported by an Italian submarine for the first time at 1630, consisting of 1 cruiser, 4 destroyers, and 3 steamers approximately 100 miles north-northeast of Derna. After landing, a German plane reported a force consisting of 14 ships, 3 of them fairly large, in the same sea area. The report of a second Italian submarine confirmed this information, so that the Italian Navy believes that the ships are the convoy headed for Malta.

Radio intelligence intercepted only 1 plane report concerning 1 submarine seen diving at 1556 on a 70° course approximately 215 miles east of Malta.

2. Own Situation:

The planned mining operation of the 3rd Pt Boat Flotilla was cancelled because of the weather.

During the transfer of the 6th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla from Galta to Messina on 20 Mar., 3 of the vessels were damaged by running aground north of Naples. The entire flotilla entered Naples on 21 Mar.

3. Situation Italy:

Enemy planes attacked Benghazi during the night of 20 Mar. without causing damage.

Upon inquiry of the Naval Staff with reference to the Reuter report, the German Naval Command, Italy transmitted the report of the Admiral, Aegean Sea of 19 Mar. concerning the enemy attack on Rhodes in the night of 14 Mar. While planes were attacking the Cadurme airfield, 1 enemy cruiser and 2 destroyers bombarded the city for 20 minutes from a distance of 9,000 meters from the north-northeast, without causing particular damage.

Italian naval forces have been ordered to attack the enemy convoy headed for Malta. (The LITTORIO and 8 destroyers from Taranto, and a group of 3 cruisers and destroyers from Messina.)

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Ship movements according to plan without special incident.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy planes attacked targets in the Athens area in the night of 20 Mar. Bombs were dropped on Kalamaki. No damage has been reported.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance obtained no new information. According to the radio intercept service, the Fleet Command was at sea, evidently on

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a battleship. Cruiser A, probably also cruiser D, 4 destroyers, and 2 or 3 submarines were off the southwest tip of the Crimea. Cruiser E was at sea, but her position was not determined.

Own Situation:

No change in the naval situation. During the night of 20 Mar. enemy planes attacked Feodosiya and a cruiser bombarded the city for one hour, evidently from south of Cape Illi.

For a report on the position of German mines in the harbor of Sevastopol see 1/Skl 6690/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

VIII. Situation East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

According to press reports, U.S. troops arrived in Port Darwin. According to the Military Attache in Bangkok, American planes launched attacks on Japanese rear communications in Burma from the Chinese Yunnan province. A state of siege was declared in Australia, and extensive air defense measures are said to have been taken in Calcutta and Colombo.

2. Situation Japan:

According to the Military Attache at Bangkok, Saigon is the main supply base for operations in Burma, Malaya, and the South Sea Islands. The Army Quartermaster General is working in conjunction with naval commands. Approximately 600,000 GRT have been set aside permanently for supply operations. The Military Attache at Bangkok states that the large joint supply dump for ammunition, fuel, and foodstuffs is insufficiently protected against enemy action or the effects of the sun.

Fighting on all Burma fronts came to a halt temporarily because of supply difficulties.

Additional Japanese landings occurred on the Solomon Islands. It is planned to establish a submarine base there against U.S. supply lines.

3. Special Item:

Germany is very much interested in having Japan cut the enemy supply lines to Russia via the Near East and the Caucasus as soon as possible. For discussions of the Naval Staff about ways to bring about large-scale operational and strategic cooperation between the German and Japanese Armed Forces see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Attacks were repulsed on the Feodosiya front. Local attacks in the sectors of the Von Kleist Army Group and the 6th Army east of

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Kharkov were unsuccessful.

Central Army Group:

House to house fighting is in progress in the western part of Vesnini. Our forces were able to close the penetration point west of Rzhev. Other local enemy attacks had varying results.

Attacks on our advancing forces between Velizh and Demidov were repulsed.

Northern Army Group:

At Szavino our lines advanced to the east, and an enemy attack on the southern wing as well as on the positions west of Kholm was repulsed. The Von Seydlitz Group crossed the Staraya Russa - Kholm highway and established a bridgehead 3 km. wide across the Porusye. North of there another division advanced to the highway leading from Staraya Russa to the south. The enemy unsuccessfully attacked our new lines of communications on the Volkhov front. South of Maluksa the enemy took Demidov. German reserves have been thrown in.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Enemy attacks across the Svir were repulsed in the Ladoga-Svir triangle.

3. North Africa:

One enemy brigade reconnoitered the Bir Temrad area to the west and the northwest. Advance units reached the area southwest of Martuba, where artillery and planes forced them to turn south.

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Sunday

Items of Political Importance

France:

According to Reuter the U.S. has agreed to resume shipment of foodstuffs and other supplies to North Africa, after Vichy explicitly promised that neither Madagascar nor the French fleet would be put at the disposal of the Axis powers.

Australia:

The disagreement between the British and Australian governments in connection with the Casey case is now also revealed in British publication of the whole discussion and in an interview with the Australian Prime Minister. For details see Political Review No. 69, paragraph 2 c.

Canada:

In the first secret session of the Parliament since the World War one of the questions discussed was whether Canada is still bound to the motherland, Great Britain, or whether she should now join the U.S. as an adult brother.

Sweden:

According to a report from a military source the Swedish armed forces are making an effort to express very great interest in keeping close friendly contact with Germany.

Bulgaria:

King Boris will come to Germany on 22 Mar. in order to visit the Fuehrer.

Turkey:

The discussion in Istanbul between the President and the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin, and the subsequent conference with the German Ambassador, who stopped in Istanbul on his way to Germany, indicate lively political activity.

Egypt:

According to the Transocean News Agency, an unsuccessful attempt was made on the life of the Egyptian Prime Minister. This is said to have caused violent anti-British demonstrations in Cairo.

Situation 22 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Indian Ocean:

Cruisers JAMAICA and GUIANA entered Simonstown on 26 Feb.

Cruiser BROOKLYN, arriving from Trinidad, entered Simonstown on 22 Feb., and was in Capetown from 24 to 27 Feb. Thereafter she returned to Trinidad via the U.S.

2. Own Situation:

Tanker GERMANIA entered Bordeaux.

See Radiogram 1700 for information to all ships in foreign waters concerning positions of the Swedish ships in the America traffic permitted them, and concerning the enemy situation.

II. Situation West Area

See Telegram 1200 for the request of the Commanding Admiral, France concerning replacements for the 10 cm. K 18 guns withdrawn from the coastal defenses.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is attending to the matter.

Otherwise no special incidents.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Nothing to report.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance sighted 10 steamers in Murmansk in the morning, 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer in Eina Guba, 4 steamers and 2 escort vessels in Motovski Bay headed for Kola Bay.

Own Situation:

Transfer of the Commander, 8th Destroyer Flotilla with destroyers Z "24", "25", and "26" to the northern area to be at the disposal of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean is to be undertaken on 23 Mar.

Otherwise nothing to report.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Skagerrak patrols have been increased according to plan.

Otherwise no special incidents.

Ice situation unchanged.

V. Merchant Shipping

The government of Venezuela ordered 1 German and 5 Italian steamers confiscated.

VI. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

A convoy consisting of 6 steamers with 3 corvettes and 1 escort vessel, heading west, passed the Gibraltar Strait at 1530. According to the radio intercept service there were 3 submarine sighting reports sent from off the American coast. Furthermore U.S. tanker PAN AMOCO (9,862 GRT) was attacked off the Florida coast.

A British plane in the Mediterranean reported attacking a submarine 30 miles north of Marsa Matruh.

According to radio and press reports, the U.S. Army claims that a German submarine was probably destroyed off the east coast by 4 depth bombs.

The Admiralty announced the loss of submarine P "38". In West Africa British air bases are being established to combat German submarines.

2. Own Situation:

A torpedo was fired at a fast convoy consisting of 5 large ships escorted by 2 cruisers and 6 destroyers approximately 400 miles south of the Cape on a 230° course, but the torpedo missed. The submarine, which was on her return voyage, was unable to maintain contact because of lack of fuel. For supplementary report see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

German attacks on ships off the east coast around noon were unsuccessful. 13 planes mined the Thames during the night.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Operations of 40 bombers against the Malta-bound enemy force were hindered by a strong southern storm. A large number of the planes missed the enemy. According to preliminary reports received so far, German planes damaged 1 steamer of 5,000 GRT at 1425, and at 1600 and later it was reported that 2 more steamers, one of them of 6,000 GRT, were damaged.

Attacks on Malta continued.

See Enemy Situation, Warfare in the Mediterranean for reconnaissance operations against Task Force H in the vicinity of the Balearic Islands.

3. Eastern Front:

No special reports from the Army fronts.

4. Organization:

The Air Force Operations Staff has made the final decision to place Coastal Air Group 506 under the 3rd Air Force also in administrative matters. The order contains the following remark:

"As the result of this new command organization there must be no change in the reconnaissance and bombing missions carried out in the interest of naval warfare (Group North)."

Thus the only forces left at the disposal of the Commander, Naval Air are the 1st Squadron of the 706th Group (at the moment icebound) and the 1st Ship Plane Squadron of the 196th Group.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

On 21 Mar. 4 French steamers and 1 patrol vessel passed Gibraltar toward the east. On the evening of 22 Mar. a DELHI class cruiser entered Gibraltar from the west. At 1533 on 20 Mar. the Italian submarine MOCENIGO attacked Task Force H with 3 torpedoes 60 miles northeast of Oran. The result is not known. On 20 Mar. Italian planes sighted 2 suspicious PT boats flying the Italian flag off Cape Serrat, and attacked them. One of the PT boats exploded after being fired upon, and the second was forced to enter Bone on 22 Mar., where the crew was interned.

These were evidently British gunboats which were flying the Italian flag.

On 22 Mar. air reconnaissance again located Task Force H in the vicinity of Mallorca, consisting of 1 battleship, 2 carriers, 1 heavy cruiser, and 6 destroyers. Contact was maintained from 1020 until 1439. According to hydrophone observation by an Italian submarine the force was located approximately 45 miles southeast of Cape de Gata at 2130, evidently returning to Gibraltar.

At 0940 air reconnaissance again located the heavily escorted convoy sighted in the central Mediterranean on 21 Mar. southwest of Crete; the convoy was at 34° 10' N, 19° 10' E, consisted of 15 vessels, and was proceeding west at 14 knots. At 1332 German reconnaissance planes spotted the force consisting of 5 cruisers, among them 3 of the DIDO and 1 of the AURORA class, 7 destroyers, and 7 medium-sized merchant vessels at 34° 02' N, 18° 35' E on a 250° course. At 1400 the convoy changed course sharply to the south, and at 1450 divided into 2 groups. One of them consisted of 3 cruisers and 7 destroyers on a 200° course, the other of 1 cruiser, several destroyers, and the merchant ships on a 30° course. At 1610 the latter group was located 6 miles south of the escort group. Doubtless this change in formation was undertaken because it was known that Italian naval forces were in the vicinity. In any case at 1431 1 destroyer informed the force that 4 unidentified vessels were sighted to the north, and 1438 these were erroneously identified as 3 battleships. One British vessel reported the Italian force consisting of 1 battleship and 4 cruisers at 1638 at 33° 48' N, 17° 14' E on a 215° course. The last German contact report about the British force was made at 1825, giving the position of the force as 301° and 140 miles off Benghazi on easterly course. (See Situation Italy.)

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According to photo reconnaissance, at 0839 there were 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer less in the harbor of Valletta than on 21 Mar.

2. Own Situation:

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla was inactive because of the weather. The 4 undamaged vessels of the 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla continued from Naples to Tripoli via Messina and Trapani. The remaining vessels will follow after repairs.

At 0030 on 22 Mar. battleship LITTORIO and 4 destroyers left Taranto for operations against the Malta convoy, and 2 additional destroyers followed them at 0250.

3. Situation Italy:

At 0100 on 22 Mar. the heavy cruisers GORIZIA and TRENTO, light cruiser BANDE NERE, and 4 destroyers left Messina.

According to Italian reports, at 1643 the Italian naval forces established contact with the enemy, which cruiser GORIZIA had reported for the first time at 1430 at 33° 54' N, 18° 07' E. At 1700 the enemy changed course, laid a smoke screen and escaped to the south. Contact was lost because of very low visibility, but was temporarily regained at 1820.

Italian torpedo planes, which took off at 0630, attacked the enemy force at 0940 at 34° 10' N, 19° 10' E (340° and 130 miles off Benghazi). They reported that 1 CAIRO class cruiser and 1 destroyer were hit definitely. 4 planes returned; there is no news of the fifth.

A supplementary report sent by the German Naval Command, Italy as of 1945 is as follows:

"(1) At 1630 the LITTORIO arrived in the combat area. She opened fire at 1638, but ceased firing at about 1700 because the enemy laid a smoke screen and escaped. Thereafter contact was lost until 1820. After that time contact was temporarily regained several times, but low visibility interfered.

(2) The GORIZIA group seems to have joined the LITTORIO group at 1630.

(3) Unless information to the contrary is still received, it seems that the enemy so far (1925) was successful in keeping the steamers out of the range of the Italian naval forces.

(4) The first 20 German bombers landed after an unsuccessful attack. One plane reported hitting 1 steamer.

(5) At 1830 6 British planes (probably torpedo planes) broke through the German fighter barrage over Malta and flew east."

As of 2100 the situation was as follows:

"At 1900 the Italian naval forces, led by battleship LITTORIO broke off contact with the enemy force and turned back to the north. Up to now there is no indication that the Italian naval forces damaged or destroyed any of the enemy forces or steamers during the engagement lasting from 1430 to 1900 on 22 Mar. The Commanding Admiral, German Naval Command, Italy can evaluate the operation only after more detailed reports have been received, since until then it is impossible to understand the course of the operation."

No clear picture of the operation between 1420 and 1800 is possible as yet.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Steamer BROOK was unsuccessfully attacked by enemy torpedo planes on 21 Mar. at 0430 south of Capo dell' Armi. On 22 Mar. transport shipping was interrupted because of the enemy situation. Coastal traffic proceeded without special incident.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Nothing to report.

IX. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Enemy attacks on the Feodosiya front continued, although somewhat abated. In the area of the Von Kleist Army Group the enemy was able to penetrate our lines temporarily east of Slavyansk. All other attacks were repulsed. Also in the area of the 6th Army all enemy attacks were unsuccessful. Enemy plane attacks on the rear area scored a direct hit on the staff headquarters of a division, causing high casualties, including the division commander and the first staff officer. Our panzer forces repulsed an enemy attack on the center of the 2nd Army.

Central Army Group:

Fighting continued at the critical points of the 2nd Panzer Army. All enemy efforts to gain advantage were unsuccessful.

Northern Army Group:

Enemy attacks in the Kholm area and in the Pola valley were unsuccessful. Our Group advancing south of Staraya Russa renewed its attack toward the east. Enemy attempts to break out of the pocket west of Novgorod were unsuccessful. Fierce fighting is in progress at the breakthrough points south of Maluksa.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

Enemy forces were mopped up by a counterattack by parts of the German Africa Corps. The enemy beat a hasty retreat to the south-east. German planes supported the operation effectively.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

A neutral diplomatic source reports concerning the British-Russian conferences that at first Eden refused to discuss political questions referring to the future. However Stalin insisted on fixing Russia's future borders as they were on 22 Jun. 1941. Ambassador Winant went to Washington as a result in order to see that pressure is put on London to give Stalin satisfaction. It is understandable that the Poles are most anxious about this development.

France:

According to the German News Agency (DNB) Vichy calls the reports concerning Franco-American agreements and resumption of deliveries to North Africa biased and untrue.

U.S.A.:

According to the German News Agency (DNB) reporting from Buenos Aires, a military conference of all 21 American republics began in Washington on 23 Mar.

The Chilean War Minister announced that U.S. war materiel was carried across Chilean territory to Peru by U.S. personnel.

Japan:

The Japan Times, which is close to the Foreign Office, makes another appeal to Australia to come to an understanding. For contents see Political Review No. 69, paragraph 11.

Rumania:

Press circles claim that the sharp attack on Hungary by Foreign Minister Antonescu was expressly approved by Germany in order to exert pressure on the new Kallay government, which is not desirable. The press states that Rumania will under no circumstances tolerate any further insults on the part of Hungary.

Bulgaria:

As background for King Boris' visit to the Fuehrer it is rumored that the changed German-Turkish relations may have relieved the situation on the Turko-Bulgarian frontier, making it possible for the Bulgarian Army to take over other assignments in support of the German Army.

Argentina:

The fact that the elections were not held, which is decisive for Argentina's future attitude to the Rio resolutions, is termed as probably favorable for the government.

Uruguay:

In a note of protest to Germany as a result of the sinking of steamer MONTEVIDEO by a German submarine, the government reserves the right to demand indemnities.

Cuba:

According to Reuter 2 British Swordfish squadrons arrived in Cuba for protection against German submarines.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Naval Communications Division reports about the suggestion made to the Commander in Chief, Air concerning the necessity of improving plane recognition signals and about the Italian request for delivery of additional search gear. This request must be turned down at the present time, however, since our own needs can hardly be covered.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports on the following:

a. It will be unnecessary to divide the mine ships into 2 groups, since they cannot be used in the west area now. In the future the single mine ship force will be under the operational command of the Groups, and under the administrative command of the Fleet.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

b. The Naval Liaison Officer at the Armed Forces High Command reported that the Fuehrer directive concerning command organization of coastal defenses was carried out by the Armed Forces High Command.

The Chief, Naval Staff orders that no steps be taken until the directive has been received, so as to determine whether it will interfere with sea defenses; if so, this must be prevented.

c. It is suggested that it might be wise to place the Admiral, Arctic Ocean under the direct operational command of Group North, although he can be left under the administrative command of the Commanding Admiral, Norway.

The Chief, Naval Staff agrees, provided this meets the approval of the Commanding Admiral, Norway.

III. The Chief, Foreign Affairs Section, Naval Staff Operations Division reports as follows:

a. The French have not yet reached a decision on the request concerning the transfer of 4 PT boats through France.

b. With reference to the departure of Norwegian steamers from Swedish harbors, the Foreign Office, at the request of the Naval Staff, has initiated a political demarche in Stockholm. The attitude of the Swedish Foreign Minister is unsatisfactory. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

c. A note has been sent to the Chilean government concerning the sinking of steamer TOLTEN. For text see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

Special Items:

I. When sending the minutes of the Garmisch conference, Admiral

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Riccardi, Chief of the Italian Naval Staff, expressed his regrets to the Commander in Chief, Navy about the fact that it is impossible to send additional motor minesweepers into the Mediterranean, and thanks heartily for the information sent by the Commander in Chief, Navy that an additional 20,000 tons of fuel oil will be allocated for March of this year; he values this highly as a sign of good comradeship.

II. Referring to the basic Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff communication of 14 Dec. 1941, which states that the open coasts of Holland and western and northern Jutland are not suitable for enemy landings, the 82nd Infantry Division called attention on 7 Feb. 1942 to the fact that enemy landing attempts are altogether possible on the western part of the Dutch coast. The Division bases this assumption on the importance of the operational targets there which challenge the enemy to attempt landings, also on the favorable geographical conditions, the fact that the enemy's jumping off bases are nearby, and the fact that the Dutch population would probably aid the enemy. The Division then proceeds to enumerate in detail the tactical and technical possibilities for landing operations, examining the conditions in the sectors particularly endangered. The Division comes to the conclusion that the stationary naval coastal fortifications best meet the requirements for defense; in the open coastal areas between the naval fortifications and in the rear areas, however, it is necessary to rebuild the entire defense system similarly to the Westwall. Naval Station, North supports the request made by the Commander in Chief, West and the Army High Command that the priority rating assigned to the Dutch defenses in the basic directive of the Armed Forces High Command should be changed from 3 to 2.

The Naval Staff cannot agree with this view, however, but continues to adhere to the priority assigned by the Armed Forces High Command which places the Dutch area behind Norway, northern France and Belgium, even though Holland is undoubtedly threatened.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division will attend to the matter. For copy of the opinion of the Naval Staff Operations Division see 1/Skl I op 6152/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

Situation 23 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

Indian Ocean:

Southwest of Port Elizabeth 2 steamers sent distress signals reporting suspicious vessels. These reports were later cancelled by radio stations ashore.

Furthermore the radio intercept service located several British vessels in the Mauritius area, presumably en route to Australia.

Pacific Ocean:

The reported U.S. cruiser and 1 transport vessel with war material left Antofagasta on 19 Mar.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 1633 informs the DOGGERBANK that on 18 Mar. at 1740

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the British radio station Jacobs broadcast the mine warning given by the Admiral at Simonstown for 33° 56' 30" S, 17° 22' E (the message was unfortunately not intercepted completely), and that the Naval Staff deducted from this that the mining mission was carried out according to plan, so that the ship no longer needs to send a radio report to this effect.

Radiogram 1926 informs ship "28" that the Naval Staff will take over command of the auxiliary cruiser at 1600 on 24 Mar. (German summer time).

Radiogram 2105 informs all ships in foreign waters that blockade runner RIO GRANDE is sailing as SALACIA, and the FUSIJAMA as ANGLO INDIAN.

Reports on the enemy situation are sent via Radiograms 0711, 1304, 1507, 1814, and 1901.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to information captured with British agents, a British assault troop operation seems to be in preparation against the northern French coast in order to take prisoners. 3 companies of 200 men each are supposed to take part in the operation.

According to air reconnaissance, there were 5 PT boats in Portland.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

Nothing special to report.

Channel Coast:

Fighter bombers reconnoitered the enemy Channel harbors and attacked the motor gunboat base at Newhaven with good results.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, a northbound and a southbound convoy left the Thames in the afternoon. There was lively reconnaissance activity in the direction of Bergen, the German Bight, and the southern part of the North Sea in the evening.

Own Situation:

A French PT boat ran aground off Blavandshuk. Ship "13" and ship "24" are en route from Hook of Holland to the east. Convoy and escort service proceeded without special incidents.

2. Norway:

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Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, a convoy consisting of 6 steamers, among them 2 of 5,000 GRT left Murmansk Bay on a northerly course. Otherwise the naval situation in the Arctic Ocean is unchanged.

According to radio intelligence, convoy PQ 13 was located on 19 Mar., presumably en route from Iceland to Murmansk.

Own Situation:

The picket boat was fired upon for the second time off Petsamo by a Russian battery. The 12th Subchaser Flotilla with 6 vessels, and 4 vessels of the 56th Minesweeper Flotilla arrived in Stavanger. Mine ship OSTMARK was unable to proceed from Stavanger because of fog.

Convoy and supply operations according to plan.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

A report has been received from Goeteborg that a number of Norwegian ships have been transferred to the outer harbor. It is impossible to tell whether the ships are only assembling for the breakthrough, or whether it is the actual breakthrough itself.

2. Own Situation:

On 22 Mar. the Naval Attache at Stockholm gave a detailed report about the situation in Goeteborg and the state of the discussions with the Swedish government. For copy see 1/Skl 6701/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III. The Naval Staff informed Group North and the Air Force Operations Staff on 22 Mar. The report is essentially the same as that transmitted by the Foreign Office on 21 Mar.

See Telegram 1320 for orders of Group North to the Commanding Admirals, Defenses North and Baltic Sea to decrease the patrols.

In Telegram 1725 Group North advises the Commanding Admiral, Defenses North, Commanding Admiral, Defenses Baltic Sea, Commanding Admiral, Norway, and the Commander, Naval Air (copies to the 5th Air Force, the 3rd Torpedo Boat Flotilla, the 6th PT Boat Flotilla, and the Naval Staff) that the danger that the Norwegian ships might break through will increase as soon as the ice situation improves. At that time preventive measures must again be increased.

According to a report from Group North, the SCHLESIEEN, icebreakers CASTOR and STETTIN, as well as 3 steamers which proceeded to Hamburg, finally arrived in Kiel on the afternoon of 22 Mar.

South of Kjelsnor 3 steamers are still icebound, and in urgent need of supplies.

The SCHLESIEEN is in need of a week's repairs. The CASTOR and the STETTIN will again be ready for operations on 24 Mar.

The Group is planning to send these 2 icebreakers to the aid of the 3

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steamers near Kjelsnor; this will take 4 to 6 days. Subsequently these ships, together with the SCHLESIEEN and GNEISENAU are to proceed through the ice barrier to the east.

Consequently the CASTOR and EISBAER will not be available beginning 3 Apr. for bringing the Elbe-Oslo transports into Oslo as requested by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch.

Group North requests that the Naval Staff make a new decision about the urgency sequence of these tasks (see Telegram 2301).

Between 13 Feb. and 23 Mar. a total of 14,512 men, 1,578 horses, and 1,108 vehicles were transported to Norway; 2 transport groups sailed from Copenhagen to Oslo, 3 from Hamburg to Kristiansand South, and 1 shuttle steamer made 7 round trips between Hirtshals and Kristiansand South.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

The ILLUSTRIOUS was located at sea off the west coast of Scotland on 22 and 23 Mar. A plane was ordered to attack a submarine located in the approaches to the North Channel.

Off the U.S. East Coast, U.S. steamer BAYOU CHICO (5,401 GRT) was chased and probably sunk by a submarine 150 miles southwest of Cape Race. At any rate an SOS signal concerning a life boat was intercepted from this area. The British tanker EMPIRE STEEL (8,150 GRT) was torpedoed 600 miles east of Cape Hatteras, and steamer PETER ROGEN was torpedoed 570 miles southeast of Bermuda.

According to an American radio report the torpedoed steamer AMERICAN TRADER reached a U.S. port. According to a report from the U.S. Navy Department a small Honduran steamer was sunk by a torpedo off the Atlantic coast.

According to the Naval Attache at Buenos Aires, Argentine naval officers assume, on the basis of intercepted radio communications that British submarines are using Montevideo as a supply base, and that this is meant to create incidents with Argentine merchant ships off the La Plata.

2. Own Situation:

The following gratifying reports have been received from our submarines off the American coast:

Submarine U "124" (Lt. Johann Mohr) reports sinking a total of 52,922 GRT south of Cape Lookout, among these 6 tankers; in addition she torpedoed 1 tanker of 11,615 GRT.

From the Cape Hatteras area U "332" (Lt. Liebe) reported sinking a total of 22,016 GRT.

For supplementary situation report see War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During a fighter bomber attack on Newhaven (see Situation West Area) 1 steamer of 3,000 GRT was sunk. During the night 9 Ju 88's attacked Portland, and 18 Do 217's attacked gunboat berths in Dover.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The report of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, closed at 1400, contains the following information:

On 22 Mar. 124 reconnaissance planes and bombers, as well as 12 Italian torpedo planes participated in operations against the westbound convoy. In addition, 110 fighters and 39 bombers operated against Malta continuously. The weather grew constantly worse during the day and visibility decreased to 100 and 200 meters. The wind turned into a storm, interfering greatly not only with air operations but also with operations of the Italian naval forces. Because of the bad weather some British planes could not be prevented from taking off from Malta in the evening for reconnaissance or torpedo missions. 2 enemy planes were shot down, however. Dive bombers could not operate because of the weather. At the end of 22 Mar. the following results could be definitely reported:

German planes sank 1 large merchant ship and damaged 2 others. Italian torpedo planes sank 1 merchant ship and 1 destroyer.

The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports as follows about 23 Mar.:

The British convoy was again located in several groups on the morning of 23 Mar. in the area directly south and southeast of Malta. In spite of continued bad weather and especially difficult starting conditions at the air bases, bombers and reconnaissance planes went into action. 2 more merchant ships had been sunk by the German Air Force by 1400. It is possible that another British vessel was sunk, judging from the radio intercept service. 2 or 3 merchant ships were observed entering Valletta. Reconnaissance reports about noon indicate that the majority of the enemy forces turned back east.

3. Eastern Front:

On 21 and 22 Mar. very many planes operated on all Army fronts.

On 23 Mar. a large number of planes attacked Tuapse successfully.

For reports on reconnaissance in the Arctic Ocean see Enemy Situation, Norway.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

Task Group H, including the MALAYA, ARGUS, EAGLE, HERMIONE, and several destroyers, returned to Gibraltar at 0800. One DELHI class cruiser left Gibraltar in westerly direction at 1415.

A report of the French Armistice Commission confirms the supposition that the gunboats attacked on 21 Mar. off Cape Bon were British. The vessels were en route from Gibraltar to Malta. The crews of both were interned.

Evidently during the night of 22 Mar. the greater part of the Malta convoy continued to the port of destination. On 23 Mar. at 0700 the convoy was again located by reconnaissance planes, and at that time was divided into several groups, approximately 30 to 50 miles south and southeast of Malta. The numerous reconnaissance reports do not give a clear picture of the size of the various groups and the total number of ships, nor do they indicate exactly the successes achieved during the heavy Italian and German air raids. Above all, there is no exact report about the number of merchant vessels which came from the east, since photo reconnaissance did not confirm the report given on 22 Mar. by German air reconnaissance that there were 7 of them. It is also noteworthy that photo reconnaissance of Valletta at 1800 on 22 Mar. showed 2 steamers more than on the previous day.

Air reconnaissance reported a force of 2 cruisers, 5 destroyers, and 2 unidentified vessels at 0833 150 miles north of Benghazi; at 1730 air reconnaissance reported 11 vessels on easterly course north of Derna; and at 1900 this force was sighted by 1 submarine north of Tobruk. Consequently the German Naval Command, Italy believes that a part of the convoy turned back to the east before reaching its destination.

It is just as possible, however, that these ships were the empty steamers returning from Malta according to plan.

2. Situation Italy:

During the night the naval forces evidently returned together and then separated at 0700 on 23 Mar. in quadrant CO 1144 in order to approach their bases, Taranto and Messina. Cruiser BANDE NERE remained behind, evidently as a result of damage of undetermined character. Destroyer LANCIERE was sighted sinking in quadrant CN 3996. The position of destroyer SIRROCCO is not known. Cruiser TRENTO was sent back to assist her.

The German Naval Command, Italy reports as follows about the results achieved:

(1) The Italian Fleet Commander reported that during the engagement at 1630 on 22 Mar. hits were seen to have been scored on the enemy naval vessels. Contact was broken off because of very low visibility.

(2) The Italian Air Force reports the following successes for 22 Mar.:

(a) Air Force Libya: 9 torpedo planes attacked at 0935. 2 hits were scored on a cruiser and 1 on a destroyer. At 1107 1 hit was scored on each of 2 cruisers. 1 medium-sized steamer was hit forward.

(b) Air Force Sicily: 9 planes attacked from 1800 to 1830. 2 cruisers were hit and 1 of them was seen sinking by another plane. 1 light cruiser or destroyer was hit by a torpedo. 1 large steamer was hit by 2 torpedoes, and 2 additional steamers by 1 torpedo each.

(3) The German Air Force established contact with the enemy naval forces at 0700 on 23 Mar. 1 steamer was definitely sunk south-east of Malta. One steamer received a direct 250 kilogram hit, but kept on going. 1 other steamer was sunk at noon. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South assumes that a total of 4 steamers was definitely sunk by the German and Italian Air Forces.

The LITTORIO reported sighting 2 submarines in the Gulf of Taranto on the return voyage.

3. Own Situation:

No operations were carried out by the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla because of the weather.

4. Special Item:

Emphasizing the necessity to capture Malta by making use of its present weakened defenses as the result of our offensive tactics, the Naval Staff asked the Naval Representative on the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff to express an opinion about Italian plans and about the operation as such.

Thereupon the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff instructed the German General at the Italian Armed Forces High Command (with copy to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South) to obtain the necessary information from the Italians, and told him that Germany could not contribute many forces, and that these would be confined to the German air and naval forces already in the Mediterranean, as well as a few improvised Army units from the reserves of the German Africa Corps in southern Italy.

First the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reported on 11 Mar. that the Italians are seriously planning to take Malta as soon as possible, and that the Italian High Command expects the operation to be launched in July at the latest; then the German General at Rome reported on 18 Mar. that on the basis of a statement made on 17 Mar. by General Cavallero in the presence of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, 1 Aug. appears to be the earliest possible date for the operation. Supported by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the German General, Rome has asked the Italians to investigate whether it would be possible to move up the date of the attack, in case the present air attacks succeed in weakening Malta to such an extent that a surprise attack might be successful. They have agreed to consider the matter. Preparations are being made to launch the attack the beginning of August.

It would be unfortunate if such a delay should become necessary, since it will be difficult to maintain the present offensive operations for such an extended period.

For copy of telegram see 1/Skl 636/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIII.

5. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Enemy operations and weather conditions interfered with ship movements. No special incidents.

6. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing special to report.

Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, a force consisting of large ships with the Fleet Command aboard, 4 destroyers and presumably 2 cruisers entered an unidentified base in the early morning. Several destroyers and submarines were located at sea in the Crimean area.

Own Situation:

No special incidents.

At the request of the Army General Staff (Intelligence Division, East), the Naval Staff transmits its opinion on Russian landing plans in Bulgaria; the Naval Staff believes it unlikely that the Russians will make such landings on a large scale in order to form a new front, especially if we continue to be successful in the fighting in the Crimea.

For copy see 1/Skl 6836/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

VIII. Situation East Asia

According to press reports, a large Japanese fleet force is advancing in the direction of Perth and southwest Australia.

Coastal batteries on the Christmas islands supposedly sank a Japanese submarine.

According to a report from Tokyo, the Dutch commander on Sumatra surrendered with 1700 of his men.

IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

Furious hand to hand fighting took place during engagements to throw back an enemy advance on the southern wing of the Feodosiya front. Enemy attacks at the breakthrough point east of Slavyansk were unsuccessful. An advance with our tank forces west of Slavyansk achieved local success. Fighting is still going on around the strong-point west of Balakleya. East of Kharkov enemy attacks continue.

Central Army Group:

Southwest of Sukhinichi the enemy succeeded in penetrating our positions. Attacks east of Orel were repulsed, however. A German surprise attack on the highway to the south between Demenskoye and Yukhnov in the 4th Army sector was successful. Stubborn fighting around Yelnya and northeast of Gzhatsk, as well as near Mostovaya and south of Byeloi.

Northern Army Group:

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Fighting is in progress near Kholm and around Staraya Russa. The Von Seydlitz Group was able to gain ground to the east in spite of stubborn enemy resistance. Southwest of Yamno the enemy launched an unsuccessful attack against the defensive front. In the rear area the enemy attempted to break out of the pocket to the north. At Maluksa reinforced enemy units continued to advance. We withdrew our line to the Tigoda.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

Normal enemy reconnaissance activity. Lively air activity.

Special Item:

The fight of the Panzer Army, Africa is a decisive factor in warfare in the Mediterranean, and has the goal of eliminating the military and political influence of Great Britain in the Mediterranean and of driving the British from their bases in Gibraltar, Malta, and Suez. The fight for Suez in particular emphasizes the great and decisive importance of naval warfare, so that the closest possible cooperation in planning is necessary between the Navy and the Panzer Army, Africa. Therefore the Navy is considering attaching a naval liaison officer to General Rommel's staff. For copy of these considerations see War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIV.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

According to reports of Cripps' statement in Delhi, negotiations with the Hindus were emphasized; the Mohammedans were not mentioned. Cripps stated that self-government for India is the aim of the British policy. There is no time to be lost; he has only 2 weeks to spend in Delhi, so that lengthy discussions are impossible at this time. Moreover no fundamental change can be made in the War Cabinet's decisions on India. Another source reports that the future position of India will be similar to that of Egypt, as far as Great Britain is concerned. A British-Indian and Indian-Allied pact will be concluded, in which India will have to make the usual promise not to make a separate peace. India is to be represented at the peace conferences as an independent nation. It is not planned to divide India into a Hindu and a Moslem state. A statement by Gandhi is noteworthy, according to which India wishes to be assured that the "scorched earth policy" will not be applied to India.

Sweden:

For an account of efforts made by the Swedish Government to avoid jeopardizing its neutral position because of one-sided opinions of the press, see Political Review, No. 70, paragraph 3.

Turkey:

According to the German Ambassador, the Foreign Minister stated that Turkey hopes to be able to stay out of the war. The attitude of the Turkish people toward the Russo-German war cannot be judged from the reaction in the big cities, but rather in the country, where each German success is greeted enthusiastically, while Russian successes are deplored. Because of this attitude of the Turkish population it is entirely out of the question that Turkey might enter the war on the side of Russia.

Argentina:

An Argentine commission sent to the U.S. for the purpose of buying weapons was unable to obtain any commitments in Washington.

Chile:

Chilean diplomatic circles believe that Chile will continue to follow a neutral policy. The new Foreign Minister, who is friendly to the U.S., will not be able to put through anything with which the new President disagrees. The latter, however, will not tolerate breaking off relations with the Axis under any circumstances.

This opinion is evidently confirmed by the attitude of the Chilean government in the case of the steamer TOLTEN.

Japan:

The extension of the fishing agreement with Russia has been greeted with satisfaction. The Japanese press reports that the attitude of the Russians during the discussions shows how anxious Russia is to avoid

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conflict in the Far East. Nevertheless the belief has also been expressed in some quarters that in spite of this agreement it is difficult to tell how Russo-Japanese relations will develop in the future.

The Chief, Naval Staff is on an official visit to Ploen and Kiel, and therefore not in Berlin.

Situation 24 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

A Spanish steamer reported that on 17 Mar. she was inspected twice off Freetown by what seemed to be British cruisers. According to an Italian report there were 1 cruiser in Saldanha Bay off Capetown and 2 cruisers in Simonstown on 24 Mar.

Indian Ocean:

According to an Italian report there are 2 British cruisers and 5 submarines in Durban at the present time. The Durban naval forces are being used to patrol the Mozambique Strait. Only 2 U.S. cruisers are said to be in South African waters at the present time.

2. Own Situation:

The Commander in Chief, Navy expresses his particular appreciation to the captain and crew of the DOGGERBANK for carrying out the very difficult special assignment. See Radiogram 1201 for information to this effect to the DOGGERBANK and for citations.

Radiogram 2204 informs ship "10" that ship "28" left western France on 20 Mar., and directs her to send her war diary to the Naval Attache at Tokyo via the REGENSBURG and TANNENFELS. The Naval Attache will wireless pertinent excerpts.

Reports on the enemy situation were sent by Radiograms 0231, 0417, 0612, and 2351.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, there were 9 eastbound steamers south of the Isle of Wight in the afternoon. 3 steamers were seen entering Portland. The merchant vessel attacked by the Air Force off Newhaven on 23 Mar. was seen beached.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

No special incidents.

Referring to the Fuehrer directive that arrival and departure of blockade-runners at the western French coast should be adequately safeguarded, the Naval Staff points out to the Air Force Operations Staff that the long-range reconnaissance which is essential for this purpose will have to be taken over by FW 200 planes, since there is only one squadron of He 115's left in the west area, and there are no reserves. Since there are at the present time 9 blockade-runners in Bordeaux, 5 more are expected to arrive with very valuable cargoes before the end of May, and prizes can also be expected, the Commander in Chief, Air is requested to keep this matter in mind when withdrawing forces from the French west coast as planned. For copy of this communication see 1/Skl I k 625/42 Gkdos. Chfs in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b.

Channel Coast:

Minesweeper M 3615 sank off Dunkirk as the result of a mine hit in water 10 meters deep. It is noteworthy that she is a wooden vessel, which shows that such vessels are no longer safe against non-contact mines where the water is as shallow as this. In the afternoon there was lively enemy air activity over the Channel coast.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance there was a convoy in the outer Thames in the afternoon on northeasterly course. The size of the convoy was not indicated. There was moderate air activity in the vicinity of the Norwegian coast.

Own Situation:

In the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North, convoy and minesweeping operations were somewhat hampered by fog, but otherwise proceeded according to plan and without incident.

The Naval Staff informs Group North that it would be wiser to use LMB equipped with FAB XI instead of the TMB mines which had been planned for the mining of the Channel, since it is more difficult to sweep the LMB mines. For copy of telegram see 1/Skl I e 6389/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. VI.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance there were 6 medium-sized freighters in the harbor of Murmansk and 6 in Polyarnoye in the morning. 2 steamers were reported leaving Polyarnoye.

According to a report from an agent (not yet proved to be reliable) from Sweden, Norwegian partisan activity and sabotage against German supplies, including those being transported via Sweden, may be expected during the imminent British-American operation against the western islands off the north Norwegian coast at the end of March or beginning of April.

Own Situation

The northern mine ship group, including the BRUMMER and the COBRA entered Tromsø after laying the "Bantos A" minefield according to plan. Convoy activity along the arctic coast as far as the west coast according to plan. Along the southern part of the west coast shipping is hindered by fog, considerably in some places.

For brief report of cruiser HIPPER concerning her transfer to Trondheim between 19 and 21 Mar. see 1/Skl 6972/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

It is noteworthy that the cruiser made the voyage alone during the night of 19 Mar. at a speed of 30 knots, since the torpedo boats and destroyers assigned to her were not able to keep up because of the bad weather. The ship's radio intercepted an enemy air reconnaissance report that cruiser Z "26" was sailing alone near Felestein and that enemy bombers were sent out against the force. Expecting British torpedo planes, the cruiser concealed herself between the steep cliffs of the Krakhellén Sound during the evening twilight.

The ships's navigational achievement deserves full recognition.

See Telegram 1031 for Group North's instruction concerning the transfer of the NORDMARK to Trondheim to be at the disposal of Group North.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Situation unchanged.

Concerning operations by icebreaker CASTOR (see War Diary 23 Mar.), the Naval Staff believes that the ice situation in the Oslo Fjord will probably be somewhat less difficult during the next 6 to 10 days, so that icebreakers will not be needed there.

The Naval Staff considers the following to be the most suitable sequence for tasks to be undertaken by the icebreakers;

- (a) Freeing the rest of the SCHLESIEEN convoy.
- (b) Transferring the GNEISENAU from Kiel to Gdynia.
- (c) Escorting the steamer LEONHARD from Swinemünde to Copenhagen.
- (d) Depending on the ice situation, assisting the transports in the Sound from Copenhagen to Oslo, and operating in Riga Bay.

For copy of this telegram to Group North see 1/Skl 6952/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

V. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

According to radio intelligence, convoy SC 75 was at about 47° N, 50° 35' W on a 60° course on the evening of 22 Mar. Convoy SC 76 left on 24 Mar.; assembly area in the Sable Island area, course via 43° 20' N, 59° 10' W.

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According to an Italian report, 4 British corvettes entered Horta on 21 Mar. in order to take on coal. More corvettes are expected there.

Submarine warnings were issued by Freetown for the sea area south and east of Monrovia.

Reports have been received from the American east coast concerning sighting of submarines; also distress signals from the two U.S. tankers PAN RHODE ISLAND (7,699 GRT) and OLNEY (7,492 GRT) from southwest of Cape Lookout. The British tanker ATHELVIKING (8,779 GRT) was at 38° N, 50° 59' W south of Newfoundland on the afternoon of 23 Mar., probably being towed by an American vessel. The U.S. fishing steamer MAYFLOWER sent an SOS signal from 60 miles southwest of San Salvador. The Costa Rica government released a submarine warning for the area northwest of Puerto Limon. According to the Associated Press, the U.S. steamer TAXON was sunk by a submarine off the coast of Rio Grande del Norte en route to Montevideo - Buenos Aires.

2. Own Situation:

A returning submarine gained contact with a southwestbound convoy at 2230 about 500 miles east of Cape Race. The convoy consisted of 25 steamers and 5 destroyers. A submarine in the vicinity was sent to relieve the shadower. Success reports and additional information about the situation are in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

During daylight incursions over the west area 9 Spitfires were shot down. Portland was attacked by 28 planes in a night raid. Only 3 enemy planes flew over German territory in the night of 24 Mar.

2. Mediterranean Area:

See Situation Italy for the report by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South about the initial results of the German and Italian attacks on the Malta convoy on 22 and 23 Mar.

See Enemy Situation, Warfare in the Mediterranean for results of reconnaissance in the Malta area.

Units up to squadron strength attacked the harbor of Valletta and the ships there constantly from the early afternoon to midnight. 1 steamer of 2,000 GRT was damaged, and a cruiser was hit amidships by a heavy bomb. The environs of the arsenal, the barracks, and storehouses at the large harbor were badly damaged. After 1600 the Malta radio was no longer heard.

On 23 Mar. enemy planes with strong fighter cover attacked our airfield at Martuba. Small casualties and damage.

3. Eastern Front:

No reports have come in from the Army fronts.

On the evening of 23 Mar. a steamer of 5,000 GRT was sunk by an aerial torpedo south of Balaklava. On 24 Mar. 13 Ju 87's attacked the harbor

of Murmansk and scored 3 direct hits on the wharves and 2 on storehouses.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

No change in the ships at Gibraltar. Task Force H is in the harbor. 102 planes were seen there.

This is an unusually large number.

Air reconnaissance observed a merchant ship with the stern grounded directly east of Marsa Scala (Malta), nearby 3 destroyers and a paddle steamer. Later reports called the 3 destroyers tugs.

Photo reconnaissance of Valletta at noon located 3 cruisers, 7 destroyers, 5 submarines, a minelayer, a harbor tanker, and 4 steamers in the harbor. At the same time a steamer escorted by 3 destroyers and 2 patrol boats was seen northeast of Malta (distance from there was not reported). Thus 6 steamers were located in Valletta or in the immediate vicinity of the island. It is uncertain whether these are all new arrivals, or whether the 2 merchant steamers observed in the last photo reconnaissance did not leave but should be included in this number. One of the steamers in the harbor was reported to be on fire.

According to the radio intercept service the leader of the escort forces for the Malta convoy reported a bombing attack at 0747 at 314° and 105 miles from Alexandria. There are no further reports of sighting ships between 20° and 27° E.

According to the Italian radio intercept service, at about 1900 a British (probably surface) vessel was located 85 miles west of Punta Palo and another 50 miles west of Malta. The Italian Navy assumes that these are damaged vessels, and will send out Italian subchasers from Pantelleria. According to the German radio intercept service, at 1625 there was a British vessel 90 miles south of Gaidaro Island at 33° 20' N, 25° 40' E.

2. Situation Italy:

The LITTORIO arrived at Taranto with 3 destroyers on 23 Mar. at 1815. The GORIZIA and the TRENTO entered Messina, the first at noon 23 Mar., the latter on 24 Mar. The BANDE NERE also arrived at Messina. The destroyer LANCIERE was reported for the last time sinking on 23 Mar. at 1000 at 35° 37' N, 17° 16' E. No more reports have been received from the destroyer SCIROCCO since the afternoon of 23 Mar., nor from the destroyer GRECALE since 23 Mar. at 1540. Measures to assist these vessels continue. The German Naval Command, Italy reported at 1350 that according to reports so far, some of which need to be verified, German and Italian planes have sunk 4 of the 7 steamers reported to be in the Malta convoy; the other 3 probably entered Valletta. The German Air Force is said to have scored the main success against the enemy, in spite of difficult weather conditions. An Italian aerial torpedo attack probably destroyed a British cruiser and damaged other British ships. (See Telegram 1350.)

It is not at all certain from the above reports that the Malta convoy consisted of 7 steamers. The report to this effect by German air reconnaissance was not confirmed by photo reconnaissance, as the German Naval Command

itself reported on 23 Mar. Thus it will be very difficult to get an exact picture of the degree of success achieved by the two Air Forces, unless it is possible to procure reliable data on the size of the enemy convoy.

The German Naval Command, Italy transmits via Telegram 2001 a preliminary report of the Italian cruiser commander, Admiral Parona, on the engagement with the Malta convoy on 22 Mar. According to this report the 3 Italian cruisers (2 heavy and one light) sighted 5 light British cruisers in 2 groups, and behind them 5 or 6 steamers with destroyer escort; the Italian force turned on the group of the 2 PENELOPE-class cruisers for a running engagement at a distance of 2000 meters on a 250° course. Shortly after they opened fire the Fleet Commander on the LITTORIO gave the order for the ships to assemble around the LITTORIO. Thus the engagement was broken off, without utilizing the situation, which according to information thus far available the Naval Staff considers as having been exceptionally favorable. The German Naval Command, Italy is of a different opinion, believing that an engagement of the Italian cruisers with the British escort forces was tactically not particularly wise, but the Naval Staff does not necessarily share this view. No final decision can be made, however, until all circumstances, particularly the unusual weather situation, become known.

Enemy planes attacked Benghazi in the night of 23 Mar., but caused no damage.

The final report of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South concerning the operation against the Malta convoy on 22 and 23 Mar. contains the following information:

German successes: Sunk: 1 steamer of 5,000 tons, 2 steamers of 6,000 tons each. Damaged: 2 steamers of unknown tonnage, 2 steamers of 4,000 tons each, 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers.

Italian successes: Sunk: 1 steamer of 10,000 tons, 1 steamer of unknown tonnage, 1 cruiser, 1 destroyer. Damaged: 4 cruisers, 2 destroyers, 1 steamer of 8,000 tons.

It is hard to tell to what extent there is overlapping in this report. Although unfortunately it was not possible, especially for the Italian naval forces, to destroy the steamers and the escorting cruisers completely, this convoy doubtless cost the enemy considerable losses, which can be ascribed to the valiant efforts of the Axis air forces.

3. Own Situation:

The 3rd PT Boat Flotilla did not operate because of the weather. The 4 damaged vessels of the 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla will have been repaired by 25 Mar. and 12 Apr.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The supply traffic came to a standstill because of the enemy situation and the weather.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Own Situation:

The Greek destroyer "ZG 3" was commissioned on 22 Mar.

On 23 Mar. in the evening enemy planes attacked targets in the Athens area and on Crete. No damage has been reported. There was no convoy traffic because of the weather.

Black Sea:

Air Commander South reported that during an air attack on Tuapse 1 enemy destroyer and 1 steamer suffered direct hits; also 1 submarine was sunk for sure and another one definitely damaged.

Otherwise no special incidents.

6. Situation France:

The sinking of the French steamer MARCELLE by a British submarine shows that the question of escorts for French merchant ships must finally be settled.

For instructions to this effect to the German Naval Command, Italy see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Domei published the announcement of the Japanese Navy concerning revision of the rules for naval warfare from the year 1914 on the basis of experience with enemy methods. See supplement to Foreign Press Report No. 70 of the Naval Staff Intelligence Division, Foreign Press Branch for a detailed report.

No special reports on the war situation.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

The enemy launched new attacks along the entire Feodosiya front, but was unsuccessful. According to prisoner of war statements, it is likely that attacks will be renewed against the bridgehead at Taganrog. Enemy attacks east and west of Slavyansk and against the Rumanian positions in the Ternovka valley were repulsed. At Bishkin a German advance succeeded. West of Balakleya the enemy evidently put a bridge across the Donets, which indicates that further attacks are imminent. A surprise advance by German panzer forces south of Volchansk pushed the enemy back across the Donets. Several villages were taken.

Central Army Group:

The enemy succeeded in entering Yelnya from the south. A counterattack is in progress. The pocket southeast of Vyazma was further tightened. Enemy attacks at Yukhnov, northwest of Rzhev, and south of Velizh were smashed.

Northern Army Group:

So far the enemy has attacked the positions at Pustinya 30

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times without success. The Von Seydlitz Group, in stubborn fighting, gained additional territory to the east south of Staraya Russa. A defense front was established at the southern flank of the advance. The Redsha sector was crossed on a broad front. The enemy is exerting heavy pressure on the new positions west of Yamno. We were able to close off the point of penetration at Maluksa to the south and west. Other attacks at the point of penetration as well as southeast of Schluesselburg were repulsed.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

Little scouting activity on both sides because of a heavy sandstorm. The major part of the German Africa Corps was transferred east of Mbaua (45 km. south of Derna).

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Items of Political Importance

France:

General Weygand made a statement to an officer of a neutral country about the political situation. He termed the idea absurd that there would soon be close cooperation between Germany and France. He said that the German armed forces are the strongest in the world, led in a masterly fashion, and are invincible at the present time. There is no doubt that Germany will be victorious over Russia, and that Russia will be beaten completely in the course of the summer. Britain is already beaten for all practical purposes. The U.S. will have to realize that it is impossible to bring up and supply an army over such long and dangerous distances, and they will have to come to an understanding with Germany. He is spiteful toward Darlan and bitter toward Petain.

Great Britain:

In the House of Commons Minister Anderson gave a survey about the re-organization of the invasion defenses. Production Minister Lyttleton announced that a war production staff has been created, which is to handle especially deliveries to the Allies, and is subordinate to the defense committee. He stated that Beaverbrook's mission in the U.S. is very important.

India:

The leader of the Moslems stated that the Moslems in India are not a minority but a nation. Until their dying breath they will oppose any intrigues of the British and Hindus to put them under Hindu control.

Sweden:

All information received lately tends to confirm that Sweden is seriously planning to oppose any aggressor. While heretofore mainly the danger threatening from Germany was stressed in this connection, now the Anglo-American threat is being given greater prominence, and a landing in Murmansk on a larger scale will be interpreted as an attack on Sweden. This in no way changes Sweden's opposition to Quisling.

Hungary:

For the time being the government will refrain from reacting to the severe attacks on the part of Rumania. According to international press reports, Hungary expects the Axis powers to intervene because of the seriousness of the case.

U.S.A.:

Willkie openly advocated admitting Negroes into the U.S. Navy.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports about the transfer of cruiser THETIS as antiaircraft vessel to Norway. She will be transferred under her own power after the necessary short repairs.

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II. The Chief, Naval Construction Division reports about the necessity of deciding at once whether construction of warships which has already been started should be continued or stopped in view of the cut in scarce raw materials during the second quarter of 1942. A proposal in this matter by the Naval Construction Division is being examined by the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division and the Operations Division, and will soon be submitted to the Chief, Naval Staff for a decision. According to this proposal, repair and rearmament of the GNEISENAU is to be continued and the GRAF ZEPPELIN completed. Likewise there is no doubt about the completion of 18 submarines per month - with the reservation that if certain special types of submarines require a particularly large amount of scarce metals this figure cannot be reached in some months.

The decision concerning continuation of construction of destroyers and torpedo boats presents difficulties. The original plan was to complete 6 destroyers and 12 torpedo boats a year; this was reduced in the plan of the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division to 4 destroyers and 6 torpedo boats. In view of the shortage of light naval forces, it is unnecessary to state that in principle as many such ships must be built as possible. Since one "36a" destroyer needs as much copper as 2 "39" torpedo boats, 14 torpedo boats could be built if construction of the destroyers were discontinued. The tasks to be performed by the light naval forces are:

- a. Reconnaissance and escort during large-scale operations of battleships and cruisers.
- b. Escort for aircraft carrier.
- c. Independent operations.
- d. Patrol of coastal areas.

With this in mind, the Naval Staff Operations Division has come to the conclusion that tasks c and d could be carried out by either destroyers or torpedo boats, but tasks a and b only by destroyers. Therefore construction of the destroyers cannot be abandoned. Likewise the Naval Staff believes that torpedo boat construction should not be curtailed in favor of destroyers, and believes it advisable to approve the ratio of 4 to 6 as suggested in the curtailed program. Consequently the Chief, Naval Staff will suggest that the destroyers and torpedo boats now under construction be completed in the ratio of 4 to 6. As regards future construction of light naval forces, the Naval Construction Division, in order to simplify construction and save labor and material, has suggested that destroyer construction be abandoned in favor of the "41" fleet torpedo boat. The Naval Staff believes that in view of the emergency situation destroyer construction can be abandoned in the future as here suggested only if the fleet torpedo boat "39" proves itself in operational use.

The Naval Staff cannot agree to the further suggestion of the Naval Construction Division that the tasks of the "41" escort vessels be undertaken by minelayers or subchasers, as these vessels do not have the speed necessary. The Naval Staff agrees, however, that at first only 4 "41" escort vessels be built, in order to keep some facilities for the minelayer program (type M 40).

This suggestion will also be submitted to the Chief, Naval Staff for his decision. For copy see Skl Qu A I a 880 Gkdos. and K/Stb 279/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

III. At the request of the Chief, Naval Staff, the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports about the suggestion of the SCHARNHORST

command that the original fire control system of the antiaircraft firing equipment be fully repaired during the present repair period. Since it will be necessary to pierce the bulkheads, it is feared that this might create considerable difficulties while the ship is in dock, in case she should be damaged below the water line in an aerial attack (the dock cannot be raised if the ship should become too heavy due to flooding the compartments IV to XIV); nevertheless, the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division approved this request. The Chief, Naval Staff will not recall this approval.

IV. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports on a conference of the chiefs of the Ordnance Divisions of the branches of the Armed Forces with Minister Speer. The conference concerned the Fuehrer directives about simplification of the communications system (Deputy Schmeer), simplification of administration of quotas, appointment of a deputy for labor (Gauleiter Sauckel), creation of a central agency in charge of transport and shipment, and appointment of an Air Force engine specialist for the Navy, etc.

V. The Chief, Naval Staff Submarine Division reports that the first transport submarine (submarine tanker) was reported completed today. The next one will be ready the beginning of May, and the third and fourth in August.

VI. The Naval Staff Operations Division, Foreign Affairs Section reports about difficulties in the Armistice Commission, France concerning payment for the French guns bought in Tunis for the German Africa Corps. This might possibly have ill effects on our efforts to obtain permission for German PT boats to proceed through France into the Mediterranean. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

VII. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports that according to the Deputy Chief, Group South the Rumanian government refused to carry out the mining operation off Cape Kherson. Group South believes that it is useless to broach the matter once more. For a copy of Antonescu's communication, which attempts to explain the refusal, see the annex to 1/Skl 650/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XIVA.

VIII. The Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the account given by the Naval Liaison Officer at the Army High Command concerning the conferences with the Northern Army Group and the 18th Army Headquarters, in accordance with orders of the Chief of the General Staff. The following questions were discussed:

- a. Whether cooperation with the Navy is assured.
- b. What preparations the Navy has made to defend the islands after they have been captured.

Together with this report a telegram was received from the Operations Staff, Army that capture of the islands in the Gulf of Finland by parts of the 18th Army has to be delayed once more, since these forces are needed urgently elsewhere at the present time.

The Chief, Operations Branch also reports that the Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff has asked the Liaison Staff, North to inform Field Marshal Mannerheim that the German operations against the islands in the Gulf of Finland will be postponed, but to express the expectation that the Finnish part of the operation will be carried out on schedule, and that the German air support will be available for this purpose.

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IX. The Chief, Operations Branch reports on the Fuehrer directive concerning measures to be taken in case the enemy should land in Brittany. All command staffs in the coastal area are to take up their command posts at once.

The Chief, Naval Staff orders similar measures for the Navy.

X. The Chief, Operations Branch reports on operations by submarines in the northern area against convoy PQ 13 reported there, as directed by the Admiral, Arctic Ocean. See 1/Skl 6974/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

He also reports on the surprise operations by 4 or 5 submarines of the Commander, Submarines, Italy in the eastern Mediterranean during the new moon period in April, as suggested by the German Naval Command, Italy. Plans are as follows:

(a) One submarine is to make a torpedo attack on the Haifa roadstead, and one on the Beirut roadstead.

(b) Subsequently the Beirut roadstead and the route to Haifa are to be mined.

(c) One submarine is to reconnoiter the main harbors on Cyprus.

Torpedoes or mines are to be used in Famagusta, Larnaka or Limasol, depending on the situation.

(d) One submarine is to lay mines on the approach route to Port Said.

(e) One boat is to be kept in reserve, possibly to reconnoiter the roadsteads of Jaffa or Tripoli.

(f) After the above 5 operations have been carried out, all of the submarines involved are to operate for a short period along the shipping routes in the eastern Mediterranean.

The German Naval Command, Italy believes that the planned operation is promising if carried out as a surprise move, thus justifying withdrawing the submarines from their previous operations areas. Their appearance in the eastern Mediterranean will relieve pressure on the Tobruk convoys.

The Naval Staff is definitely in favor of the operation. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

XI. According to a report by the Naval Liaison Officer to the Armed Forces High Command, the Fuehrer has rejected the suggestion that Spitsbergen be captured. The Naval Staff does not know who made the suggestion.

XII. The Chief, Naval Staff gave orders that the Air Force be requested to make available suitable minesweeping planes. The Naval Staff has broached this matter to the Commander in Chief, Air (see War Diary 22 Mar.). If necessary the Chief, Naval Staff will discuss the matter with the Fuehrer.

XIII. According to a report from the German Naval Command, Italy, the Italian Navy needs considerably more Diesel oil than before, as motor ships are being used to replace the lost steamers. The amount used in December was 7,000 tons, in January 10,000 tons, and in February 7,000 tons. The total Italian supply at present is 60,000 tons, of

which 45,000 tons are earmarked for submarines; part of the remaining 11,000 tons cannot be touched for technical reasons. Thus the available supply is practically used up. The Italian Navy therefore requests of the High Command, Navy, an additional monthly allotment of 7,000 tons of Diesel oil besides the fuel oil deliveries as before.

Situation 25 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an Italian report there is an important south-bound convoy in the Atlantic at present, escorted by vessels of the Home Fleet and Gibraltar and Freetown forces.

The Naval Attache, Buenos Aires reports that it is intended to replace British ships patrolling the South American east coast by U.S. forces.

Escort for Uruguayan ships to the U.S. is to be provided as far as Rio by the British, to Pernambuco by the Brazilians, and from there on by the U.S. Navy.

Pacific Ocean:

The Military Attache at Santiago states that according to press reports not yet confirmed, U.S. coastal artillery with training personnel, scout cars, and tanks have been landed in Antofagasta, Tocopilla, San Antonio, and Chanaral, allegedly to protect U.S. interests in Chile. It is said that large U.S. war materiel dumps are being established in the mining area of northern Chile.

2. Own Situation:

Information about the enemy situation is sent in Radiograms 0207, 0634, 1417, 1500, and 2017.

II. Situation West Area

1. Atlantic Coast:

6 ground mines were removed off Lorient.

2. Channel Coast:

The 2nd and 4th PT Boat Flotillas laid mines along the south-east coast. During enemy incursions in the night of 14 Mar. mine detonating vessel "136" shot down 1 enemy plane. Enemy planes attacked the Le Havre shipyard in the night of 25 Mar., and caused some slight damage. In Paris propaganda leaflets were dropped, but no bombs.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:Enemy Situation:

According to a report by a British plane, there were 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, and 1 destroyer 80 miles east of Firth of Tay. Our air reconnaissance reports normal convoy activity off the east coast. According to an agent report, there are 140,000 to 160,000 GRT of ships assembled in Moray Firth for use as transports to Russia. They are to leave about 26 Mar. They will be met in the Barents Sea by 10 Russian submarines.

Own Situation:

Convoy tasks according to plan. Enemy planes strafed 2 harbor patrol vessels at Hook of Holland, causing a few casualties. Lively enemy air activity over the Dutch area in the night of 25 Mar. No damage has been reported.

Group North supports the request of Station North to lay mine barrages between the islands Walcheren and Beer outside the fishing areas established there, in order to make enemy landing attempts and illegal traffic more difficult. The same measure is requested for Eierland Gat between Texel and Vlieland.

The Naval Staff believes that it is improbable that the enemy will establish beachheads on islands in the river delta which have no connection with the mainland, and that therefore it is unnecessary and inadvisable to mine these areas since this would interfere with our own movements. For the same reasons the former Dutch minefields in this area were removed with great difficulty.

The Naval Staff leaves the decision up to Group North, informing the Group of its opinion and pointing out that Station North itself considers the approaches between Voorne, Overflakke, Schouwen, and Walcheren as of no great military importance.

2. Norway:Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

On 24 Mar. 3 vessels of the 5th Motor Mine Sweeper Flotilla and the steamer SKRAMSTADT transferred from Trondheim to Tromsø, and the 8th Destroyer Flotilla with destroyers Z "24", "25", and "26" transferred from Trondheim to the north. On 25 Mar. the OSTMARK and 3 minesweepers left Stavanger for Bergen, and the 12th Subchaser Flotilla, with 9 vessels, torpedo boat T "17", and 4 vessels of the 56th Minesweeper Flotilla left Stavanger for the south. Minesweepers M "1501" and "1507" left Kirkenes for the Kongs Fjord with soldiers, equipment, and ammunition aboard.

See Submarine Warfare for orders issued by the Admiral, Arctic Ocean for submarines to operate against convoy PQ 13.

See Telegram 1312 for Group North's communication to the 5th Air Force, pointing out that in view of the large area submarine and destroyer operations against the important northern convoys can be successful only if air reconnaissance provides the essential information, which must

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include not only reports about convoys, but also about ships sailing alone, and about ice conditions.

Supplementary to its suggestion to the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch, that troops be transported to northern Norway, Group North points out in view of possible objections that the troops might be disembarked in Kristiansand South, transported by rail to Trondheim, and there reembarked on the transports which had been sent up with their equipment. (See Telegram 1208.)

It depends primarily on the railroad situation in Norway whether this can be carried out.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

There is still no definite information concerning the state of readiness of the Norwegian ships in Swedish harbors. In view of prevailing conditions (the ice situation, the extent of the harbor and the intervening coastal islands) direct observation and preventive measures are impossible. Because of the ice it is unlikely that the ships can leave Goeteborg through the coastal islands; they will have to stay in the channel that has been broken through the ice.

2. Own Situation:

Information is sent to Group North concerning the opinion of the Naval Staff; it is suggested that the Group consider stationing a patrol line outside of Swedish territorial waters off Vinga along the departure route of the Goeteborg navigational channel. See 1/Skl I Nord 6984/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

Otherwise nothing to report.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, convoy SC 76 was at 44° 15' N, 63° 00' W at 2200 on 24 Mar. It changed course at 61° 30' W.

There was lively reconnaissance by planes of the 15th and 19th Groups.

An SSS signal was intercepted from steamer EMPIRE PICT approximately 30 miles southeast of Cape Sable on the American east coast. 2 ships were sent to the rescue. After 2 hours the steamer reported that she opened fire. 75 miles southeast of Cape Sable the Dutch steamer OCEANA (6,256 GRT) was chased by a submarine. The British motor tanker NARRAGANSETT (10,389 GRT) was torpedoed 200 miles northwest of Bermuda.

2. Own Situation:

A second submarine established contact with the convoy east of Cape Race in the morning, and maintained it during the day. Then

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the submarine was forced off by destroyers. The first submarine sank 1 9,000 GRT tanker and 1 8,000 GRT steamer of this convoy and then continued her return voyage. A submarine operating in the Cape Hatteras area sank 1 tanker of the BRITISH FIDELITY class (8,445 GRT) on 17 Mar. on her way to the operations area, and steamer OAKMAR (5,766 GRT) west of there on 20 Mar.

U "68" in the South Atlantic sighted a convoy on a 200 course, consisting of 5 steamers and 3 escort vessels, about 60 miles south of the Gold Coast. While making an underwater attack, the submarine was sighted by a land-based plane, forced off, and pursued with depth charges for 5 hours by the plane and the escort vessels.

For further reports see War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines informs the Naval Staff via Telegram 1005 that the York group is being relieved by submarines U "703", "702", "657", and "334".

In order to intercept convoy PQ 13, the Admiral, Arctic Ocean has ordered the submarines to take up the following positions:

- U "435" during the day in quadrant 8822, at night 8828
- U "589" during the day in quadrant 8823, at night 8837
- U "454" during the day in quadrant 8914, at night 8862
- U "585" during the day in quadrant 8945, at night 8868 lower right.

All of these are in quadrant AC. If PQ 13 is located earlier, the submarines are to operate within the area under the Admiral, Arctic Ocean. (See Telegram 0010.)

On the basis of the latest information, Group North gathers that some of the PQ convoys sail east through the Denmark Strait and along the ice border toward the southeastern tip of Jan Mayen. The Group therefore asks the Commanding Admiral, Submarines that the submarines going out into the Atlantic to relieve the York group be sent along the route through the Denmark Strait which the Murmansk convoys evidently follow, so that if necessary the Group can order these submarines to attack the convoy. (See Telegram 2032.)

Since it was impossible to obtain any appreciable increase in the raw material allocation for the Navy, a large cut in submarine production will soon be unavoidable.

In this connection the Naval Staff Submarine Division informs the Naval Construction Division that since further cuts in the production of C VII submarines must be avoided, the last 4 X B submarines will have to be delayed considerably. The Submarine Division, however, asks the Construction Division to make every effort to utilize any improvement in the submarine construction situation to speed up the X B boats.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

On 24 Mar. during the day 172 planes of the 3rd Air Force, mostly fighters, were in operation. 4 enemy planes were shot down.

During the night 19 German planes attacked PT boat berths in Dover, and

12 flew armed reconnaissance missions. 56 enemy planes attacked areas in Germany from the North Sea coast to Trier, Mannheim, Nuernberg, without concentrating on any particular locality. 8 planes were shot down.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

According to a report from the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, a large number of bombers successfully attacked ships in Valletta and Marsa Scirocco. In Valletta 2 merchant ships were hit, and in Marsa Scirocco several patrol vessels. All fighters flying escort and free-lance missions did not contact the enemy.

Reconnaissance in the Malta area was incomplete because of the weather.

3. Eastern Front:

No special reports have been received from the Army front. Lately, as already for some time, losses have been in a ratio of 1 German to from 5 to 10 enemy planes. On 25 Mar. the ratio was 5 to 34 planes.

It was reported that during the attack on the harbor of Murmansk carried out on 23 Mar., 3 more hits were scored on steamers which were unloading.

It was also reported that during the attack on Tuapse on 23 Mar. additional hits were scored on 1 destroyer and 1 steamer. No report has as yet been received about the results of the attack made on Tuapse on 24 Mar. On 24 Mar. 1 tanker of 6,000 GRT was seen grounded southwest of Tuapse in the morning, and in the afternoon 1 steamer and 2 escort vessels northwest of the town. The reason is unknown.

VII. Mediterranean Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

No important change in the ships in Gibraltar. 91 planes were seen.

In the Malta area the steamer sighted half-sunk on 24 Mar. off Marsa Scala was located in tow and escorted by 2 ships headed for Valletta.

According to the British Admiralty report concerning the attack on the convoy on 22 to 24 Mar., 2 British naval vessels under Admiral Vian engaged the Italian cruiser group the afternoon of 22 Mar. Details are still lacking, but the enemy was driven off without damage to British vessels. During another attempt to destroy the convoy that same afternoon, the Italian naval forces included at least 1 battleship. The British naval forces launched a torpedo attack during the day, and 1 Italian battleship was seen to be hit by at least 1 torpedo. Thereafter the Italian forces withdrew and made no further attempt to disrupt the convoy. A bad storm delayed the arrival of the convoy in Malta, and made it possible for the enemy air forces to launch a series of heavy attacks in the course of 23 Mar., which did not succeed in preventing the most important supplies from reaching Malta. 1 merchant vessel was sunk by air attack. Additional details are still outstanding.

Radio intelligence intercepted an urgent message from an unidentified British ship approximately 40 miles south-southwest of Malta.

Submarines were located south of Leucas, 45 miles southeast of Pola, 15 miles southwest of Taranto, and 15 miles south-southeast of Cape Passero. 7 destroyers, escort vessels, and evidently 1 or several convoys were in coastal waters between Tobruk and Sidi Barani. One of the convoys was sighted in the night of 25 Mar. by a German submarine about 10 miles from the coast between Marsa Matruh and Sidi Barani.

2. Own Situation:

4 vessels of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla were ordered to launch a torpedo attack on the steamer reported stranded near Marsa Scala. The vessels were to be in the latitude of Malta before the moon goes down. (See Telegram 1145.)

Since the steamer arrived at her destination, the operation was evidently not successful. No report has as yet been received.

3. Situation Italy:

The search for destroyers LANCIERE and GRECALE was unsuccessful up to 1250. At that time the German Naval Command, Italy gave the following extract from the Italian battle report of 1100 on 24 Mar.:

"The engagement of 22 Mar. begun at 1640 lasted about 2 hours with interruptions. The LITTORIO fired 175 rounds of 38.1 cm. caliber and about 400 rounds of 15.2 caliber. The cruisers GORIZIA and TRENTO together fired approximately 570 rounds of 20.3 caliber. The visibility, which was constantly getting worse, along with heavy smoke screens, complicated the operation, and prevented decisive results, although at times the enemy cruisers were only 1000 meters away. During the first part of the battle 2 British cruisers were hit, one of them seriously; also 2 destroyers were hit during the destroyer attack at sundown. At this time the destroyers were as close as 600 meters to the LITTORIO, and fired their torpedoes, which it was possible to evade. One missile of medium caliber hit the LITTORIO, but the damage was negligible.

All destroyers which took part in the operation are temporarily out of commission because of damage caused by the heavy seas. Therefore operation S 5 (evidently a mining operation in the Strait of Sicily) must be postponed."

The account of the engagement confirms the British Admiralty report that British destroyers made daylight attacks on the heavy Italian ships, and not one of the attacking vessels was sunk in spite of the very considerable amount of ammunition expended. The British claim that a torpedo hit the battleship is probably as incorrect as the Italian claim that British cruisers and destroyers were hit by gunfire. It is understandable that the heavy Italian ships broke off the engagement for the night considering the time of day and the danger from the destroyers. In any case the report is not detailed enough to permit any definite conclusions.

According to additional reports, enemy torpedo planes unsuccessfully attacked the destroyer FOLGORO at 0403 south of Cape Spartivento. A plane and a torpedo boat chased an enemy submarine off Brindisi the evening of 24 Mar., probably at least damaging the submarine.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Supply traffic has been halted by the weather. According to

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the Shipping and Transport Office, Benghazi, the Maria Eugenia pier was completed on 24 Mar.

The 6th transport group (Lupo), escorted by cruisers and destroyers, is to leave on 28 Mar.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Nothing to report.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to sighting reports, there was a large number of ships in the harbor of Kerch. Air reconnaissance located 6 PT boats which had left Sevastopol south of Balaklava on westerly course on 24 Mar., and simultaneously (1530) reported 2 submarines near Cape Kherson on southwesterly course. In the morning there were 3 destroyers on southerly course southwest of Sevastopol, and in the afternoon 1 destroyer on southeasterly course.

Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

The U.S. Navy Department announces the loss of destroyers PILLSBURY and EDSALL during the naval battle in the Java Sea.

2. Situation Japan:

According to the Military Attache at Bangkok there was little fighting on the Burma front on 23 Mar. The Japanese launched heavy air attacks on Port Darwin and smaller harbors on the east coast of Australia. On New Guinea there is said to be unrest among the natives.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Heavy enemy attacks supported by tanks launched on our positions east, north, and west of Slavyansk were repulsed or smashed.

A German counterattack reached as far as northwest of Salto in the sector of the 6th Army. North of there our tank advance against strong enemy tank attacks made slow progress.

Central Army Group:

Local fighting in the area of the 2nd Panzer Army with varying outcome. In the front sector of the 4th Army there was fighting at Demenskoye around the highway and in the area of Yukhnov. In the rear area the enemy penetrated into Yelnya. The situation is critical. Enemy attacks were repulsed at Vyazma and northeast of Gzhatsk. At the northern front of the Army strong enemy attacks with tanks and reinforcements are in progress against the former penetration point. A tank attack south of Velizh was repulsed.

Northern Army Group:

Lively fighting in the Kholm area. South of Demyansk an attack by parts of 2 Russian paratroop battalions was repulsed. Through seizure of the Redvya sector the main supply route of the enemy has been blocked. The forward positions of the Von Seydlitz Group have been reinforced. Several villages were captured in the northern sector of the Redvya position. Enemy attacks were repulsed south of Maluksa.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

South of Suursaari in the Gulf of Finland small groups of enemy vessels were sighted en route south, evidently carrying reinforcements for the islands. Lively scouting activity at the southeastern and northeastern Finnish front.

3. North Africa:

Nothing to report.

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Items of Political Importance

Great Britain:

A representative of the Labour Party stated in a debate in the House of Commons that the enthusiasm which increased production in the factories at the time of the German attack on Russia has diminished greatly. Production Minister Lyttleton declared that 60% of the national income goes to the government, and that this will increase to 70% in the future. He said that it is quite evident that the remaining 30% is not sufficient to provide comforts for the civilians.

The House of Lords discussed appointing a committee to investigate the loss of Singapore. The surrender of 80,000 British soldiers is doubtless the greatest defeat Britain has ever suffered. Several of the speakers demanded that the post of Defense Minister be abolished; in other words they directly attacked Churchill.

Complaints are increasing that the materiel and personnel resources of the British economy are being insufficiently utilized.

The coal supply situation is deteriorating more and more. Withdrawal and transfer of skilled workers is having very bad results. The stevedores are accomplishing only two thirds of what they used to. As a consequence of wage raises 4,000 stevedores in Liverpool did not appear at all for 11 half-day shifts between the beginning and the middle of February.

Cripps' trip to India via the African route (via Lagos) shows the importance of this route between England and the Mediterranean. According to the Transocean News Agency the British are making every effort to improve this route by expanding the airfields. At the same time transport routes to Egypt via French Equatorial Africa are being speedily improved. De Gaulle is trying to complete roads adequate for truck transports from Duala, Libreville and Port Gentil to Khartoum.

It is feared that German long-range bombers might attack the airfields.

Australia:

According to the Prime Minister, General MacArthur has been granted very extensive powers. For the duration of the operations, the Australian Air Force will be directly under the U.S. High Command.

Canada:

The Prime Minister reported that Canada will not send an expeditionary corps to Australia, and that furthermore Canada has requested representation on the Pacific War Council.

Egypt:

According to the Prime Minister Nahas, the Wafd Party won 216 out of 264 seats in Parliament during the elections.

U.S.S.R.:

On the occasion of decorating 4 British flyers with the Lenin order, Maisky demanded once more in a lengthy speech that the Allies launch

an immediate offensive. He said that the enemy is staking everything on winning in 1942, and consequently the Allies have to do the same, and throw in all their resources in the spring and summer of this year. Only one thought must prevail: 1942 and not 1943!

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports that the directive announced by the Naval Liaison Officer at the Armed Forces High Command concerning unified command organization of the coastal defense of all branches of the Armed Forces has now been issued; he suggests that the directive be passed on to the naval offices with the necessary explanations and supplementary instructions which safeguard the basic views of the Navy. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees, and orders that these instructions be submitted to him before being sent off. For copy of Fuehrer directive see 1/Skl 7296/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

II. In view of the threat to districts near the coast due to enemy raids, the Chief, Naval Staff issues strict orders that the naval commands involved pull back their quarters from the coast. See 1/Skl 7380/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

III. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports that it is assumed that the DOGGERBANK successfully carried out her mining operations; he also reports about the disposition of the submarines. The Chief, Naval Staff asks that the Commanding Admiral, Submarines be instructed once more to have submarines in the West Indies at all times. Submarine "UA" carried out her first supply mission. The Commanding Admiral, Submarines is planning to use the minelaying submarines U "116" and "456" likewise for supply missions in the near future, since the submarine mines (SMA) will not be available for some time.

Special Items

I. The Army General Staff memorandum "Possibilities for Anglo-American Operations against Europe and Africa in 1942", which is being analyzed jointly by the Army General Staff, Intelligence Division East and the Naval Staff Intelligence Division, has caused the Chief of Staff Armed Forces High Command to inform the Army General Staff that it is necessary previously to coordinate such analyses of possible enemy plans with the opinion of the Fuehrer. Therefore the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command should be consulted before such estimates are released. The Armed Forces High Command does not entirely agree with the Army memorandum, and states that the arctic and Norwegian coasts are already now in 1942 greatly threatened by enemy landings. The memorandum is not suitable for the Army High Commands in Norway and Lapland, since it runs counter to the orders issued. The Armed Forces High Command will release its estimate in the pending battle instructions for coastal areas.

For copy of this communication, which was also sent to the Naval High Command and the Commander in Chief, Air, see 1/Skl 6562/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, "Basic Problems of Warfare".

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For copy of the Army memorandum see report 632/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, "Basic Problems of Warfare".

II. The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Fleet Branch has submitted the following statement:

A. Naval barges required:

1. For operational purposes:

In the East	54
In Norway	65
	<u>119</u>

2. For planning by the Admiral,

Amphibious Forces (formation of flotillas and training)	144
Total:	<u>263</u>

B. New vessels becoming available between February 1942 and January 1943:

In Germany	306
Abroad and in Linz	63
	<u>369</u>

Situation 26 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

According to a report from the Naval Attache, Madrid, British circles there are talking about supposed concentrations of British and American naval forces near the Canary Islands and on the African west coast between 26 Mar. and 5 Apr. Whether this is true or whether these are rumors purposely spread has not been determined.

According to Reuter a new contingent of Canadians, mostly air troops, arrived in the British Isles.

According to the German Official News Agency (DNB) the U.S. is planning to add to the U.S. Navy 2 battleships of the INTERNATIONALE class, 35,000 tons with 40.6 cm. guns, which the Soviet Navy ordered in 1938 and which were to have been delivered at the end of 1941.

This report must be investigated.

2. Own Situation:

No reports have been received from our ships in foreign waters.

Radiograms 1645 and 2212 contain information on the enemy situation.

II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

Enemy air raids on Brest, Lorient, and St. Nazaire during the night of 25 Mar. Mines were probably dropped at Brest. In Lorient and St. Nazaire the attacks concentrated on the shipyards.

According to the port commander of Bordeaux the harbor is overcrowded and it was not possible to disperse the ships as ordered.

Instructions are issued to Group West and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines to bring in the blockade-runner RIO GRANDE, which according to dead reckoning might be at point "Rotfeder" on 4 Apr. and at Bordeaux on 10 Apr. She is to be met by a submarine at point "Rotfeder". At 0000 on 4 Apr. (German official time) Group West will take over command. Information is sent concerning the position of points "Rotfeder", "Rotauge", and "Rossauge". For copy of telegrams see 1/Skl 659 and 660/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

See 1/Skl 7103/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II b for report of Group West concerning the new division of the subchase area along the Atlantic coast which became effective on 16 Mar.

Channel Coast:

In the afternoon of 25 Mar., enemy planes attacked the Le Trait (Seine) shipyard. Some casualties and light damage resulted. On the afternoon of 26 Mar. considerable numbers of enemy bombers with fighter cover attacked Le Havre, coming from the south. Several hits were scored on military installations, causing slight damage; 2 mine-sweepers were also hit. German fighters shot down 7 of the attacking planes.

During the night of 25 Mar. the 4th PT Boat Flotilla carried out its mining operation according to plan. The 2nd PT Boat Flotilla broke off its operation because one of the vessels had engine failure. For brief reports of the flotillas, see telegrams 1005 and 1100. The 2nd PT Boat Flotilla will carry out its mission with 2 vessels during the night of 26 Mar.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean1. North Sea:

During an air attack on the 13th Minesweeper Flotilla on route "Blau" there were some casualties and damage. Minesweeping and convoy operations in the area of the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North proceeded according to plan.

There was lively air activity over the Netherlands in the evening. Bombs were dropped on Amsterdam and Vlaardingen. An air raid alarm was sounded in Wilhelmshaven.

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2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

Convoy operations proceeded according to plan. Mine ship OSTMARK left Bergen to carry out mining operation "Krefeld" as part of the repair of the Westwall barrage.

A convoy was attacked by enemy planes off Ryvarden. No details are known as yet. The convoy continued on its way.

There is no proof that a torpedo sank steamer ULANDSHOERN. Since a moored mine was found near Nurmansaetti, it is possible that a mine caused the sinking.

The 8th Destroyer Flotilla has been ordered to proceed to Kirkenes at once in order to operate against convoy PQ 13.

The Commanding Admiral, Norway reports after a thorough investigation by the admirals of the coasts and the Intelligence Center, Norway that it would be impractical and unpromising to use fishing vessels for patrolling coastal waters as suggested. On the other hand the Commanding Admiral, Norway is trying to provide 3 whaling vessels during the whaling period from the end of April to the end of July for the Tromsø and Aalesund areas, if replacements for patrol flotillas can be provided from Germany.

For copy of telegram see 1/Skl 7176/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

According to a report from the consulate at Goeteborg, on the morning of 25 Mar. 7 Norwegian ships were seen at the entrance of the harbor; 2 others could no longer be located.

The German captain of the steamer KUNGSBERG was stopped by the criminal police on 25 Mar. when he entered the harbor section; he was not released until after 6 hours of questioning about his observations and his reports to the German consulate.

Evening reconnaissance by the Commander, Naval Air in the eastern part of the Skagerrak and the Kattegat along the border of the Swedish territorial waters resulted in no observations of any kind as to the departure of the Norwegian ships.

2. Own Situation:

Skagerrak patrols according to plan without special incident.

V. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

Several British vessels were observed in the sea area around Porcupine Bank and Rockall Bank. The U.S. steamer CAROLYN (3,209 GRT) reported 270 miles northeast of Cape Hatteras that she had a fire in the bow and that the torpedo attacks were continuing. The U.S. steamer HAMLIN F. McCORMICK sent an SSS signal about sighting a vessel with suspicious lights near Cape Hatteras.

The Mexican Ministry of the Navy announced that the Vichy tanker MEROPE was captured near Vera Cruz because it was suspected that she is being used to supply Axis submarines. The suspicion was not confirmed, however.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine U "701" reports gratifying successes from the sea area east of Iceland. She sank a steamer along with the entire escort of 1 escort vessel and 2 subchasers.

Contact was permanently lost with the convoy east of Cape Race. Operations against this convoy have been broken off.

In the Mediterranean submarine U "652" (Lt. Hamm) sank 1 tanker of 5,000 GRT and 1 destroyer from a convoy northeast of Sollum Bay. Thus this submarine has sunk 2 destroyers within a few days. Submarine U "205" reports from the same area an attack on 1 tanker and 2 destroyers, with a hit on the tanker, which probably sank.

The Commanding Admiral, Submarines cannot comply with the request of Group North to direct the York group through the Denmark Strait, since the submarines have already started on the return voyage to the French bases, and the detour would be too great. However, U "252" will return via this route; she has just completed the special mission of the Armed Forces Intelligence Division (debarking men on Iceland).

For details see supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

The Commander in Chief, Navy releases instructions once more to make sure that the Caribbean Sea is patrolled at all times. See l/Skl I u 661/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

See Situation West Area and North Sea for reports on enemy air activity over northern France and the Netherlands. 25 of our planes took off during the night of 26 Mar. for Sunderland. Other forces of the Air Commander, Atlantic carried out armed reconnaissance.

Duisburg was the center of enemy attacks in Germany during the same night. 24 enemy incursions were reported from Belgium and northern France, and 11 from Norway.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South reports as follows: Photo reconnaissance of Valletta at 1040 on 26 Mar. showed 2 cruisers of the AURORA class, 5 destroyers, 4 submarines, 1 minelayer, 3 steamers, one of them burning. Since 24 Mar. there are 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers, 1 submarine, and 1 steamer fewer in the harbor. All day 71 Ju 88's, 4 Ju 87's, 6 fighter bombers, and 182 Me 109's attacked the harbors of Valletta and Marsa Scirocco. All three of the merchant ships in the harbor were hit during these attacks, one of them a troop transport, the stern of which was submerged at 1700; at this time she received 3 further direct hits. One of the other merchant ships was in flames in 4 different places. One cruiser received several direct hits, and a destroyer was likewise hit. Numerous hits in oil storage tanks and antiaircraft positions caused large fires.

The Air Commander Africa reports that on 26 Mar. at 0045 there were 2 steamers in Tobruk. At 1255, 12 Ju 87's attacked, escorted by 36 Me 109's; a direct hit was scored on a 3,000 ton freighter, causing violent explosions. The mole was hit by an SC 500 bomb.

During a renewed enemy attack on the German airfield at Martuba, which was unsuccessful, another 3 enemy planes were shot down.

The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South further reports that air traffic to Malta has increased during the past few days, and he concludes that these are not purely ferrying missions, but also supply transports.

3. Eastern Front:

During the night of 25 Mar., 6 planes mined the harbor of Sevastopol.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

For reports of photo reconnaissance of Malta see Aerial Warfare, Mediterranean Theater.

A belated Italian photo reconnaissance report is available for Malta for 24 Mar., 1300. According to this the cruisers AURORA and COVENTRY were in the harbor, and the PENELOPE in dock; furthermore there were 11 destroyers, 1 of them in dock, 5 submarines, 5 steamers, one with stern submerged, also 1 harbor tanker, and auxiliary vessels. Thus at least 2 steamers must have left the harbor by 1040 on 26 Mar. Disregarding the steamer located in Marsa Scirocco, it would thus appear that at least 3 supply steamers reached their destination, unless the 2 steamers located on 22 Mar. departed during the night of 22 Mar. to return to the east. In this case as many as 5, and counting the one in Marsa Scirocco 6, steamers carried out their supply operations. Doubtless the steamers had already been unloaded to a large extent before the air attacks of 26 Mar. set in.

According to further Italian air reconnaissance reports, 5 steamers took aboard large troop detachments in Alexandria between 5 and 8 Mar. For details see Telegram 1300. These were probably Australian troops returning home.

No other important reports from other Mediterranean sectors. A sup-

plementary British Admiralty report states that on 22 Mar. 3 destroyers and 1 cruiser suffered some damage and a few casualties, and on 23 Mar. 1 steamer of the convoy was sunk; 1 destroyer was hit but returned to port.

2. Own Situation:

As was to be expected, the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla did not locate the steamer reported near Marsa Scala. The mining operation of the flotilla scheduled for the evening of 26 Mar. had to be postponed because of the weather.

3. Situation Italy:

German Naval Command, Italy reported at 1930 concerning the operation of the Italian naval forces against the Malta convoy on 22 Mar. as follows: "According to my information, the Italian Naval Staff assumed that the Italian naval forces operating against the convoy would go through with the engagement with the purpose of destroying the convoy. There is no reason to assume that the Italian Fleet Commander on the LITTORIO had any other plans when undertaking the operation. The fact that the mission was not carried out can be explained, in my opinion, primarily by lack of tactical ability on the part of the Italians, which in the face of a determined, experienced, and daring opponent had a paralyzing effect on the Italian forces. I consider it unwise to inquire about further details and explanations at the Italian Naval High Command. Furthermore for the present the Italians will probably not release any pertinent explanations concerning the tactical behavior of their naval forces. However the operation of the Italian forces at least succeeded in delaying the arrival of the convoy at Malta, so that the German Air Force had further opportunity for successful attacks on 23 Mar."

The Naval Staff has nothing to add to this analysis; it might be pointed out that there is a discrepancy between this report and that made by the German Naval Command, Italy on 23 Mar., which termed the engagement between the Italian cruisers and the inferior enemy forces during the first engagement as tactically unfortunate. Participation by the LITTORIO group in an extensive cruiser engagement in the early afternoon might have had good results, not only as regards the enemy escort forces, but especially thereafter as regards the steamers. These would not have been able to escape after their escort forces had been destroyed. It was certainly a mistake to assemble and withdraw from the enemy.

The destroyer GRECALE, which had been reported missing, reached port. Destroyers LANCIERE and SCIROCCO were lost; according to Italian reports this was not due to enemy action but due to damage caused by the heavy seas. There were few survivors.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Traffic to Africa has not been resumed as yet due to the uncertain enemy situation.

5. Area Naval Group South:

No special incidents.

VIII. Situation East Asia1. Enemy Situation:

According to U.S. radio reports, Chinese troops repulsed a Japanese landing attempt at Masec.

The Andaman Islands have been captured by the Japanese, according to Reuter.

According to the radio intercept service, the WARSPITE is in west Australian waters.

According to an agent report it is planned to ship 3 or 4 divisions from the Gulf ports to New Zealand, where Christ Church, Dunedin, and Napier have been put at the disposal of the U.S. armed forces. So far somewhat less than 10,000 men have been shipped.

U.S. tankers from Tampico are taking on planes as deck cargo in Gulf ports.

2. Situation Japan:

Nothing to report.

IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

Renewed enemy attacks on the Feodosiya front were unsuccessful. In the Von Kleist Army Group sector, enemy attacks were repulsed north of Taganrog, near Yama, southeast of Barvenkovo, east of Kharkov, and south of Volchansk. The enemy suffered great losses.

Central Army Group:

Enemy forces unsuccessfully attacked near Sukhinichi, Demenskoye, and Yukhnov. We have retaken Yelnya. Renewed enemy attacks were also launched on the other sectors of the eastern front, especially along a wide front northeast of Gzhatsk and northwest of Rzhev.

Northern Army Group:

The road from Staraya Russa to the south has been cleared by the Von Seydlitz group. Enemy pressure is continuing undiminished at the penetration point north of Lake Ilmen and at Maluksa.

Nothing to report from the other Army fronts.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

According to a report from the German official news agency (DNB) from Vichy, rumors are recurring constantly that the Riom trial will be adjourned or even dismissed. Particularly following the Fuehrer's remarks on the matter it is assumed that the trial has reached a stalemate.

According to an official French report, the French government has not given Washington new assurances concerning utilization of the French fleet. The only naval matter discussed is said to have been the transfer of the DUNKERQUE. The government has made no commitments regarding Madagascar, and as regards the Antilles it has stated that it must continue to observe strictest neutrality toward all belligerents.

Great Britain:

On 26 Mar. Churchill presented a very dark picture of the situation to the Conservative party. He depicted the capitulation of Singapore as the greatest misfortune in the history of the British Army. He said that after a temporary improvement the Atlantic situation has again grown worse. Britain is engaged in a mortal struggle with 2 strongly armed enemies, both of whom have been preaching war for years. In spite of this Churchill stated that the situation has immensely improved as compared to a year ago. He pointed to the entry of America and Russia into the war, which could be lost only through mistakes made by the Allies themselves. For details see Political Review No. 73, paragraph 3.

The military commentator Falls declared in the periodical Illustrated London News in speaking about the overall situation that with regard to Russia's power of resistance to the new German offensive the Allies must hope for the best, but be prepared for the worst. If Germany should succeed in establishing contact with Japan in the Orient, this would mean victory for the Axis, since this would completely do away with the blockade, and consequently eliminate possibilities for an Allied victory. Talk about the necessity of an offensive is nonsense. An offensive in the near future would mean nothing but suicide for the Allies.

Australia:

The government has demanded that the U.S. increase war deliveries at once, according to press reports.

India:

On 27 Mar. Cripps and Gandhi met.

Canada:

The Labour Party has asked its adherents to vote for universal military service during the coming referendum, and at the same time to demand that industry be nationalized and 100% tax levied on war profits.

South Africa:

A mass demonstration of colored people in Capetown demanded not only that colored men and women be armed, but also be given the right to

vote. They stated that they want to fight, not only the Japanese, but also the whites, the Germans and Italians!

In contrast to this the Boer press has launched a sharp attack against Smuts, claiming that he has placed Kafirs above white people.

Chile:

The German government announced that it will pay for the loss of the steamer TOLTEN, if the Chilean naval investigating committee establishes that a German submarine sank the ship.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. The Fleet Commander has gone to Trondheim in order to take over command of the Fleet forces in Norway from the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, who has been taken ill.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division reports that the communications equipment in Norway has been increased, and that Italian submarines have been equipped with anti-detection decoys (Bolde).

III. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports on the directive issued by the Chief, Army Ordnance Division concerning the construction and procurement of equipment. Construction is not to be handled by the ordnance divisions, but by industry. Attention is called to the fact that torpedo construction is an exception in the German Navy, as in all larger navies.

IV. The Chief, Naval Construction Division suggests that an attempt be made to avoid strengthening the landing deck of the GRAF ZEPPELIN by finding a different solution for the airplane problem; this reinforcement, made necessary by the type of carrier planes being furnished by the Air Force, would considerably delay completion of the ship.

V. The Chief, Submarine Division, Naval Staff reports that 2 submarines under construction at the Le Trait (Seine) shipyard were slightly damaged during an enemy air attack, and that the transfer of the Italian submarines to Rumania will be carried out as planned the beginning of April.

VI. The Chief, Foreign Affairs Section, Naval Staff Operations Division reports that in the meantime permission has been received after all to send the 4 PT boats through France; he reports on the U.S. notes to Vichy concerning resumption of deliveries to North Africa and concerning the closing of the Antilles to naval forces of all belligerents; he also reports on another note, similar to the previous one, sent by the 3 Axis powers to Chile. For details see War Diary, Part C, Vol. VIII.

VII. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports on the following matters:

a. A short signal report received from ship "10"; probable destruction of a whaling station. (See War in Foreign Waters, Own Situation.)

b. Report of the Commanding Admiral, Norway concerning submarine barrages in Trondheim (see Situation, Norway), and concerning naval

transports to Norway (see War Diary, 19 and 20 Mar.).

VIII. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division submitted explanatory instructions to the Fuehrer directive concerning command organization in coastal defense. The Chief, Naval Staff approves. See 1/Skl 7296/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

Special Items

I. Planning of the operation against Egypt and Suez.

With reference to the situation analysis of the Naval Staff of 20 Mar., the German Naval Command, Italy is instructed as follows by telegram on 24 Mar.:

The Fuehrer in principle approves the situation analysis of the Naval Staff. Whether and when the operation will be carried out depends upon numerous military conditions which lie outside of the competence of the Navy. The problem is still in the planning stage. As long as there is no Fuehrer directive that preparations should be started, plans will have to be confined to matters pertaining to naval affairs. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the Panzer Army, Africa, other Army or Air commands, and Italian commands will not participate.

The Naval Staff confirmed and explained in detail the above telegraphic instructions in writing, pointing out the basic requirements for the operation; the problem of supply shipments from Italy to North Africa; the naval situation in the Mediterranean, which has developed more and more in our favor since the end of 1941 due to operations by German submarines and planes; the coastal transport situation; the operations of Italian transport submarines; the over-all impression of the transport situation; and the question of increasing harbor facilities. The Naval Staff stated that the objective of German warfare should be to make the decisive thrust against Suez this year. For this purpose the information necessary for such a decision should be made available as quickly as possible to the Armed Forces High Command. Appended to these instructions is a memorandum of the Army General Staff concerning the supply situation in Africa as of 22 Feb., as well as an inquiry by the Army High Command "How much shipping space will the Panzer Army, Africa need for an attack on the Suez Canal?" For copy see 1/Skl I b 632/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, files "Operation Suez (Aida)".

II. The Chief, Naval Communications Division reports on the investigation of security measures called forth by the loss of ship "16" and the PYTHON (this report has been sent to Groups West and North, the Fleet Command, the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, and the Commanding Admiral, Norway). He states positively that during the period under investigation no systematic treason was committed involving important offices; on the other hand it is impossible to determine the role of occasional leaks due to negligence in communications by wire and conversation, and to unauthorized access to conference rooms and documents.

See Skl Chef. MND Stab 631/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

III. War experiences of the defense forces.

Experiences made in wartime by minesweepers, motor minesweepers, in the escort service, and in anti-submarine warfare must be communicated as quickly as possible to all other commands which could profit thereby.

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The Naval Staff orders that the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North, the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic Sea, and the Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic Sea issue regularly special reports on their experiences for their areas, as the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, West is already doing, and that they send them to the other command areas, including the Commanding Admiral, Norway and Group South.

See 1/Skl I E 6310/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. V.

IV. A short memorandum on the main points of the discussion between the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff and Vice Admiral Nomura on 27 Mar.

The Naval Staff sees no possibilities in the Pacific for the enemy to undertake large operations for a long time. In the Atlantic enemy intentions to launch an offensive are noticeable, to be sure, but they can hardly be realized in the near future. On the other hand, the Naval Staff considers the Indian Ocean area as most endangered in the interest of German-Japanese warfare. The important sea communications of the enemy run through these waters, as follows:

1. To India for strengthening the India and Burma front against Japan.
2. To Iran to support the Russian front and protect the oil wells in the Near East.
3. To the Red Sea and Egypt to strengthen the North African front in the Suez-Libya area.

If Japan could win supremacy in the Indian Ocean, the vital British communication lines would be greatly endangered.

Conclusion to be drawn from this situation for German-Japanese warfare:

- a. It is necessary for Germany to cut the Anglo-American sea communications in the northern area for the support of Russia.
- b. It is necessary for Japan to cut the enemy's sea communications to India and the sea routes in the Indian Ocean to Iran and the Red Sea.

Germany is entirely convinced of the decisive significance of an operation toward the Caucasus to win an oil base and to make connection with Japan later, and fully recognizes the importance of launching an offensive against the strategically important position of the enemy in the Middle East. The prerequisite for this is that the British sea communications in the Indian Ocean be harassed and broken off as soon as possible.

Therefore the Naval Staff desires that the Japanese Navy operate as soon as possible in the northern part of the Indian Ocean.

Result of the conference:

1. The Japanese Liaison Staff desires to be informed by the Armed Forces Operations Staff about German plans for operations and the approximate dates of such operations. (The Naval Staff will put this question to the Armed Forces High Command.)
2. The Naval Staff desires to be informed in the near future by the Japanese about the probable time of Japanese operations in the Indian Ocean.

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Possible plans for operations against Ceylon, the Seychelle Islands, or Madagascar. Inquiry whether Japan considers operations against Australia and New Zealand operationally more important than an offensive against the enemy sea communications in the northern Indian Ocean.

Germany and Japan will exchange written opinions, by request of the Japanese.

V. Fuel oil situation:

Fuel oil to be expected in April:

Produced in Germany	47,000 tons
Produced in Estonia	4,000 tons
Produced in Rumania	<u>46,000 tons</u>
Total:	97,000 tons

In the following months a similar amount will probably also be available.

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division is instructed to allocate 25,000 tons of this for maintenance of the most necessary services of training, supply, and escort of the German Navy, and 20,000 tons for the Fleet forces in Norway - together 45,000 tons. This amount makes Fleet operations of any importance absolutely out of the question.

For the present the Italian Navy, which has reported needing 75,000 tons, will be allocated only the 46,000 tons of Rumanian fuel oil. The remaining 6,000 tons are to be kept as reserve, and can be allocated only with special permission of the Armed Forces High Command.

The following instructions, taking account of the emergency situation, are sent to Groups West and North and the Fleet Command; a copy is sent Group South:

The unfavorable development of the fuel oil situation and the necessity of keeping fuel oil available for the Italian Navy, considering the high priority escort tasks to North Africa, force a further decrease in fuel oil consumption of the German Navy. Therefore for the present we must dispense with operations by heavy forces using fuel oil. The amounts allotted must suffice, if we are not to lose even the minimum of operational independence by prematurely consuming the small stocks still at hand.

However any operations made necessary by offensive operations of the enemy are to be carried out without regard for the allotments. Here, too, it should always be kept in mind that any fuel oil over and above the allotments which is used is drawn from reserves and cannot be replaced.

For copy see 1/Skl I g 667/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.

Situation 27 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

For a compilation of enemy reports up to 22 Mar. collected by

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the radio intercept and radio deciphering services see Radio Intelligence Report No. 12/42 of the Naval Communications Division, Radio Intelligence Branch.

South Atlantic:

The cruiser DIOMEDE is expected in Montevideo on 26 Mar. According to an intelligence report of 18 Mar. from Freetown, a large convoy is being assembled there, which is to transport manganese, tin, copper, Congo rubber, lumber, and peanuts to the U.S. U.S. cruisers have been brought to Freetown to escort the convoy. On 18 Mar. a large convoy from South America was expected, which several British cruisers, including the CHARYBDIS, the DAUNTLESS, and the DELHI, are escorting.

According to a press report from London, the U.S. Navy will take over Allied operations in the Pacific, so that the British Navy can reinforce its forces in the South Atlantic.

U.S. air forces are stationed in Costa Rica.

Neutrals:

According to the official news agency (DNB) the Portuguese troops intended for Timor have arrived in Mormugao (Portuguese Indies) on steamer JOAO BELO under escort.

Radiogram 1980 informs ship "10" accordingly.

The Naval Staff believes that the route to Australia around the Cape of Good Hope is promising for operations by ship "10". Radiogram 2222 informs ship "10" of this opinion, and instructs her not to proceed north and east of 10° S and 80° E, since otherwise there is danger that she might run into the Japanese Navy; she is also informed that a rendezvous is planned between the REGENSBURG and TANNENFELS in the northwestern corner of the "Metalle" area.

At 2217 Norddeich picked up the following message, evidently a repetition of the garbled message received in the morning: "Silently seized* PAGASITIKOS on 23 Mar. in GO 37. Handed over prisoners. Ship '10'."

Confirmation of receipt of message was sent to ship "10" via Radiogram 2309.

This success of the auxiliary cruiser is especially welcome since it is the ship's first, and thus has significance for the morale of the crew.

All ships in foreign waters are informed about reference points and their positions on route "Japan gelb" via Radiograms 1807 and 2126.

The Swedish steamer CIRILLA left New York for Greece under protection of the International Red Cross.

* Silent seizure (lautlose Aufbringung): a method of attack used by German merchant raiders to prevent the victim from sending out radio messages. The raiding ship's plane would swoop down on its victim in a surprise attack and cut the latter's antennas by means of a specially designed gear.

2. Own Situation:

Ship "10" reports by short signal: "26 Mar. finished taking on supplies. Up to now found nothing in Antarctic."

A further short signal was garbled and could not be deciphered.

Radiogram 0752 confirms receipt of telegram.

The Naval Staff concludes from this report that ship "10" has taken on about 1,600 cubic meters and is proceeding to the Indian Ocean; that the REGENSBURG has been dismissed, is proceeding on a southerly course toward a latitude 7° further south than point "Maastricht", and then will continue east to the Indian Ocean. Only 1 quadrant near the rendezvous point was deciphered from the garbled message. There is no objection to having the message repeated.

According to the Naval Attache at Buenos Aires, the Argentine ship PRIMO DE MAYO, en route to relieve the meteorological station on the South Orkneys, found the whaling station at Port Foster on Deception Island destroyed.

The Naval Staff believes that this might have some connection with ship "10", and considers this an indication that the presence of an auxiliary cruiser in the Antarctic is of value.

Information on the enemy situation is sent via Radiogram 0203.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to a submarine report, 3 destroyers and 10 PT boats on westerly course were in quadrant BF 5468 at 0720.

According to Reuter numerous mines were laid in enemy waters in the night of 25 Mar. during plane operations. 11 British bombers did not return from their missions during this night.

Lively air activity over St. Nazaire beginning at 2330.

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

During an enemy air attack on St. Nazaire during the night of 25 Mar., 7 vessels of the 16th Minesweeper Flotilla and 2 vessels of the harbor patrol flotilla were damaged more or less severely by bombs and splinters. Moreover 2 tankers and 1 dredger were damaged, and there was other damage. For details see Telegram 0740.

The Loire and Gironde estuaries were closed because of danger from mines.

Channel Coast:

During an enemy air attack on Le Havre the afternoon of 26 Mar., 1 hit was scored on ship "36", which is being converted there. 3 of the attacking planes were shot down, 2 of them within 2 minutes of one another by patrol boat "1506". At point 9 on route "Rosa", 3 ground

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mines were swept, and on route "Lila" 3 AT mines, 1 of which was brought into Boulogne. For details see Telegram 0740.

The 2nd PT Boat Flotilla laid 12 LMB mines on the convoy route between points 54 B and Z. For brief report see Telegram 1035.

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla went on a minelaying operation on the convoy route southeast of Orfordness, but had to break it off because of the weather.

Special Item:

Group West, Group North, and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines are informed about the Fuehrer's instructions to the Army High Command and the Commander in Chief, Air, concerning measures to prevent possible enemy attempts to capture the Cherbourg and Brest peninsulas, in order to set up a new western front. The Naval Staff requests the Commanding Admiral, France to examine the quarters of the naval commands and of the submarine crews in accordance with this directive, and if necessary to order them transferred with the approval of the commanders involved. See the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division order, 1/Skl 7380/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X. (cf. the order of the Chief, Naval Staff in War Diary of 25 and 26 Mar.).

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Lively convoy activity on the east coast. Radio intelligence intercepted the report of a British reconnaissance plane in the afternoon, concerning German shipping off Sylt and Lister. 75 miles south-east of Lister 2 eastbound merchant ships were unsuccessfully attacked with aerial torpedoes.

Own Situation:

Mine detonating vessel "147" sank off Hook of Holland after sweeping 3 ground mines, which detonated under her bow within one and a half minutes of one another. The Commanding Admiral, Defenses, North therefore repeats his very urgent request that all mine detonating vessels be equipped with pole reversing gear and noise box turbines (GBT). See Telegram 1355.

At 0130 a Dutch fishing steamer was sunk off IJmuiden by 3 British PT boats with machinegun fire and depth charges. The harbor entrance of Hook of Holland was temporarily closed because of mine danger.

Convoy and transport operations according to plan.

The 5th transport group Hamburg - Kristiansand left on 26 Mar. with 3,642 men aboard.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

Lively air activity in the Petsamo area on 24 and 25 Mar.,

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at Bergen, Felestein, Lister, and Kristiansand South on 26 Mar.

According to air reconnaissance, there were 3 large eastbound merchant ships at 72° 30' N, 110° 20' E (300 miles north of the southern tip of the Lofoten Islands) at 0955.

Own Situation:

The 8th Destroyer Flotilla, with destroyers Z "26", "24", and "25" entered Kirkenes and is on 1 hour readiness. Convoy operations proceeded according to plan. For 26 Mar. an enemy plane attack on the convoy of steamer ASIEN has been reported. There was slight damage, no casualties.

As the result of Group North's reminder that it is necessary to have sufficient air reconnaissance in the Arctic Ocean (see War Diary 25 Mar.), the 5th Air Force makes reference to the instructions for warfare issued by the Commander in Chief, Air, according to which requests for reconnaissance over the entire sea area are to be made by the Admiral, Arctic Ocean to the Air Commander, East, who will fulfill them as far as possible, the weather and other urgent tasks permitting. The 5th Air Force considers that this answers the telegram of Group North (see Telegram 1600).

Group North will certainly not fail to take a stand on this peculiar behavior.

See 1/Skl 7246/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV. for the commendation of the Commanding Admiral, Norway expressed to subchasers "1205", "1404", and patrol boat POLARFRONT for sinking an enemy submarine on 14 Jan.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

The reports that the Norwegian ships were leaving Goeteborg were not substantiated. 6 ships are lying across from the naval station. None of the ships are left in the inner harbor. The Swedish Naval Staff confirmed the report that if the ships leave they will be escorted right to the border of the Swedish territorial waters.

Otherwise no special incidents.

Additional planes and ships are patrolling the Kattegat and Skagerrak.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service of the Army, a convoy has left Inverness. 10 transports are destined for Reykjavik.

All U.S. merchant ships have been ordered to pass Cape Hatteras and Cape Lookout at a distance of 30 miles.

The British Admiralty announced the sinking of the trawlers BOTANIC and WARLAND, and the U.S. Navy Department the sinking of the coast guard vessel ACACIA in the Caribbean Sea.

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According to Reuter, an unarmed U.S. freighter supposedly unintentionally rammed a submarine on 18 Mar. An underwater explosion was heard after the ramming. In spite of a 10 hour search, no survivors were found.

2. Own Situation:

Submarines in the Arctic Ocean were informed that 3 large merchant ships were sighted southwest of Bear Island on easterly course. As soon as contact has been reported, Group North intends to transfer command of these submarines to the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, so that they may operate jointly with the submarines stationed off Murmansk.

Submarine U "569" reported sinking a 5,000 GRT steamer in quadrant AM 2717.

A southbound convoy, evidently an OG convoy, was sighted 400 miles southwest of Porcupine Bank. Submarine U "587" is to maintain contact as long as her fuel permits. Submarines in the vicinity are to operate against the convoy if their positions are favorable.

See War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV for a survey of the submarines in operation and for a supplementary situation report.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

7 of the attacking planes were shot down during enemy air raids during the day.

Fighter bombers severely damaged a 3,000 GRT steamer in the harbor of Torquay and a 5,000 GRT steamer in the harbor of Paignton. 7 German planes flew armed reconnaissance missions during the night. A small number of enemy planes flew into the St. Nazaire area at midnight, and 10 planes into Germany as far as Wesermuende and Borkum. One plane flew via Ruegen and Schneidemuehl as far as Lodz and back. 5 enemy planes were shot down over Reich territory.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Photo reconnaissance of Valletta at 0840 showed that as the result of the attack of 26 Mar. 2 steamers in the harbor were burning, and a third still had her stern under water. No damage was seen on the 4th steamer. 2 destroyers had recently docked. 9 oil tanks were definitely destroyed.

Thus in the opinion of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South, the greater part of the Malta convoy, which originally consisted of 7 or 8 merchant ships, was destroyed by the air forces at sea and the rest in the harbor. The Commanding General, Armed Forces, South believes that the enemy succeeded in unloading only a part of the cargo. The ships destroyed in the harbor alone total approximately 25,000 GRT according to photo reconnaissance.

Some of our planes continued the attacks on Valletta and the airfields on Malta.

Contact was maintained between 0913 and 1910 with a force north of Tobruk consisting of 1 cruiser and 4 destroyers on easterly course.

The X Air Corps carried out successful operations against the desert railway.

3. Eastern Front:

Bad weather greatly interfered with operations on the Army front on 25 Mar. On 26 Mar. greater activity was possible. 9 German and 39 enemy planes were lost.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

Task Force H left Gibraltar in an easterly direction during the afternoon with 7 destroyers.

The ships attacked by Italian planes off Cape Bon on 21 Mar. were actually British motor gunboats, according to the French Armistice Commission. The vessels had red and white identification stripes on deck. Motor gunboats of a similar type are said to have been sighted repeatedly from land flying the Italian flag.

Photo reconnaissance of Valletta at 0840 showed 2 light cruisers, 5 destroyers, 1 destroyer without bow, 4 submarines, 4 steamers, and 1 harbor tanker (see also Aerial Situation).

The burning merchant vessel was still lying in Marsa Scirocco. According to German air reconnaissance, a force consisting of a light cruiser and 4 destroyers with fighter escort was proceeding at high speed in an easterly direction between Tobruk and Marsa Matruh. Since an Italian submarine heard ship noises at 0415 approximately 84 miles north of Derna, it is possible that these were the naval forces which left Malta the morning of 26 Mar.

A westbound force consisting of a cruiser and 3 destroyers was reported by air reconnaissance northeast of Ras Azzaz. 60 miles west of Alexandria, 2 large and 2 small merchant vessels with fighter escort were sighted at noon on a 240° course. According to Italian radio intelligence, a British force was attacked by planes at 1135, 30 miles northwest of Ras Azzaz, and a cruiser at 1523, 33 miles northeast of Sollum.

According to an Italian report from a reliable source, the British submarine flotilla in Malta consisted of 12 submarines of the U class.

2. Own Situation:

The 4 vessels of the 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla which are ready for operations entered Messina on 27 Mar. They are to continue to Trapani early on the 28th.

3. Situation Italy:

Enemy planes attacked Benghazi during the night of 26 Mar. No important damage.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

Transport traffic by means of single steamers was to be resumed the evening of 27 Mar. or 28 Mar. Traffic along the North African

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coast proceeded according to plan.

5. Area Naval Group South:

See Telegram 1915 for the request of the Admiral, Black Sea that an additional naval artillery battalion without guns be sent to the Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine for occupying the most important positions from Berdyansk to Taganrog (guns to be furnished from the Army captured materiel). The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division will handle the matter. Otherwise no special incidents.

VIII. Situation East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

The U.S. Navy Department announced that a 3rd destroyer, the LOCACE, was lost in the battle of the Java Sea, and that Pearl Harbor has become useless as a base.

According to Reuter 54 heavy Japanese bombers attacked the fortified islands at the entrance to Manila Bay for 6 hours. The attack was concentrated on Corregidor: Supposedly no important military installations were damaged. According to a report from the Military Attache at Bangkok on 25 Mar. U.S. submarines are active off Shanghai, Formosa, Hongkong, and the Bonin Islands.

2. Situation Japan:

According to the same report, heavy Japanese air attacks were made on Australian airfields and Port Moresby, in addition to Bataan. Japanese troops have reached the Papua Gulf and are advancing along the coast toward Port Moresby.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Local enemy attacks in isolated sectors of the Von Kleist Army Group were unsuccessful. Near Salto, east of Kharkov, and south of Volchansk enemy pressure is increasing. In the 2nd Army sector, an advance by German panzer forces south of Dolgoye was successful.

Central Army Group:

Southwest of Sukhinichi advanced German units were withdrawn. Enemy attacks were repulsed at Demenskoye and Yukhnov. The Gablenz group succeeded in reestablishing connection with Yelnya from the east. The first supply train has reached the city. Enemy attacks from the pocket and west of Vyazma were unsuccessful. Soldiers 14 to 16 years old were captured. Northeast of Gzhatsk the enemy penetrated our positions after several unsuccessful attacks. Northwest of Rzhev the enemy attacked the penetration point with several waves of tanks. At the southern front several enemy tanks and some infantry succeeded in breaking through our lines. South of Velizh, German forces threw the

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enemy back to the east. West of Velizh the enemy temporarily blocked the supply route. The road from Velikiye Luki to Nevel has been cut at 4 places.

Northern Army Group:

Attacks southwest of Kholm and near Demyansk, involving enemy paratroops, were repulsed under heavy enemy losses. Enemy attacks on the advanced positions of the Von Seydlitz Group southeast of Staraya Russa were repulsed. Fighting is still in progress at the penetration point west of Yamno.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Situation unchanged.

3. North Africa:

There is lively enemy scouting activity ahead of the German Africa Corps.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

Another attempt was made on the life of Marcel Deat, leader of the A.S.P. and the most outspoken advocate in France of collaboration with Germany.

Great Britain:

In the foreign press a number of demands are reported which have emerged from the preliminary discussions for the annual convention of the Labour Party. Their foreign policy calls for total victory; their domestic policy attacks the very foundations of the British social and economic order, aiming to socialize all key industries and all farm lands. Naturally the party does not fail to make all sorts of promises to the German people if they would abandon National Socialism. The demands of the transportation workers are said to be especially radical.

India:

There will be an extraordinary session of the committee of the Congress Party on 31 Mar. to discuss the memorandum which is to be submitted to Cripps. The following 5 points form the basis of the memorandum:

1. All Hindu leaders are to pledge themselves to continue the war against the Axis powers together with Britain until final victory.
2. Britain is to promise to give India a constitution which would grant India an equal amount of independence with the other sovereign Allied nations.
3. Britain is to promise to unite India after the war into one nation headed by a constitutional body with many rights.
4. All positions on the executive committee of the Viceroy are to be filled with Indians, who are to handle all external financial and military matters.
5. A war cabinet is to be formed at once in India, in which the representatives of the provinces will also participate.

Australia:

According to a semi-official report, General Blamey, who has so far been the Commander in Chief of the Australian forces in the Middle East, has returned to Australia in order to lead the Allied forces under MacArthur. A part of the 2nd Australian Division is being transferred from the Middle East back to Australia.

U.S.A.:

Roosevelt has informed the Maritime Commission that the U.S. is lagging in its deliveries to Russia, and has directed that these orders are to take priority over construction of merchant ships. Corresponding instructions have been issued to the War and Navy Departments.

Japan:

The government has sent a special envoy to the Vatican. Accordingly

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the papal nuncio in Tokyo is being accorded all diplomatic privileges.

A government decree has abolished the right of foreigners to lease Japanese land permanently.

Situation 28 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

The U.S. War and Navy Departments have announced that instructions have been issued for closer cooperation between Fleet and Army commanders on the coast. In accordance with these instructions, units of the Army Air Force have been attached to the Navy commands. This measure is meant to aid the anti-submarine defenses on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

The U.S. Navy has announced 7 new controlled areas: San Francisco, the Columbia River, Puget Sound, southeastern Alaska, Prince William Sound, and Kodiak in Alaska.

For description of the Panama Canal see Naval News Analysis, Foreign Navies, No. 14, issued by the Naval Intelligence Division.

South Atlantic:

U.S. steamer DELBRASIL arrived in Uruguay on 23 Mar. with the first shipment of war materials from the U.S., consisting of planes and anti-aircraft and coastal guns. At the same time a U.S. military commission arrived in Montevideo.

Indian Ocean:

According to the radio intercept service, the WARSPITE evidently was near Mauritius on 28 Mar. A British steamer 180 miles southeast of Calcutta reported an attack by a 4 engine bomber.

2. Own Situation:

Radiograms 1817 and 0929 inform all ships in foreign waters about reference points and the position of route "Rollbahn".

Reports on the enemy situation were sent by Radiograms 0328, 1221, 1547, 1639, and 2132.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, a British force was located at 0858 approximately 60 miles southwest of St. Nazaire, and at 0916 about 95 miles southwest of St. Nazaire. The force was located off and on in the same area until 1140. A British plane was ordered at 1335 to establish optical contact with the closest destroyer. Another plane was ordered at 1435 to report landing conditions at sea, in

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order to take over wounded personnel from destroyer DECATUR. At 2045 Davenport asked a motor gunboat force to report its position, which was to be given to escort vessels which were sent to the rescue. The force addressed reported at 2315 from 150 miles southwest of Brest headed for the Scilly Islands, stating that fuel was running out and that they were in need of medical assistance.

No reports from the radio intercept service were available for the night of 27 Mar.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

The scattered enemy reports intercepted are connected with a British nuisance raid on the submarine base at St. Nazaire, which was initiated by a violent air attack at 2330 on 27 Mar. and ended abruptly early on 28 Mar. in an enemy defeat. Thanks to the facts that attention was diverted to air defenses, and that air reconnaissance and naval patrols were lacking due to the chronic shortage of forces, one old destroyer loaded with explosives and approximately 10 motor gunboats succeeded at midnight at high tide in entering the Loire, getting the destroyer through the net barrage, and ramming her into the outer gate of the Normandie lock. The naval coastal batteries and naval antiaircraft batteries, as well as mine detonating vessel "137", the 2nd and 8th Minesweeper Flotillas, and harbor patrol boats, succeeded in destroying all but a few (1 to 4) of the enemy vessels before they reached the shore. The crew of the destroyer put the pump of the lock out of commission, and entered the nearest streets and houses, where they were annihilated or captured by naval detachments and an Army detachment which had been alerted in the meantime. 3 vessels of the 16th minesweeper flotilla took part in the land fighting, and protected the open side of the submarine pens. It is impossible to gain a clear picture yet from the mass of details reported. However it is clear that the submarines and submarine crews did not suffer in any way, and other damage is comparatively small and easily repaired. Unfortunately, the explosives on the destroyer exploded at 1145, when German personnel was already aboard to secure documents and equipment, and there were unfortunately numerous curious bystanders, mostly French shipyard workers, in the vicinity, so that the number of casualties on our side increased considerably. Fortunately the secret documents of the destroyer and the enemy's latest mine chart had been removed previously.

4 vessels of the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla, which were engaged during the night in sweeping the routes because of mine danger, received the first report of the attack at 0315 and returned at top speed to St. Nazaire. 1 British motor gunboat was captured by the JAGUAR after a short engagement, and was later brought in by patrol boats. The other vessels of the flotilla engaged 6 to 8 enemy destroyers. The SEEADLER and the ILTIS fired torpedo fans and scored 4 definite gun hits on 2 enemy ships. Because of the low visibility (morning fog) further observations were impossible.

According to the first reports 21 British soldiers were killed and 140 captured on land. Our losses amounted to 67 dead, 62 badly wounded, and 74 slightly wounded, including the victims of the explosion of the destroyer CAMPBELLTOWN.

Among the secret papers captured there was information about German recognition signals for 26 to 31 Mar.!

For a preliminary report from 0800 of the Admiral, Western France and a brief report of Group West see 1/Skl 7334/42 and 1/Skl 7422/42 Gkdos.

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in War Diary file "British Landing at St. Nazaire on 28 Mar. 1942". The Naval Staff keeps the Fuehrer, the Armed Forces High Command, and the Army High Command informed by telephone via the Naval Liaison Officers, and in the course of the afternoon sends a summary by telegram. For copy see War Diary file "British Landing at St. Nazaire on 28 Mar. 1942".

At 1625 the Armed Forces High Command, Operations Staff sent a new Fuehrer directive ordering that especially the headquarters and quarters of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines should be removed from the coast at once. "Likewise inactive submarine crews are to be taken to a safe place. The Fuehrer expects an immediate report that this order has been carried out."

The Chief, Naval Staff had already given an order to this effect on 25 and 26 Mar., and the order went out on 27 Mar. (See War Diary 25, 26, and 27 Mar.)

Group West states as follows on the basis of information available so far:

a. The higher coastal defense commands functioned excellently; likewise cooperation between the branches of the armed forces was good.

b. The enemy surprise attack was successful because we lacked continuous air reconnaissance.

c. It was impossible effectively to pursue the withdrawing enemy because of shortage of sufficient fast strong naval forces, sufficient reconnaissance, as well as bombers available for immediate use.

d. It is urgently necessary to set up an adequate radar net against approaching ships.

On the basis of the special report of the Armed Forces High Command on the successful defense against the enemy surprise attack, the Commanding Admiral, France requests a correction to the effect that only naval guns and antiaircraft guns fired on the enemy vessels, and not Army or Air Force antiaircraft guns.

Channel Coast:

No special incidents.

Special Items:

a. The Fuehrer has ordered that a naval landing detachment be organized.

The Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command therefore orders that effective at once the Naval High Command organize a naval fortress brigade to begin with. This brigade is to safeguard the islands off the Atlantic coast, i.e., Ile de Groix, Belle Ile, and Ile D'Yeu. The personnel is to be taken from existing naval detachments and from various staffs and other commands.

The brigade will be under the operational command of the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West.

For copy of order see 1/Skl 7289/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

b. The Army General Staff replied to the Naval Staff's request that the safety of coastal areas be kept in mind during troop

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withdrawals from the western area that the Army High Command is fully aware of the importance of adequate protection of naval bases along the French coast. The Army has taken all possible measures for protecting the important coastal bases insofar as available forces permit. In view of troop transfers to the Eastern Front the troops available for coastal defense cannot be increased; however the Army High Command is striving to increase the strength of these troops by supplying them with captured weapons.

The Naval Staff informs Group West and the Commanding Admiral, France of this reply.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Air reconnaissance located only 1 convoy off Hartlepool. According to the radio intercept service, an auxiliary ship received orders from Harwich to meet the British yacht VESTAL and to carry out an operation the character of which is unknown.

Own Situation:

Shortly after 0100 the Danish steamer BERTHA (766 GRT) which was engaged in the Ems-Elbe traffic sank very quickly with considerable loss of life 500 meters from buoy 25 on route "Hellrot" as the result of a ground mine explosion. Otherwise convoys proceeded without special incidents. During the night of 27 Mar. enemy planes were active over the North Sea coast as far as Schleswig Holstein.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service 3 British vessels were located on 26 Mar. between the western tip of the Rybachi Peninsula and the western tip of Vardoe. These were evidently waiting for convoy PQ 13. On 28 Mar. at 2100 1 vessel, evidently a cruiser, was located 120 miles northeast of Vardoe, and 3 destroyers were located 2 miles from her. The cruiser reported sighting a submarine.

Air reconnaissance spotted a convoy 90 miles northwest of the North Cape (quadrant AC 4816) at 1017; at 1039 an enemy submarine 65 miles northwest of North Cape (AC 4863); and at 1140 6 merchant vessels of from 2,000 to 8,000 GRT, 1 destroyer, and 1 guard boat 18 miles northwest of North Cape on a westerly course. Submarine U "309" reported a convoy of 6 steamers, 1 destroyer, and probably 1 cruiser on a southeasterly course, speed 10 knots, 120 miles north of Nordkyn; she fired 1 torpedo at one of the escort vessels, but missed.

Own Situation:

At 1420 the Admiral, Arctic Ocean reported that the 8th Destroyer Flotilla, consisting of 3 destroyers, and group "Eiswolf" with 3 of the submarines operating off the Murman coast, as well as submarine U "585" were sent out to operate against the convoy located by air reconnaissance. If possible the 8th Destroyer Flotilla is to bring in

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the convoy in its entirety.

Group "Ziethen" is to operate against the convoy located by submarine U "209".

Group North assumes that there are additional sections of the convoy behind the ships reported, and extends the operational area of the Admiral, Arctic Ocean to the west as far as 160 E. In addition the Group gives him command of the 2 submarines stationed at Narvik, which are to take up positions in the area between 160 and 260 E. However, these submarines are to continue to protect the Lofoten area. German submarines are told not to attack the destroyers.

The 8th Destroyer Flotilla left Kirkenes at 1430 for the operation.

The spot where battery 558 is being set up near Petsamo was shelled by the Russians with 56 rounds from 13 cm. guns. Battery 885 returned the fire. So far 3 mines, evidently submarine rack mines, were swept in the entrance to the Petsamo Fjord.

Convoy operations proceeded according to plan without special incidents.

The Fleet Commander reports that he took over command of the forces in Norway and the post of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships on the flag ship TIRPITZ.

With regard to the brief report of cruiser HIPPER (see War Diary 25 Mar.), Group North justifiably criticizes the high speed which led to increased oil consumption and to the dismissal of the light escort forces. For copy see 1/Skl 7405/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. II a.

See Telegram 0950 for Group North's stand on the reply of the 5th Air Force concerning requests for reconnaissance and bombing planes (see War Diary 27 Mar.).

Troop transports to Norway

a. According to the latest information from the Supply and Transportation Office, about 50,000 men are being shipped to Norway. 19,000 of these have been shipped, and 4,000 are awaiting shipment in Copenhagen. The remaining 27,000 are in Hamburg, and 14,500 of these are destined for the area north of Trondheim.

b. It is impossible to transport 14,500 men from Hamburg directly to the northern area because of lack of shipping space, since these ships would then not be available for other operations for 5 to 6 weeks. This is intolerable, in view of new transport requirements and operations in the Baltic Sea (transports to Finland and the eastern area).

c. The Armed Forces High Command orders that the transport operations under a. should be carried out by 7 Apr. For this purpose beginning 29 Mar. 2 convoys with 4 transport vessels are to leave each week from Hamburg for Oslo; on 6 Apr. the POTSDAM and GNEISENAU are to leave Hamburg for Oslo, and the remaining 5,000 men are to be shipped directly to northern Norway on ships some of which are coming from Copenhagen and some of which are just being repaired.

d. These ships will remain in northern Norway for transports from Trondheim to the north.

The Naval Staff issues corresponding instructions to Group North, with copies to the Commanding Admiral, Norway, the Commanding Admiral,

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Defenses North, the Commanding Admiral, Defenses, Baltic, the Naval Liaison Officer to the Armed Forces High Command, and the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, Shipping and Transport Branch (see Telegram 1818).

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

According to reconnaissance reports of the 5th Air Force, on 27 Mar. in the morning there were 8 steamers of different sizes under Swedish fighter observation in the channel to Goeteborg harbor. One exceptionally large ship was at the pier in the harbor. The 5th Air Force assumes that these are the Norwegian ships returning from an attempted breakthrough. The situation in Goeteborg was unchanged on 28 Mar. By order of the authorities, the German steamer INGRID TRABER had to transfer to the inner harbor. According to the Naval Attache at Stockholm, it will be impossible for the ship to follow the Norwegians, since she has to get clearance for a definite time. It is not possible to wait at Vinga because of the ice situation.

2. Own Situation:

Nothing to report.

3. Situation Finland:

Finnish troops have occupied the northern part of Hogland. According to statements from prisoners, there are 600 men on Seiskari and 1,000 men on Lavansaari. There are 3 batteries on Seiskari, as well as eight 4.5 cm. antitank guns on wheels. The shore is mined.

V. Merchant Shipping

At the end of 1941 the British Board of Trade declared occupied and unoccupied France enemy territory, in accordance with the Trading with the Enemy Act.

Mexico, Brazil, and Uruguay chartered the confiscated German, Italian, and Danish ships to the U.S. They will probably be used primarily as troop transports.

For details and further information see Brief Report No. 10/42 of the Foreign Merchant Marine series of the Naval Staff Intelligence Division.

VI. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

3 steamers, among them the British steamer NALGORA (6,579 GRT), were located off the American coast. They reported sighting and being attacked by submarines.

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The Dutch tanker OZANA (6,256 GRT) was reported drifting on 27 Mar. about 180 miles south of Halifax. 12 hours previously she had reported being pursued by a submarine.

Freetown repeated as SSS message about a submarine and oil slicks approximately 50 miles northwest of the small Bahama Bank. The British cable steamer NORSEMAN (1,844 GRT) reported sighting a submarine approximately 360 miles northeast of Puerto Rico.

In the Mediterranean radio intelligence intercepted a message from a British ship concerning a submarine sighted 65 miles northeast of Tobruk.

2. Own Situation:

A number of welcome reports have been received from the American coast: Submarine U "373" sank a 5,000 GRT steamer on 17 Mar., and steamer THURSOBANK (5,570 GRT) on 22 Mar. Submarine U "160" sank an armed coastal steamer or patrol vessel (15,000 GRT) on 27 Mar. Submarine U "71" sank tanker NARRAGANSETT (10,389 GRT) on 24 Mar., and a 7,000 GRT tanker and probably a 4,000 GRT steamer on 26 Mar. Submarine U "754" sank a 10,000 GRT tanker on 23 Mar.

See Situation Norway and supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV for operations in the Arctic Ocean against convoy PQ 13.

For copies of the letters pertaining to these operations exchanged between the Naval Staff, Group North, and the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, see 1/Skl I u 657/42 Gkdos. Chefs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

VII. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

221 German planes flew missions during the day. 7 enemy planes were shot down by our air defenses in daylight incursions.

In the central part of the Bay of Biscay 20 to 30 small vessels were sighted, evidently in connection with the St. Nazaire operation. 1 of the enemy motor gunboats that had escaped from St. Nazaire was annihilated by forces of the Air Commander, Atlantic.

During the night of 28 Mar., 50 to 55 enemy incursions were made in the areas around Skagen, Salzwedel, Uelzen, and Wilhelmshaven. The heaviest attacks were made on Luebeck, where heavy damage was reported. Furthermore 18 enemy incursions were made in northern France, 12 in western France, and 11 in Holland.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

During the night of 27 Mar. strong enemy forces attacked Benghazi, and lesser forces Derna and Martuba.

Throughout the day German planes attacked harbor installations and airfields on Malta. Lively enemy fighter activity. It was reported that German dive bombers under fighter cover attacked Tobruk on 27 Mar. 2 merchant vessels were hit.

3. Eastern Front:

8 Ju 88's attacked harbor installations and ships at Murmansk from 1535 to 1715. The piers and presumably 1 steamer were damaged.

1 steamer of 6,000 GRT was sunk, and 1 steamer of 5,000 GRT badly damaged in the convoy east of Bear Island.

VIII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

At 1324 German air reconnaissance sighted task force H off Ibiza on a 300 course, and at 1440 on a 1200 course. The force is evidently engaged in maneuvers at sea. The British motor gunboat brought into Bene is marked ML 132. According to air reconnaissance, a convoy, escorted by 4 destroyers, or 2 cruisers and 2 destroyers, was located 30 miles off the Marmarica coast on easterly course. The SOLAZ convoy, proceeding in the opposite direction, was located by the radio intercept service and air reconnaissance, likewise escorted by 4 vessels. The SOLAZ reported to Tobruk at 1410 that she was under air attack 17 miles off Tobruk.

Another convoy was sighted leaving Alexandria on a northeasterly course in the afternoon, escorted by 1 destroyer and 1 escort vessel. In the evening 4 destroyers on easterly course were sighted by a submarine northwest of Ras Azzaz.

British air reconnaissance reported 1 merchant vessel and 1 destroyer on a northerly course at noon 100 miles northwest of Derna, evidently returning from Tripoli to Italy. 1 submarine was reported off Marsa Matruh in the morning, and 1 in the afternoon 65 miles northeast of Tobruk.

Photo reconnaissance of Alexandria at 1318 showed the 2 battleships as heretofore, as well as 3 DIDO-class cruisers, 1 antiaircraft cruiser of the C class, 7 destroyers, 1 destroyer in drydock, 5 submarines, 6 small naval vessels, destroyer tender WOOLWICH, submarine tender NEEDWAY, other auxiliary vessels, 1 Greek destroyer, 2 Greek torpedo boats, and 1 Greek auxiliary vessel, as well as 5 passenger ships, 6 tankers, and 33 steamers totalling approximately 210,000 GRT.

According to an agent report a convoy is ready to leave Alexandria, evidently destined for Malta. On 27 Mar. 3 steamers, one of them a very large one, passed through the Suez Canal in the direction of the Mediterranean.

2. Own Situation:

The 6th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla interrupted its voyage from Messina to Trapani because of the weather.

The Naval Staff informs the German Naval Command, Italy, with copy to the Commanding Admiral, Submarines, of its approval of planned submarine operations in the eastern Mediterranean during the April new moon period (see War Diary 25 Mar.). For copy of the plan and the approval see 1/Sk1 I u 648/42 Gkdos. Chfs. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IV.

3. Situation Italy:

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Enemy planes attacked Benghazi during the night of 27 Mar. without causing major damage.

4. North Africa:

Tanker SATURNO and steamer ARGENTEA left for Tripoli, steamer BROOK for Benghazi, and steamer PETRARCA left Benghazi for Taranto, all separately and accompanied by 1 or 2 escort vessels. Coastal traffic without special incidents.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

The Turkish steamer DUMLUPINAR arrived at Piraeus from Istanbul on 27 Mar. with grain for the Greek population.

Black Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

Own Situation:

The operations A and B in the gap in the minefield at Constanta have been carried out according to plan. A river mine barrage has been laid near Yalta.

IX. Situation East Asia

1. Enemy Situation:

According to the Vichy telegraphic service (Ofi) Chinese forces crossed the border of Thailand at 6 spots in the face of stubborn Japanese resistance.

According to a report of 26 Mar. from the Military Attache at Bangkok, the supply dumps in Burma which were meant for Chungking had to be used in Burma because of supply difficulties.

2. Situation Japan:

The same report confirms the Japanese advance on Tungu and occupation of the Andaman Islands. According to a Domei report from Rangoon, the Japanese have begun minesweeping in the Irrawaddy Delta. Japanese warships are said to have arrived in Rangoon already.

X. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Heavy fighting was in progress in the Salto and Volchansk areas, in addition to local fighting on other sectors of the front.

Central Army Group:

Heavy partisan fighting is in progress in the Bryansk area. Lively enemy attacks near Yelnya, Gzhatsk, and northwest of Rzhev. Heavy defensive fighting.

Northern Army Group:

The right wing of the Von Seydlitz Group gained additional territory. Heavy defensive fighting is in progress in the Yamno area. Enemy attacks were repulsed at Kholm and Demyansk.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Several strong enemy detachments advanced against the defenses north of the Kestenga sector. Otherwise no change in the situation.

3. North Africa:

Lively scouting activity on both sides. Low-flying enemy planes strafed the Via Balbia at night without success between Derna and Tmimi.

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Items of Political Importance

India:

In the presence of representatives of the press Cripps disclosed the sug-
gestions of the War Cabinet for the future form of government in India. The objective is to create a new "Indian Union" in the form of a dominion. There can be no question of a new constitution until the cessation of hostilities (not, however, as late as the signing of the peace treaty). If the various provinces so desire, India can be divided into several states with equal rights. The defense of India will, however, remain in British hands. For details see Political Review No. 75, paragraph 2.

Britain evidently assumes, and rightly so, that she will be able to maintain her position in view of the lack of unity in India as the result of the far-reaching concessions made to the various racial, confessional, and other special-interest groups.

Bulgaria:

Reports from Sofia contradict the statements which claim that the visit of King Boris is connected with Turko-Bulgarian complications. There will be no such complications even if Bulgaria should join the Tri-Partite Pact while Turkey remained neutral.

Prime Minister Filoff declared in Parliament that it is not possible for Bulgaria to remain inactive in a war in which Europe's future is being decided. The fate of the country is inextricably connected with that of her allies. Bolshevism is the greatest enemy.

Situation 29 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

According to as yet unconfirmed radio reports, 2 large British warships, 2 aircraft carriers, several cruisers, and other vessels were sighted at the Cape of Good Hope en route to the Indian Ocean.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 0006 instructs ship "10" to answer "yes" or "no" in her next radio message whether the Naval Staff's assumption is correct that the prisoners from the PAGASITIKOS are on the REGENSBURG.

Radiograms 2014 and 2150 inform ship "10" about the code names for the routes to Japan and the new positions of route "Fussweg".

Radiogram 2205 informs ship "28" that German submarines are at the present time operating along the West African coast.

Information on the enemy situation was sent via Telegrams 0614, 1328, 1427, and 1600.

II. Situation West Area1. Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, the force returning home was 10 miles south of the Scilly Islands on a 700 course, speed 20 knots, at noon on 29 Mar. The ALBERNINGTON, unknown to us, and the ex-Polish torpedo boat KUJAVIK went to the aid of the force.

At 0935 air reconnaissance sighted 6 motor gunboats on a southerly course 300 miles west of Brest; and at 1245 2 single steamers on the same course 250 miles west of Brest.

Air reconnaissance reported for 28 Mar. sighting numerous vessels of various types on different courses beginning at 0838 in quadrants BF 64, 55, 67, 57, etc.. Most of the ships were destroyers and other light naval vessels, as well as merchant ships. Group West points out, however, that the majority of the reports were made by inexperienced training crews. At any rate it can be concluded that considerable covering forces stood ready to meet the vessels attacking St. Nazaire, or that these ships represented a second wave in the attack. For details see telegrams 1/Skl 12079 and 12095 geh. in file "British Landing at St. Nazaire on 28 Mar. 1942".

2. Own Situation:Atlantic Coast:

A very few enemy planes attacked Brest on 28 Mar. from 1020 to 1056 and from 1841 to 0227, and Lorient from 2236 to 2252. A few bombs were dropped. The 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla made a check sweep in the "Uhunest" area.

A number of additional reports have been received concerning the British raid on St. Nazaire on 28 Mar. For copies see file in War Diary. These included an evaluation of the operational order found on the CAMPBELL-TOWN, according to which the ship was to proceed from Falmouth to point Z at 46° 48' N, 02° 50' W, from where the attack was to be launched at 2230. She was to meet the covering forces at point Y at 47° 02' N, 12° 42.5' W at 0600. 3 groups were to land at the following spots: the old mole, the old entrance, and south of the dock gate. The maximum time to be spent on land: 2 hours.

The captured documents were taken to the Naval Staff by plane. Other reports concern primarily questions asked by the Naval Staff and the Armed Forces High Command. Thus the Commanding Admiral, France reported that the Admiral, Western France was not informed about the 3 destroyers and 10 motor gunboats sighted on westerly course on the morning of 27 Mar. by a submarine (see War Diary 27 Mar.) until after the alarm was sounded. The staff officer responsible has been reprimanded. The incident itself would probably not have been changed if the Admiral, Western France had been informed earlier; thus for example the Group believed the force to be returning from a mining operation or to be en route to Gibraltar, and the fact that the force was reported on a westerly course was probably primarily responsible for this interpretation. At any rate the staff of the Group did not believe that the vessels were about to attack the coast. In addition the Commanding Admiral, France reports that the command organization functioned well, although still closer coordination should be striven for. At the request of the 7th Submarine Flotilla, the radio beacons on Belle Ile and Ville-St. Martin were functioning from 2335 to 0215. Light beacons were not lit. The nets in front of the locks had been laid as ordered.

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This explanation in addition to the measures taken by the harbor patrol flotilla and the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla as reported on 28 Mar. make it evident to the Naval Staff that all security measures which it was possible to take with the forces available were taken.

Therefore it is all the more surprising that questions could arise of the type put by Fuehrer Headquarters to the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, and answered by the Commanding Admiral, Group West. For copies see 1/Skl 7431/42 Gkdos. in the War Diary file.

It is very regrettable that there was evidently no one in Fuehrer Headquarters who from the very beginning could give a proper picture of the events to the Fuehrer and the Armed Forces High Command; thus a completely inaccurate impression which was very derogatory to the Navy was created by the Army officers, with a corresponding effect on the Fuehrer. Worse yet, great nervous tension ensued, which certainly cannot improve the situation.

For a report from the Armed Forces Intelligence Center, Anger concerning interrogation of the prisoners of war see 1/Skl 12146 geh. in the files.

Channel Coast:

The 4th PT Boat Flotilla laid mines on the southeast coast. On 28 Mar. the "Prinz Heinrich" battery shot down 1 Spitfire, and Fort Lapin shot down 3.

Special Item:

The forces needed to set up a naval fortress brigade for the defense of the islands off the Atlantic coast as ordered by the Armed Forces High Command (see War Diary 28 Mar.) were reported to the Armed Forces High Command, with copies to the Naval Staff, the Army High Command, the 7th Army, Group West, the Commanding Admiral, France, and the 3rd Air Force. For copy see 1/Skl 7423/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. X.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to air reconnaissance, there were large convoys off Flamborough Head and Harwich on northerly course, and according to the radio intercept service of the Air Force, there were additional convoys off Harwich and Margate on southerly courses.

According to the radio intercept service, reconnaissance planes reported a number of German convoys off the coasts of Jutland and southern Norway.

According to Reuter, it is believed in London that the TIRPITZ, SCHEER, and PRINZ EUGEN are in Trondheim, the SCHARNHORST in Kiel, and the GNEISENAU in Wilhelmshaven.

Own Situation:

During the night of 28 Mar. enemy air forces flew over the

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coastal areas of the German Bight, beginning at Terschelling, in a broad front toward the east. Bombs were dropped at Hamburg, Cuxhaven, and Heligoland without causing damage. A total of 12 planes were reported shot down by night fighters and naval and Air Force antiaircraft guns in the area of Group North.

Mine operation KAISER as well as the operation of the 1st Minesweeper Flotilla, which was to close the gap between the southwest barrage in the Hoofden and the southwest corner of the German declared area in the North Sea, were postponed 24 hours because of the weather.

The 12th Subchaser Flotilla arrived from Norway at Wesermuende for shipyard repairs.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

The Finnish Military Attache at Stockholm reported to the Liaison Staff North from a reliable source that the danger of an enemy landing in northern Norway has increased. London is said to have reported to Stockholm that Russia is exerting heavy pressure on Britain, with U.S. approval. Preparations are in progress. The Norwegian advance guard is to be under the command of the Norwegian General Hansteen. The present season is said to be the most favorable; later the long days and the mud might make operations more difficult. The British count on the Swedes not permitting German troop transports through Sweden, and they believe that the resultant German-Swedish conflict will lead to creation of the much discussed new front.

Reconnaissance planes of the 5th Air Force sighted a convoy of 25 steamers, 1 cruiser, 4 destroyers, and 2 escort vessels, headed for Iceland, about 200 miles west of the Faroes. The 5th Air Force believes that this is a PQ convoy.

According to air reconnaissance in the Arctic Ocean there were 4 destroyers or torpedo boats on northwesterly course approximately 75 miles north of Cape Teriberski. At 0710 a convoy of 7 steamers was 130 miles north of Vardoe on easterly course.

According to the radio intercept service, PQ 13 was approximately 120 miles northeast of Vardoe in the early morning. At 0824 a vessel in the convoy reported sighting a submarine, and at 0532 and 0951, 3 northbound destroyers were reported. Another ship, coming from Murmansk, presumably joined the convoy about noon.

Submarine U "378" and U "376" likewise located the convoy in the early morning, and reported it at 0600 in quadrant AC 5726 on an easterly course, consisting of 5 to 7 steamers with escort vessels to the south.

Own Situation:

The submarines maintained contact with the enemy until 1500. The weather greatly hampered attacking. Air reconnaissance was impossible during the day because of increasingly bad weather.

The 8th Destroyer Flotilla had an engagement with an enemy cruiser in quadrant AC 5830 according to a report from the Admiral, Arctic Ocean and Group North. Destroyer Z "26" sank in AC 5840 on the way back. The Admiral, Arctic Ocean recalled the flotilla to Kirkenes. Group North suggested that the destroyers and PT boats be held in immediate readiness in the Varanger Fjord in case favorable opportunities for

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operations present themselves. The Group believes that it was correct to recall the destroyers in view of the weather and the lack of air reconnaissance, and in order to give the submarines freedom of action.

The Group expects the convoy to be in quadrant AC 8530 to 8330 early on 30 Mar. There the submarines are to launch a new attack in case contact is lost during the night. The Air Force is requested to reestablish contact. (See Telegram 1714.)

There are as yet no reports of successes.

According to a report from the Admiral, Arctic Ocean, there has been a heavy snowstorm in the operations area for the past hours. Visibility is from 100 to 300 meters. (See Telegram 1720.)

The Naval Staff informs the Fuehrer, the Armed Forces High Command, the Commander in Chief, Air, and the Army High Command, through the Naval Liaison Officers, to this effect. For copy see 1/Skl 7454/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

The current operation is interfering with the escort service in northern Norway. During the day and evening of 28 Mar. enemy planes were active over Kirkenes, Trondheim, Stavanger, Bergen, Kristiansand South, and Oslo. No damage was reported.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

Enemy air activity in the Holstein area in the night of 28 Mar. An attempted attack on Kiel was not completed because for the first time night fighters were used, and the city and shipyard were effectively covered with a smoke screen. Luebeck, however, was heavily attacked as an alternate target. (See Telegrams 1713 and 1843.)

It is suspected that planes dropped mines in the southern part of the Big Belt.

The Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries suggests to Group North that the islands in the Gulf of Finland be captured in a combined Army and naval operation, provided the Air Force participates. Seiskari is to be captured first, and subsequently Lavansaari. For copy see 1/Skl 7446/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

Since according to air reconnaissance it can be assumed that the Russians have evacuated Tytersaari, the Commanding Admiral, Baltic Countries has suggested to the 26th Army that the island be captured at once from Kunda, if necessary by parts of the Naval Coastal Artillery Battalion 531, and the Estonian Company. For copy of a corresponding report to Group North, see 1/Skl 7429/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. III.

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report from Spain a convoy consisting of 9 ships, escorted by 2 destroyers and 3 corvettes entered

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Gibraltar from the west during the night of 28 Mar. According to the radio intercept service, subchaser SARABANDE reported a submerged submarine, evidently in the Freetown area.

The radio intercept service intercepted reports from the American coast that U.S. steamer PATRICIA SKAKEL (4,964 GRT), U.S. steamer CITY OF NEW YORK (8,872 GRT), and the British steamer HERTFORD (11,785 GRT) were torpedoed. Canadian motor ship FLEUR DE LIS and U.S. tug SECURITY have gone to the aid of the Dutch tanker OZANA which was reported adrift.

All U.S. ships in the West Indies were informed that beginning 1 Apr. the entrance to the Gulf of Paria (Trinidad) will be dangerous because of mines. All entrances to the Gulf will be closed, except for one controlled channel. Sailing instructions for leaving the Gulf of Paria were added.

According to an announcement of the U.S. Navy Department, 71 ships had been sunk off the east coast and in the Caribbean Sea by 28 Mar. Between 1 Jan. and 23 Feb. 3 submarines were sunk and several others damaged.

2. Own Situation:

For submarine operations against convoy PQ 13, see Situation Norway and the supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Our air defenses shot down 6 enemy planes during the day. For reconnaissance report see daily situation. Single planes flew armed reconnaissance missions during the night of 29 Mar.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

9 Me 109's were damaged during an enemy air attack on the Martuba airfield during the night of 28 Mar. Attacks on Valletta and the Halfar airfield continued.

3. Eastern Front:

For reports of reconnaissance in the Arctic Ocean see Situation Norway. Another destroyer and a 4,000 GRT steamer from the convoy southeast of Bear Island were reported damaged on 28 Mar.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

Task Force H, evidently on the return voyage to Gibraltar, was sighted by an Italian submarine at 2215 on a 2400 course 60 miles northwest of Oran.

Air reconnaissance observed lively ship traffic in the Alexandria -

Tobruk area. The convoy reported on 28 Mar. in Sollum Bay on easterly course was located at 0930 about 50 miles west of Alexandria, consisting of 3 steamers, 2 destroyers, 1 torpedo boat, and 2 escort vessels, headed for Alexandria. Further west there were 5 destroyers and another force consisting of 2 destroyers and 2 escort vessels on easterly course. According to the radio intercept service, these 2 escort vessels were evidently repeatedly attacked by enemy planes at 1000 about 40 miles northeast of Marsa Matruh. At the same time air reconnaissance located 16 ships of unidentified type directly off Alexandria, evidently not moving.

2. Own Situation:

According to a report from the German Naval Command, Italy, torpedo or mining operations of the 3rd PT Boat Flotilla will be carried out during the full moon period only if the enemy situation is such that immediate success is likely. The systematic mining of Malta will be resumed on 8 Apr.

3. Situation Italy:

Enemy planes attacked Benghazi during the night of 28 Mar. without causing damage.

At noon on 27 Mar. the Italian steamer ORESTE (2,600 GRT) sank off Cattaro as the result of a mine hit. In the harbor of Benghazi mine-sweeping planes have so far detonated 2 magnetic mines.

4. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

An unsuccessful enemy air attack was made on steamer PETRARCA while she was returning from Benghazi on the morning of 28 Mar. Other transport traffic without special incident.

5. Area Naval Group South:

Nothing to report.

VIII. Situation East Asia

According to a report of the Japanese Naval Staff, the Navy will carry Army supplies to Rangoon beginning 25 Mar., following minesweeping operations. South of Chijima an enemy submarine unsuccessfully attacked a Japanese transport steamer on 25 Mar. The submarine was damaged by a bomb and subsequently sunk by naval forces.

According to the radio intercept service, the Japanese are attacking merchant shipping off Calcutta with heavy 4-engined bombers.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Local enemy attacks were repulsed by the Von Kleist Army

Group. A German advance smashed enemy concentrations near Taganrog. Also the 6th Army attacked a village near Salto east of Kharkov, and threw the enemy back to the east. North of there an enemy tank attack was halted by a counterattack. Also in the area of the 2nd Army a German operation southeast of Kursk was successful.

Central Army Group:

East of Demenskoye the enemy succeeded in breaking through; the breakthrough is being closed off. Southwest of Vyazma a German counterthrust threw back the enemy who had penetrated our lines. Northeast of Gzhatsk the enemy succeeded, after several unsuccessful attempts, in breaking through our lines with spearheads. The breakthrough spot was sealed off. Heavy enemy pressure on our positions at the old point of penetration west-northwest of Rzhev and south of there.

Northern Army Group:

Very lively fighting in the Kholm area. The southern wing of the Von Seydlitz Group was able to take another village on the Redvya River. At the defense position north of Lake Ilmen the enemy is making strong attacks in an attempt to force a supply line for his units which are cut off there. Up to now we have been able by using all possible means to fight off these attacks, which are using tanks. At the point of penetration south of Maluksa, enemy forces which have just been brought up are threatening our positions by detouring around them.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

During the Finnish attacks on Hogland the enemy put up strong resistance in fortified positions. The island was taken. Finnish planes pursued the remains of the enemy troops beating a retreat over the ice. An enemy group approaching the Finnish positions over the ice on Lake Onega was annihilated. An attack is in progress against the enemy who has advanced north of Kestenga.

3. North Africa:

No special incidents.

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Items of Political Importance

France:

The fact that Laval had conferences not only with the Minister of the Interior, Puchou and Admiral Darlan, but also with Marshal Petain, confirm that he is of late making efforts to establish closer contact with the Vichy government.

Great Britain:

Foreign Minister Eden, in his talk of 29 Mar., emphasized especially British efforts on behalf of Russia. The Russians have shown up Hitler's boasting, and Britain has kept her promise to supply the Russians with war material, although it is difficult to provide the necessary ships and to protect them on their voyage through the Arctic Ocean. British flyers are participating in the defense of Moscow, and there are British tanks at the Russian front. Above all Britain has blockaded Germany for two and a half years, and has opened the supply route to Russia via Iran. The present is the darkest time of the whole war, and both sides are preparing for the decisive moment. Britain can be proud to have survived alone until she was joined by her allies.

U.S.A.:

Official circles state that Roosevelt's order that deliveries to Russia should take precedence over everything else was necessary since, contrary to the agreements, deliveries promised for March and April will not be available until the end of June at the earliest.

Conference on the Situation with the Chief, Naval Staff

I. For report of the Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division concerning the transfer of the 3 Dutch gunboats to the Norwegian area, see 1/Skl I op 5708/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees with the suggestion.

II. The Chief, Naval Staff Communications Division reports on the following matters:

a. Technical effects of the transfer of the headquarters of the Commanding Admiral, Submarines.

b. Establishment of teletype connections between Rome and Athens.

c. Installation of radar equipment on the coasts. Such equipment must be set up not only from the standpoint of coastal artillery, but also so as to control the largest possible sea area. Therefore the equipment should be given to the batteries only temporarily in case of need.

III. The Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division reports that Captain Schubert has been sent to St. Nazaire in order to gather information on the spot concerning the raid of 28 Mar.

The Chief, Naval Staff directs that the renewed request of Vice Admiral

Wuelfing von Ditten that the Shipping Office be placed under the Navy for the duration of the war be refused.

An investigation is to be made of Minister Speer's communication concerning insufficient cooperation between the Navy and the Organization Todt in construction of fortifications on the Channel islands. The Chief, Naval Staff orders that the matter be handled at once in the manner suggested by the Chief, Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, which would prove Speer's assertions incorrect.

IV. The Chief, Naval Construction Division reports about Minister Speer's demand that the capacity of the shipyards be increased and about his conference with Staatsrat Blohm concerning cooperation with the Navy in the Central Committee for the Shipyard Industry, in which he emphasized that the Navy should remain the contracting party. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division thereupon points out the character of this committee, which is in charge not only of naval but also of merchant ship construction. If the Navy were the sole contracting party, it would also be responsible for merchant ship construction. In this connection attention is called to the request of Wuelfing von Ditten.

The Chief, Naval Staff decides that for the present matters are to be arranged as the Chief, Naval Construction Division agreed with Staatsrat Blohm.

V. The Chief, Naval Staff directs in connection with the Armed Forces High Command order to set up a naval brigade that, in view of the personnel required, Captain Rollmann's report concerning his investigation should be awaited. If necessary, the Chief, Naval Staff has decided to have Admiral Marschall go through all naval offices to see what personnel is dispensable, after he has finished his duties as deputy to the Commanding Admiral, Group South.

VI. The Chief, Naval Ordnance Division reports that 100,000 to 200,000 rounds of ammunition from naval stocks will be made available to the Army each month. He reports further on the intention of Minister Speer to set up a central ordnance commission and a central construction commission within the armaments industry which will decide about construction and testing of equipment. The ordnance commission will be responsible for deciding whether equipment is ready for operational use. The Navy has protested this plan.

A further report is made on the additional Fuehrer directive to the Armed Forces making unauthorized possession of raw materials a punishable offense.

VII. The Naval Attache Division reports on the Japanese plan to send a submarine to Bordeaux or Lorient.

VIII. The Chief, Operations Branch, Naval Staff Operations Division reports that the naval offices have been ordered to report directly to the Armed Forces High Command via the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, because of the incident at St. Nazaire on 28 Mar. This measure shows an absolutely incomprehensible concern and nervousness at the Armed Forces High Command and at Fuehrer Headquarters. The Naval Staff has ordered that all reports in this matter be channelled through Group West. The Chief, Naval Staff agrees.

In the same connection, the Chief of Staff, Naval Staff telephoned General Jodl and expressed surprise about the entirely unjustified and inaccurate opinion which has been expressed in the Armed Forces High Command concerning the state of preparedness of the Navy in general, and

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the success achieved by naval defenses at St. Nazaire in particular.

IX. Because of the enemy surprise attack on St. Nazaire, the Chief, Naval Staff once more orders the Commanding Admiral, Norway to close the Trondheim Fjord hermetically against enemy submarines and light naval forces.

Situation 30 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

North Atlantic:

3 British destroyers, among them the LOOKOUT, entered Ponta Delgada on 28 Mar.

Indian Ocean:

The Italian Consul in Lourenco Marques reported that there are 4 British cruisers and 4 submarines in Durban. According to the radio intercept service, the Norwegian steamer THORDES reported a suspicious vessel 500 miles south of Bombay. Another QQQ signal was intercepted from a Danish ship in the Mozambique Strait.

Pacific Ocean:

According to press reports, the U.S. has taken over 3 modern airfields at unnamed spots on the Mexican coast.

2. Own Situation:

Radiogram 2132 contains felicitations of the Commander in Chief, Navy to ship "10" on the occasion of her first success.

The Japanese Navy has acknowledged receipt of the information that the operations area of German auxiliary cruisers is south of 10° S and west of 80° E. Since Japanese submarines are to operate in this area beginning with the middle of April, the Japanese Navy asks through the Naval Attache, Tokyo for detailed information on German operational plans, and promises to supply similar information concerning Japanese submarine operations.

There are no objections against handing over prisoners to ships en route to Japan and routing prizes to Japan. Permission is given to overhaul German auxiliary cruisers in Japanese shipyards, and an attempt will be made to make a similar arrangement for shipyards in conquered territory.

The Attache is asked to inform the Japanese Navy that it is impossible to transmit detailed operations plans, since the auxiliary cruisers must have freedom of operations in the area assigned, and furthermore supply steamers must be stationed in areas where the weather is favorable. Therefore the Naval Staff suggests that Japanese submarines should be used to supplement the auxiliary cruiser operations only north of 10° S and east of 80° E. In case the Japanese Navy insists on operations in a larger area, the Naval Staff suggests that Japanese submarines operate in a 300 mile strip along the coasts of Africa and Madagascar, which the German auxiliary cruisers would avoid.

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The Naval Staff expects good results from auxiliary cruiser operations in the Indian Ocean in the operations area agreed upon, supplementing operations of the Japanese Navy in the northern Indian Ocean. If the operations area is limited because of submarines, the auxiliary cruisers could not operate successfully. The Naval Attache, Tokyo is informed to this effect, and is directed to call the attention of the Japanese Navy to possible operations in the Arabian Sea, since these would affect supplies to the Russian front.

The Japanese Attache in Berlin has been informed of the above.

For copy of telegrams to and from the Naval Attache, Tokyo see 1/Skl 7401/42 Gkdos. and 7501/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

The Naval Attache, Tokyo is informed for his own information in connection with the voyage of a Japanese submarine to Germany that ship "10", the REGENSBURG, and the TANNENFELS are en route to the Indian Ocean, and ship "28" is en route to the South Atlantic. Since supply steamers are stationed in these waters, and also blockade-runners are en route, probably the Japanese submarine will have to be asked not to attack any ships during the greater part of her voyage. The Japanese Naval Attache at Berlin has been informed. For copy of the telegram see 1/Skl I opa 7480/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. I.

Another telegram orders the Naval Attache, Tokyo to have the Japanese submarine coming to Germany take along the following raw materials:

- | | | |
|----|---|------------|
| a. | Mica | 40 tons |
| b. | Industrial Diamonds
(300,000 carats) | 70 kg. |
| c. | Molybdenum | 35 tons or |
| | Ferro-Molybdenum | 55 tons |
| d. | Shellac | 20 tons or |
| | Stick lac | 30 tons |
| e. | Platinum | 100 kg. |
| f. | Quinine base or | |
| | Quinine sulphate or | |
| | Quinine hydrochloride | 15 tons |
| g. | Iodine | 5 tons |

The items are listed approximately in the order of importance. The entire cargo space should be utilized fully. If the cargo space has been overestimated the quantities should be reduced equally. If one of the items cannot be obtained the others should be increased correspondingly in equal amounts. Platinum and industrial diamonds are to be given preference.

The Naval Attache should ask the Japanese Navy to help in obtaining the raw materials, pointing out that the German Navy will deliver equipment. Payment will be worked out with the Wohltat delegation.

The raw materials have been requested by the War Economy and Armaments

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Division of the Armed Forces High Command. The Economics Ministry and the Japanese Naval Attache in Berlin have been informed.

For copy see 1/Skl I opa 7500/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IX.

Radiogram 1417 informs the RIO GRANDE about the German submarine which is to meet her at point "Rotfeder" and escort her home, and about sailing instructions.

Information on the enemy situation was sent via Radiogram 1849.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing to report.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

See 1/Skl 7466/42 Gkdos. in file "British Landing at St. Nazaire on 28 Mar. 1942" for the answers by the Commanding Admiral, France to the following questions of the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command transmitted via the Commanding General, Armed Forces West and Group West:

a. How was it possible to get through the net barrage?

b. Are there barrages at other submarine bases, and if so what kind?

The Commanding Admiral, France, who went to St. Nazaire on 30 Mar., made a preliminary report to Group West, the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, the Naval High Command, the Admiral, Channel Coast, and Fuehrer Headquarters to the effect that it is necessary to reinforce the land and coastal defenses, air reconnaissance, and naval security forces. For copy see 1/Skl 7471/42 Gkdos. in War Diary files. The Naval Staff transmits to the Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command and the Army High Command the personal report of the Commanding Admiral, France concerning the security measures in effect at the time of the British raid, the successful defense, the information obtained so far, and measures already put into effect. For copy of the report see 1/Skl I West 7497/42 Gkdos. in the War Diary file.

This report of the Commanding Admiral confirms fully the impression received from the first reports that defenses against the enemy attack functioned excellently. Absolutely no negligence or fault of command authorities can be found. The success achieved by the enemy was slight, that of our defenses great. The fact that the enemy could make a surprise attack that penetrated so deeply into our coastal defenses is simply due to the lack of naval and air forces and other defense equipment. This lack has been pointed out often enough, and the Navy is not in a position to eliminate it as things stand at present.

All the more surprising, therefore is the letter which Field Marshal Keitel sent to Field Marshal Rundstedt, according to which the Fuehrer is demanding an investigation to establish who was responsible for the fact that the enemy ships were able to pass unnoticed the defense instal-

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lations and barrages, and which inquires whether court-martial proceedings have been or will be instigated against the responsible commander.

On the basis of the report of the Commanding Admiral, Group West, the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, who together with the former is going to inspect St. Nazaire on 31 Mar., in the meantime reported to the Chief, of Staff, Armed Forces High Command that in his opinion it is not necessary to instigate proceedings against anyone. It seems to him that adequate defense is impossible in view of the Navy's shortage of reconnaissance and defense equipment, as is the situation with the Army and the Air Force likewise. Moreover, he stated that command at St. Nazaire during the defense operation was in order. The Chief, Naval Staff is informed about this exchange of telegrams between the Armed Forces High Command and the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West through copies transmitted by Group West, to which Field Marshal Rundstedt had added the following questions, stating explicitly that he had been instructed to do so:

- a. What kinds of naval reconnaissance, defense, and barrage equipment would have been suitable to prevent the enemy vessels from entering?
- b. What equipment of this type was available, and what was lacking?
- c. Why was this equipment not available?
- d. Was such equipment requested? Who requested it, and who turned down the request?
- e. If the equipment was not requested, why? Who would have been responsible for requesting it?

For copy of the telegram, see 1/Skl 7525/42 Gkdos. in the War Diary file.

The Chief, Naval Staff must understand the above order and questions of the Armed Forces High Command as an indirect attack on his own person. He is disagreeably surprised by the procedure adopted by Field Marshal Keitel, and is not going to accept the situation without action.

According to a report from Group West, the small lock in St. Nazaire next to the Normandy lock was damaged, evidently by a delayed explosion at the outer gate, in the late afternoon. Evidently this explosion caused shooting to break out, the origin of which has so far not been determined, and which lasted until 2100. The Army has declared a state of siege for St. Nazaire, and a state of emergency for Nantes. All was quiet at St. Nazaire by midnight. The Commanding Admiral, France ordered increased readiness for the entire area, since it seemed not entirely out of the question that the new fighting in St. Nazaire might be a signal for the outbreak of disturbances in the interior.

Channel Coast:

During the night of 29 Mar. the 4th PT Boat Flotilla laid mines according to plan along the convoy route. For brief report see Telegram 1100. The vessels were able to evade British patrol vessels, which were using German recognition signals.

During the night of 30 Mar., the 2nd PT Boat Flotilla laid mines north of Cromer.

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By telegram Group West requests that the 5th Torpedo Boat Flotilla be left in the west area until the ice situation permits it to undertake shooting practice at Flensburg and that at that time the Naval Staff, and not the Torpedo Inspectorate, recall the flotilla.

With regard to the 3 Dutch gunboats, only 2 of which are so far in service, while the 3rd will follow in May 1942, the Naval Staff decides that these vessels are to remain at the disposal of Group North for the time being in order to be used for convoy and anti-submarine operations in Norway in view of their range and equipment. See 1/Skl I op 5708/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA for copy of the telegram to Groups West and North, as well as information sent to the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division, with the remark that the Commander in Chief, Navy wishes to have the 3 gunboats placed under the administrative command of the Commanding Admiral, Norway, and also the memorandum of the Naval Staff Operations Division which led to this decision.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

Enemy Situation:

Some air reconnaissance during the day, more in the evening, concentrating on the west coast of Norway. According to the radio intercept service of the Air Force, there was lively convoy activity on the southeast and east coasts.

Own Situation:

The mine operation in the Hoofden has gotten under way according to plan. Convoy traffic proceeded without special incidents.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

The convoy reported on 29 Mar. consisting of 25 steamers headed for Ireland was located again by reconnaissance planes of the 5th Air Force at noon.

In the Arctic Ocean, reconnaissance planes sighted 2 destroyers and 2 steamers on westerly course at 1707 about 40 miles north of Kildin.

4 German submarines located convoy PQ 13 in the course of the afternoon north of Teriberski, and maintained contact up to 10 miles from the coast.

Own Situation:

See preliminary short battle report based on the oral statements of the commander of destroyer Z "25" and the 1st officer of destroyer Z "26" for the experiences of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla on 29 Mar.

On the evening of 28 Mar. the flotilla picked up 61 survivors of a steamer sunk by the Air Force shortly before, thus confirming this first success against convoy PQ 13. On 29 Mar. between 0145 and 0155 it sank the steamer BATEAU of 10,000 GRT by gunfire and 1 torpedo. The ship was proceeding with 18 other steamers from New York via Reykjavik

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and was loaded with tanks and ammunition. 7 survivors of 5 different nationalities were captured. After submarine U "376" reported the position of the convoy at 0600 in quadrant AC 5720, with the escorts to the south, the flotilla hauled off to the northwest in order to attack from the north. During low visibility and snow flurries, destroyer Z "26" located a target by radar, and at 0948 encountered an enemy cruiser of the City Class, which opened fire at a distance of 3,000 to 4,000 meters and shot a 6-fan. Z "26" was severely hit at once by gunfire, but outmaneuvered the torpedoes. Z "24" shot a 7-fan at the cruiser; probably 1 of the torpedoes hit the target. Destroyers Z "24" and Z "25" lost contact with Z "26" in the snow flurries while the latter was outmaneuvering the torpedoes. Subsequently Z "26" had further encounters with 1 large and later 1 smaller enemy destroyer, and suffered additional damage as well as heavy casualties. The intention to break through to Honningsvaag could not be carried out. At 1125 Z "24" and "25" reestablished contact with their hard-pressed flotilla leader, chased off the enemy destroyer by gunfire, and took aboard 88 survivors, 7 of them officers including the flotilla commander and the captain, as well as 23 dead, before Z "26" sank. 8 more members of the crew were picked up by submarine U "376". According to statements of prisoners, convoy PQ 13 was escorted by 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers. These were later joined by 4 destroyers from Murmansk, according to air reconnaissance. Destroyers Z "25" and "24" returned to Kirkenes at 1915 on 29 Mar., without further encounters.

For copy of the report see 1/Skl 7467/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIa.

Group North was able to report further successes by submarines on the evening of 30 Mar. In the course of the morning submarine U "376" torpedoed 1 tanker (5,000 GRT) from the convoy, U "435" a tanker of 6,000 GRT, and U "456" a steamer of unknown size. The 3 successful submarines, as well as submarine U "454", which once more located the enemy in the afternoon without being able to attack, reported effective defense by the destroyers and depth bombs. For details see Submarine Situation.

Thus 5 enemy ships in all, carrying most valuable war materiel, were sunk in cooperation between the destroyers, submarines, and Air Force. However this success does not make up for the loss of Z "26" with a large part of her crew, especially unfortunate considering the few destroyers available. We are forced, ungratifying as this step may be, to hold back our few surface forces even more during conditions such as prevailed in this case, when due to the weather there was no air reconnaissance and it was impossible to gain an absolutely clear picture of the number of enemy forces and their positions. Furthermore the fact that the enemy cruiser immediately had the range of our destroyer is remarkable and needs explanation. Evidently the cruiser made the very best possible use of her radar equipment.

According to the situation report of the Commanding Admiral, Norway, minesweeper M "5608" sank following an explosion the evening of 29 Mar. during minesweeping operations in the entrance of Petsamo Fjord. 8 men are missing. In the night of 28 Mar. enemy planes dropped 3 torpedo-like missiles with parachutes, one of which exploded on land. On 30 Mar. an enemy plane strafed a convoy off Felestein.

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea1. Enemy Situation:

After evaluation of the aerial photographs of 19 Mar., the 1st Air Force reported as follows on the probable combat readiness of the Russian Baltic Sea fleet:

a. On the OKTYABRSKAYA REVOLUTSIYA there is a roof over the bow, which permits the assumption that the forward triple turret is not yet repaired.

b. The bow of the KIROV is evidently entirely repaired. 3 torpedo boats and 36 submarines were seen on the same photograph.

c. The forward and aft 20.3 cm. turrets on the ex-LUETZOW are evidently ready for combat. The two high turrets midships still have no barrels.

2. Own Situation:

The remaining part of the SCHLESSEN convoy has been freed from the ice. Transports according to plan.

The Admiral, Baltic Countries has refused to agree to the request of the 26th Army High Command for the 531st Naval Coastal Artillery Battalion, since the Battalion is urgently needed at other sectors of the Eastern Front, considering the intended occupation of the islands, and since other orders have been issued. (See Telegram 1305.)

The 531st Naval Coastal Artillery Battalion is absolutely not equal to heavy commitment on the Eastern Front, and such commitment thus cannot be justified.

In agreement with plans of the Northern Army Group and with the view-point of the Admiral, Baltic Countries, Group North thinks it operationally important to capture the Finnish islands during the ice period, considering the time after the ice has thawed for cutting off the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. (See Telegram 1525.)

The Naval Staff is of the same opinion.

V. Submarine Warfare1. Enemy Situation:

An SSS signal from an unidentified steamer was intercepted from 40 miles northeast of Cape Hatteras. The U.S. steamer MANA (3,283 GRT) in the Arctic Ocean reported a submarine attack at 1025 approximately 190 miles north of Kanin Nos.

2. Own Situation:

For operation against convoy PQ 13 see Situation Norway and the supplementary situation report in War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV. In the same place are reports of German submarines in the North, West, and South Atlantic. No reports were received from the West Indies and the Mediterranean.

VI. Aerial Warfare1. British Isles and Vicinity:

The 3rd Air Force reports that a transport vessel of undetermined size was sunk on 28 Mar. 120 miles west of St. Nazaire. The 3rd Air Force assumes that she was a De Gaulle ship.

For reconnaissance reports see Enemy Situation North Sea and Norway.

10 planes flew reconnaissance missions during the night of 30 Mar. for Group North. There were 2 enemy incursions in the same night into Reich territory as far as Warsaw and Radom and 17 incursions into the Aalesund-Trondheim area. 24 bombs were dropped.

The Air Force Operations Staff ordered the He 115 planes of the 2nd Squadron of Group 906 withdrawn. Thus the forces remaining at the disposal of the Air Commander, Atlantic are as follows:

The 3rd Reconnaissance Squadron (Ju 88) of Group 120 in Lannion
The 5th Squadron (Arado 196) of Group 196 in Hourtin and Brest
Group 106 (Ju 88) in Dinart (St. Malo)
2 squadrons (FW 200) of Group 40, III Bomber Wing in Rennes, with Bordeaux as jumping off place.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

No special reports from the Commanding General, Armed Forces, South.

3. Eastern Front:

1 vessel, evidently a submarine tender, was sunk during an attack on Novorossisk on 28 Mar. On 29 Mar. a 4,000 GRT steamer was damaged by aerial torpedo and beached in the Novorossisk area.

Air reconnaissance over Kerch, Novorossisk, Tuapse, Poti, and Batum on 28 Mar. did not obtain any additional information.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean1. Enemy Situation:

Task Force H returned to Gibraltar from the east.

Air reconnaissance sighted a cruiser on a westerly course evidently coming from Malta in the central Mediterranean 50 miles off Cape de Garde.

No enemy reports were received from the eastern Mediterranean. At 0445 Alexandria sounded a submarine warning for the area 80 miles northwest of the harbor.

2. Situation Italy:

An enemy submarine sank steamer GALILEA (8,040 GRT) with approximately 1,000 men and equipment of the Julia Division at 2350 on 28 Mar. off Antipalos from a convoy en route from Patras to Brindisi.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

No special incidents.

According to a report from the German General at Rome to the Army High Command, it is the aim of the Italian Deputy for Construction to increase the unloading capacity of Benghazi to 3,500 tons per day, permitting 7 ships to be handled simultaneously. The necessary installations were to be completed by June. However, this will probably not be possible, since the necessary building material and unloading equipment cannot be delivered in time because of the transport situation. In Derna, only 2 motor sailing vessels can dock at the present time. By building a suspension bridge to a ship sunk in the harbor the unloading capacity can be increased.

4. Area Naval Group South:Aegean Sea:

Nothing special to report.

Black Sea:Enemy Situation:

According to aerial photographs of the main harbors on 28 Mar., the total of merchant ships is estimated at 1,400,000 GRT, and tankers roughly at 30,000 GRT.

Own Situation:

No special incidents.

Since the entire 601st Naval Coastal Artillery Battalion is needed for the defense of the Crimea, Group South reports that the 1st Panzer Army (Von Kleist) and Naval Shore Command Ukraine need one naval coastal artillery battalion without guns, but with all other equipment, to occupy guns at important points along the Sea of Azov between Berdyansk and Taganrog; at the very least, however, a cadre of artillerists with training in the use of these guns. (See Telegram 2040.)

The Naval Staff Quartermaster Division will handle the matter.

VIII. Situation East Asia

The Military Attache at Bangkok confirmed on 28 Mar. that Tongoo was taken. In order to incite local revolts, the Japanese dropped propaganda troops by parachute behind the enemy lines.

Both sides launched air attacks in the South Sea Islands. The white population of Port Moresby has been evacuated.

According to the Naval Attache in Tokyo, approximately 8 Russian steamers were stopped and released after search by the Japanese between Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk between 3 and 15 Mar. The cargoes consisted mainly of coal.

IX. Army Situation1. Russian Front:Southern Army Group:

There were strong enemy attacks only west of Slavyansk, which had to be broken off after heavy losses.

Central Army Group:

Northwest of Yukhnov an enemy attack in regimental strength broke through our line. Fighting was especially violent near Yelnya, where both sides suffered heavy losses. The enemy once more unsuccessfully attacked the former point of penetration northwest of Rzhev in a front 17 km. wide, after a strong preliminary artillery barrage. Enemy paratroopers landed southeast of Nevel.

Northern Army Group:

The commander in chief of the enemy's northwest front has personally taken over command in the sector opposite the Von Seydlitz Group, and therefore stubborn resistance may be expected. The Von Seydlitz Group was able to advance the southern wing several kilometers east across the Redvya River into wooded terrain. The northern wing is ready for a new attack. Further large-scale combat activity took place near Yamno, Maluksa and Lyuban.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

There was local fighting on the northeast front (Army Command, Lapland) at the northern wing of the Loukhi sector and in the Kandalaksha sector.

3. North Africa:

During the night of 29 Mar. enemy planes made low-level attacks on the bases south of Tmimi. No losses.

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Items of Political Importance

India:

According to the first reports about the reaction to the Cripps proposals, the Congress Party objects decidedly to the intended solution of the Moslem question. Gandhi is also supposed to have protested sharply. An explanatory radio address by Cripps brought no new viewpoints.

Turkey:

The Foreign Office is of the opinion that the winter campaign in Russia is practically ended without having brought the Russians the strategical success they desired. The disappointment in Moscow is said to be great.

The constant Russian advance into Iran and her plans for setting up an independent Kurd or even Iranian Soviet republic have caused great anxiety in important circles in Ankara, and have injured perceptibly the prestige of Great Britain, which country is said to be unable to prevent this development, so detrimental to Turkey.

U.S.A.:

At the opening session of the Pan-American Defense Committee, Knox stated that the measure most urgently needed is control and protection of inter-American shipping against enemy submarines. It must be expected that naval operations will extend to the South Atlantic and the Central Pacific. The U.S. Chief of Staff Marshall stated that all forces will be concentrated in the near future for an important offensive.

The Americans claim that the U.S. is producing more merchant ships and tankers than all of the rest of the world together. Instead of the 45 shipyards with 170 slipways as in 1941, at present there are 64 shipyards with 480 slipways in operation. At the present time 2 ships are being finished each day, and soon there will be 3. By the end of 1943, not 18,000,000 but 20,000,000 to 22,000,000 tons will have been built.

The Pacific War Council will meet in Washington for the first time on 1 Apr., and representatives of Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Britain, and the U.S. will participate. Roosevelt stated that the Council in Washington will work in close contact with the corresponding organization in London.

According to a report from a diplomatic source, production in the U.S.A. is greatly hampered through a shortage of raw materials and labor. Therefore it has been ordered to channel all raw materials into immediate war production for the next 6 months, and to postpone the planned expansion of armament factories.

The Chief, Naval Staff is on an official visit to Wilhelmshaven, and is therefore not in Berlin.

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Situation 31 Mar. 1942

I. War in Foreign Waters

1. Enemy Situation:

South Atlantic:

According to an agent report of 18 Mar. from Freetown, no U.S. troops had arrived by that date. However, 4 ships with war materiel had arrived; part of the cargo is being stored, and part is being sent on to the Sudan for De Gaulle. There were 1 U.S. gunboat, 2 destroyers, and the cruiser CINCINNATI in Freetown. A convoy was expected from South America, which was to proceed from Freetown escorted by the DAUNTLESS and the CHARYBDIS.

According to a report from the Japanese Naval Staff, the disposition of the U.S. Fleet was unchanged on 24 Mar. Only in South Africa there are now 2 light U.S. cruisers instead of 1. So far heavy cruiser INDIANAPOLIS and light cruiser BROOKLYN had been reported in Durban.

2. Own Situation:

Radiograms 1742 and 2047 contain sailing instructions for the TANNENFELS and the REGENSBURG for their voyage to the Indian Ocean, and information to this effect to ship "10".

Radiograms 0347 and 0052 inform all ships in foreign waters about the positions of the RIO GRANDE and the FUSIJAMA according to dead reckoning, as well as about ships sighted during the voyage of the OSORNO. Radiogram 1448 contains information about the position of the Swedish Red Cross ship SICILIA at 40° N, 73° W on 27 Mar., and about the return of Italian citizens from Italian East Africa, with the approval of Britain, on the Italian ships SATURNIO, VULCANIA, DUILIO, and GUILIO CESARE, including markings agreed upon. These ships will leave Italy via the Atlantic for Jibuti between 2 and 9 Apr., and will be refueled by tankers ARCOLA and TAIGETE, which are lying ready in the Canary Islands. German ships have been informed not to molest these ships. Their routes will be made known later.

Information on the enemy situation was sent by Radiograms 0501, 0713, and 2154.

For material for a conference with the Japanese Liaison Officer at the Naval Staff on 31 Mar. concerning operations of German auxiliary cruisers and Japanese submarines in the Indian Ocean (see War Diary 30 Mar.) see 1/Skl I opa 7619/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. XV.

II. Situation West Area

1. Enemy Situation:

Nothing special to report.

2. Own Situation:

Atlantic Coast:

7 ground mines were swept off Lorient since 13 Mar. by Ju 52's.

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In St. Nazaire a British weapons cache was discovered on 30 Mar. according to a report from the Admiral, Western France. So far 80 civilians have been arrested in connection with the shooting of 30 Mar. and a number of persons have been shot following court martial proceedings. The Army is in charge of quelling the disturbances. At 0300 everything was under control. The incidents of 30 Mar. at St. Nazaire have not affected submarine warfare.

The damaged tankers PASSAT and SCHLETTSTADT are blocked in the Normandie lock. 3 officers, among them the captain of the SCHLETTSTADT, and 39 men are missing from the 2 tankers.

More detailed reports must be awaited.

After the return of the Chief, Naval Staff from Wilhelmshaven, the Naval Staff submitted to him the draft of a letter to be sent to the Armed Forces High Command. For copy see file "British Landing at St. Nazaire on 28 Mar. 1942".

Channel Coast:

The 2nd PT Boat Flotilla carried out its mining mission according to plan during the night of 30 Mar. For brief report see Telegram 1330.

Special Item:

The Armed Forces High Command Operations Staff sent the following directive to the Naval High Command, the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West, and the Commander in Chief, Air, concerning the Naval Fortress Brigade: "The figures given by the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West (see War Diary 29 Mar.) may serve as a basis for organizing the brigade. The units of the Naval Brigade are to be assigned the moment they are set up." This directive caused Army Group D under the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West to ask the Naval High Command to keep the Commanding General, Armed Forces, West informed about the progress made in organizing the Naval Brigade, as well as its availability. The 7th Army is to report as soon as possible where the first forces becoming available are to be assigned.

Considering that the organization has hardly gotten under way, and moreover it is unclear where the minimum of 140 officers needed will be taken from at all, the above orders seem altogether premature. The Naval Staff cannot help feeling that they also were occasioned by the case of nerves prevailing at the Armed Forces High Command. At any rate the Naval Staff Quartermaster Division has been striving for days to make the necessary preparations to provide the personnel and equipment for the brigade.

III. North Sea, Norway, Arctic Ocean

1. North Sea:

The 1st Minesweeper Flotilla carried out mining operation "Kaiser" in the Hoofden area.

Mine detonating vessel "150" ran onto a wreck off Hook of Holland, and

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was towed into port after losing both propellers.

Escort and convoy service according to plan.

2. Norway:

Enemy Situation:

According to the radio intercept service, the ILLUSTRIOUS was at sea northwest of northern Scotland at noon on 29 Mar. The radio intercept service located a British vessel 120 miles southwest of Bergen in the afternoon of 31 Mar. Air reconnaissance located 18 steamers totalling 80,000 to 100,000 GRT, 1 cruiser, and 4 destroyers in Murmansk and the harbors north of there at 0600. At 1640 seven steamers were spotted in Polyarnoye.

Own Situation:

The operation against the convoy was concluded at 1200. Destroyer Z "24" will probably need 6 days overhaul; destroyer Z "25" is on 6 hour readiness.

The Admiral, Arctic Ocean reports, in addition to the earlier battle report of the 8th Destroyer Flotilla, that in addition to the torpedo hit also a gun hit was scored on the enemy cruiser of the City or FIJI class. Also 2 of the enemy destroyers last engaged by destroyer Z "26" were damaged by gunfire (see Telegram 0200).

For commendation by the Commanding Admiral, Group North of the forces involved in the operation against convoy PQ 13 see 1/Skl 7596/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA.

See 1/Skl 7586/42 Gkdos. in War Diary, Part C, Vol. IIA for the Naval Staff directive to the Commanding Admiral, Norway in accordance with the order of the Chief, Naval Staff concerning the hermetical sealing of the Trondheim Fjord against the possible entry of enemy PT boats, submarines, and other enemy naval weapons.

Group North agrees to the transfer of the Frohavet barrage as requested by the Fleet. The Group feels that if the barrage is laid at a depth of 14 or 15 meters the risk involved for our heavy ships is very slight. The Group therefore requests the approval of the Naval Staff. (See Telegram 0025.)

According to a report from the Admiral, Arctic Coast, the objects dropped by parachute at Petsamo on 28 Mar. (see War Diary 30 Mar.) were torpedoes, 4 of which exploded at the coast of the inner fjord without causing damage. The 5th torpedo was a dud.

During minesweeping in the Karm Sound, mine detonating vessel "138" was slightly damaged by an exploding mine. Karm Sound will remain closed for the time being.

During the night of 30 Mar., 15 enemy land-based bombers attacked the coastal area between Aalesund and Smøla, as well as the Trondheim area. 2 of the planes were shot down at Agdenes. In the opinion of the Admiral, North Norwegian Coast, they had no definite target. According to a brief report of the Commanding Admiral, Battleships, the planes repeatedly flew over the berths of the ships at low altitude. Parts of a flare fell on one of the ships in the Faetten Fjord. 1 bomb was seen to drop in the Lo Fjord north of the ship berths. The Commanding Admiral, Battleships stresses once more the necessity of reinforcing the

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anti-aircraft defenses of Trondheim. (See Telegram 1210.)

IV. Skagerrak, Baltic Sea Entrances, Baltic Sea

1. Enemy Situation:

According to an intelligence report all Norwegian ships in Goeteborg have been ready to sail since 2200 on 29 Mar. They are to proceed within Swedish territorial waters as far as the latitude of Stroemstad. It is assumed that British ships are waiting to meet them in the western Skagerrak.

2. Own Situation:

8 patrol vessels are stationed in a patrol line between Skagen and Stroemstad, and 2 in the gap in the minefield at Kristiansand South. Air reconnaissance had to be cancelled because of the weather.

The 6th transport group Hamburg - Oslo left with 4 steamers at 2000. 2 ships are carrying 835 men on leave from Hirtshals to Kristiansand South.

The Swedish Navy is making available an icebreaker for 2 days for use in the Oslo Fjord.

Group North orders that the GNEISENAU be transferred on 4 Apr. from Kiel to Gdynia with the aid of icebreakers SCHLESSEN and CASTOR, and from there to Swinemunde by icebreaker STETTIN. The Commander, Minesweepers, Baltic Sea is to be in charge of the operation. After the transfer of the GNEISENAU, the CASTOR is to proceed to Libau, to be at the disposal of the Admiral, Baltic Countries for the Riga operation. (See Telegram 1958.)

The Operations Staff, Armed Forces High Command orders that German Summer Time remain effective for German units in northern Finland. German Armed Forces offices which are subject to Finnish time (e.g., Liaison Staff North, 163rd Infantry Division) are to report according to German time when communicating with German offices. (See Telegram 2130.)

V. Submarine Warfare

1. Enemy Situation:

Radio intelligence intercepted messages about submarines sighted off the U.S. east coast, among them one from the British steamer SARPEDON (11,321 GRT).

A drifting mine was reported 40 miles north of Cape Hatteras. British destroyer ROXBOROUGH was ordered on 29 Mar. to go to the aid of British steamer HERTFORD (11,785 GRT), which was torpedoed 225 miles south of Halifax. Tankers PENNSYLVANIA SUN, DELAWARE SUN, and MERCURY SUN were ordered to proceed to the nearest harbor before noon of 31 Mar.

In the West Indies a submarine warning was sounded by the British Admiralty for the Florida Strait. A U.S. tanker, the T.C.McCOBB (7,452

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GRT), which was fired upon by an Italian submarine, sent an SOS signal from 400 miles northeast of Cape Orange.

In the Mediterranean a report of a British plane about a supposed depth charge hit scored on a submarine 22 miles northeast of Algiers was intercepted. No German submarine can be involved.

2. Own Situation:

Submarine operations against convoy PQ 13 have been concluded. 3 submarines were assigned stations outside of Kola Bay for the purpose of intercepting possible stragglers of the convoy which has made port in the meantime.

For supplementary report on the situation see War Diary, Part B, Vol. IV.

VI. Aerial Warfare

1. British Isles and Vicinity:

Fighter bombers attacked Paignton harbor at 1445. 2 SC 250 hits were scored on a 3,000 GRT steamer.

During the night of 31 Mar., only 2 enemy planes flew into the Rhine valley. Bombs were dropped over Holland.

2. Mediterranean Theater:

Considerable forces attacked Malta airfields during the day and in the evening. 2 enemy fighter planes were shot down. The Air Commander, Africa attacked the desert railroad and the Gambut airfield.

3. Eastern Front:

On 30 Mar. a 6,000 GRT steamer was seriously damaged by a bomb attack in the Arctic Ocean west of Kildin Island. Harbor installations of Murmansk were attacked at 1700, and hits were observed on buildings and tracks.

VII. Warfare in the Mediterranean

1. Enemy Situation:

No special reports have come in from the western and central Mediterranean.

At 0855 German air reconnaissance located 8 merchant vessels and 3 destroyers on westerly course off Alexandria.

The British Admiralty announced the loss of the cruiser NAIAD. The cruiser was last seen in the eastern Mediterranean. Possibly this is a success of submarine U "565", which heard sinking noises after hitting a cruiser twice some time ago.

2. Situation Italy:

Enemy planes attacked Benghazi during the night of 30 Mar.

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without causing important damage.

3. Transport of Supplies to North Africa:

The 6th transport group has not as yet gotten under way. An enemy submarine sank steamer BOSFORO (3,600 GRT) at 0125 24 miles west of Navarino on her return voyage to Benghazi.

Tanker SATURNO and steamer ARGENTEA arrived in Tripoli.

Coastal traffic proceeded without incidents.

4. Area Naval Group South:

Aegean Sea:

Enemy Situation:

According to a report from the Italian Navy, 3 cruisers of the NIGERIA class arrived in Larnaca on 23 Mar. British vessels from Karavastisi are mining territorial waters in the Aegean Sea at night, especially off Rodi. 1 minelayer is operating in the Polis zone in the Krisoku Bay. On 22 Mar. 2 steamers unloaded heavy war materiel in Limasol. (See Telegram 1945.)

This information is important for the planned submarine operations in the eastern Mediterranean.

No other reports of importance are available from the area of Naval Group South.

Turkey:

According to the Naval Attache at Istanbul, the 2nd of the destroyers built by Britain, the DEMIRHISSAR, arrived at Alexandretta on 30 Mar. and was handed over to Turkey.

VIII. Situation East Asia

Nothing to report.

IX. Army Situation

1. Russian Front:

Southern Army Group:

Enemy attacks in the Slavyansk area continued without success. On the southern front of the 6th Army the enemy attacked between Balakleya and the outermost part of the southern wing. He succeeded only in advancing to the northern bank of the Donyets west of Balakleya. West of Kharkov the enemy was pushed eastward back across the Donyets.

Central Army Group:

A German advance east of Bolkhov was successful. The enemy

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withdrew northeast across the Susha. Lively fighting in the area of Sukhinichi. North of the Gzhatsk - Mozhaisk highway an enemy surprise penetration was successful. The position changed hands several times. At the penetration point northwest of Rzhev only weak enemy forces attacked today. At the western front of the 4th Army, 35 enemy bunkers were taken in a German advance at Sychevka. The enemy blocked the supply route in front of Byeloi.

Northern Army Group:

The Von Seydlitz Group broadened its bridgehead across the Redvya River. The enemy withdrew southward on the southern wing of the Staraya Russa position. Newly brought up German troops have been thrown into the breach at Maluksa.

2. Finnish and Norwegian Front:

Enemy forces in battalion strength were encircled on the southeastern front at Rugozero, but they were able to break out later toward the east, with the help of reinforcements from the outside.

3. North Africa:

Nothing to report.

GLOSSARY

Aida

Code name for the planned capture of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

Bantos A

Code name for a mine field laid northeast of Rybachí Peninsula.

Eisenbahn

Code name for transfer of the HIPPER from Germany to Trondheim in March 1942.

Etappe

Secret German naval organization for providing German naval units with information and supplies from foreign bases. Etappe Japan was of great importance for German blockade-running activities.

Fab XI

A combination magnetic and acoustic firing device for mines.

Felix

Cover name for a proposed operation involving the conquest of Gibraltar and the establishment of German naval bases on the Canary Islands and at selected points along the Spanish coast.

Fussweg

Route for German blockade-runners and prizes. The following points were along this route:

Koenigsberg	-	52° 27' S, 93° 41' W
Dinkelsbuehl	-	38° 30' N, 150° 00' W
Chemnitz	-	42° 00' N, 180° 00' W
Oppeln	-	34° 00' N, 139° 50' W

Isabella

Cover name for defense measures to be taken in the event of an Allied invasion of Spain.

Kopenhagen

Mine laying mission of the German supply ship and blockade-runner DOGGERBANK in the Capetown area.

Kuesel Minefield I

A minefield blocking the western navigation channel of the entrance to the White Sea. The mined area was rectangular and its boundaries were approximately the following: 67° 30' N; 67° 25' N; 41° 32' E; 41° 09' E.

Maastricht

German reference and rendezvous point located at 39° S, 44° W.

Metalle area

Area between 22° and 30° S, 70° and 85° E. The following reference points were in this area:

Eisen	-	22° S, 85° E
Messing	-	23° S, 80° E
Kupfer	-	25° S, 75° E
Mangan	-	26° S, 80° E

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Nickel - 27° S, 85° E
Wolfram - 28.5° S, 79° E

News Analysis "Foreign Navies" (Nachrichtenauswertung "Fremde Marinen")
A daily analysis of foreign newspaper reports concerning foreign naval news, compiled by the Naval Staff Intelligence Division (3/Skl).

Ostseekrabbe

German reference point located at 42° 05' N, 38° 40' W.

Pfanne

German reference point located at 41° 30' N, 36° 20' W.

Political Review (Politische Uebersicht)

A daily review of political developments abroad published by the Naval Staff Intelligence Division (3/Skl).

PQ

Designation of convoys proceeding eastward from the United Kingdom to northern Russia.

QP

Designation of convoys returning to the United Kingdom from northern Russia.

QQQ signal

Distress signal sent by ship when sighting or under attack by armed raider. QQQ was also used when suspicious merchant vessels were sighted.

Rack mine, type A

The German SMA mine. A moored influence mine laid by a specially constructed minelaying submarine. Its charge weighed approximately 350 kilograms. This mine was designed for waters of 50 m. to 300 m. depth.

Rossauge

Must refer to reference point "Rosskaefer" mentioned in the operations order of the RIO GRANDE. "Rossauge" is probably a confusion between "Rosskaefer" and "Rotaug". Point "Rosskaefer" was located at 43° 48' N, 7° 52' W.

Rotaug

German reference point at 47° 20' N, 20° 00' W.

Rotfeder

German reference point at 38° 30' N, 37° 30' W.

SMA mine

Rack mine, type A. A moored influence mine laid by a specially constructed minelaying submarine. Its charge weighed 350 kilograms. This mine was designed for waters of 50 m. to 300 m. depth.

Todt Organization (O.T.)

A construction organization (named for the founder), which built the German superhighways, the Westwall, and the Atlantic fortifications. It employed domestic and foreign labor on military projects both in Germany and in the occupied countries.

Type VII C

A 500 ton sea-going submarine. It was 67.1 meters (221.43 ft.)

in length, had diesel-electric propulsion, and was armed with 4 bow tubes and one stern tube.

Type X B

A 1600 ton minelaying submarine. It was 89.8 m. (296.34 ft.) in length and had normal diesel-electric propulsion. It was equipped with 30 mine shafts and two stern torpedo tubes.

Route "Gelb"

Route taken by German vessels to Japan, via Indian Ocean and Sunda Strait. The points touched on this route are given below, with their usual designations. On occasion the designations for these points were changed.

1.	"Duesseldorf"	-	24° 00' S, 99° 00' E
2.	"Dahlem"	-	Sunda Strait
3.	"Danzig"	-	09° 15' N, 110° 30' E
4.	"Darmstadt"	-	20° 50' N, 120° 00' E
5.	"Duisburg"	-	26° 00' N, 128° 40' E
6.	"Doeberitz"	-	34° 00' N, 139° 50' E

By an order dated April 13, 1942 the points on route "Gelb" were renamed for blockade-runners as follows:

1.	Rose
2.	Lilie
3.	Tulpe
4.	Reseda
5.	Narzisse
6.	Loewenzahn

Route "Lila"

A German shipping route to the west of route "Rosa", branching off the latter near Ostend and rejoining it near Calais.

Route "Rollbahn"

This route touched the following points:

Saale	-	24° 00' S, 99° 00' E
Altmuehl	-	Sunda Strait
Regen	-	09° 15' N, 110° 30' E
Hunte	-	20° 50' N, 120° 00' E
Persante	-	26° 00' N, 128° 40' E
Neckar	-	34° 00' N, 139° 50' E

Route "Rosa"

German shipping route along the western coast of France.

Route Uhunest

A German shipping route out of St. Nazaire. It ran from point N I (47° 07' N, 20° 36' W) to point 34 U (46° 50' N, 20° 37' W) thence in a 211° direction via point Uhu (46° 05' N, 30° 18' W) to 45° 38' N, 30° 41' W.

SC bombs

Thin-shell high explosive bombs.

Sportpalast

Code name for the transfer of the SCHEER, and PRINZ EUGEN, to Norway 21-23 Feb. Originally the GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST were to participate in this operation.

SS priority

S (Sonderstufe), priority; SS, preferential priority; SSD, emergency.

SSS signal

Distress signal sent when sighting or under attack by a submarine; could also indicate being damaged by a mine.

Suedsee

Cover name for a planned voyage of German steamers to and from Japan along the northern coast of Russia and Siberia. The German auxiliary cruiser KOMET (ship "45") sailed this route in 1940 with Russian cooperation (operation "Gruen").

